COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD & Anr.
Case Details
Acts & Sections
Automec Sri v. Commission of the European Communities (1990) ECR 11-00367 - referred to. 8 C 0
1.6 The Tribunal was not right in holding that the use of the words 'any' and 'or' were the expressions of wide magnitude and that 'any' being an adjective qualifies the E nouns under the relevant provisions, i.e. directions, decisions and orders, all were appealable without exception. The expression 'any', in fact, qualifies each of the three expressions 'direction issued or decision made or order passed'. It cannot be said that it signifies any one F of them and, particularly, only 'direction issued'. All these words have been used by the legislature consciously and with a purpose. It has provided for complete mechanism ensuring their implementation under the provisions of the Act. [para 39-40) [169-A-D]
1.7 The provisions of s.26 and 53A of the Act clearly depict the legislative intent that the framers never desired that all orders, directions and decisions should be appealable to the Tribunal. Under s.26(1) the Commission G H COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA v. STEEL AUTHORITY OF INDIA LTD. 119 is expected to make a decision by formation of a prima A facie opinion and issue a direction to cause an investigation to be made by the Director General and after receiving the report has to take a final view in terms of s.26(6) and, even otherwise, it has the discretion to form an opinion and even close a case u/s 26(2). Having B enacted these provisions, the legislature, in its wisdom, made only the order u/s 26(2) and 26(6) appea!able u/s 53A of the Act. Thus, it specifically excludes the opinion/ decision of the authority u/s 26(1 rand even an order passed u/s 26(7) directing further inquiry, from being c appealable before the Tribunal. Therefore, it wbuld neither be permissible nor advisable to make these provisions appealable against the legislative mandate. [para 40] [169-C-F] D
1.8 Expressum facit cessare taciturn - Express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of other. (Expression precludes implication). This doctrine has been applied by this Court in various cases to enunciate the principle that expression precludes implication. The first and primary rule of construction is that intention of E the legislature is to be found in the words used by the legislature itself. The true or legal meaning of an enactment is derived by construing the meaning of the word in the light of the discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which F an enactment is directed. It is always important for the court to keep in mind the purpose which lies behind the statute while interpreting the statutory provisions. The appropriate interpretation of s.53A(1 )(a) would be t~at no other direction, decision or order of the Commission is G appealable except those expressly stated in it. The maxim est boni judicis ampliare justiciam, non-jurisdictionem finds application here. [para 42-44] [170-B-E; 171-A,-C] Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 (2) Suppl'. : ' , H 120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2010] 11 S.C.R.