LAUT KUMAR MODI v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA & Ors.

The first respondent-society (BCCI) organized a cricket competition (IPL), and the petitioner, a member of first respondent, was appointed as the incharge Chairman thereof. The rights for telecasting of the cricket C games were auctioned by the first respondent. The first respondent received a complaint from a bidder alleging breach of confidentiality against the petitioner. The petitioner was suspended from his position and was served with show cause notices. The petitioner denied D the allegations and also wrote to 'M', the Honorary President of the first respondent requesting him to recuse himself from the decision making process in the interest of fairness. Consequently, 'M' recused himself from the Disciplinary Committee of respondent no.1, which was to E decide upon the show cause notices and one 'J' was appointed in his place. F The petitioner thereafter filed a Writ Petition raised two objections. The first ground of objection was that the Disciplinary Committee was not validly constituted and that since the President of BCCI had recused himself from the Committee, the Disciplinary Committee was· required to either wait until the next President was elected so that the committee was reconstituted after including the new President therein, or if the Committee was to G consist of three persons other than the President, it should consist of persons who were unbiased and acceptable to the petitioner. The second objection was that the members of the Committee suffered from an institutional bias and that the petitioner could not expect fairplay from the members who were already party to the H decision to initiate the disciplinary action against the LAUT KUMAR MODI v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 1007 CRICKET IN INDIA AND ORS. petitioner. This Writ Petition was dismissed. The High A Court held that the substitution of the President by 'J' was acceptable on the basis of the doctrine of necessity and also repelled the argument with respect to bias. It further held that in case the petitioner had any grievance against the functioning of any of the members of the B Committee, he may apply to the Committee that such a member may recuse himself from the Committee. Subsequently, the petitioner applied to the Committee members that they should all recuse themselves from functioning as members of the Disciplinary Committee. c The Committee rejected the application. It led to the filing of a second Writ Petition by the petitioner before another bench of the High Court. That petition also came to be dismissed. Meanwhile, the first respondent extended the term of D the Disciplinary Committee for continuing with the enquiry against the petitioner. The Petitioner challenged the extension granted to the Committee, but the challenge was negated by a different bench of the High Court. All the said three orders passed by the different E benches of the High Court were challenged in the instant petitions. Dismissing the petitions, the Court HELD: 1.1. The objection of the petitioner to the F forming of the Disciplinary Committee was on the basis of Rule 1 (q) of the Board of Control for Cricket in India. This rule states that the Board shall at every Annual General Meeting appoint a Committee consisting of three persons. The President shall be one of them and the function of the Committee is to inquire into and deal with G the matters relating to any acts of misconduct etc. In view of the wording of this rule, there is no difficulty in accepting that normally the President has to be one of the members of this Committee. The question is with respect to the necessity arising on account of the H 1008 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. A President being unavailable in a situation like the present one. [Para 27) [1024-H; 1025-A·B] • 0

1.2. In the instant case the petitioner himself had objected to the President being the member of the Committee. That being the position, the President B recused himself from the Committee. When a situation thus arises, in view of the objection of the petitioner, the society cannot be left without a remedy. The rule does not say that if the President cannot be a member of the Committee no substitution shall take place, nor does it c say that the substituting member should be one not objected by the delinquent against whom the enquiry is proposed. A member of the society having accepted the rules, agrees to the disciplinary authority of the three member Committee which is to be constituted under these rules. He cannot claim a right to dictate as to who should be the members of the Committee. Any such interpretation will lead to a situation that the delinquent will decide as to who should be the members of the Disciplinary Committee. Such a submission cannot be accepted. The rule is elastic enough, and in an E appropriate situation the word 'shall' can be read as 'may'. It is very clear that, normally the President shall be a member of three Member Committee, but if for any reason his presence on the Committee is objected to on grounds of unfairness, and he recuses himself therefrom, the respondent no.1 certainly has the power to substitute him by some other person. The action of the respondents is sought to be defended on the basis of necessity. The doctrine of necessity is a common law doctrine, and is applied to tide over the situations where G there are difficulties. Law does not contemplate a vacuum, and a solution has to be found out rather than allowing the problem to boll over. Otherwise, one will have to wait for one more year for a new President to be elected, which submission cannot be accepted. [Para 30) [1026-G-H; 1027-A·FJ F H LALIT KUMAR MODI v. BOARD OF CONTROL FOR 1009 CRICKET IN INDIA AND ORS.

1.3. As far as the disciplinary actions by societies A and associations are concerned, many of the societies under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act and similar State Acts, are smaller societies. It is another matter that the first respondent society is a large body having large resources. If the members or the Managing 8 Committee of a Society receive a complaint of any misconduct on the part of any of its office bearers, surely the subject is expected to be taken up in the General Body Meeting of the Society. These societies are expected to sort out the future course of action with respect to such allegations on their OV'!"n on the basis of their internal C disciplinary mechanism. Merely because all the members of a society have participated in the discussion concerning such allegation, the Society can't be expected to appoint an outsider to hold the disciplinary proceeding. lt may not be financially possible as well for D such small societies. That apart, only a prima facie opinion is formed in such meetings. Merely because a member has participated in such a meeting he cannot be accused of bias to disentitle him from being appointed 1 on the Disciplinary Committee. [Para 31] [1027-G-H; 1028- E A-C]

1.4. A mere apprehension of bias cannot be a ground for interference. There must exist a real danger of bias. Though such domestic inquiries have undoubtedly to be fair, a member of a society cannot stretch the principle F of fairness to the extent of demanding a tribunal consisting of outsiders, on the basis that the society members are biased against him. In the instant case, the petitioner has, in clear terms stated that he was not making any personal allegations against two members of G the Disciplinary Committee, .viz. 'J' and 'S'. Even the grievance against the third member 'A' cannot be said to be well founded. The petitioner was a!Yeging institutional bias against the members of the Com'mittee, which was only on the basis of their participation in the meetings of H 1010 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 8 A the first respondent society. In this way, institutional bias can be alleged against every member of the Governing Council of IPL and the General Body of the first respondent which cannot be accepted. The petitioner may have an apprehension, but it is not possible to say from the material on record that he was facing a real danger of bias. One cannot presume that the three member committee will not afford the petitioner a fair hearing, or that it will not render unbiased findings. Taking a view as canvassed by the petitioner will lead to a C demand for interference in the enquiries conducted by all other societies in such situations, and that cannot be approved. This is apart from the view taken by this Court, that the Committee was validly constituted under Rule 1(q) in view of the necessity arising due to the recusal of the President of BCCI from the Committee. Similarly, there D was no error in the order of the Disciplinary Committee declining to recuse, or the decision of the Annual General Meeting of the first respondent to extend the term of this Disciplinary Committee for the inquiry against the petitioner. [Paras 32, 33] [1028-E-H; 1029-A-E] E M.P. Special Police Establishment v. State of MP.; 2004 (8) SCC 788: 2004 (5) Suppl. SCR 1020 - followed. State of U.P. v. Manbodhan Lal AIR 1957 SC 912: 1958 SCR 533 and State of A.P. and another v. Dr. Rahimuddin