K. GOPAL REDDY v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

363 K. GOPAL REDDY V. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH November 22, 1978 (JASWANT SINGH AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, JJ.j Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate JurisdictkJn) Act, 1970-Appellant acquitted by trial court on the ground that two views were pcssible on the evidence-High Court convtcted and sentenced hhn-AppeUate G'ourt-TVhc11 cn11 review evidence- Words a11d phrases-"Proof beyond reasonable doubt' n1eani11g of. The iappellant was charged with the offence of committing the murder of his wife. The trial court acquitted him on the ground that the prosecution had failed to establish any motive for the offence, that the evidence of prosecution witnesses was discrepant, conflicting and when two views were possible on the basis of two divergent versions given by the prosecution and the defence, the benefit of doubt should be given to the accused. improbable The High Court reversed the order of !acquittal and convicted and sentenc ed the appellant to imprisonment for life on the view that the trial court had magnified the importance to be attached to the discrepancies which were of a minor nature.

B c D In appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the appellant the.,t in aJI c·ases \vhere two views of the evidence were possible the accused was E entitled to the benefit of doubt arising from the two views and that on this principle the High Court should not have interfered with the order of acquittal merely because another view Mis also possible. Dismissing the appeal, llELD ; (1) Where the trial court allow~ itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is the obvious duty of the High €ourt justice be brought to ridicule. to interfere in the interest of justice. lest the admini.;tration is but barely poSsible, it f370DJ (2) After the deci11:ion of this Court in Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1961 SC 715) this Court has consistently recognised the right of appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclu sion bearing in mind the considerations mentioned hy the Privy Council i•_1 Sheo Swarup v.

Emperor (61 I.A. 389). Occasionally phrases like "mani the ocders of festly illegal'', "grossly unjust" have been m1ed to de.cribe acquittt\J which warrant interference. But such expre: Mions have been U3ed. more as :flourishes of language to emphasise the reluctanc.e of the appellate court to interfere \vith an order of acquittal than to curtail the power of the appellate court to review the entire evidence and to come to its own con dasion. In two other cases it has been held that io the principles laid down :wo· in Sanwat Singh's oose may added further principle F u 364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1979) 2 S.C.R. reasonable conclusions could be reached on the basis of the evidence on record the appellate court should not disturb the finding of the trial court. This principle stems out of the fundamental principle of our criminal juris~ prudence that the accused is entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt Jf two reasoniably probable and evenly balanced views of the eyidence arc possible, one must necessarily concede the existence of a reasonable doubt.

But fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit. of a doubt arising fro·m the possibility of la duality of views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against him. If the preponderance of probability fa all one way, a bare possibility _of another view will not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any doubt. It is, therefore essentilail that, any view of the evidence in favoYr of the accused must be reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which an accused person may claim, must be reasonable. A reasonbble doubt does not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that may flit through the mind of a Judge about almost anything at any time or other, it does not mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of reluctance to convict, it means a real doubt, a doubt founded upon reason.

"Proof beyond a reasonable doubt'' does not mean proof beyond a shadow of doubt. The la\\' would fail to protect the community admitted fanciful po~sibilitics to deflect the course of justice. strong against a man las to leave only a remote possibility in his favour which c\"1>n be disn1is<;ed v,tith the sentence, "of course it is possible but not in the least probable," the case nothing sho1·t of that \\'ill suffice. is proved beyond reasonable doubt but [Jfi9A-Gl If the evidence Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 715 0pplied.