RAGHUBIR SINGH & OTIIERS ETC v. STATE OF BIHAR

Alleging that the Special Public Prosecutor had never been in structed to file such a petition before the Special Judge, the respondent State of Bihar filed a writ petition in the High Court and obtained a stay of further proceedings before the Special Judge. The accused-petitioners filed special leave petitions and writ peti tions before the Supreme Court against the rejection of their bail appli cations and for quashing the proceedings before the Special Judge. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners (a) that the funda mental right of the petitioners under Art. 21 of the Constitution had been frustrated hy the tactics of the State whose only object was to somehow keep the petitioners in prison; (b) that there was no material whatever to substantiate the offences of waging war etc. and that the proceedings deserved to be quashed on that ground also; (c) that the proceedings before the Special Judge, Purnea were "'.ithout jurisdiction both for the reason that he was not competent to try the offences under s. 12 lA and s. 124A etc. and also for the reason that he came to be seised of the case at the instance of the Executive Government, who had no authority to transfer the case from the court of the Special Judge, Patna to the Court of the Special Judge, Purnea, since the rule of law would be defeated if the Executive Government were to be permitted to have cases decided hy Judges of their choice; (d) that the High Court and the special Judge were wrong in not permitting the accused to offer fresh sureties or cash security; (e) that the High Court and the Special A B c D E F G H > .. RAGHUBIR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR 805 I Judge were wrong in holding that the order of the Magistrate directing them to be released on bail under s. 167(2) had come to an end by the passage of time, particularly after cognizance had been taken of the case; (I) that there was no material whatsoever to warrant the framing of charges for any of the offences mentioned in the-.:harge-sheet other than sec. 16SA; (g) that in the case of the accused persons other than Simran jit Singh Mann, there was nothing whatever to connect them with the offences under ss. l21A and 124A. On behalf of the respondent-State it was argued that the order for release on bail stood extinguished on the remand of the accused to custody under s. 309(2) of the Code of Crimi nal Procedure. Dismissing the petitions, HELD: 1.1 The delay in the investigation and in the trial of the case is not so unfair as to warrant quashing the proceedings on the ground of infringement of the right of the accused·to a speedy trial, a part of their fundamental right under Art. 21 of the Constitution. Hav ing regard to the entirety of the circumstances, the long lapse of time since the original order"' for bail was made, the consequent change ~n circumstances and situation, and the directions that were now given for the expeditious disposal of the case, there would be 110 justification lor exercising the court's discretion to interfere under Art. 136 of the Constitution at this stage. [8 J8G-H; 827A-B]

1.2 The High Court is directed to dispose of the criminal revision petition before it as expeditiously as possible preferably within three or four weeks. Whatever be its outcome the High Court should also direct the Special Judge or other Judge who may have to try the case, or the cases as the case may be, to try the cases expeditiously setting a near date for the trial and to proceed with the trial from day to day. [820D-E]

#2. The right to a speedy trial is one of the dimensions of the fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed by Art. 21 of the Con stitution. The question whether this right has been infringed is ulti mately a question of fairness in the administration of criminal justice even as "acting fairly" is of the essence of the principles of natural justice. A "fair and reasonable procedure" is what is contemplated by the expression "procedure established by law" in Art. 21. [81SF-G]