DAYA NANO v. STATE OF HARYANA

A deceased. Appellant fired a shot, which hit the deceased resulting in bleeding injury. PW5 and PW6, brothers of the deceased, had taken the victim to a hospital, where he was declared dead. On the basis of an information received from the hospital, an FIR was recorded by the B Police and after investigation of the case, charge sheet was filed against the accused appellant u/s.302 IPC and s. 27 of the Arms Act and against his father u/s.302 r/w s.34 IPC. Trial Court found the prosecution evidence cogent and credible as against the appellant and C accordingly convicted him for committing the offence of murder punishable u/s. 302 IPC and sentenced him accordingly but found the evidence as against father of the appellant insufficient, and acquitted him. Appeal filed thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence the present appeal. 0 Appellant contended that s.302 IPC has no application in the facts and circumstances Of the case. Partly allowing the appeal, the Court E HELD: 1.1 'Culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of murder is culpable homicide not amounting to murder'. For the purpose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic F offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in s.300 IPC as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable G homicide of the second degree'. This is punishable under the first part of s.304 IPC. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the lowest type of culpable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three H grades. Cul.pable homicide of this degree is punishable t-" DAYA NANO v. STATE OF HARYANA 1045 under the second part of s.304 IPC. (Para - 10) [1050-E, A F & G]

1.2 The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Ss. 299 and 300 IPC. (Para - 11) [1050-H; 1051-A & B]

1.3 For cases to fall within clause (3) of s.300 IPC, it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. (Para - 14) [1053-D & E] B c 0 Rajwant and Anr. vs. State of Kera/a, AIR (1966) SC 1874 - relied on.

1.4 Under clause thirdly of s.300 IPC, culpable E homicide is murder, if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. According to the G rule laid down by this Court in Virsa Singh's case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the infliction of a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would not be murder. H F ... -+ -v t~ +' ' 1' • 1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 5 S.C.R. A Illustration (c) appended to S. 300 clearly brings out this point. (Paras - 18 & 19) [1055-C, D, E & F] Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab AIR (1958) SC 465 - relied on. B

1.5 Clause (c) of s.299 and clause (4) of s.300 IPC both require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that c clause (4) of s.300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of a person or persons in general as distinguished from a particular person or persons - being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to a practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury. (Para""'.' 20) [1055-G & H; 1056-A & B] 0 E