B.S.GORAYA v. U.T. OF CHANDIGARH

A charge-sheet was filed against the appellant by CBI u/s 13 (1) (e) r/w s. 13 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. After withdrawing his application u/s 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR, he filed an application u/s 227 Cr.P.C. for discharge. His case was that charge-sheet could not have been filed against him without obtaining requisite sanction as at the time of registration of the case he was in Army service. His plea was that though on the date when the charge-sheet was filed he was not in service due to his dismissal prior thereto, but in view of the fact that later he was reinstated, he F should be deemed to be in service during the relevant period. Special Judge held that protection u/s 19 of the Act was not available to him as he could not be deemed to be in Government Service on the relevant date. High Court affirmed the order of Special Judge. Hence the present appeal. Dismissing the appeal, the Court G H HELD:

The order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant any interference. Protection u/s 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ~as not available to the appellant. The Deeming provision is operative for the purpose for which it has been created and cannot be extended beyond ~ ~ the legitimate field. !Paras 10 and 6) 1462-C, 464-A) A I B c p E Kalicharan Mahapatrav. Stare of Orissa, (1998( 6 SCC 411; C.S.T. Uttar Pradesh v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd AIR 1961 SC 1047; Mis. Braithwaite and Co.(India) Ltd. v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1968 SC 413; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR (1955) SC 661; The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombuy City, Bombay v. The Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., AIR (1960) SC 1016 and K.S. Dharmadatan v. Central Government and Ors., 11979) 4 SCC 204, relied on. State of U.P. v. Mohammad Noah, AIR (1958) SC 86, distinguished. Prakash Singh Badal and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., (2007) 1 sec 1, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1205 of

1999. From the Judgment & Order dated 29.09.1998 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Revision No. 210 of 1998. Jawahar Lal Gupta, Nidhi Gupta and Sureshta Bagga for the Appellant. B. Dutta, ASG., Vikas Shanna, P. Panneswaran and Sushma Suri for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DR. ARIJIT PASA Y AT, J. 1. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the revision petition filed by the appellant. In the said revision challenge was to the order passed by learned Special Judge, Chandigarh deciding to frame charge against the appellant in terms of Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short the G Act'). 1 F

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: A charge sheet was filed against the appellant by the Central Bureau H :::..:, ;. 'T / A of Investigation Authorities (in short the 'CBI') Chandigarh. After completion of the investigation in the case it was registered on 6.8.1990, in tenns of Section 13(l)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act. An application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short the 'Code') was filed for quashing the said FIR and the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 11.9.1996 . Liberty was however given to take all the available pleas as and B when the same were available. An application under Section 227 of the Code was filed before the learned Special Judge Chandigarh for discharge stating that at the time of registration of the case he was serving as Colonel in the Army and was posted at Chandimandir, he was placed.under suspension and enquiry was initiated and ultimately he was dismiss~d from service with effect C from 27.1.1993.

Mr. B. Dutta, learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that the .. r- ·. B.S.GORAYAv. U.T.OFCHANDIGARH[PASAYAT,J.] 461 decision in Mohammad Noah's case (supra) on which emphasis is led by the A appellant has no application to the facts of the present case.

In Kalicharan Mahapatra v. State of Orissa, { 1998] 6 SCC 41 l the effect of Section 19(3) of the Act was considered with the following words. ""Public servant" is defined in Section 2 (C ) of the Act. It does not B include a person who ceased to be a public servant. Chapter III of the Act which contains provisions for offences and penalties does not point to any person who became a non-public servant, according to the counsel. Among the provisions submitted in the chapter, Sections 8,9,12 C and 15 deal with offences committed by persons who need not be public servants, though all such offences are intertwined with acts of public servants. The remaining provisions in the chapter deal with offences committed by public servants. Section 7 of the Act contemplates offence committed by a person who expects to be a Ii) public servant. It must be remembered that in spite of bringing such a significant change to Section 197 of the Code in 1973, Parliament was circumspect enough not to change the wording in Section 19 of the Act which deals with sanction. The reason is obvious. The sanction contemplated E in Section 197 of the Code concerns a public servant who "is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty", whereas the offence contemplated in the PC Act are those which cannot be treated as acts either directly or even purportedly done in the discharge of his official duties. Parliament must have desired to maintain the F. distinction and hence the wording in the corresponding provision in the former PC Act was materially imported in the new PC Act, 1988 without any change in spite of the change made in Section 197 of the Code. "

Section 19(3) of the Act reads as follows: G I -t "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 : (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on H the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (I), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the· authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice; (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any•other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal or other proceedings.

