KHORSHED SHAPOOR CHEN AI ETC v. ASSISTANT CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY

f ·nr mati'on that enhanced compensation was awarded by the d Civil Court in respect of tho above lands the respondent ~MUC two no!lces. ~hapoor both dated November 14, 1969, onq addressed to .Mrs. Khorshcd Chenai and the other to Mrs. Freny Rashid Cbenar. Tho formec nohce was issued under section 59(a) of the Act calling upon Mrs. Khorsbed to show cause th Estate Duty assessment made on December 30, 1966 should not be •h th c· . 'W y reopened and revised in view of the extra compensallons awar . Y 1vi1 !~Iter Court in respect of the lands acquired by the Govc.n;mcnt, while notice was issued under section 61 of the Act requmng Mrs. Frcny Chenat to show c.1.use why the mistake apparent from the record should not be rectified and the enhanced compensation included in the p rincipal value. of the estate. These noti~ were challenged by the reccipients by ftling writ petition.s in tbc High Court. The High Court negatived the contentions raised in both the writ petitions upheld the impugned notices :md dismissed the writ petition.s. Hence the two appeals by cei:tificates. dcd b . . e i • i \ . i Allowing the appeals, the Court. JIELD : 1. So far as the eswte duty assessment in respect of the properties. pas~ing on the death of Shapoor w:u concerned, the lands which were the sub· !cct matter of ncquisition proceedings could not be regarded as fonnin:; ' part of the esL'lte of the do:cea.sal on the relcvunt date and could DOl pass on his death in as much as these lands hnd vested in the Government long prior to his death but the richt to n:ceive compensation at market value on tbe dates of the relevant notifications unquestionably accrued dec.:a.'~<--d 'lvhich w:u property nod it would be such property that would pass on the death In other words, since the lands were lost to the cst:tte of the of the deceased. ~cce;u;ed be(orc the relevant d:tte, n:tmcly, the d~tc of death, it would be tbc right to receive compensation under the Lund Acquisition Act th.'lt will have t~ be evaluated under the £states Duty Act. [324 G-H, 32S A, C] to the Pondit Laksltml Kant JIUl v. Commissionu of W~alth To:c, Diltar (Jlttl Orissa, 90 lT.R. 97 (S.C.), applied.

#2. There or~ no two kparate risht~-ono 11 right to recdve compensation IUld other a right to receive extru. or {urthcr compensation. Upon acquisition of his lands under Jho Lllod Acquisition Act the claimant bas only one risbt "'hich Is to receive compensation for the lands ot their !Illlrket value on ~ date of tbe relevant notificatioM and It Ia thia right which is qu11ntifkd by ~~ Collector under •· 11 alld by tho Civil Court under s 26 of the Land AcqulSl· !ion. Act. lt ~ true that under •· 11 tho Collector alter holdiog the n~C$S~irY IDqutry dch:rlillna the quantum of compensation by fixing the market value of the lllnd und in doing so is guided by tho provisioru coutuin.:d In as. 23 and 24 of the Act-the Very provillioM by references to which the Civil Court fixes the It is idlO true that the Collector'& awnrd is, und.:r ~. 12. dec!artd' valuation. t~ be, ucept as otherwise provWed, finn! and conchL<ive evid(nce as betw«ll' taw ~e him and .the J'er.IOM interested. Even ao, it is well settled Collectors a word under 1. 11 ia nothing more than aa oiler ot compen.satJoll made by tho Government tQ the d:timant whose property is acquired. lf thJlt be th~ true nntu~e of the award made by the Collector th~a the question wbetber tht lll; ht to rece1ve c:ompensatioa survives the llwa.rd mwt depend upon wbe~ · --~~~- ·- - --···- --:-)'-· K. S. CHENAI V. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY . . 317 the claimant acquies~s therein fully o: not. If the offer is acquiesced in by total acceptance ~e nght to compensation. will not survive but if the offer .not accepted or IS accepted .under pro~t and a land. reference is sought by the claimant under s. 18, the nght to receive compcn.sa!lon must be regarded as having survi~ed and kept alive which the claimant prose.cutcs in Civil CC\urt [326 B-G) Eua v. Secn·tary of State for India ll.R 32 Cal. 605; Raja llorish C110ndra v. Dy. Land Requisition O[Jir:cr, [1962] 2 SCR 676 and Dr. G. H . Grant v. Sta/1! J~/ Bihar [1965] 3 SCR 576, followed. •. r

#3. It is not correct that no sooner the Collector has made his award under 5• 11 the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merced in the award, or what is left with the claimant is a mer~ right to litigate the cor rectness of the award. The claimant can litigate the correctness of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which be prosecutes in Civil Court That is why when a claimant dies in a ·pending reference his heirs are brought on record and are permitted to prose· cute the rcf~rcnce. This, however, does not mean that the Civil Court's evaluation of this right done subsequently would be its valuation as at relevant date either under the Estate Duty Act or the Wealth Ta.'t Act. It will 'be the duty of the assessing authority under either of the enactments to evaluate this property (right to receive compensation at market value on the date of relevant notification) ns on the relevant date (being the date of death under the Stale Duty and Vuluatio n date under the Wealth Ta.'C Act). Under s. 36 of the State Duty Act the ussessing authority has to estimnte the value of this property at the price whil:h it would fetch if sold in the open market at the timt: of the t!cc~:<~~;ed's death. In the case of the right to receive compensation, which is property, where the Collector's award has been made but has not been accepted or has been accepted under protest and areference is sought or {IC:nrling in Civil Court at the date of the dt!ceascd's death the estimated value can uever be below the figure quantifil!d by the Collector because under s. 25(1 l of the Land Acquil.ition Act. Civil Court cannot award any amount below thilt awarded by the Collector; the estimated value may be eql!al to the Collec tor'• award of more but can never bo equal to the tall claim made by the claimant in the Reference nor equal to the claim actually award.!d by the Civil Court inasmuch us the risk or hazard of litigation would be dctr:lcting (actor '•bile arriving at u reasonable nml proper value of this property as o.n the dat.:o, (.[ the deceased'~ death. The asscs~ing authority will hav~ to estimate th~ value having regan.l to the peculiar nature of the proper!}', its ~~rk~tability a_nd the aurrounding circumstances including the risk or ha.zaru or hltgataon loommg l.ar,e at the relevant dah:. [326 H. 327 A-FJ · a e m pun~u ance h nn~;:mg t e same

