Judgment · Supreme Court

A and Kashmir High Court in Civil 1st Appeal No. 54 of 1985. Altaf Anjad, Adv. General and S.K. Bhattacharya for the Appellants. B S.M. Aquil and Shakeel Ahmed for the Respondents. The Order of the Court was delivered by THAKKAR, J. To condone, or not to condone, is not the only question. Whether or not to apply the same standard in applying the "sufficient cause" test to all the litigants regardless of their personality in the said context is another. c -"'- ·+ ·-_ An appeal preferred by the State of Jammu & Kashmir arising out of a decision enhancing compensation in respect of acquisition of lands for a public purpose to the extent of nearly 14 lakhs rupees by D making an upward revision of the order of 800% (from Rs.1000 per kanal to Rs.8000 per kanal) which also raised important questions as regards principles of valuation was dismissed as time barred being 4 days beyond time by rejecting an application for condonation of delay. Hence this appeal by special leave. E F G The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 1 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- I. "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provi sions of o;der XX.I of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficiet1t cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." ' H ANANTNAG v. MST. KATJI [THAKKAR, J.] 389 I. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. A

#2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause B would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

#3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic c manner.

#4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim D to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nun-deliberate delay. -

#5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deli berately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact E he runs a serious risk.

#6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing in justice and is expected to do so. F Making a justice-oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the 'State' which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a G litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law )s administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the 'State' is the applicant praying for con donation of delay. In fact experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinary (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the in- H 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R. A B herited bureaucratic m"ethcidology imbued with the note-making, file pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less dif ficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The Courts therefore have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression "sufficient cause". So also the same approach has to be evidenced in its application to mat ters at hand with the end in view to do even handed justice on mertis in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. Turn ing to the facts of the matter giving rise .to the present appeal, we are satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the C High Court dismissing the appeal before it as time barred, is there fore, set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to the High Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal on merits after affording reasonable opportunity. of hearing to both the sides. D Appeal is allowed accordingly. No costs. P.S.S. Appeal allowed. +-.