K.L.E. SOCEITY AND ORS. v. SIDDALi NG ESH

Respondent was appointed as a peon with the appellant-society. He filed a petition in terms of s. 33 (C) F (2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 stating that lesser amounts were paid to him and his signatures were taken for higher amounts. After his retirement he filed a complaint against the society and its Principal and Secretary alleging· commission of offence punishable u/ss. 403, 405 G and 415 r/w s. 34 IPC. He stated in the complaint that he was given to understand by the appellants that certain amounts were being deducted for repayment at the time of retirement. Judicial Magistrate took cognizance and 783 H 784 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 3 S.C.R. issued pr.ocess. Appellants filed application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings and the complaint. High Court dismissed the application. Hence the present appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court A B HELD: 1. The complaint was nothing but an abuse of the process of law. High Court came to the conclusion that deductions were made without any rhyme and reason and without any basis. That was not the case of the c complainant. On the other hand, it tried to make out a case that the deduction was made with an object. That obviously, was the foundation to substantiate claim of entrustment. On a close reading of the ·complaint it is clear that the ingredients of Sections 403, 405 and 415 do not exist. The statement made in the complaint runs contrary to the averments made in the petition in terms of Section 33-(C) (2). [Paras 7 and 12) [795-C, D; 790-A, BJ D E

2.1 Exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in a case of the nature where quashing of criminal proceeding is sought, is the exception and not the rule. The Section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the intierent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Cr.P.C. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction F may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. [Para 8] [790-C, D]

2.2 It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down G any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper H discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them f • ~ ( .,;-" ,; ',. ) ., , .. - , -t- - t " j. " ·"';... ' ...-- r • ;l:; ~-+ K.L.E. SOCEITY AND ORS. v. SIDDALINGESH 785' by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the A section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in B course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). [Para 8) [790·0, E, F, G] c

2.3 While exercising powers under the Section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the Section though wide, has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests D specifically laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as E to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice an_d prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds · F that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abase of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the cou"rt may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. [Para 8) [790-G; 791 ·A, B, C, DJ G

2.4 When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 H 786 SUP~EME COURT REPORTS (2008] 3 S.C.R. B A Cr.P.C., the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it, accusation WO!Jld not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private c complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. [Para 10] [792-A, B, C] D State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1) 335 ... relied on. E

2.5 Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the F issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the G proceeding at any stage. [Para 11) [793-G; 794-A, BJ t v l ~ ,.. -.I , ) ~ •""""