#4. lhe very is~uanco of the notice under section 59(a) was on a ~rong basis; h was bsucd with tho obj.:ct to includ.: the enluncd an~ounts recet\·ed by the in the principal value o! the pro~rty passmg :m the death o~ arJICIIant to duty· such notl.:e and the subsequent reassess d b · Shan.. · bl · ,~,r an rncot m d th eo{ would be clearly illegal and unsusta!Da e · · h th ina\much as the elltra compcn.~ation awardro by the CIVIl Court ta ·en, Wit ~ original compen.,ation as on the date. of the death .of the deedce~ed. :rop~ .I as Well as actual 'incht~ion of such extra compe!IS3.tionhawdard h f\ t ~ IV~ tha one reason. In the first :r ace I e I cccasthc Court in the principal value or tho estate passing on t e cat o c v.~·•-- . aaid property. namely, the enhanced compensation was n": m e:ust.:ncc "' o ~ ..... be manifestly wrong for more . . k n • . . .·J , . ' A B c D E F G n ·.: A B c D E G . 318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 S.C.R. d 1 of the death of the deceased. Secondly, such extra compensation awarded b~ ~he City Civil Court was liable to variation in th: appeals that ~ere pending in the High CourL Thirdly, such extra compensation together wtth the com pensation awarded by the Special Deputy Col.lcctor could not be regarded as the proper valuation of the right to compensation as on the relevant date (the date of the deceased's death). [330 A-D]

#5. The notice under section 16l of the Act and the rcctificativn order passed ( in pursuance thereof if illegal and unsustainable. [333 E] (i) The r~ctiJication is being undertaken on the ground that the initial valua tion adopted in respect of the acquired lands was based at raks fixed by Land Acquisition Officer, that such .valuation was obviously wron;: in view of the enhanced compensation· awarded by the Civil Court and, enhanced compensation was sought to be included in the principal value of In substance it cannot the estate by undertaking the rectification proceedings. record be said to be a case of rectification of any mistake apparent from the · but the reswndent is really seeking to change his opinio nabout the V<lluatioJt of the acquired lands because some other authority, namely, lhe Ci·;il Court bas valued th_!: same differently. [331 C-E] therdore, (ii) for the purpose of enhancing the value of the acquired la nds t>n the basis of their value as determined by the Civil Court the respondent must resort to provisions of s. S!l and proceed to IIl:lkc reassessment but sucll reassessment has. to be done within the period of three yean; from the date of the original assess ment und~r s. 73A of the Act. In the instant case the respondent resorted to s. 61 because the rectification of any mistake apparent from the record could be don: nt any time within five yearn from the date of the original assessment. [331 E.F) (iii) When the original assessment was made it v.01s the duty of res· pondcnt, alter scrutinising the account filed and examining the materials pro duced before him, to v::~luc the estate of the deceased properly under s. 36 of the Act nnd when he accepted the com~nsation fi:oted by the special Deputy Collector as the proper v:•luation ho must be deemed to have adopted valuation as his ·own estimated value of the lands which he wanted to enhance b~ ;cJyin~ upon the valuation mnde by the another authority, namely, the City Cl\·11 Court. To such a case s. 59 is clearly attracted but obviously with a view to avoid the bar of s. 73A ho purported to i.~ue the impugned notice und~r a. 61. [332 F-HJ i f I I ' I . I 1972. · From the Judgment and Order dated 17-11-1971 and 16·11-71 of 1 the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. Nos. 5~ of 1970 a·rid 4059/ 69. CIVIL API'ELLATE ]IJRISDICTION: Civil App:al Nos. :005-2006 of Ethtl Rodriqrlt!t v. Assista111 Colltrolltr of Estate Duty, E.rtat~ Dllty-cru11: Jncome Tax: Circle, Matrllalort, [1963] 49 l.T.R. (E.D. )' 128, applied. II N: A. Palkhiwlla, Y. V. Anjaneyulu, A. Subba Rao, J. B. Dada"' chanjl, Mrs. A . K. Verma, T. Ansari and A. H. Haskar for the Appel lant. K. S. CHENAI v. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapurkar, J.) 319 t V. S. Desai, B. B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respon- A dent. S. P. Meht•a, !. B. Dadachanji, R. Narain, Mrs. A. K. Verma, T. Ansari and A. H. Haskar for the Intervener. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by TULZAPURKAR, J .-These two appeals by certific~tes granted by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh raise the question of legality and or validity of two notices issued by the · Assistant Controller of Estate ·~ Duty, Hyderabad, one under s. 59(a) and the other under s. 61 of the ' ~ Estate Duty Act, 1953 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). V Two parcels of agricultural land (admeasuring 22 Acres 24 Guntas and 8 Ac:res 23 Guntas) situated in Moosapet village, belonging to ohe Rashid Shapoor Chenai wer~, during his lifetime, acquired for the Syn tlletic Drugs Project Factory of the Indian Dru~ and Pharmaceutical Ltd. by the Andhra Pradesh Government by Notifications issued on June 19, 1961 and January 18, 1962 u'nder the Land Acqui~ition Act. Possession of the lands was taken in January 1963 and by two sepa rate awards both made on January 31, 1963 the Special Deputy Collec tor of Land Acquisition award;:d a total compensation of Rs. 20,000. This compensation was received by Rashid himself during his lifetime. Later two more parcels of agricultural land (admeasuring 131 Acr~ 10 Guntas and 224 Acres 22 Guntas) situated at Qutbillapur in Med chal Taluk belonging to Rashid w~re acquired for Hindustan Machine Tools, Units I and II by th~ Andhra Pradesh Government by Notifica tions issued on November 1, 1963 and February 1, 1964 under the La'nd Acquisition Act. Though the former notification was issued dur ing his lifetime and the latter after death, poss·.;ssion of both the lands was taken after his death by the Government on December · 4, 1963 and March 15, 1964 and by two separate awards made on March 12, 1965 and March 19, 1965, the Special Deputy Collector awarded a total compensation of Rs. 4,29,360. This compensation was received in April 1965 by the heirs of Rashid, namely, his widow Mrs. Frcny Chenai and son Shapoor Rashid Chenai on whom the estate of Rashid devolved in equal· shares. On tlr~ death of Rashid on November 4, 1963, Mrs. Freny Chenai (the appellant in C.A. No. 2206 of 1972) as his widow and 'accountable persoh' filed before the respondent on December 26, 1963 on account of the properties passing on the ~eath of her husband under s. 53(3) of the Act. The estate duty assessment was compkted by the respondent on March 29, 1966. With regard to the lands ac..: quired both during the lifetime of Rashid as well a~ after their values __ _., ___ _ , __ Ill _ __ . . . . . - 8 c D E F G·, B . 