GURUPAD KHANDAPPA MAGDUM v. HIRABAI KHANDAPPA MAGDUM & Ors.

#2. (a) In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceased coparcener it is necessa.ry i~ the very nature of things, and as they very first step H to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by dong that alone can one determine the extent .ofl the claimant's share. Expla~ nation I to section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that 14-315SCI/78 762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 3 S.C.1'.. A B c D E the in.terest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener "shall be deemed to oo·' share m the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that pro~rty had taken place immediately before his death. What therefore requued to be ~ssumed is that. a p~tion had in fact taken place between the deceased and. h~s coparcencrs 11.·med1ately before his death. That assumption, once made, 1s 1rrevocable.. In other words, the assumption having been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the copar cenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, stages. . To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calculating the quantum of the share of the heirs is. truly to permit one's imagination to boggle. All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically work ed out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the parti tion which had taken place during the life time of the deceased. The allot ment of this share is not a processua1 step devised merely for the purpose of It has to be treated and accepted as a working out some other conclusion. concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. The :inevitable corollary of this position is that the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcenary property at the time of his death, in addition to the share which he or she received or must be deemed to have [768 B-G] received in the notional partition. through all (b) This interpretation furthers the legislative intent in regard to the enlar gement of the share of female heirs, qualitatively and quantatively. Even reasonably possible, assuming that two interpretations of Explanation I are Courts must prefer that interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature and remedy the injustice from which the Hindu women have suffered over the years. By restricting the operation of the fiction created by Explana tion I in the manner suggested by the appellant, Courts shall be takiing a retro grade step, putting back as it were the clock of social .reform which has enabled the Hindu women to acquire an equal status with males in matters of pro perty. [768 G. 769 A-BJ Rangubhai La/ji v. Laxn1an Lalji, 68 (Born.) L.R. 74; Sushilabai Ramachandra Kulkarni v. Narayanarao Gopalrao Deshpande and Ors .. A.I.R. (1975) Born. 257; Vidyaben v. Jagadislzchandra N. Bhatt, A.LR. 1974 Guj. 23; Ananda v. Haribandu, A.J.R. 1967 Orissa 194; approved. F

#3. In the instant case, (a) There is no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th by ignoring the tth share which she would have obtained had there been a parti In a parti tion during her husband's life time between him and his two sons. tion between Khandappa and his two sons, there would be four sharers in the coparcenary property, the the plaintiff. Khandappa would have therefore got a !th share in the coparcenary property on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and his sons. fourth being Khandappa's wife, r766 G-H. 767 B-CJ (b) By the application of the normal rule prescribed by Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, Khandappa's interest in the coparcenary property would devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary 1nd not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But, since the widow ,nd daughter are amongst the female relatives specified in class I of the Sche lule to the Act and Khandappa died leaving behind a wido\v and dau~hters, he proviso to section 6 comes into play and the normal is excluded. Khandappa's interest in the coparcenary property would therefore devolve. according to the proviso, by intestate Mtccession under the Act and not by survivorship. Testamentary succession is out of question as the deceased had not made a testamentary disposition though, under the explanation to section G H .. / • , ... ,,, A • G. K. MAGDUM v. H. K. MAGDUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 763 30 of the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary pro- A perty is capable of being disposed of by a will or other testamentary disposi- tion. [765 E-Gl (c) The plaintiff's share as determined by the application of the rules. of intestate succession contained in Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Hindu Succession Act will be 1/6th. The deceased Khandappa died leaving behind him sons, three daughters and a widow. The son, daughter and wido\v are me~­ tioned as heirs in class I of the Schedule and therefore, by reason of the prov1- -sions of section 8(a) read with the 1st clause of section 9, they simul- tmaeously and to the exclusion of other heirs. As b;:tween them the two sons, the three daughters and the \Vidow will take equally. each having one share in the deceascd's property under section 10 read \Vith Rules I and 2 of section. [766-C-Dl B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 187.S of 1975. Appael by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 19th March, 1975 of the Bombay High Court in First Appeal No. 524 of 1966 from original decree. c R. B. Datar for the Appellant. T'. N. Ganpu/e and (Mrs.) V. D. Khanna for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by CHANDRACHUD, C.J. It will be easier, with the help Jf !he foUow ing pedigree to understand the point involved in this appeal Khandappa Sangappa Magdun1 Gurupad (Doft. I) . I B1yawwa (Doft. 3) Hirab2.i (PlaintifT) I I Bhagirathibai (Deft. 4)1 I Dhrr.di.itai (Deft. 5) ' Shivapa'.d (Deft. 2) D E KhanJappa died on June 27, 1960 leaving him surviving