RAMJILAL ETC & Ors. v. GHISA RAM ETC

D.V. Sehgal, D.S. Tewatia, AK. Goel, Mrs. Sheela Goel, P. Narasim han, R.S. Sodhi, K.K. Mohan and Ms. Geetanjali Mohan for the appearing G parties. The following Order of the Court was delivered : Leave granted in the SLP. H Substitution allowed. 974 RAMJILALv. GHISARAM 975 These appeals were referred to a larger Bench by order of this Court A made on lOlh May, 1994. The facts in C.A. No. 4017 are sufficient for disposal of these appeals. The facts are that on July 16, 1979, certain lands situated in Kutiyana Tchsil & District Sirsa were sold by Mathri, Dilawar and Santosh Kumar B to the appellants by registered sale deed dated June 16, 1979. The respon- dent filed Suit No. 581/80 in the Court of Sub-Judge, 1st Class, Sirsa under Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 on July 18, 1980 for pre-emption of the land from the appellants on the premise that the lands originally belonged lo one Shri Ram who died in the year 1944.

His widow Dhapan had remained in possession as Widow's Estate. She cannot be said C to have inherited the property through her husband. She had no right to sell the lands to the appellants as she remained limited owner. Therefore, being a co-owner of Shri Ram, the respondent is entitled to pre-emption of the lands sold by Dhapan to the appellants. Accepting the contention of the respondent, the trial Court decreed the suit. On appeal, it was D confirmed. Second appeal was dismissed. Thus these appeals by special leave. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 enlarges the \Vi(h1\vs' estate known to sastric law; removed the fetters on possession and blossom into an absolute right to the wido\v. E Pending appeals, the Haryana Pre-emption Amendment Act, 1995 (Act No. 10 of 1995) came into force w.e.f. July 7, 1995. The question arises: whether the respondents are entitled to pre-emption. This con troversy was considered by this Court Karan Singh & Ors. v.

Bhagwan Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., C.A. @ SLP (C) Nos. 14362 & 14372 of 1986 decided on 24th January, 1996 by a Bench of which two of us [K. Ramas- wamy & G.B. Pattanaik, JJ.] were members. Therein, it was held that the appeal was continuation of original proceedings. When the appellate court has seisin of the whole case, the entire controversy would be at large and the issue would be open for reconsideration. Thus the whole case is at large. For the purpose of pre-emption, the right and remedy must be available not only on the date of the sale but also on the date of the suit G as well as on the date when the decree is made and is finally to be affirmed or need to be modified at the time of the disposal of the appeal. Since the appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings, the right and the remedy should continue to subsist till this Court decides the controversy, if the appeal is presented and is pending disposal.