320 SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS · [198Q] 2 S.C.R. A mre taken at the respective figures of compensation (Rs. 20,000 and Rs. 4,29,360) awarded for them by the Special Deputy Collector. i : B c D I E F .G n Unfortunately, within two years of his father's death, Shapoor Rashid Chenai (the son) died on May 7, 1965. As stated earlier he . had one half share in the undivid·~d es:ate of his late father Rashid. As required by s.53 of the Act, (Mrs. Khorshed Chenai) (the appellant in C.A No. 2205/1972) as his widow and the 'accountable person' filed before th.; Respondent on November 6, 1965 on account of the proper- ties passing on the death of her husband and the Respondent completed ~· In making this the estate duty assessment on December 30, 1966. assessment also the respondent as in the Ca!?e of estate duty assessment in respect of the properties passing on the death of Rashid, adopted the values of the lands acquired by the Government at figures awarde.d b'y the Special Deputy Collector for those lands. . j It app~ars that the legal heirs of Rashid did not accept the awards made by the Special Deputy Collector in res~ct of the aforesaid lands and requested the Special Deputy Collector to refer the question of compensation to Civil Court under s.l8 of the Land Acquisition Act. References were, accordingly, made and the Civil Court by its order dated March 6, 1967 enhanced the compensation awarded by the Special Deputy CoUector in respect of Moosapet land by Rs. 1,90,000 and by its order dated October 30, 1967 enhanced the compensation in respect of Qutbillapur lands by Rs. 20,45,000. The Government did not accept the decisions of the Civil Court and filed appeals to the High Court challenging the enhancement, which appeals are still pending in the High Court. On receipt of information that cahanced compensa tion was awarded by the Civil Court in r~spect of the above lands the respondent issued two notices both dated November 14, 1969, one addr~ssed to Mrs. Khorshed Shapoor Chenai and the oth.er to Mrs. Freny Rashid Chenai. The former notire was issued ·under s. 59(a) of the Act calling·upon Mrs. Khorshed Chenai to show cause why the estate duty assessment made on December 30, 1966 should not be re· opened and revised in view of lhe extra compensations awarded by the Civil Court in respect. of the lands acquired by the Government, while the latter notice was issued under s. 61 of the Act requiring Mrs. Freny Chenai to show cause why the mistalre apparent from the record should not be rectified and the enhanced compensation included in the princi pal value of the estate. These notices were challenged by recepients by filing writ petitions in the High Court. The notice under s. 59(a) of the Act issued for the reopening of the assessment completed on December 30, 1966 was challenged in I 0' --~~ J \.· .. \. "\ J<;.. .-'< -------- . -·-y- ..-"'II.IEr.l!IJI·---·------ - t<. S. CHENAI V. CONTHOLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapurkar, J.) 321 ait petition No. 54 of 1970 on two gro_unds : (a) that after compen -sation had been awarded by the Special Deputy Collector und~r s. 11 of the Land Acquisit.ion Act the heirs of the deceased Rashid had merely .exercised a right to sue for further compensation which was merely a hope or a chance that the compensation might be enhanced, that such hope or chance could not be elevated to the status of an assets or pro perty and as such not asset or property chargeable to estate duty bad escaped as~ssment and (b) that even assuming that any asset or pro perty chargeable to estate duty had escaped assessment the notice was ·illegal and without jurisdiction b.!cause such escapement was not due to a·ny omission or failure on the part of th·~ accountable person to disclose fully nnd truly material facts necessary for making the assessment. As regards the first ground, the High Court took the view that the right to receive compensation equivalent to mark·~t value of the lands on the -dates of notifications which sprang directly from the acquisition was •·property", that no fresh or independent right "to receive extra com pcns atio'n" accrued to th•.! heirs of the dcceas·~d and that &ince com pensation awarded by Special Deputy Collector had been enhanced by Rs. 1,90,000 for the lands acquired for the Synthetic Drugs Projo.:ct and by Rs. 20,45,000 for the lands acquired for the Hindustan Machine. Tools by tho: Civil Court, these facts, which came into existence subse quent to the making of the original assessm.:nt, easily led to the con clusion that the values adopted by the respondent fof these lands were • far below tht>ir real and true market value and as such prop.::rty (mean ing lands) chargeable to es•ate duty having been under-valued had es caped assessment of the duty. On the s~cond aspect the High Court held that the fact that land References were filed ~g:;~inst the awards of the Special Deputy Collector tmda s. 18 of th.: Land Acquisition Act and were pending in the Civil Court was not disclosed by the account able person, that the said fact was a primary and material t'.lct and not .an inferential fact and its non-disclosure amounted to omissiotl or failure which could kud the assessing authority to a reasonable belief that pro perty chargeab!c to estate duty had escaped assessment and as such the fn this view, of the respondent had jurisdiction to issue the notice. matter. the High Court uphehi ttl\! notice issued und.:r s. 59(a) of the Act and dismissed the writ petition. ThL'i d.:cisi\,)\ of the High Court is being challenged before us in Civil Appeal No. ::!205 of 1972. The hsuancc ofl the notice under s. 61 or the Act was challenged in Writ Petition No. 4059 of 1969 principally on three grounds: (i) that the accountable person had only a claim iO get an extra cdmpensatio'n which was an inchoate right which could not be called 'property' and ·whether that chtim amounted to a right to