P.K. PALANISAMY v. N. ARUMUGHAM & Anr.

A by a suitor liberally. If court fees are not available in a sub-treasury for one reason or the other, the court having regard to the maxim 'lex non cogit ad impossibilia" would not reject such a prayer. Payment of court fees furthermore is a matter between the State and the suitor. Indisputably, in the event a plaint is rejected, the defendant would be benefited thereby, but if an objection is to be raised in that behalf or an application is to be entertained by the court at the behest of a defendant for rejection of the plaint in terms of Order VII rule 11 (c) CPC, C several aspects of the matter are required to be considered. Once an application under Section 149 is allowed, Order VII Rule 11 (c) of Code would have no application. It is for that additional reason, the orders extending the time to deposit deficit court fee should have been challenged. Filing of an application fol'.' rejection of plaint in a case of this nature as also having ~egard to the events which have taken place subs·equent to registration of the suit appears to be mala fide. If the trial judge did not entertain the said plea, the High Court · should not have interfered therewith. [Para 8] [344-F-H; 0 1 E 345-A-D]

#3. The respondents in their written statement did not raise any issue with regard to the correctness or otherwise of the orders dated 7th October, 1998, 8th F November 1998, 20th November, 1998 and 21st January, 1999. Rightly or wrongly, the plaint was accepted. The deficit court fee was paid. The court was satisfied with regard to the bona fide of the plaintiff. Hearing of the suit proceeded; not only issues were framed but the G witnesses on behalf of the parties were also examined by both the parties. It is difficult to believe that from 10th January 2001 to 4th January 2008, the respondents or their counsel did not have any occasion to inspect the records. Any counsel worth itself would not only do so H but even without doing so would address himself a ~ ~ I /lo .>. 'I - -+- ~ ... -<( P.K. PALANISAMY v. N. ARUMUGHAM &ANR. 345 question as to why a suit filed on 4th October 1998 was A entertained in the year 2000. The suit was at one point of time decreed ex parte. The same was set aside on certain conditions. Evidently, the conditions laid down were satisfied only upon obtaining an extension of time. [Para 9] [355-D-G] B K. Natarajan vs. P.K. Rajasekaran (2003) 2 M.L.J. 305; Ramiah & Anr. vs.R. Palaniappan & Ors. (2007) 5 MLJ 559; S. V. Arjunaraja vs.P. Vasantha 2005 (5) CTC 401 and V.N. Subramaniyam vs. A. Nawab John & Ors. (2007) 1 MLJ 669, c referred to.

#4. The Code does not envisage a situation where the civil court could hear a defendant before registering a plaint. When a suit is filed, the Civil Court is bound by the procedures laid down in the Code. The defendant upon D appearing, however, in certain situations, may question the orders passed by the Civil Court at a later stage. [Para 10] [356-C] E

#5. Indisputably, the -courts were required to assign reasons in support of their orders. Had the validity and/ or legality of those orders been challenged before an appropriate court, it would have been possible by the plaintiffs to contend that the defendants had waived their right by their subsequent conduct and they would be deemed to have accepted the same. Even on later F occasion, the courts would assign reasons upon satisfying itself once over again. If an order has been passed without hearing the one side, he may be heard but by reason thereof, the plaint would not be rejected outrightly. Before doing so, the applications of the plaintiff under Section 149 have to be· rejected. [Para 11] [356-D- F] G Buta Singh (Def!_d) By LRs. v. Union of India (1995) 5 sec 284, referred to. H 346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 11 S.C.R. A

#6. It is now a well settled principle of law that an order passed by a court having jurisdiction shall remain valid unless it is set aside. [Para 12) [357-D-E] ''t' Baljinder Singh v. Rattan Singh (2008) 11 SCALE 198, B relied on State of Kera/a v. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 906, referred to. "" )< c E

#7. Section 149 provides that where the whole or any part of court fee prescribed for any document has not been paid, the court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part as the case may be, of such court fee, ~nd D upon such payment, the document in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such court fee had .been paid in the first instance. Section 148 CPC is a general provision and Section 149 thereof is special. The first application should have been filed in terms of Section 149 CPC. Once the court granted time for payment of deficit court fee within the period specified therefor, it would have been possible to extend the same by the court in exercise of its power under Section 148 CPC. Only because a wrong provision was mentioned by the appellant, the same by itself would not be a ground to hold that the application was not maintainable or that the order passed thereon would be a nullity. IHs a well settled principle of law that mentioning of a wrong provision or non-mentioning of a provision does not invalidate an order if the court and/or statutory authority had the requisite jurisdiction therefor. [Paras 13 and 16] [306-D-G; 359-C-D] F G

#8. An application for rejection of the plaint was filed only in the year 2008. Evidently, that was not the stage H ~ )>.. "~ P.K. PALANISAMY v. N. ARUMUGHAM &ANR. 347 for entertaining the application. Order VII rule 11(c) CPC A could not have been invoked at that point of time. [Para 14] (360-E] ~ ~ ~ ' . .._ Mahasay Ganesh Prasad Ray & Anr. v. Narendra Nath Sen & Ors. AIR 1953 SC 431; Mahanth RamDas v. Ganga Das AIR 1961 SC 882; Mannan Lal v. Mst. Chhotaka Bibi (Dead) by LRs. B. ShardaShankar & Ors. (1970) 1 SCC (2005) 13 sec 769; Ganapathy Hegde v. Krishnakudva 539; K. C. Skaria v. Govt. of State of Kera/a & Anr. (2006) 2 sec 285, relied on.