SUNITAJAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & Ors.

According to the appellant, she was married to respondent No.1 and remained with him for a few days. She gave birth to twins. She allegeQ that her husband and in-laws had been harassing her for demand of dowry. When the demand was not met with, her husband even assaulted her causing injury to her, torturing her physically and mentally. The appellant informed her father about the ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband and in-laws; and that her children had been taken away by them and were not allowed to see her. The appellant was again assaulted and severely beaten by her husband and was also compelled to sign a document purported to be a compromise deed between her husband and herself. She lodged a complaint in the Police Station. Respondent No.1 was called at the Police Station, he assured in writing that he would not ill treat the appellant. When respondent No.1 E was transferred from Raipur to Raigarh, appellant was allegedly not taken by respondent No.1 along with him. Later, he sent a notice through advocate to father of the appellant informing him about filing of a divorce petition. The appellant's father brought her with him. Later, the F appellant lodged First Information Report (FIR) in Women Police Station giving details about physical and mental torture meted out to her by respondent No.1 and his family members. Non-bailable warrants were issued against them. D G Respondent No.1 filed a petition for grant of bail and made a statement in the High Court that he had settled the dispute amicably with his wife and both of them had decided to live together. High Court granted bail to respondent No.1 and his parents. In the meantime, Police H 60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. -+- - A filed Challan against the respondents for committing offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506, 406 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and also under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Trial Court framed charges against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and also B against brother and sister of respondent No.1. All the accused challenged the action of framing of charge against them in the High Court by filing a Revision Petition. The High Court partly allowed the revision and quashed charges against brother and sister of c respondent No.1. The High Court, however, held that so far as other respondents were concerned, charges could not be quashed against them and dismissed the petition. Being aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the respondents approached this Court by filing a Special Leave Petition which was dismissed by this Court. Respondents then filed a petition in the High Court by invoking Section 482 of the Code, which was allowed by the High Court by quashing the proceedings. Hence, the present appeal. 0 E Appellant contended that grave and serious error has been committed by the High Court in quashing the proceedings as once the proceedings had been initiated in accordance with law and the Court was satisfied that prima facie case was made out, charges were framed and the said action was upheld by the High Court as well as by this Court, it was not open to the High Court to quash the proceedings on the ground that there was abuse of process of Court; and that the High Court has virtually reviewed its earlier order. There is no power of review in a G Court exercising criminal jurisdiction under the Code and F such order is illegal and without jurisdiction. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submitted that taking into account, overall conduct of the appellant and actions taken by her against them and in the light of subsequent H facts which were brought to the notice of the High Court, SUNITA JAIN v. PAWA.N KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 61 ._ the High Court was satisfied that it was in the interest of A justice to quash the proceedings. Such an action of the High Court cannot be said to be illegal or improper, that there was no demand of dowry raised by them and a totally false and concocted complaint was filed by the appellant against them and the High Court was convinced B that the action had been taken by the appellant to harass the respondents, therefore, the proceedings were liable to be quashed; that two children were born in 1990 but , the appellant had never taken interest in them nor even seen them since 1990. Both the children are residing with c the respondents happily; and that this Court may not exercise equitable jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution in favour of the appellant. -t Disposing of the appeal, the Court D HELD: 1.1 The High Court was wrong in quashing the proceedings. From the facts, it is clear that a complaint was lodged by the petitioner against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as also against other accused for offences punishable under Ss. 498A, 342 and 406, IPC and Ss. 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The trial Court satisfied that prima facie case was made out and accordingly charges were framed against respondent Nos. 1 to 3 as well as against other accused. In a petition challenging that action, the High Court partly allowed the petition and quashed charges against brother-in-law and sister-in-law F of the appellant but upheld the order of framing of charge against the remaining respondents. Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition. (Para - 12) [68-F-H; 69-A] E

1.2 It is clear that all the Courts including this Court were of the view that there was prima facie case for framing of charge against the respondents. (Para - 13) [69-C] G

1.3 The High Court in the impugned order noted that earlier the respondents had approached the Court against H )- ,.._ ~ " -t- ... 't f I 62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R. A framing of charge and the said action was not interfered · with even by the Supreme Court. But observing that a Court of law cannot be expected to remain a silent spectator and cannot be made a tool of gratifying personal vengeance of any party, it held that the case in hand was B a fit one to exercise inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and accordingly the proceedings were ordered to be quashed. However, after the order passed by this Court dismissing Special Leave Petition upholding framing of charge against respondent Nos. 1 to 3, the High Court c could not have exercised power under Section 482 of the Code quashing criminal proceedings initiated by the appellant. (Paras - 13 & 19) [69-G-H; 72-C-D] Madhu Limaye V. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 sec 551; G V Rao v. L.H. V Prasad & Ors., (2000) 3 SCC 693 and D B.S. Jos.1-ii & Or~. v. State of Haryana & Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 675 - relied on.

2.1 The High Court has exercised power of review not conferred by the Code on a Criminal Court. (Para - 20) [72-E] E

2.2 Section 362 Cr.P.C. makes it clear that a Court cannot alter or review its judgment or final order after it is signed except to correct clerical or arithmetical error. The scheme of the Code is clear that as a,;general rule, as soon F as the judgment is pronounced or order is made by a Court, it becomes functus officio and has no power to review, override, alter or interfere with it. (Para - 21) [72-G-H; 73-A]

2.3 No doubt, Section 362 Cr.P.C. starts with the words G. "Save as otherwise provided by this Code" .. Thus, if the Code provides for alteration, such power can be exercised. For instance, sub-section (2) of Section 127 Cr.P.C; But in absence of express power, alteration or modification of judgment or order is not permissible. ~ ...,.. .. H (Para - 22) [73-B] + >- ... SUNITA JAIN v. PAWAN KUMAR JAIN & ORS. 63

2.4 It is also well settled that power of review is not A an inherent power and must be conferred on a Court by a specific or express provision to that effect. (Para - 23) [73-C]