property capable of salll in .open market was a highly debatable question and a mistake which haJ A B c D E F G " r • • A B C 0 E F G II 322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 2 S.C.R. . IS IVt h d' cussion and debate could not be said: d (") that land acquisition pro· . to be discovered after lengt. Y to be a mistake apparent on ~he~e~~~ 'u~1 not being part of the assess ~ ce to such other record was. ceedings and land References ID not a mistake apparent from the recor t h . c mcnt r~cord a mistake discovered by re ;re~ th case and (iii) that the f Rashid belonged to crt that ass•'d extra compensation received by the )ega. and not to the deceased and hc'nce It was not prop y no proFrty escaped d . on the death of the deceased an ' h [ t ere ore, t In other words under the guise of rectification, the cn- t nd therefore · ass·!ssmcn · ' hanced compensation could not b-~ taken Into ~c~ou_n . a . ~ •the impugned notice was illegal and without J~msdtctlon. ~he Ht!;? Court negatived the contentions and upheld the Impugned notice. This. decision is challenged in Civil App~al No. 2206 of 1972. elrs o .• p • . "". ~~ • D~aling first with C.A. No. 2205 of 1972, wherein the notice issued under s.59(a) of the Act has been challenged, counsel for the appellant raised three conte'ntions against the vbv taken by the High Court. At the out 5et counS'.!I pointed out that so far as the estate duty assess ment in respect of the properties passing on the death of Shapoor was· concerned, the respondent as well as the H igh Court had proceeded orr th·~ v.Tong assumption that the acquired lands formed part of the estate of the d~ccascJ and passed on his death, for, it was on such basis that the High Court held that having regard to the enhanced compensation· granted by the Civil Court for the la.nds such property (meaning lands) had been undervalued in the original assessment and as such it had es caped assessment to duty. According to him the lands no long.:r formed part of the estat~ of the deceased at the da:e of his ·death, namely, on May 7, 1965, inasmuch as long prior thereto they had ve~t~:d in the Govcrnmc:nt, and, therefore, it was merely the right to· receive comp;:nsation, which, if at all, could constitute property pass!ng on the death of the deceased., but he contended that during the lifetime of the (].~;:cased the lands in question had not merely heen acquired but cvc·n the compensation as determined under tho;: awards made by ~he Spcciill D.:puty Co:J.~ctor was paid to and received by the deceased and: hence nt tho;; time of the death the initial right to receive compensation: ~ad already merged in those awards ami the only right which the dc c~a~ed had was the right to agitate against the correctness of the award:> and nothing more and this right to claim furth~r compensation was :t ~rccario~s right, being merely a right to litigate-a chancy and dicey nght, wh1ch could not be clev;~tcd to the status of any asset or property lind ns such there was no question of any property having escaped the nss~ssmcnt to du:y. It was urged thut such n right to further compen sation would bccom.! property only when the claim would be accepted! ·-- ---------···-·--""' . .. . ---~-~------- K. S. CHENAI v. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapurkar, J.) 323 \.. ·~ finally by the Court and till the enhanc-ed compensation became pay able by reason of final adjudication of the Court no property could be said to have come into existence and certainly it was not in existence at It was point·~d out that against the decrees passed the date of death. by the City Civil Court appeals had been preferred by the Government to the High Court and even the High Court's decision might be carried in further appeal to this Court and, therefore, till the claim was finally accepted by the high~st Court no property (enhanced compensation) could be said to have come into existence. Counsel urged that it would~ run counter to aU principles of direct taxation to regard the amou'nt decreed subsequ.;ntly by the final Court as property having come into existence retrospectively on the re},;vant date (being date of death under Estate Duty Act and valuation date unckr the Wealth Tax Act) though, in fact, it did not exist on that date, a'nd in this behalf reliance was placed upon the dt;::cision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Khan Bahadur Ahmed Alladin & .Sons. v. Commissioner of Income-tax('), two decisions of the Calcutta High Court, namely, Commissioner of Wealth Tax, West Bengai (II) v. U. C. Mahatab(") and Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal-I! vi. Hindustan Housing and Land Deve lopment Trust Ltd.(8 ) two decisions of the Gujarat High Court, namely, Topandas Kundanmal v. Commissioner of Income-tax( 4 ) and Addl. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Gujarat v. New Jelumgir Vakil Mills Co. Ltd. (r,) and one decision of the Kerala High Court in M. Jairam v. Commissioner of Income~ Tax, Kerala( 6 ). Secondly, counsel contended that assuming that the. right to receive compensation survived and it was that right which was being prosecuted by the heirs of Rashid Civil Court, the impugned notice had not been issued on the ground that such right to compensation had be~n undervalued on the earlier occasion and required to be properly valued as at the date of the death but the basis on which it was issued was clearly unsustainablein inasmuch as the respondent had issued it on the assumption that there had been escapement of assessment to duty because the in the original assessment had been undervalued in view of the glaring en hano~d compensation awarded by the Civi1 Court, and the High Court's decision upholding the issuance of such notice on the wrong basis was liable to be set aside. Thin!ly, counsel contended that seeking Refe th~ir pendency in Civil .re·nces under the Land Acquisition Act and E- G· ( (l) 74 I.T.R. 651; 657 and 658. (2) 78 I.T.R. 214. (3) 108 I.T.R. 380. (4) 114 LT.R. 237. (5) .117 I.T.R. 849. (6) J]7 l.T.R. 638. ---------~--- - ~· 324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980} 2 S.C.R. 