\ . H.D. VORA & Ors. v. MAHARASHTRA 695. between con1pulsory acquisition and requisition -of p_roperty. ·The_ two conct-pts & Anr.

One of the grounds on' which the validity o(tpe order of requisition was challenged· w~s that the order of requisition. did not set out the public purpose for which it was made, This ground of chalien'ge was negatived .by the Hi~h · Co~rt and, .in our opinion, rightly, because it is not necessary that the orcter of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made, law is · The only requirement of the • be made• for a public ·purpose and: so is a public purpose for which an order of requisition, is made, it would be · _valid irrespective whether s·uch public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not It bas, ip fact, been Sp held by this Court · in State ofBombay v. Bhanji Munji & A.nr. <1 > where Bose, J. speaking that the i;.equisitioning must . long as - . /--· on behalf, of the Court pbserveq : ' / , "In our opinion, it is not necessary to set out the. order. The the purpose of the requisition in is obvious because when desirability' of such a course it is n.ot done, proof of \he purpose must be given in other ways and' that exposes the authorities to the kind of charges we find here and to the danger the courts will consider them well founded. But in. itself an omission to set out the purpose in the order is not fatal so long as the facts are established to the · satisfaction Of the court in some other way." - . , . J : J<• ' . , The order of requisition could n~ therefore be successfully . attacked on the ground that it did not set out the public purpose for which it was, made, But as pointed out by Bose, J. in the above· dassagc quoted from this iddgment in Bhanji Munji's case (supra), the State Government would have to show ihat the order of requisi tion was made for a public· purpose andAhe necessary facts showii1g. the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made would ' have to be established by the State Government to the satisfaction of the court. The High Court held ill' the present case that no material was placed' before it to. s.ho,w what was the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made and in fact, theQ' was no denial on the. part of the State Governme, nt or the appella'ht of the averment made on behalf of the 3rd. respondent that the appellant was neither a government servant nor a homeless.person. This view it is J\Ot taken. by the High Court appears to be well-lounded and .. (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 777. .• ' H.p. VORA v, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.)_ 699 ···"'" 'possi~ to hold on the material placed_ before us that the order of requisition was· made for a public purpose. A But it was contended on ·behalf of the appellant that even if the order of requisition was invalid as having lieen made for a ·• ·purpose oti1or than a pitbliC p·u.rpose, the ·3rd responileni was not ' B entitled to challenge the. same aftet-a lapse of over _30 years and the writ petitio•1 should therefore have been dismissed by the Higl1 Court.· Now if the only , ground. on which the order .of· requisition· was challenged. in the. writ petition was that it was not. made for a public purpose and was therefore void; perhaps it might have .been possible to successfully repel· this ground of challenge by raising an olojection that the High Court Shouk\. not have entertaiaed the writ petition Ghallenging the order of requisition "aftet a lapse of over 30 years. But we find that there fa also another ground of challenge· · urged on .behalf of the 3rd respondent.and that is a' very formidable· , ground· to which there is no· answer, The argument urged under' this ground of challenge wits that'-'tn order of ',requisition is by jts very nature temporary in character· anq it 'cannot endure for 'an· ii1definite period Of tim'e. and the Order·of }eqisition in the .present case therefore ceased to b~ valid and .effective after the expiration of a reasonable per.ad of time and that it could ·not, under any_ circum- stance~, conti11ue for a period of about 3u years and hencf it was liable to be quashed and set aside or in any event the State Govern- ment was bound to revoke "the .same and to_ dereqilisition the flat. This Contention has·, in o~ur opinion, great fo_r,;e and must be sustained. There is a -basic and fundamental distinction, recognised by .law. betw~en r,:;quis.ition and acquisitinn_. The Consqtution itself in Entry 42 '.of List !fl of the Seventh Schedule makes a distinction between. acquisition and requisitioning of property. The original Article 31. clause (2) cif the .,Constitution also recognised 'this distihction _bet- ween . Compuisory acquisition and. requisitioning of ·pri, peity. The two concfepts, one of requisition and the· other of acquisition are totally :c',istiric\ and independent. Acquisition.., means ,the. acquiri1ig ' , . of the· entire title of the expropri 1ated owner \Vhatever u1? nature anct·· • extent of that title inay be .. The ·entire bundle' of rights which was vested ii1 the original llolder passes on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing to the former. Vide : Observations of Mukherjee, J. · in Chiranjitla/'s.case. The c01icept' of acquisition has an aif of permanence -and finality in thO:t there is tra; osference of the title. of· · tl1e original holder to. the acquiring authority. But the concept of ;.requisition involves merely taki.n'g of '.'domain or control over pro-' . . \ "" '\ , • \. . ' . - . I • c. D E F '·· .,. " G ' · H • + . I • 700 . SUPRE\fF. COURT ')lEPORTS . [1984j 2. S.C R .. , perty with?ut acquiri'ng rights of o;,,nershii:>> and musi by its very. . nature be of temporary duration. lf requisiti~ning of property could ' icGitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, t!ie dis\irictic·n. between requisition an4 acquisition v,:ould tend .. to become blurred, because in that event for all practical purposes the right to pcssess'on and enjoyineIJ~ of the property ,\vhich constit~tes a major constituent element of the right of ownership wonld be vested indefinitely with out any limitaiion of time in the reuuisitioning authority and it would . be