BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD v. CHEMBUR SERVICE STATION

of this part of the order which was not in challenge in that A proceeding. As far as the other part of the Appellate Bench, protecting the possession of the respondent was concerned, the same was in challenge only before the other Single Judge in the Writ Petition at the instance of the appellant. In that petition the Single Judge has .held B that the pendency of the proceeding in the Civil Court would not preclude the appellant from taking steps in accordance with due process of law, which according to the Single Judge was taking steps under the Public Premises Act, if permissible. [Paras 25 and 26] [668-C-H; c 689-A]

1.2. Even if the respondent is an agent of the appellant, the fact remains that he is in occupation of the concerned premises consisting of the rooms and the structures of the RPO situated on the particular plot of D land since 1.4.1972. The appellant has authorized the respondent to be in occupation of this RPO by virtue of the dealership agreement between the parties. The respondent is not a trespasser. [Para 27] [689-B-C] E

1.3. No fault can be found with the impugned order passed by the Single Judge viz. that it would be open to the respondent to take steps in accordance with the Public Premises Act which would be the due process of law, and not by any force. The termination of the F dealership agreement by the appellant would render the occupation of the premises by the respondent to be unauthorised one and it would be open to the respondent to take further steps to. take possession thereof though only in accordance with the due process G of law. This much minimum protection has to be read into the relationship created between the parties under the . clauses of the agreement. Besides, an opportunity of being heard in a situation which affects the civil rights of an individual has to be implied from the nature of the H 644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R. A functions to be performed by the public authority which has the power to take punitive or the damaging actions. [Para 29] [690-H; 691-A-C]

1.4. By no stretch of imagination the respondent can 8 be called a trespasser into the concerned premises. The respondents have been permitted to occupy the premises under the dealership agreement and have been so occupying it under the agreement with the appellant since 1st April 1972. A submission coming from a public C authority in this fashion is totally unacceptable and deserves to be rejected. [Para 30] [692-B-C]

1.5. In the instant case, the respondents are occupying the premises, may be as an agent of the appellant, right from the 1st April 1972. The respondent D has moved the Court of Small Causes for the declaration and has obtained an order of status-quo. That order presently survives and is not set aside though the Single Judge has observed in the impugned order that the order of status-quo would operate only till the competent E authority passes the order of eviction. The respondents have not challenged this order either by filing a Special Leave Petition or by filing any cross objections in the instant appeal, and therefore, it binds them. In the circumstances of the instant case, the Single Judge F permitted the appellant to proceed against the respondent under the Public Premises Act on the footing - that after the termination of the dealership agreement the occupation would be unauthorized. He has rightly observed that the pendency of the proceeding in the Civil G Court cannot preclude the appellant from taking recourse to recovery of the possession of the suit premises by following due process of law including by resorting to action under the provisions of Public Premises Act, if permissible. However, it is made clear that in any case H possession cannot be obtained by force. There is no BHARAT PETROLEUM CORP. LTD. v. CHEM BUR 645 SERVICE STATION reason for this Court to take any different view. The A respondent has to be afforded an opportunity of being heard, may be in the forum of the appellant, and only after obtaining an order from the competent authority the '· respondent can be evicted. [Para 34] [694-8-G] B

1.6. In the facts of the instant case, amongst others the respondent had raised the issue with respect to the nature of his licence to remain on the premises, and had also sought the protection which was available to the licencee in occupation of the premises prior to 1.2.1973. C Whether the respondent was right in that contention or not is not for this Court to determine. It is for the appropriate authority to decide. That is· the minimum opportunity which would be required to be provided to the respondent in the facts of the instant case, when he is in occupation of the concerned premises for nearly 40 D years. Even on the footing of being an agent, apart from the right to receive the compensation in a situation which could be placed under Section 205 of the Contract Act, the agent also has the right to remain on the property of the principal under Section 221 of the Contract Act, for E the reliefs which are available under that Section if he makes out such a case. Furthermore, the respondent has placed his case on a higher pedestal, but even on the basis that he is a mere agent, he does have certain rights under Sections 205 and 221 of the Contract Act. Thus, it F .,, cannot be said that the respondent does not deserve even an opportunity of being heard. What are the relevant terms of the agreement between the parties, what is their true connotation and what order could be obtained by the appellant against the respondent, or what relief at the G highest the respondent would be entitled to, would have to be considered and decided before an appropriate forum. [Para 35] [695-C-H]

1.7. All throughout the respondent contended that H 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 3 S.C.R. A they have been in exclusive possession of the premises · concerned, and all the employees on the premises are that of the respondent. In the third suit filed in the City Civil Court, the respondent has specifically pleaded that the termination of the licence was without any reasons B and was contrary to public policy, and was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The respondent has specifically submitted that a technical fault in the machine cannot amount to manipulation and that apart it was not a case of adulteration. All these submissions c of the respondent require a determination. An opportunity of being heard is something minimum in the circumstances. The proceedings before the authority under the Public Premises Act are an expeditious proceeding and that is something minimum in the circumstances. A Public Corporation, from which a higher standard is expected, cannot refuse to follow this much minimum due process of law. [Para 36] [696-A-C F] 0

1.8. There is no reason to interfere with the order E passed by the Single Judge. However, the observations made are for the purpose of deciding the correctness or otherwise of the impugned order passed by the Single Judge and not on the merit of the rival claims. In the event, the appellant takes the steps under the Public F Premises Act, it would be open to the respondent to plead · their case before the competent authority on all counts, though it would also be open to the concerned competent authority to take its own decision on the merits of the rival contention on facts as well as on law. [Para 37] [696- G G-H; 697-A] ORDER Leave granted. In view of the divergence in views, the Registry is directed c to place the matter before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for placing the matter before a larger Bench. N.J. Matter referred to larger Bench.