'f 'A Court could not be said to be primary facts, non-disclosure of whictl could amount to an on)ission or failure on the part of the accountable ~rson resulting in escapement of ass~ment to duty. B c On the other hand counsel for the Revenue pressed for our accept ance the view taken by the High Court. He fairly conceded that the lands in question could not be ~egarded as forming part of the estate of the dereased on the relevant date in~smuch as the lands had vested in the Government long prior to the death of the deceased, but he con tended that upon such acquisition of lands, the right to receive compen sation at market value on the dates of the relevant notifications accrued to the deoeased and such right was unquestionably property which would pass on the death of the deceased. He disputed that this right to receive compensation got mer~d in the awards made by the Special Deputy Collector or that thereafter such right ceased to exist. Accord ing to him if the awards made by the Special Deputy Collector had been acquiesced in and accepted without a'ny protest by the deceased or his D heirs, such right would have merged in--the said awards, but where, as in the case here, the awards made by the Special Deputy Collector, which in law are nothiiig but offers made by the Government to the claimant, are not accepted or are accepted under protest and the claim ant seeks land References in Civil Courts, the right to compensation must be regarded as having surviwd or kept alive by the claimants and to be it is that property (right to compensation) which will have evaluated by the assessing authority as qn the date of death. According to him obviously this asset or property had not been correctly valued in the original assessment proceedings ment had been granted by the Civil Courts ih the land References and, therefore, there was escapement of assessment to duty, and hence the notice under s. 59(a) of the Act should be regarded as having been issued properly. Counsel further contended that the High Court had rightly taken the view that seeking References under the Land Acquisi- tion Act and their pendency in Civil Court were primary facts which had not been disclosed' by the accountable person during the original reasonable belief that assessment and such non·disclosure led to the impugned noti~ there was escapement of assessment to duty. The according to him, therefore, was, relied and justified. E inasmuch as glaring enhance-r ·G As stated above, so far as the estate! duty assessment in respect of the properties passing o:t;~. the death of Shapoor was concerned, counsel for the Revenue fairly conceded that the la'nds which were the subject regarded as forming part of the estate of the deceased on the relevant date and could not pass on his death inasmuch as those lands had vested in the Government •H matter of acquisition proceedings could not be --- 1 r - - - - --.........- J J ~ Jl .. " • -tl .t- _}. I ' \.. .. K. S. CHENAI v. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapurkar, J.) 325 long prior to his death but the right to receive compensatio'n at market valve on the dates of the relevant notifications unquestionably accrued to the deceased which was property and it would be such pro~rty that would pass on the death of th~ deceased. That such right is property is well-settled and if necessary reference may 'be made to a decision of this Court in Pandit Lakshmi Kant Jha v. Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Bihar and Orissa C), a case under the Wealth-Tax Act, 1957 where it has been clearly held that the right to receive com~nsation in respect of the Zamindari estate which was acquired by the Government under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, e\"Cn though the date of pay ment was deferred, was property and constituted an asset for the pur pose of that taxing statute. In other words, since the lands ~re lost to the estate of the ·deceased before the releva'nt date, namely, the date of death, it would be the right to receive compensation under the Land Acquisition Act that will have to be evaluated under the Estate Duty Act. Counsel for the appellant did not dispute this position but he con tended that no sooner the Collector (the Special Deputy Collector here in) made his awards determining the amounts of compensation payable to the claimants under sec. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having merged in awards, the determination having been made by a statutory public offi cial and what the claimants would be left with thereafter WM merely a right to agitat•;: the correctness of such determination and this right to claim further compensation being merely a right to litigate was no asset or property and further that such ri.cllt would become asset or property only after the Civil Court finally adjudicated upon such claim. The High Court, while negativing this contention, has held that the "right to receive extra compensation'' was not a separate or different right inde pendent of "the right to receive compensation". It has observed thus: c· ,. "The right to receive compensation for the lands acquired by the Government, .at their market value at the date of the acquisition is one and indivisible right. There is no right to 'receive compensation' a,.nd a separate right to receive 'extra comp; msation'. The only: right is to receive the compensa tion for. the lands acquired by the Government, which is. the fair market value on the date of acquisition. .. The argument of learned counsel that the right to receive extra compensation accrued when the Civil Court passed the order and not before does not merit acceptance. The (1) 90 J.T.R. 97. .. . J > 326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.a. . . A so called right to receive extra compensation cannot be torn from or consider~ separately from the right to receive the market value of the lands acquired by the Government. That right accrues to the owner of the lands as soon as the lands are acquired by the Government. It is, therefore, difficult to ac cept the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a fresh and an independent right to 'receive extra compen sation' accrue to the heirs of the deceased and that it was owrnd and possessed by the heirs of the deceased." In our opinion the High Court was right in holding that there are no two separate rights-one a right to receive compensation and other -c a right to receiv·~ extra or further compensation. Upon acquisition of · his lands under the Land Acquisition Act the claiinant has only one ·right which is to receive compensation for the lands at their market value on the date of the relevant notification and it is this right which is quantified by the Collector Wlder s.ll and by the Civil Court under s.26 of the Land Acquisition Act.. It is true that under s.ll the