his wife Hirabai, who is the plaintiff, two sons Gurupad and Shivapad, who are defondants l and 2 respectively, and three daughters, defendants 3 to 5. On November 6, 1962 Hirabai filed special civil suit No. 26 of 1963 in the co"rt of the Joint Civil Judge, Senior Division, Sanrli for partition and separate possession of a 7 /24th share in two houses, a land, two shops a·nd movables on the hasis that these properties belonged to the joint family consisting of her husband, herself and their two sons. H a partition were to take place during Khandappa's lifetime between himself and his two sons, the plaintiff would have got a 1/4th share in the joint family properties, the other three getting G a J /4th share each. Khandappa's l/4th share would devolve. upon •·i each · his death on six sharers, the plaintiff and her having a I/24th share therein. plaintiff claims a 7 /24th share in the joint family properties. That in short, is the plaintiff's case. Adding 1/4th and five children l/24th ' F Ddendants 2 to 5 admitted the plaintiff's claim, the suit having been contested by defendant 1, Gurupad, only. He contended that the suit properties did not belong to the joint family that they were Khandappa's self-requisitions and that, on the date 'or Khandappa's H .. .. .,~ 764 SUPREME _COURT REPORTS [1978] 3 s.c.R. death in 1960 there was no joint family in existence. He alleged that Khandappa had effected a partition of the suit properties between himself and his two sons in December 1952 and December 1954 and that, by a family arrangement dated March 31, 1955 he had given directions for disposal of the share which was reserved by him for himself in the earlier partitions. There was, therefore, no question of a fresh partition. That, in short, is the case of defendant 1. The trial court by its judgment dated July 13, 1965 rejected defendant 1 's case that the properties were Khandapp;i's self -acquisi tions and that he had partitioned them during his lifetime. Upon that finding the plaintiff became indisputably entitled to a share in the joint family prop~rties but, following the judgment of the Bombay High the learned trial judge Court in Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda(11 limited that share ta l/24th, refusing to add. l/4th and 1 /24th to gether. As against that decree, defendant 1 filed first appeal No. 524 of 1966 in the B9mbay High Court, while the plaintiff filed cross objections. By a judgment dated March 19, 1975 a Divis10n Bench of the High Court dismissed defendant 1 's appeal and allowed the plaintiff's cross-objections by holding that the suit properties belonged to the joint family, that there was no prior partition and that the plain tiff is entitled to a 7,124th share. Defendant I has filed this appeal' against the High Court's judgment by special leave. ) A B c D E Another Division Bench of !he Bombay High Court in Rangubai Lalji v. Laxman Lalji(') had already reconsidered and dissented from ~arlier Division Bench judgment in Shiramabai Bhimgonda.( 1) these two cases, the judgment of the. Bench was delivered by the same learned Judge, Patel J. On further consideration the learned Judge felt that Shiramabai( 1) was not fully argued and was incorrectly decided and that on a true view of law, the widow's share must be· ascertained by adding the share to which she is entitled at a notional partition during her husband's life time and the share which she would In the judgment under get in her husband's interest upon his death. F appeal, the High Court has based itself on the judgment in Rangubai Lalji(') endorsing indirectly the view that Shiramabai("i) was incor rect_ly decided. Since the view of the High Court that the suit properties belonged to the joint family and that there was no prior partition is well-founded and is not seriously disputed, the decision of this appeal rests on the interpretation of Explanation I to section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, (30 of 1956). That section reads thus: "6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara copar'cenary property, his interest in the property H (I) (1963) 66 Born. L.R. 351. (2) 68 Born. L.R. 74. - I. ' • / { .. - <G. K. MAGDUM v. H.K. MAGDUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 765 :shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members ,of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act : Provided that, if the deceased had left him survivi11g a .female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such a female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitak shara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary ·or intestate succession, as· the case may be, under this Act .and not by survivorship. Explanation 1.-For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place imme diately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2.-Nothing contained in the proviso to this ·section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a ~hare in the interest referred to therein." A B c D The Hindu Succession Act came into force on June 17 1956, Kliandappa having died after the commencement of that Act,' to wit in 1960, and since he had at the time of his death an interest in Mita kshara coparcenary property, the pre-conditions of section 6 are satisfied and that section is squarely attracted. By the application of E the normal rule prescribed by that section, Khandappa's interest in the coparcenary property would devolve by survivorship upon ·surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. But, since the widow and daughter are amongst the female relatives specified in class I of the Schedule to the Act and Khandappa died leaving behind a widow and daughters, the pro viso to, section 6 comes into play and the normal rule is excluded. P Khandappa's interest in the coparcenary property would therefore devolve, according to the proviso, by intestate succession under Act and not by survivorshop. Testamentary successive is out of question as the deceased had not made a testamentary