NAVINCHANDRA RAMANLAL v. KALIDAS BHUDA

1957" it was exempted from the operation of ss. 1 to 87 of t1w Tenancy Act of 1948 and, therefore, the enquiry should be dropped. The Agricultnral Lands Tribunal rejected the application of the appellant landlonl and proce~ded further with the enquiry. The appelfant-land lord' appealed to the Collector which met with the same fate, Appellant carried' the matter to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The Revenue Tribunal was of the opinion that on a true and correct interpretation of s. 88 ( 1) (b) read with the relevant notification, not merely the lands which were in Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation area at the date of the Notification would be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act but the exemption would also extend to the lands brought within the Corporation area from time to time without any Notification for reservation and accordingly allowed the Revision Application of the appellant-landlord and directed that the enquiry under s. 32G be dropped. The respondent no. I-tenant approached the High Court of Gujarat under Article 227 of the Constitution, The High Court held that the exemption would apply only to the lands included within the limit~ of the Municipal Corporation of Ahmeda bad as on the date of Notification and in the absence of the reservation by a fresh notification the lands included in the Municipal area on extension of the limits of the Municipal Corporation subse quent to the Notification would not be exempted from the operation of the Tenancy Act. impressed the High Court was that while power to exempt the land from the operation of the Tenancy Act vests in the Government, the area of the Municipal Corporation may be extended by the Corpora tion authority and if to such extended area the exemption were to apply, the power of granting exemption would be enjoyed by Munici- pal Corporation which was not the legislative delegate and on which the power to exempt was not concerned and simultaneously, the legis lative delegate, namely, State Government would completely abdicate its function. This aspect is specifically referred to as it proceeds on an erroneous assumption that Municipal Corporation can extend its the Bombay Provincial own area. A reference to section 3 of Municipal Corporation Act would show that unless the State Govern ment in exercise of the power conferred upon it, extends the limits, the Municipal Corporation on its own cannot extend the limit. The assumption being incorrect, it cannot be called in aid of the conclusion , reached by the High Court. Mr. J. C. Shah for the respondent, how ever, frankly stated that he could not support the aforementioned reason of the High Court and, therefore, the Court should ignore it. In accordance with its opinion that We would say no more about it. In reaching this conclusion one aspect • c D E F G H 334 SUPRl!ME COUll.T 11.EPOll.TS [1979] 3 s.c.R. .. ~ the land falling in the iubsequently extended limit would not 1~njoy the benefit of exemption, the High Court quashed the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and directed the authority under Tenancy Act to proceed further with the enquiry under s. 32G. 8 C D E F G H Mr. I. N. Shroff, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant urged that the High Court was in error in putting a narrow construc tion on s. 88(1) (b) because the power to exempt an area situate with in the Municipal Corporation limit was to be exercised for urban non agricultural or industrial development and that once such powt!f is exercised, it should cover the entire area situate JVithin the limits of Municipal Corporation at any given point of time, and this cons1ruc- tion adopted by Gujarat Revenue Tribunal deserves acceptance by this Court as it effectuates the purpose for which power is conferred. It was further contended that once a Notification exempting the land from the operation of the Tenancy Act is issued under s. 88(1) (b), the exemption would become operative retrospectively and no vested right could thereafter be claimed. The contention raised by Mr. Shroff would have necessitated examination ot the ~heme of the various provisions of the Te:m1ncy Act as illls been done by the High Court but in our opinion the High Court unnecessarily undertook this exercise wholly overlooking and by passing two important amendments introduced in the relevant pro visions of the Tenancy Act of 1948, viz., 43C and 88(1) both of which were in force at the timo when the petition was heard and upon proper construction both amendments being retroactive in their opera tion from the commencement of the Amendment Act of 1956 w:iich came into force on ht August, 1956 would have clinched the issue. Therefore, it is not necessary to examine the contention from the angle from which the High Court has done but the contention of Mr. Shroff can be disposed of by a mere reference to the two relevant provisions. The two sections relevant for considering the exemption from the operation of the Tenancy Act of 1948 are 43C and 88. Section 43C as it stood before its amendment by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 read as under : "43C. Nothing in ss. 32 to 32R, both inclusive, and 43 • • " ' ~ ,. • l shall apply to lands in the areas within the limits of- ( a) xxx (b) Municipal Corporation constituted under Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1948". Section 88 ( 1) (b) as it stood prior to the introduction of a pro viso by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 reads as under : NAVINCHANDRA v. KALIDAS (Desai, J.) 3:15 "88.