In C.S.T. Uttar Pradesh v. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., AIR (1961) SC 1047 it was held that the deeming provision is operative for the purpose for which it has been created and cannot be extended beyond the legitimate field. The p~sition was again reiterated in Mis. Braithwaite and Co.(Jndia) Ltd v. The Employees' State Insurance Corporation, AIR (1968) SC 413. It was observed that legal fiction is adopted in law for a limited and definite purpose only and , there is no justification being extended beyond the purposes for which the legislature adopted. E

In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd v. State of Bihar and Ors., AIR (1955) SC 661 it was observed that explanation should be limited to the purposes the Constitution maker said and legal fiction has created for some definite purposes.

Again in The Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City. Bombay v. F The Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. AIR (1960) SC 1016 it was held that the fiction cannot be carried further for what it is intended for. The view was re-iterated in KS. Dharmadatan v. Central Government and Ors., [ 1979] 4 SCC 204 where the factual situation is almost identical. The factual position was that the appellant in that case was being prosecuted for commission of offence punishable under Sections 120(8), 420, 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and Section 5(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (in short the 'Old Act'). At the time the charge sheet was filed and the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge the appellant in that case had ceased to be a public officer. He filed an appeal before the President of India against the removal from service which was allowed by H order dated 25.9.1972 and the order of removal from service was set aside. On G ., ~ ~ A y r- B.S.GORAYAv. U.T.OFCHANDIGARH[PASAYAT,J.] 463 his reinstatement appellant filed application before the Special Judge praying A that all further proceedings be dropped inasmuch as the prosecution against him was initiated in the absence of proper and valid sanction. The Special Judge as well as the High Court rejected the prayer. Before this Court the point raised was that the appellant must be deemed to be in service with effect from the date from which the departmental proceedings were initiated against B him and therefore he was a public servant at the time the cognizance was taken by the Special Judge as no sanction under Section 6 of the Old Act was obtained, the proceedings were void ab initio. This contention was not accepted by this Court with the observation that it is too well settled that the deeming fiction should be confined only for the purpose for which it is meant.

In Prakash Singh Badal and Anr. v. State of Punjab and Ors., [2007] I SCC I it was observed at para 9 as follows: c "IPC provided for offences by or relating to public servants under Chapter IX including Sections 161 to I 65A. The Old Act was enacted on 12.3.1947, with the object of making provisions for the prevention D of bribery and corruption more effective. In 1952 a Committee headed by Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand was constituted. The said Committee examined the true intent and purpose of Section 6 of the Old Act. It was inter alia noted by the Committee as follows: "Section 6 of the Act prescribes that no prosecution under Section E 5(2) is to be instituted without the previous sanction of the authority competent to remove the accused officer from his office. The ~xact implications of this provision have on occasions given rise to a certain amount of difficulty. There have been cases where an offence has been disclosed after the officer concerned has ceased to hold office, e.g., by retirement. In such cases it is F not entirely clear whether any sanction is at all necessary. Another aspect of the same problem is presented by the type of case which, we are told, is fairly common-where an officer is transferred from one jurisdiction to another or an officer who is lent to another Department, commits an offence while serving in his G temporary office and then returns to his parent Department before the offence is brought to light. In a case of this nature doubts have arisen as to the identity of the authority from whom sanction for prosecution is to be sought. In our opinion there should be an unambiguous provision in the law under which the appropriate H ...J... A B authority for according sanction is to be determined on the basis of competence to remove the accused public servant from office at the time when the offence is alleged to have been committed. "

In view of the aforesaid analysis the order of the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity to warrant any interference.

The appeal is sans merit, deserves dismissal which we direct. K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.