Collec.. ~D tor after holding the necessary inquiry determines the quantum of ~om­ pensation by fixing the marlret value of the land and in doing so is guided by the provisions contained in ss. 23 and 24 of Act-the very provisions by reference to which the Civil Court fixes the valuation. It is also true that the Collector's award is, under s.l2, declar~d to be, except as otherwise provided, final and conclusiv·~ evidence as between E him and the persons interested. Even so, it is well settled that in law the Collector's award under s.ll is nothing more than a'n offer of com pensation made by the Government to the claimants whose property is acquired (vide Privy Council decisions in Ezra v. Secretary of State for lndiaC) and this Court's decision in Rfzja Harish Chandra v. Dy . .. • , Land Requisition Officer(2) and Dr. G. H. Grant v. State of ' ' Bihar C)). If that be the true nature of the award made by the Collec tor· then the question whe1ber the right to receive compensation sur· vives the award must depend upon whether the claimant acquiesces tlnlrein fully or not. If the offer is acquiesced in by total aeceptan~ the right to compensation will not survive but if the offer is not accepted claimant under s.l8, the right to receive compensation must be regarded as having survived and kept alive which the claimant prosecutes in Civil Court. It is impossible to accept the contention that no sooner the Collector has made his award under s.ll the right to compensation is destroyed or ceases to exist or is merged in the award, or what is left -G or is accepted under protest and a land reference is sought by (1) I.L.R. 32 Cal 605. (2) [1962] 2 s.c.R. 676. (3) [1965) 3 S.C.R. 576 . - -· ...... ·- . . . - ~ \.. '- I ••• " 1(.., -~ K. S. CHENAI v. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tu[zclpurkar, J.) 32'/ - -.. J.. with th~ claimant is a mere righ! to litigate the correctness of the award. The claimant can litigate the correctn~ss of the award because his right to compensation is not fully redeemed but remains alive which he prose-· cutes in Civil Court. That is why when a ~laimant dies in a pending referenCe his heirs are brought on record and are permitted to prosecute the reference. This, however, does not mean that the Civil Court's .evaluation of this right done subsequep.tly would be its valuation a.> at the rekvant date either under the Es~ate Duty Act or the Wealth Tax Act. It will be the duty of the assessing authority under either of the enactments to evaluate this property (right to receive compensation at ~rket value on the date of relevant notification) as o'n the relevant date v· • (being the date of death under the Estate Duty and valuation date under the Wealth Tax Act). Under s.36 of the Estate Duty Act the assessing authority has ~· estimate the value of this property at the price which it would fetch if sold in the open market at the time of the de ceased's death. In the case of the right to receive compensation, which is property, where the Collector's award has been made but has not been accepted or has b.;en accepted under protest and a reference is sought or is pending in Civil Court at the date of the deceased's death, estimated value can never be below the figure quantified by the Collec tor because under s. 25 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, Civil Court cannot award any amount below tha! awarded by the Collector; the esti mated value may be equal to the Collector's award or more but can never be equal to the tall claim made by the claimant in the Reference nor equal to the claim actually awarded by the Civil Court inasmuch as the risk or hazard of litigation would be a detracting factor whib arriv- """' ~at a reasonable a'nd proper value of this property as on the date of · V m: deceased's death. The assessing authority will have to estimate the value having regard to the peculiar nature of the property, its market ability and the surrounding circumstances including the dsk or hazard of litigation looming large at the rebvant date. The first contention of counsel for the appellant, therefore, fails. > f B c D E F The second contention urged by the counsel for the appellant, how- ever, appears to us to be \Wll-founded and the impugned notice issued G • under s.59(a) of tQe Act will have to be quashed on that ground. As .~ Wf ltave said, above, since in the instan,t case the wards made by the Sjlecial Deputy Collector were not accepted by the heirs of the deceased and Land References were sought by them and the same were pending in Civil Court at the relevant date (being the date of Shapoor's death), the notice under s.59(a) would have been valid if the same had been H issued on the basis that such right to compensation had b~n under~ valued ob the earlier occasion and required to be properly valued '3s on ( l.- :1- / \ '' 328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c.R. A B c i the date of the death, but what we find is that the said notice was issued by' the respondent on the wrong assumption that the acquired lands. still fanned part of the estate of the deceased and that having regard to the glaring enhanced compensation granted by the Civil Court for the lands, the said lands had been undervalued in the original assessment 'and as such the same had escaped assessment to duty. In the notice issued to the appellant under s.59(a) of the Act a bald statement was made by the respondent to the effect that he had reason to believe that pro~rty chargeable to estate duty (a) had escaped assessment and (b) bad been under assessed, and, therefore, the appellant was called. upo~ _ '-'J to deliver a further statement of Account By her Chartered Account: _ a~t's letter dated December 15, 1969 the respqndent was called upon to give the basis for his aforesaid belief, to which the respondent re- plied on January 1, 1970 thus : · 1 .1 "The extra compensations received by you in 0. P. No. 325/65, O.P. No. 364165, O.P. No. 29164 and O.P. No .. 