P. RAMA CHANDRA RAO v. STATE OF KARNATAKA

1.2. Prescribing periods of limitation at the end of which the trial court would be obliged to terminate the· proceedings and necessarily acquit or discharge the accused and further, making such directions applicable to all the cases in the present and for the future amounts to legislation, which cannot C be done by judicial directives and within the arena of judicial law-making power available to constitutional courts, however liberally Articles 32, 21, 141 and 142 of the Constitution may be interpreted. Courts can declare the law, they can interpret the law, they can remove obvious lacunae and fill the gaps but they cannot entrench upon in the field of ~egislation properly meant for the legislature. Judiciary may not, like legislature, enact a provision akin to D or on the lines of Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [82-F, G, H; 83-A-B]

1.3. Bars of limitation enacted in Common Cause {/), Common Cause {JI), Raj Deo Sharma {/) and Raj Deo Sharma (//) cannot be sustained also because the decisions though two or three-Judge Bench decisions, run counter to that E extent to the dictum of Constitution Bench in A.R. Antu/ay 's case and therefore cannot be said to be good law to the extent they are in breach of the doctrine of precedents. The well settled principle of precedents which has crystalised into a rule of law is that a Bench of lesser strength is bound by the view expressed by a Bench of larger strength and cannot take a view in departure p or in conflict therefrom. [83-B, CJ

1.4. The dictum in A.R. Antulay's case is correct and holds the field. The propositions emerging from Article 21 of the Constitution and expounding the right to speedy trial laid down as guidelines in the case, adequately take care of right to speedy trial. The guidelines are not exhaustive but only G illustrative. They are not intended to operate as hard and fast rules or to be applied like a strait-jacket formula. Their applicability would depend on the fact-situation of each case. It is difficult to foresee all situations and no generalization can be made. [84-C, D, E,] Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., [1992) 1 SCC 225, H affirmed. ... ,,., ~' y ,. / 1-. P. RAMACHANDRARAOv. STATEOFKARNATAKA 63 Common Cause v. Union of India, [1996] 4 SCC 33; Common Cause v. A Union of India, [1996] 6 SCC 775; Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1998) 7 SCC 507 and Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, (1999) 7 sec 604, overruled. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr., (1978) l sec 248; Hussainara Khatoon and Ors., (/) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, [1980] l SCC 81 and Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, referred to. 'Principles of Jurisprudence' I 2th Edition by Salmond; Judicial Activism 'The and 'Comtitutional Democracy in India' by Professor Sir William Wade QC; Judge (1979) by Patrick Devlin; "Judicial Activism in Jndia-Tramgressing Borders and Enforcing limits", by Professor S.P. Sathe, referred to.

The Criminal Courts should exercise their available powers, such as those under Sections 309, 3ll and 258 of Code of Criminal Procedure to effectuate the right to speedy trial. A watchful and diligent trial judge can prove to be better protector of such right than any guidelines. In appropriate cases jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution can be invoked seeking appropriate reliefor suitable directions. (85-B, C] B c D

A perception of the cause for delay at the trial and in conclusion of criminal proceedings is necessary so as to appreciate whether setting up bars oflimitation entailing termination of trial or proceedings can be justified. Goal E of speedy justice can be achieved by a combined and result-oriented collective thinking and aetion on the part of the Legislature, the Judiciary, the Executive and representative bodies of members of Bar. (77-E; 79-C] Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors., v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., jl992) l sec 225; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (I994[ 4 SCC 569 and Raj Deo Sharma II F v. State of Bihar, ( 1999) 7 SCC 604, referred to. I 20th Report of law Commission of India on Manpower Planning in Judiciary, referred to.

Union of India and the State Government should fulfil their G constitutional obligation to strengthen the judiciary-quantitatively and qualitatively by providing requisite funds, manpower and infrastructure. (85-D)

High Court could not have condoned the delay in filing of the appeals and then allowed the appeals without noticing the respective accused- H )-- 64 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) 3 S.C.R. A respondents before the High Court, now the High Court shall hear and decide the appeals afresh after noticing the accused respondent before it in each of the appeals and consistently with the principles of law laid down in the instant case. [85-F] Per Raju, J. (Partly dissenting with the observations as regards the B powers and jurisdiction of Supreme Court)

The declaration of law in A.R. Antu/ay's case still holds the field and its binding force and authority has not been undermined or whittled down or altered in any manner by another decision of a larger Bench. Consequently, the Benches of lesser number of Constitution of Judges which dealt with the C cases could not have laid down any principles in derogation of the ratio laid down in A.R. Antu/ay's case either by way of elaboration, expansion, clarification or in the process of trying to distinguish the same with reference to either the nature of causes considered therein or the consequences which are likely to follow and which, in their view, deserve to be averted. Even where D necessities or justification, if any, were found therefor, there could not have been scope for such liberties being taken to transgress the doctrine of binding precedents. The solitary reason would suffice by itself to overrule the decisions by Bench of lesser strength. All the more so when, there is no reason to doµbt the correctness of the decision in A.R. Antulay 's case and this Bench concurs with the principles laid down therein. (87-B-F] Abdul Rehman Antu/ay y. RS. Nayak and Anr., [ 1992) 1 SCC 225, affirmed. E