disposition though under the explanation to section 30 of the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property is capable of being disposed of by a will or other testamentary disposition. G - \ • • • There is thus no dispute that the normal rule provided for by ·section 6 does not apply, that the proviso to that section is attracted and that the decision of the appeal must turn on the meaning to be given to Explanation 1 of section 6. The interpretation of that Ex planation is the subject-matter of acute controversy between the parties. Before considering the implications of Explanation 1, it is necessary to remember that what section 6 deals with is devolution of the inter est which a male Hindu has in a Mitakshare coparcenary property at H A B c D E F G H 766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978J 3 S.C.R. the time of his death. Since Explanation I is intended to be explana- tory. of the provisions contained in the section, what the Explanation provides has to be correlated to the subject matter which the section In the instant case the plaintiff's suit based as it itself deals with. is on the provisions of section 6, is essentially a claim to ~btain a share in the interest which her husband had at the time of his death in the coparcenary property. Two things become necessary to determine for the purpose of giving relief to the plaintiff. One, her share in her husband's share and two, her husband's own share in the copa<- cenary property. The proviso to section 6 contains the formula fixing the share of the claimant while Explanation 1 contains a for- mula for deducing the share of the deceased. The plaintiff's share, by the application of the proviso, has to be determined according to the terms of the testamentary instrument, if any, made by the deceased and since there is none in the instant case, by ·the application of the rules of intestate succession contained in sections 8, 9 and I 0 of the Hindn Succession Act. The deceased Khandappa died leaving be- hind him two sons, three daughters and a widow. The son, daughter and a widow are mentioned as heirs in class I of the Schedule and therefore, by reason of the provisions of section 8 (a) read with the !st clause of section 9, they take simultaneously and to the exclusion of other heirs. As between them the two sons, the three daughters and the widow will take equally, each having ooe share in the deceas- ed's property under section 10 read with Rules 1 and 2 of that section. ·Thus, whatever be the share of the deceased in the coparcenary pro- perty, since there are six sharers in that property each having an equal share, the plaintiff's share therein will be I/6th. The next step, equally important though not equally easy to work out, is to find out the share which the deceased had in the coparcenary property because after all, the plaintiff has a I/6th interest in that share. Explanation I which contains the formula for determining the share of the deceased creates a fiction by providing that the ;nter- est of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediatelv hefore his Jeath. One must, therefore. imagine a state of affairs in which a little prior Khandappa's death, a partition of the conarcenarv property was effec- ted between him and other members of the coparcenary. Though the plaintiff, not being a coparcener, was not entitled to demand partit; ·m yet, if a partition were to take place betwee·' her husband <:nd his two sons, she would be entitled to receive a share equal to that of a (see Mulla's Hindu Law, Fourteenth Edition, page 403, para son. In a partition between Khandappa and his two sons. there 315). would be four sharers in the coparcenary property, the fourth being Khandappa's wife, the plaintiff. Khandappa would have th~rcfore got a 1/ 4th share in the coparcenary property on the hypothesis of a partition between himself and his sons. Two things are thus clears : One, that in a partition of the copar- cenary prope)'ty Khandappa would have obtained a 114th share and , "'" CL / ~ ' r"-.~ - / ., ~ ~ • ·-;( ,,_ J. • .;.. ~ - - ,. G. K. MAGDUM v. H.K. MAGDUM (Chandrachud, C./.) 767 two, that the share of the plaintiff in the 1/4th share is l/6th, that is A to say, l/24th. So far there is no difficulty. The question which poses a somewhat difficult problem is whether the plaintiff's ohare in the coparcenary property is only l/24th or whether it is l/4th plus l/24th, that is to say, 7 /24th. The learned trial Judge, relying upon the decision in Shiramabai which was later overruled by the Bombay High Court, accepted the former contention while. the High Court accepted the latter. The question is which of these two views is to B be preferred. We see no justification for limiting the plaintiff's share to 1/24th by ignoring the l/4th share which she would have obtained had there been a partition during her husband's life time between him and his two sons. We think that in overlooking that l/4th share, one un wittingly permits one's imagination to boggle under the oppression of the reality that there was in fact no partition between the plaintiff's husband and his sons. Whether a partition had actually taken place between the plaintiff's husband and his sons is beside the point for the purposes of Explanation 1. That Explanation compels the assump- tion of a fiction that in fact "a partition of the property had taken place", the point of time of the partition being the one immediately be fore the death of the person in whose property the heirs claim a share. c D The fiction created by Explanation 1 has to be giv® its due and full effect as the fiction created by section 18A(9) (b) of th~ Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, was given by this Court in Commissioner of lncome-tax, Delhi v. S. Teja Singh('1). It was held in that case that the fiction that the failure to send an estimate of tax on income under section 18A(3) is to be deemed to be a failure to send a return, E necessarily involves the fiction that a notice had been issued