STATE OF GUJARAT & Anr. v. GU.JARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCIATION & Anr.
Case at a glance
Provisions considered
- Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act, 1957
- Constitution of India arts. 226, 227, 233, 234, 236
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ss. 195, 480, 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 ss. 193, 219, 228
- Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948
- Bombay Revenue G Tribunal Act, 1939
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 O. 47 r. 1
- Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946
- Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
- Bombay Civil Courts Act, 1869
- Constitutional Amendment Act, 1976
- Disputes Act, 1947
- Gujarat Agriculture and Land Ceiling Act, 1961
- Gujarat Private Forest Act
Judgment
and are kept within the framework of powers conferred A upon them. Such revisional powers have to be exercised sparingly, only as a discretion in order to prevent gross injustice and the same cannot be claimed, as a matter of rtght by any party. Even if the person heading the Tribunal is otherwise a "judicial officer", .he, may merely B be persona designata, but not a ~ourt, despite the fact that he is expected to act in a quasi-judicial manner. In the generic sense, a court is also a Tribunal. However, courts are only such Tribunals as have been created by the concerned statute and belong to the judicial department c of the State as opposed to the executive branch of the said State. The expression 'court' is understood in the context of its normally accepted connotation, as an adjudicating body, which performs the judfcial functions of rendering definitive judgments having a sense of 0 finality and authoritativeness to bind the parties litigating before it. Secondly, it must be in the course of exercise of the sovereign judicial__power transferred to it by the State. Any Tribunal or acrthority therefore, that possesses these attributes, may be categorized as a court. [Para 9] [834-H; 835-A-H] E
1.3. Tribunals have primarily been constituted to deal with cases under special laws, and to hence provide for specialised adjudication alongside the courts. Therefore, a particular Act/set of .Rules will determine whether the F functions of a particular Tribunal are akin to those of the courts, which provide for the basic administration of justice. Where there is a Us between two' contesting parties and a statutory authority is required to decide such dispute between them, such an authority may be G called as a quasi-judicial authority, i.e., a situation where, (a) a statutory authority is empowered under a statute to do any act (b) the order of such auttiority would adversely affect the subject and (c) although there is no tis or two contending parties, and the contest is between H 820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 10 S.C.R. A B the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is a quasi judicial decision. An authority may be described as a quasi-judicial authority when it possesses certain attributes or trappings of a 'court', but not all. In case certain powers under C.P.C. or Cr.P.C. have been conferred upon an authority, but it has not been entrusted with the judicial powers of the State, it cannot be held to be a court. [Para 1 O] [836-A-E] c The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. The Employees of Bharat Bank & Anr. AIR 1950 SC 188: 1950 SCR 459; Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1956 SC 153: 1955 SCR 1013; Engineering Mazdoor Sabha & Anr. v. Hind Cycles Ltd. AIR 1963 SC 874: 1963 Suppl. SCR 625; D Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma & Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1595: 1965 SCR 366; Ramrao & Anr. v. Narayan & Anr. AIR 1969 SC 724: 1969 (3) SCR 185; State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. v. Raja Mahendra Pal & Anr. AIR 1999 SC 1786: 1999 (2) SCR 323; Keshab Narayan E Banerjee v. State of Bihar & Ors. AIR 2000 SC 485: 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 394; Indian National Congress (/) v. Institute of Social Welfare & Ors. AIR 2002 SC 2158: 2002 (3) SCR 1040; K. Shamrao & Ors. v. Assistant Charity Commissioner (2003) 3 SCC 563: 2003 (2) SCR 523; Trans Mediterranean F Airways v. Universal Exports (2011) 10 SCC 316: 2011 (14) SCR 47; Namit Sharma v. Union of India JT 2012 (9) SC 166 and Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjunwala & Ors. AIR 1961 SC 1669: 1962 SCR 339 - relied on. G Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1931) A.C. 275 - referred to.
2.1. The present case is also required to be examined in the context of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, with specific reference to the 42nd Constitutional H STATE OF GUJARAT v. GUJARAT REVENUE TRIBUNAL BAR ASSOCN. 821 Amendment Act 1976, where the expression 'court' stood A by itself, and not in juxtaposition with the other expression used therein, namely, 'Tribunal'. The power of the High Court of judicial superintendence over the Tribunals, under the amended Article 227 stood obliterated. By way of the amendment in the sub-article, B the words, "and Tribunals" stood deleted, and the words "subject to its appellate jurisdiction" have been substituted, after the words, "all courts". In other words, this amendment purports to take away the High Court's power of superintendence over Tribunals. Moreover, the c High Court's power has been restricted to have judicial superintendence only over the judgments of inferior courts, i.e. judgments in cases where against the same, appeal or revision lies with the High Court. A question does arise as regards whether the expression 'courts' as it appears in the amended Article 227, is confined only to the regular civil or criminal courts that have been constituted under the hierarchy of courts and whether all Tribunals have in fact been excluded from the purview of the High Court's superintendence. Undoubtedly, all courts are Tribunals but all Tribunals are not courts. [Para 12) [838-C-G] E 0
2.2. The High Court's power of judicial superintendence, even under the amended provisions of Article 227 is applicable, provided that two conditions are F fulfilled; firstly, that such Tribunal, body or authority must perform judicial functions of rendering definitive judgments having finality, which bind the parties in respect of their rights, in the exercise of the sovereign judicial power transferred to it by the State, and secondly, G that such Tribunal, body or authority must be subject to the High Court's appellate or revisional jurisdiction. [Para 13) [838-H; 839-A-B]
#3. A person holds 'judicial office' if he is performing H 822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 10 S.C.R. A judicial functions. The scheme of Chapters V and VI of the Constitution deal with judicial office and judicial service. The expression, 'judicial office' in the generic sense, may include a wide variety of offices which are connected with the administration of justice in one way 8 or another. The holder of a judicial office under Article 217(2)(a), means a person who exercises only judicial functions, determines cases inter-se parties, and renders decisions in purely judicial capacity. 'Judicial office' means a subsisting office with a substantive position, C which has an existence independence from its holder. [Paras 18, 19] [840-E-F; 841-A-C] Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb & Ors. AIR 1968 SC 1495: 1968 SCR 614 - followed. D Shri Kumar Padma Prasad v. Union of India & Ors. (1992) 2 sec 428: 1992 (2) SCR 109 - relied on.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.