(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in sub··S. (2) uothing in the foregoing provisions of this Act shall apply- ( a). x x x x (b) to any area which the State Government may from time to time by Notification in the official gazette specify as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial develop ment". The Tenancy Act of 1948 was amended by the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965, (Gujarat Act 36 of 1965). Section 7 of the Amendment Act of 1965 reads as under : - "7. Amendment of section 43C of Born. LXVII of 1948-In section 43C of the principal Act, for the word 'areas within the limits of', the words 'areas which on date of the coming into force of the Amending Act, 1955 are within the limits of' shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been substituted with effect on and 1st August, 1956". Section 18 of the Amending Act reads as under : "18. Amendment of section 88 of Born. LXVII of 1948-In section 88 of the principal Act,- (1) in sub-section ( 1), (i) x x x x x x x x x x (ii) to clause (b) added, namely following provisios shall be Provided that if after a notification in respect of any area specified in the notification is issued under this clause, whether before or after the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Gujarat Amendment) Act, 1965 (Guj. 36 of 1965), the limits of the area so specified are enlarged on account of the addition of any other area thereto, then merely by reason of such addition, reservation as made by the notification so issued shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have applied to the area so added, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any judgment, decree. or order of any court, tribunal or any other authority". 2-253SCI/79 B c D E F G· H ~ ' .. -i; ~ ·.~ -\.-'" • ' .x. ) • 336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979] 3 s.c.R. A B c 11 E Both these amendments to the Principal Act were introduced by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 which came into force from 29th December, 1965. However, looking to the language of the amendments made retroactive in s. 43C and s. 88(1) (b), both the amendments are from !st August 1956, i.e. from the date Bombay Act 13 of 1956 In other words, amended s. 43C and s. 88 ( 1) (b) came into force. with its proviso will have to be read as if they were introduced in that very form from !st August, 1956. Having noticed the amendments let us look to its impad on the question of application of the Tenancy Act of 1948 to the lands in cluded in the Municipal Corporation area of Ahmedabad after 1st August, 1956. Indisputably, Survey No. 165, the land involved in this appeal, being situated within the revenue limits of Acher Village, was included from 30th May, in the area of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation 1959. Therefore, on 1st August 1956 when the amended sections 43C and 88(1) (b) with its proviso as amended by Act 36 of 1965 came into force, the land being not in Municipal Corporation area, would not enjoy the exemption as conferred on the land within the Municipal Corporation area by the Notification issued on 9th August, 1956, superseded by the subsequent Notification dated 14th February, 1957 in exercise of the power conferred bys. 88(1)(b). Accordingly, this land Survey No'. 165 would be governed by the Tenancy Act of 1948. The consequences of the application of the Tenancy Act of 1948 to land Survey No. 165 may now be examined. By Bombay Act 13 of 1956 a revolutionary amendment of far reaching consequence was made in the Tenancy Act of 1948 and the amended Act came into force with effect from 1st August, 1956. F • i The most important provision of the Amending Act was s. 32 as amended by the Amending Act which provided for transfer of the ownership of land by operation of law from the landlord to the tenant. The title to the land which vested in the landlord on 1st April, 1957, the tiller's day, passed to the tenant by operation of law. What is the effect of this transfer of title was examined by this Court in Sri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay.(') The Court held as under. • • "The title of the landlord to the land passes immediately to the tenant on the tiller's day and there is a completed purchase or sale thereof as between tenant. The tenant is no doubt given a locus penitentiae and an option of declaring whether he is or is not willing to the landlord and Cl) [1959] Suppl. I S.C.R. 489. G H , • x' ) • MVINCHANDRA v. KALIDAS (Desai, !.) 3 37 purchase the land held by him as a tenant. If he fails to appear or makes a statement that he is not willing to pur· chase the land, the Tribunal shall by an order in writing declare that such tenant is not willing to purchase the land and that the purchase is ineffective. It is only by such a declaration by the Tribunal that the purchase becomes in effective. If no such declaration is made by the Tribunal the purchase would stand as statutorily effected on tiller's day and will continue to be operative, the only obliga tion on the tenant then being the payment of price in the If the tenant commits mode determined by the Tribunal. default in the payment of such price either in lump or by instalments as determined by the Tribunal, s. 32M declares the purchase to be ineffective but in that event the shall then be at the disposal of the Collector to be disposed of by him in the manner provided therein. Here also purchase continues to be effective as from the tiller's day until such default is committed and there is no question of a conditional purchase or sale taking place between the land