30/64 relating to the land acquired by the Goveroinent es caped assessment. In view of your failure to disclose full particulars to Department regarding the land acquisition pro ceedigs in the Account filed by you, reassessment proceed ing have been initiated under s.59(a) of the Estate Duty Act." t The aforesaid communication clearly brings out the fact in the respon dent's view the extra coll}pensation (meaning the enhanced amounts) received by the appellant under the Civil Court decree-<; in Lanli Refer- ences had escaped assessment in the earlier assessment proceedings an~ .; ..,..._ sibce such escapement was due to the appellant's failure to disclose fuh particulars regarding the land acquisition proceedings, the reassessment proceedings were being initiated. In other words, the assessment was being reopened for the purpose of including the enhanced amounts re- . ceiV""..d by the appellant :i'n the principal value' of the property passing on the death and assessing the same to duty and not for the purpose of, evaluating the right to compensation which had been undervalued on the earlier occasion. • Further, as regards the basis on which the impugned notice bad been issued the High Court took the f~ilowing· view while upholding th~ issuance of the notice : · - · · • f.._ ' "Then, the next question that arises is whether such non disclosure r~l'red in an under-valuation of the properties in eluded in the account, and consequently there was an escape ment of the property chargeab:e to the estate duty from assess ment? The compensation awarded by the Special Deputy D E F G B ....... -- K; .S. CHf:.NAI V. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapur"kar, ].) 329 .:: Collector ha-s been enhanced by Rs. 20,45,000 in the case of lands acquired for H.M.T. and by Rs. 1,90,000 for the lands acquired for the Synthetic Drugs Project. Those facts which came into existence subsequ;:,nt to the making of the assess ment, lead to the conclusion that the values a.dopted by the Asst. Controller of Estate Duty for those lands were far below their real and true market value." • X X X X X X X X X X "In the instant case, the enhancement by the City 1Civil Court of the compensation awarded by the Special Deputy Collector was so large that no reasonable person could say that the values adopted by the Asst. Controller of Estate Duty of those lands on the basis of the awards made by' the Special Deputy Collector, represented their true and correct market values. No attempt has ever ~en made by the Accountable person to show that the values adopted by the Asst. Controller of Estate Duty represented their true and correct market In those circumstances, an inevitable conclusion "Values. ' flows that there was , under-valuation of the properties which were included in the account." A B c D 11Je aforesaid observations of the High Court as well as the contents of the communication sent by the respondent to the appellant's repre sentative on January 9, 1970, clearly suggest that the impugned notice had been issued ·ou the basis that the acquired lands still formed part of tlie e.state of the deceased which passed on his death, that the valua tion for those lands adopted on the earlier occasion which was on the ba.S~ of compensation awarded by the Special Deputy Collector did not represent their corro;:,ct market value which was clear from the glaring enhanced compensation that was· awarded by th~ Civil ,Court under its decrees in Land References· and , therefore, such property had escaped In other words, the reassessment was intended to assessment to duty. be ·undertaken \Yith a view to include the -enhanced amounts received by the appellant in the principal value of the property passing on death and bringi.n.,g the same to duty. We were informed at the Bar by counsel for. the appellant that in the reassessment which w:1s made pursuant to the impugne4 notice, the quantum of extra compensation decreed . by th~ ~vii Court was included in the assessment .and brought to duty . Obviously, the impugn.ed notice which was issued on a wrong basis and wiJh the aforesaid objective and the subsequent reassessment made in PJP.'Suance thereof would pe clearly illegal and unsustainable inasmuch ~868SC1!79 . F G B ).. f

#11. . . 330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 2 s.c . .a. as the extra compepsation awarded by the Civil Court taken with tile original compensation awarded by the Special Deputy Collector can:not be regarded as proper evaluation of the right to rec~ive compensation as on the date of the death of the deceased. Proposed as well as actual inclusion. of such extra compensation awarded by the Civil Court in the principal value of the estate passing on the death of the deceased would be manifestly wrong for more tha'n one reason. In the first place the said property, namely, the enhanced compensation was not in existence at the date of the death of the deceased. Secondly, such extra com pensation awarded by the City Civil Court was liable to variation in the appeals that were pending in the High Court. Thirdly, as discussed~ _ aboV'~, such extra compe'nsation together with the compensation award-. , ed by the Special Deputy Collector could not be regarded as the proper valuation of the right to compensation as on the relevant da~~ (the date of th~ deceased's death). In our view, therefore, the very issuance of the notice under s.59(a) .which was dooo on a basis c)early unsustain- able in iaw is liable to be quashed on this ground. Consequently, re- assessment which has been made by the R·~spondent, is also liable to be quashed. • In view of the aforesaid conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to deal with the last contention urged by the counsel for the appellant that seek~ ing of land References and their pendency in Civil Court were not pri- mary facts but inferential fac~s and non~disclosure thereof would not amount to failure or omission ,on the part of the accountable person to disclose full particulars leading to escapement of assessment to duty. 1 In the result the appeal is allowed and the impugned notice issued .