NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB & Ors.
Case at a glance
Outcome
Dismissed
The appeals are dismissed with aforementioned di
Provisions considered
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ss. 36, 173, 173(8), 190
- Indian Penal Code, 1860 ss. 120B, 406, 411, 420, 467, 468
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ss. 13(1)(d)(e), 13(2)
- Constitution of India arts. 20, 21, 142, 226, 227
- Police G Act s. 3
- Police Act, 1861 s. 3
- Raj Act, 1994
- Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 s. 6
- Delhi Special Policed Establishment Act, 1946 s. 6
- Treasures Act, 1972
- Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947 s. 7
Judgment
2.1 If the State has the ultimate supervisory jurisdic- tion over an investigation for an offence and if it intends to hand over a further investigation even after filing of the chargesheet, it may do so. However, it appears from the E records that those officers including the Chief Secretary who were dealing with the public interest litigation were not aware that the chargesheet had been filed in the ear- lier case. The State Government and the High Court had proceeded on the basis that the investigation was to be F handed over to the CBI. The High Court came to know thereof only when an application for modification was filed by the appellants therein. It may be true that the High Court proceeded on the basis that although the CBI had lodged the FIR, the same would be deemed to have been cs lodged only for the purpose of carrying out further inves- tigation, but, in the opinion of the Court its conclusions are correct. [Para 54] (1085-F, G, H; 1086-A)
2.2 The High Court in this case was not monitoring any investigation. It only desired that the investigation hl 'i ~ ""' ~ ... 4 1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. A should be carried out by an independent agency. If that be so, the contention that the monitoring of an investiga- tion comes to an end after the chargesheet is filed, loses all significance. [Para 55) (1086-B, C) 8 Vineet Narain v. Union af India 1998 (1) SCC 226; MC. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (1) sec 110 - referred to.
2.3 Moreover, it was not a case where the High Court had assumed a jurisdiction in regard to the same offence c in respect whereof the Special Judge had taken cogni- zance pursuant to the chargesheet filed. The chargesheet was not filed in the FIR which was lodged on the inter- vention of the High Court. As the offences were distinct and different, the High Court never assumed the jurisdic- tion of the Special Judge to direct reinvestigation. [Para 56) (1086-D, E) D
3.1 The High Court while entertaining the writ peti- tion formed a prima facie opinion as regards the system- atic commission _of fraud. While dismissing the writ peti- tion filed by the selected candidates, it initiated a suo motu public interest litigation. It was entitled to do so. The na- ture of jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, in a pri- vate interest litigation and in a public interest litigation is different. Whereas in the. latter it is inquisitorial in nature, in the former it is adversorial. In a public interest litiga- tion, the court need not strictly follow the ordinary proce- dure. It may not only appoint committees but also issue directions upon the State from time to time. [Para 32) (1072- G, H; 1073-A, 8) Indian Bank vs. Godhara Nagrik Co-op. Credit Society Ltd. and Anr. 2008 (7) SCALE 363; Raju Ramsing Vasave v. Mahesh Deorao Bhavpurkar and Ors. 2008 (1 ?) SCALE 252 - relied on. E F G
3.2 In an ordinary case, it could be said that the High H Court should not direct CBI to investigate into a particu- • t- y I ~ ),:- ~- t .. f- NIRMAL SINGH KAHLON v. STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. 1055 lar offence. The offence, however, is not ordinary in na- A ture. It involved investigation into the allegations of com- mission of fraud in a systematic manner. It had a wide ramification as a former Minister of the State is said to be involved. The instant case was not a case where investi- gation could be carried out in a slip-shod manner [Paras B 34 and 37] (1073-F, G; 1076-C)
3.3 The High Court was concerned only with ap- poiritment of Panchayat Secretaries. Public Interest Liti- gation was confined to such appointments only. In regard thereto, the only allegation which was made was that he c got his favourites appointed who did not fulfill the qualifi- cations. [Para 38] (1076-F, G) Vineet Narain v. Union of India 1998 (1) SCC 226; State of Bihar v. PP Sharma, 1992 Sup. (1) SCC 222 ; Union of India v. Sushi/ Kumar Modi, 1998 (8) SCC 661; Rajiv Ranjan D Singh 'La/an' v. Union of India 2006 (6) SCC 613; Rajesh v. Ramdeo, 2001 (10) SCC 759; Sasi Thomas v. State 2006 (12) SCC 421; State of WB. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights WB. and Ors. 2006 (12) SCC 534 - re- ferred to. E
4.1 Lodging of the second FIR was not impermissible in law. The second FIR lodged by CBI was on a wider can- vass. It was lodged after holding a detailed preliminary inquiry. CBI collected a large number of materials. It had also recorded the statements of a large number of per- F sons. Whereas the first FIR contained the misdeeds of individuals, the second one depicts a crime committed in the course of selection process of Panchayat Secretar- ies involving a large number of officers. [Paras 40 and 53] (1085-E; 1077-B, C) G
4.2 It may be true that in both the FIRs the ex. minis- ter was named. He was considered to be the prime ac- cused. But, it is one thing to say that he acted in his indi- vidual capacity and it is another thing to say that he con- spired with a large number of persons to facilitate com- H '1 -,t ,,... . + ~ -';- 1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R. B A mission of crime by him as a result whereof all of them had made unlawful gains. When two conspiracies are al- leged; one is larger than the other, there may be some common factors but the nature of offence would differ. An offence committed would not be judged by mere men- tioning of the Sections but the mode and manner in which the same was committed as also the nature thereof. The canvass of two FIRs is absolutely different. The numbers of accused in both the FIRs are also different. There is a distinction between crime committed by an individual or c a group of persons vis-a-vis a scam. [Paras 46, 47, 49 and 50] (1080-D, E, F; 1083-8, C)
4.3 The second FIR, would be maintainable not only because there were different versions but when new dis- covery is made on factual foundations. Discoveries may D be made by the police authorities at a subsequent stage. Discovery about a larger conspiracy can also surface in another proceeding, as in a case of this nature. If the po- lice authorities did not make a fair investigation and left out conspiracy aspect of the matter from the purview of its investigation, as and when the same surfaced, it was open to the State and/ or the High Court to direct investi- gation in respect of an offence which is distinct and sepa- rate from the one for which the FIR had already been lodged. [Para 59] (1087-E, F, G) E F G
Questions this judgment answers
What did the Court decide in this case?
The Court recorded the following disposition: The appeals are dismissed with aforementioned di
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — ss. 36, 173, 173(8), 190; Indian Penal Code, 1860 — ss. 120B, 406, 411, 420, 467, 468; Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 — ss. 13(1)(d)(e), 13(2); Constitution of India — arts. 20, 21, 142, 226, 227; Police G Act — s. 3; Police Act, 1861 — s. 3.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.