OF THE CITY OF NAGPUR (Civil Appeal Nos.6192-6197 of 2008) OCTOBER 22 & Ors. v. CORPN. OF THE 1093 CITY OF NAGPUR - 1 the three appeals & Ors.

1.3. The Court indisputably has all incidental pow- ers so as to enable it to proceed in accordance with law. It is, however, difficult to conceive that its jurisdiction is E plenary in nature. The jurisdiction of the civil court in terms of s.287 of the Act is barred. If the contention that the Dis- trict Judge has all the powers, whether incidental or supplemental is correct, it "is difficult to comprehend as to why the legislature has barred the jurisdiction of the F civil court. Keeping in view the nature of jurisdiction con- ferred upon the District Judge as also in view of the fact that the Civil. Court's jurisdiction has been excluded in determining the said question, the jurisdiction of the Dis- trict Judge is limited. If a jurisdiction is confined to grant of mandatory injunction, the court may in a given case also exercise its power to pass prohibitory injunction. + ~ Assuming that if an order of injunction can be passed in favour of the applicant, in a given case, it may be passed in favour of the non-applicant also. But, such a power must be exercised whether in favour of the applicant or G t-- H RIKHABSAO NATHUSAO JAIN v. CORPN. OF THE 1095 CITY OF NAGPUR & ORS. non-applicant, having regard to the scope of the limited jurisdiction to be exercised by the District Judge in terms of s.286(5) of the Act. It is, therefore, difficult to compre- hend that it has an implied power to grant mandatory in- junction and that too suo motu. [Para 22] (1108-H; 1109-A to E) A B

#2. The matter was heard and judgment was reserved by the District Judge. Respondent No. 2 did not file any application for a direction upon respondent No. 1 to con- sider his application for grant of sanction of the building plan. The District Judge passed the order suo motu. It is c one thing to say that it was done with a view to enable him to pass an appropriate order for the purpose of find- ing out as to whether the building plan conformed to the building bye-laws or not, but the court cannot shut its· eyes to the fact that respondent No. 1 found the said plan to be D defective and returned the same to the respondent No. 2 for curing the defects. [Para 23] (1109-E, F, G) - -; •• "\ -f ..... t _,

3.1. Whereas respondent No. 2 filed an application for grant of building plan on or about 10.11.1981 the same was returned in August, 1983. It appears from the records E that respondent No. 2 started constructions upon demo- lition of the old structure in July, 1983. It is one thing to say that the District Judge could direct respondent No. 1 to point out as to the provisions of the building bye-laws which are said to have been violated so as to consider the merit of the application filed by appellant but it would - be another thing to say that it had the jurisdiction to di- rect it to reconsider the matter of granting sanction of building plan without the defect pointed out by it recti- fied. Furthermore one may assum that it was within the purview of the jurisdiction of the District Judge. For the G' said purpose, the nature of implied power, which the civil court is entitled to exercise may be noticed. An implied power on the part of civil court is conceived of having regard to the interest of the parties, as for example, power to admit appeal includes power to stay or power to grant H - -T F 1096 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. A maintenance includes power to grant interim mainte- nance. The power to grant injunction is a special power which may be found to be absent in certain jurisdictions, as for example, the provisions of the Consumer Protec- tion Act. [Paras 24,25] (1109-H; 1110-A to E) t- - B c D E F G H