lord and tenant. The title to the land which was vested originally in the landlord passes to the tenant on the tiller's day or the alternative period prescribed in that behalf. This title is defeasible only in the event of the tenant failing to appear or making a statement that he is not willing to pur chase the land or committing default in payment of the price thereof as determined by the Tribunal. The tenant gets a vested interest in the land defcasible only in either of those cases and it cannot therefore be said that the title of land lord to the land is suspended for any period definite or indefinite''. B c D E F If the effect of the land being governed by s. 32 on tiller's day is to transfer the title of the landlord to the tenant by operation of law, dcfeasible only in the event of tenant declining to purchase the land or committing default in payment of price as determined by Tribunal, the next question is : if the land is subsequently brought within the Municipal Corporation area which area enjoys the exemp- tion under s. 88(1)(b), would the vested title be vested: the G This question can be answered shortly by referring to the amended H s. 43C ands. 88(1)(b) with its proviso, both of which clearly assert that the exemption granted under s. 88 ( 1) (b) by a Notification 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS < [1979] 3 s.c.R. issued by the Government would enure for the benefit of the land which was within the Municipal Corporation area on lst August, 1956 and in no case the additional area which may be included within the Municipal Corporation area after 1st August, 1956 would enjoy the exemption granted by the Notification unless a fresh J\:otification is issued. Admitiedly, since 14th February, 1957 no fresh Notification is issued. The land bearing Survey No. 165 was not within Municipal Corporation area either on 14th February, 1957, the day on which exemption was granted, or on 1st August, 1956 when Bombay Act VIII of 1956 was put into operation or on 1st April, 1957, the tiller's day, when title to land would stand the tenant by sheer operation of law without anything more. There fore, the Notification dated 14th February, 1957 would not cover the land which was at the date of the issue of the Notification not included in Ahmcdabad Municipal Corporation area. Subsequent ex ten; ion of the area of Municipal Corporation would not enjoy the benefit of exemption in view of the proviso to s. 88(1) (b) and the opening words of s. 43C both of which clearly recite that the exemption would apply to the land included in the Municipal Corporation area on 1st August, 1956, the day on which Bombay Act 13 of 1956 came into force, and not to any subsequently added area to the area of Municipal Corporation. Land bearing Survey No. 165 was brought within the Municipal Corporation area after 1st August, 1956 and, therefore, the Notification dated 14th February, 1957 would not cover such added or extended area and there would be no exemption under that Notification for the land in the extended area. transferred If the land bearing Survey No. 165 does not enjoy the benefit of exemption under s. 88(1) (b) and it being agricultural land in respect of which the respondent was tenant on the tiller's day, the respondent has, by operation of law, become the owner and is a deemed pur chaser. The Agricultural Lands Tribunal would have to proceed with the enquiry to determine the price as required by s. 32G. Mr. Shroff, however, contended that the decisions of this Court in Mohan/al Chunilal Kothari v. Tribhovan Haribhai Tamboli,(') and Sldram Narsappa Kamble v. Sholapur Borough Municipality,(2) would clearly indicate that whenever a Notification under s. 88(1) (b) is issued by the appropriate Government granting exemption to any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act for the purposes men tioned in the sub-section, such exemption will apply retrospectively • c D E F G (!) [1963] 2 SCR 707. l (2) [1966] I SCR 618. • • • NAVINCHANDRA v. KALIDAS (Desai, 1.) 339 and no vested right under the Tenancy Act 1948 or even one under the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1939, could be claimed by any one. It is not necessary to examine this contention because subsequent to the later decision in Sidram Narsappa Kamble (supra) the Tenancy Act of 1948 was amended by Gujarat Act 36 of 1965 making it abundantly clear that if there is any Notification exempting any area from the operation of the Tenancy Act issued by the appropriate Government under s. 88(1) (b), the exemption would enure for the benefit of that area included in the Municipal Corporation as on 1st August, 1956 and in the absence of a fresh Notification such exemption would not be available to the extended or area added to the area of Municipal Cor poration and this amendment is made effective notwithstanding any judgment, order or decision of the Court or Tribunal to the contrary . Presumably, in order to combat the effect of some judgments which purported to lay down that the exemption once granted would apply to any area that may be included in the Corporation area at a date much later to the date of issue of the Notification, the amendment was made. Accordingly, law having undergone a substantive amendment bearing on the subject, the ratio in the decision of Mohan/a! Chunilal Kothari and Sidram Narsappa Kamble (supra) which turned upon the construction of s. 88 (1) (b) as it stood at the relevant time, would not be of any assistance. Therefore, for the reasons herein stated, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. A B c D E N.K.A. Appeal dismissed. I , .. • ) •