UNION OF INDIA v. RABINDER SINGH

The first respondent was deployed as Commanding Officer of the 6 Armoured Regiment in the C Indian Army. The unit was authorized for one signal special vehicle. In case such a vehicle was not held by the unit it was authorized to modify one vehicle with ad hoc special finances for which it was authorized to claim amount. D It is the case of the appellant that the respondent proceeded to order modification of some 65 vehicles in two lots, first 43 and thereafter 22 and he countersigned bills, and claimed and received an amount of Rs.77,692/ E - by preferring four different claims, though not a single vehicle came to be modified; that no such items necessary for modification were purchased, but fictitious documents and pre-receipted bills were procured; and that though, the counter-foils of the cheques showed the F names of some vendors, the amount was withdrawn by the respondent himself. This led to the conducting of the Court of Inquiry to collect evidence and to make a report. On conclusion of the inquiry, disciplinary action was directed against the G respondent. Thereafter, the case against the respondent was remanded for trial by a General Court Martial. General Court Martial found him guilty and awarded punishment of R.I. for one year and cashiering. The respondent filed writ petition which was dismissed by a H UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY MINISTRY 795 OF DEFENCE v. RABINDER SINGH Single Judge· of the High Court but appeal therefrom was A allowed by the Division Bench leading to the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.

The Division Bench of the High Court held B that the only allegation leveled against the first respondent was that he had countersigned the contingent bills for claiming the cost of modifications of the vehicles, but there was no charge of wrongful gain against him. The Division Bench ignored the fact that this C countersigning led to withdrawal of an amount of Rs.77,692/- by the respondent for certain purchases which were neither authorized nor effected. The fact that the respondent had countersigned the contingent bills was never in dispute. The appellant placed on record the D necessary documentary a·nd oral evidence in support of the charges during the course of the enquiry which was conducted as per the provisions of the Army Act. The enquiry records showed that these amounts were supposed to have been paid to some shops but, in fact, E no such purchases were effected. The respondent could not give any explanation which could be accepted. The Division Bench clearly erred in ignoring this material evidence on record which clearly shows that the Army did suffer wrongful loss. [Para 14] [804-F-H; 805-A-B] F

1.

The text of the charges clearly mention that the respondent claimed advance for 43 vehicles initially and then 22 vehicles subsequently by countersigning the contingent bills knowing fully well that his Regiment was not authorized to claim such grants. Thus, the charges G are very clear, and the respondent cannot take advantage of Rule 30(4) and Rule 42(b), in any manner whatsoever. The Army had led additional evidence to ·prove that the amount was supposed to have been passed on to H 796 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A certain shops but the necessary purchases were in fact not made. There was economic loss suffered by Army, since an amount was allegedly expended for certain purchases when the said purchases were not authorized. Besides, the expenditure which was supposed to have B been incurred for purchasing the necessary items was; in fact found to have been not incurred for that purpose. There was a complete non-utilisation of amount for the purpose for which it was claimed to have been sought. The evidence brought on record is sufficient enough to c come to the conclusion that there was deceit and injury. Therefore, it was clear that Section 52 (f) of the Act would get attracted since the respondent had acted with intent to defraud. (Paras 16, 17] (806-C-E; 807-B-D]

1.

The two parts of Section 52 (f) are disjunctive, D which can also be seen from the fact that there is a comma and the conjunction 'or' between the two parts of this sub-section, viz (i) does any other thing with intend to defraud and (ii) to cause wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person. If the legislature E wanted both these parts to be read together, it would have used the conjunction 'and'. The appellants had charged the respondents for acting with 'intent to defraud', and therefore it was not ne~essary for the appellants to refer to the second part of Section 52 (f) in the charge. (Para 17] (807-E-H] F

1.

The respondent had full opportunity to defend. All the procedures and steps at various levels, as required by the Army Act were followed and it is, G thereafter only that the respondent was cashiered and sentenced to R.I. for one year. There was no allegation of malafide intention. Assuming that the charge of wrongful gain to the respondent was not specifically averred in the charges, the accused clearly understood H the charge of 'intent to defraud' and he defended the UNION OF INDIA THROUGH ITS SECRETARY MINISTRY 797 OF DEFENCE v. RABINDER SINGH same. He fully participated in the proceedings and there A was no violation of any procedural provision causing him prejudice. The Courts are not expected to interfere in such situations. The armed forces are known for their integrity and reputation. The senior officers of the Armed Forces are expected to be men of integrity and character. B When any such charge is proved against a senior officer, the reputation of the Army also gets affected. Therefore, any officer indulging into such acts could no longer be retained in the services of the Army, and the order passed by the General Court Martial could not be faulted. [Para c 18] [808·A·D]

1.

The Single Judge was right in passing the order whereby he declined to interfere into the decision rendered by the General Court Martial. There was no reason for the Division Bench to interfere in that order in D an intra-Court appeal. The order of the Single Judge in no way could be said to be contrary to law or perverse. On the other hand, the Division Bench clearly erred in exercising its appellate power when there was no occasion or reason to exercise the same. In the E circumstances, the order passed by the Division Bench is set aside, and the one passed by the Single Judge is confirmed. Consequently, the Writ Petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed. [Paras 19, 20] [a08-E-G]