possible for the authority to sub.stantially take over 'the prope<rty ·'without acquiring it and . paidng fu.11.market value· as comp\nsaticn und~r th~and. Acquisition Act, 1894. We do not think that the g~vernrneilt can unde~the guise cf requisition continued for an inc\efidc pericd of time,, in substance acquire the property; bec.ause that wo.uld be a fre.ud on the ·power conferred en the government. If the governmei wants to take over the, pror>_ertv for an iudefini& period 0( time, the government must acquire the property but it can-· not, use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The i:overnrnent · c)nl~ fer a power of requisition ·is exercisable by the public purpose which is of a transitory· character. .. If the public pur . p0sc for.which the premises are requ; rcd is of a perenn.i~l or.permanent character from.the very inception, no oraer can be passed requisition ing the premises and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed', ·would be a fraud upon the statute, 'ror the . government would be requisitioning the premises when ,really speaking they want the pre-. . mises fdr acquisitjon, the object 0~ taking the. premises being net transitory but permanent in cha.ractct. Where·'t]Je.purpose for .which the prerniscs are .required is of ,such a chameter that. from the very inception it can rieve'r be .served by req-;,isitioning the premises ,tut can be. achieved only by acquiring ti1e property which would be the case where. the purpose is o( a permanent character. or likely to ·SUQSist for an indefinite period Ol time, the government may acquire the premises . but it certainly cannot requisition the premises and continue the req~isit!oning. inde~P.it'cly. Here in the present .case the order of requisition -was made as far ·back as 9th April ·1951' and even if it .was mai!e for housing a. homeless person and the appel lant al .thaMirne fell within the category of homeless person, it 'can not be allowed to continue for such an inordinately Jong period. as thirty vears,"' We must therefore hold tliat the order of requisition even. if it wa-s valid when made, ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration 'of'a reasonable period of time. His not necessary for us to deciile what period of time rn; iy be regarded as reasonable for aSe, bccau~e u'tim:Jely the an·swer to this question must depiend on the facts and ; the contlnuanCe ef an ordc;r of r·~ql:iSitit::1~ iri a giv,~n c 0 A B. c D E F • G H • • I ' / ·~ ' .... . ' \ .. H.D. VORA V, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagivali; J.) . . . ' . • .. 701 .) ---- ·circumstances of each case but there can be no ·doubt that whatever be .. the public purpose fo~ which an order of •requisition is made,' ·the·period of .time for which the order o( requisitioir 'may be con Hnued' cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years . . The High Court was, therefore, in .any view of the matter, right in holding '.that in the circumstances the order. of 'requisit'<>p could not . survive 'any longer an« the State Governmeni. was' bound to revoke · / the order of requisition and d.erequisition ihe flat ·and ·to take steps to evict the appellant from the flat and to hand <\vervacarit ·posses- sion of it to the. 3rd respondent. 1 '· I ' Th~e ·was ~ls;· cme .other conte.ntion' \1rged on behalf of the' appellant in a desperate attempt to pr6tcct his possession of the flat arrd that contention was, cince he had'paid rent of th~ flat to Rukma· . nibai and such rent was accepted by ,her; he. ha\l becoine a direct 'tenant .of Rukmanibai and the order of requisition had become totally irreleva~t so far as .as his p:issession .of the flat i~ concerned. · This contention'is,.in our opi~ion, wholly unfounded .. The appellant' , admittedly came into occupation· of-the flat as 'an·''1!Jottee under the order .of requisition passed by' the· State Government and 'eyen any r~nt was paid by tho ilppellant to ·Rukmanibai and such rent was acce'pte~ by her, it did not,'have the effect of putting an end to " the order of requisition .. The appejlant was an ~Uottee of tqe flat under the order of requisitio~ and he was liable to pay compensation for the use .and occupation of the fla·t to the State Gov.ernment and the . ,\ ! -1'.~ -.State ·Qovernment was ·in its triml.iable. 'to 'pay compensation to. Rukmanibai for:the:requisitiqning of.the flat and i( therefore, ·instead. of the ·appellant paying compensation to the State· ·Government :ind the State Government rhakiiig payment.'of ap identical amount to '. - F Rukmanibai, the appellant paid directly to Rukmanibai with the . -express or in any event implied· assent of the State .Governmeni, the It did · ·.order of requisition. Tould not cease· to be valid and effective. ' · \ 'not matt~r at all whether the .appellant described the am.cunt paid '· by him to Rukmanibai as rent, because whatever was done by him : was ·under the order of requisition and · so long as ,the order of. · requisitioii stood, his possession of the flafwas attribut.able only' to the order of requisition and no payment of an amount described as rent could possibly alter the nature of his occupation of the flat or . . make him a teriant of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat.· I. . . . ,. .. We are \herefo, re of the view that the High Court ._wa,• right. A B c D G H . SIJPREME COURT REPORTS \ [1984] 2 S.C.R . A B '. in allowing the writ petition ard directing the State Government and the Cq.ntroller of Accommodati.on to derequisitio~ the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant and !,O. hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the flat to the 3rd respondent'. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, and confirm the order· passed by the High CoHrt but (n j:.lie circumstances of the case, the appellant shall not be evicted from. the flat until 28th February, 1985, provided the appellant files a~ undertaking in this Court within two'_weeks from today that he will vacate the flat and hand over its vacant possession to the 3rd respo~dent on or before tl1at date .. There wilt be 'no order as to c<"ts of the appeal. c N.VK Appeal dismissed . • • • • • " \ .. , . ' ' ... • • ' .. \ ,. . I