~ ~. ~. under s.59(a) of the Act as also the subrequent reassessment made are quashed. The Revenue will pay the costs of the appeal to the appel- lant. · A B D F Turning to Civil Appeal No. 2206 of 1972, counsel for the appel lant challenged the impugned notice issued under s.61 of the Act on two G grounds : (a) it was case of change of opinion as regards the valuation of land.s acquired and not a case of mistake apparent from the recocd and as such the impugned notice was issued under s.61 with a view- to get over the bar of limitation under s.73A, which would otherwise be· ~ applicable to a notice under s.59(a) of the Act and (b) that for pur poses of s. 61 the hind acquisition proceedings and La,n.d Referell. Cell in the Civil Court could not be regarded as part of th~ assessment record and the so~cttlled mistake discovered by reference to such other record was not a mistake apparent from th~ record of the ca~ and as such the · D 1r - K S. CRENAI :V. CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapurkar, J.) 331 ~, I impugned notice was liable to be quashed. In our view, the first ground A 1s sufficient to dispose -of the appeal. ...,' ' ' t · The •impugned notice dated Nm»cmber 14, 1969 in terms I\~cites that the assessment in this case was completed on March 29, 1966 on a net · principa1 value of Rs. 23,53,064 (which included the vulue of acquired lands at ·rates fixed by the Land Acqui~ition Officer) with a B duty worked out at Rs. 5,07,919.20, that it was then learnt that in respect of the acquired lands the Civil Court had enhanced the com 'Pensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer and had ordcreli paY- ~ment thereof with interest at 4% (particulars whereof were specified) ilnd that, therefore, the respondent proposed "to rectify the assess ment under s. 61 as mistake apparent from the record and adopt tho~ c ·abov.$ enhanced compensation awarded by the Court". It is thus dear that the rectification is bei'ng undertaken on the ground that the initial valuation adopted in respect of the acquired lands was based at rates fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, that such valuation was .obviously w.t:,ong in View of the enhanced compensation awarded by the Civil Court and, therefore, the enhanced compensation was sought to D ibe included in the principal value of the estate by undertaking the rec tification proceedings. In substance it cannot be said to be a case of Tectification of any mistake apparent from the record but the respon- dent is really seeking to change his opinion about the valuation of the. -acquired lands because some other authority, namely, the Civil Court has valued the same differently. Now, for the purpose of enhancing the ' B value of the acquired lands on the' basis of their value as determined by the Civil Court the respondent must resort to provisions of s. 59 · v - and proceed to make reassessment but such re~sessment has to oc done within the period of three years from the date of the original · It seems to us that in the instant assessment under s. 73 A of the Act. -case the respondent resorted to s.61 because the rectification of any. mistake apparent from the record could be done at any time within fi~ years from the date of the original assessment. F -'• Duty-cum-Income-tax Circle, Mangalore("), on In· Ethel Rodrigues v. Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Estate similar facts when · the Assistant Controller of Estate Duty, Bangalore had issued a notio~ , -purporting to act under s.61 of the Act on the ground that the e~tate 1 ' had been valued at an enhanced figure in the probate proceedings and had in proceedings undertaken pursuant to such noti~. enhanced the valuation of the estate in accordance with. its valuation placed o'n the -estate in the probate proceedings and consequently enhanced the estate .(futy, this Court quashed the order of rectification. The principle enun- G H {1) [t'963]-<J.9 J:T.R. (E.D.) 128. j· I i I 332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. (1980] 2 S.C.R. A ciated by this Court in that case has been succinctly summarised in the head-'note thus : ']o.. "Where the Controller has made his own valuation of the the Estate ·estate of a de'ceased person under s. 36 of Duty Act, 1953, he has no jurisdiction to rectify the assess ment under s. 61 on the ground that the estate has been. taken at an enhanced value in the probate proceedi'hgs. By taking the enhanced value put upon the estate in the probate proceedings he cannot be said to rectify any mistake apparent from the record of the estate duty assessment out he would be changing his opinio'n about the valuation of the estate be cause some other authority has valued the estate differently. For the purpose of s. 61, the only record tli.at the assess .. ing authority can look into is the record relating to the ass·~ss­ ment of -estate duty and not any other record such as the re cord in the probate proceedings which is not relevant For the purpose of enhancing the value of an estate on the basis of the value taken in the probate proceedings, the Controller has to- invoke the provisions of s. 59 and pro ceed to reassess and for such a reassessment tire bar provided in s. 73 A will operate." · . In our view, the facts of the instant case clearly como;! within the ratio of the aforesaid decision. The High Court has attempted to dis tinguish the above decision by stating that in the instant case the res pondent had merely accepted the value of the acquired· lands as deter- mined by the Special Deputy Collector in his award and the accountable person had no obje~tion to this c_ourse and, therefore, the respondent~_ himself did not ~timatc the market value of the lands on the date of death of Rashid and as such it was not a case of change of opinion on his part as Iegards the correct valuation of the lands. It is difficult to accept this view. It cannot b~ disputed that when the original assess ment was made it was the duty of the respondent, after scrutinising the Account filed and examining the materials produced before him, to value the estate of the deceased pro~rly under s.36 of the Act and when he accepted the compensation fixed by the Special Deputy Collec- tor <j.S the proper valuation he must be deemed to have adopted that valuation as his own estimated value of the lands which he wanted to-\ . enhance by relying upon the valuation made by the another authority~ nanr~ly, the City Civil Court. To such a case s.59 is clearly attracted but obviously with a view to avoid the bar of s. 73-A he purported to issue the impugned notice under s. 61 and therefore the same is liable to be quashed. The aforesaid dt:Cision seems to lend support to the B c D E F G R -- - - - - -y- - K. ~. GHENAI !\1, OONII1R6LLER OF ESTATE DUTY (Tulzapurkar, !.) 333 ) .. second ground urged 'by counsel for the appellant for quashing the im- pugned notice but we would like to base our decision on the first ground In ·this case also we are told that the rectification discussed above. proc~edings havy been completed pursuant to the irnpugneu no~ice, which also must be quashed. A In the result, the notice under s.61 of the Act and the rectification. order passed in pursuance thereof are quashed. The Revenue will pay the costs of the appeal ·to the appellant. 8 ~ V.D.K. Appeals ·allowed. - - - - - - . - -. . . It" · ~ · ·- . ·-