to assessee under section 22 and that he had failed to comply with it. In an important aspect, the case before us is stronger in the matter of working out the fiction because in .Teja Singh's case, a missing step had to be supplied which was not provided for by section 18A(9)(b), namely, the issuance of a notice under section 22 and the failure to comply with that notice. Section 18A(9) (b) stopped at creating the F fiction that when a person fails to send an estimate of tax on his in come under section 18A ( 3) he shall be deemed to have failed tcY furnish a return of his income. The section did not provide further that in the circumstances therein stated, a notice under section 22 shall be deemed to have been issued and the notice shall be deemed not to have been complied with. These latter assumptions in regard to the issuance of the notice under section 22 and its non-compliance G had to b~ made for the purpose of giving due and full effect to In our case it is not necessary, fiction created by section 18A(9) (b). for the purposes of working out the fiction, to assume and supply a missing link which is really what was meant by Lord Asquith in his famous passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council.(') He said if you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must also imagine as real the consequences and H (!1 [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 394 (2\ [1912] A.C. 109/132 A ·C D E F G H 768 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1978] 3 S.C.R. incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it; and if the statute ,ays that_you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it cannot be interpret ed to mean that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. In order to ascertain the share of heirs in the property of a deceas- ed coparcener it is necessary in the very nature of things, and as the very first step, to ascertain the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property. For, by doing that alone can one determine the extent of the claimant's share. Explanation 1 to section 6 resorts to the simple expedient, undoubtedly fictional, that the interest of a Hindu Mita- kshara coparcener "shall be deemed to lie" the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of that property had taken place immediately before his death. What is therefore requir- ed to be assumed is that a partition had in fact taken place between the deceased and his coparceners immediately before his c!ealh. That assumption, once made, is irrevocable. In other words, the assump tion liaving been made once for the purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased in the coparcenary property, one cannot go back on that assumption and ascertain the share of the heirs without reference to it. The assumption which the statute requires to be made that a partition had in fact taken place must permeate the entire process of ascertainment of the ultimate share of the heirs, through all its stages. To make the assumption at the initial stage for the limited purpose of ascertaining the share of the deceased and then to ignore it for calcu- latillg the quantum of the share of the heirs is truly to permit one's imagination to boggle. All the consequences which flow from a real partition have to be logically worked out, which means that the share of the heirs must be ascertained· on the basis that they had separated from one another and had received a share in the partition which had taken place during the life time of the deceased. The allotment of this share is not a processual step devised merely for the purpose of It has to be treated and accepted working out some other conclusion. as a concrete reality, something that cannot be recalled just as a share allotted to a coparcener in an actual partition cannot generally be recalled. the heir will get his or her share in the interest which the deceased had in the coparcei:"ary property at the time of his death. in addition .to the share which he o.r she received or must be deemed to have receiv- ed in the notional partition. inevitable corollary of this position The The interpretation which we are placing upon the provisions of section 6, its proviso and explanation I thereto will further the le¢s lative intent in regard to the enlargement of the share of female heirs, qualitatively and quantitatvely. The Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act, 1929 conferred heirship rights on the son's daugh ter. daughter's daughter and sister in all areas where the Mitokshara law prevailed. Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rizhts tn Pwperty Act 1937, speaking broadlv. conferred upon the Hindu widnw right to a share in the joint family propertv as also a right to demand partition like any male member of the family. The Hindu Succession . / / - -•1 -- . ... ( G. K. MAGDUM v. H. K. MAGDUM (Chandrachud, C.J.) 769 Act, 1956 provides by section 14(1) that any property pos·sessed by .a female Hindu, whether acquired before or afte.r the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as a full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. By restricting the operation of the fiction created by Explanation I in the manner suggested by the appellant, we shall be ·taking a retrograde step, putting back as it were the clock of social ··reform which has enabled the Hindu Woman to acquire an equal status with males in matters of property. Even assuming that two :nterpre tations of Explanation I are reasonably possible, we must prefer that interpretation which will further the intention of the legislature and remedy !ht: injustice from which the Hindu women have suffered over the years. We are happy to find that the view which we have taken above has also been faken by the Bombay High Court in Rangu/Jai Lalji v. Lax man Lalji (supra) in which Patel, J., very fairly, pronounced his own earlier judgment to the contrary in Shiramabai Bhimgonda v. Kalgonda (supra) as incorrect. Recently, a Full Bench of that High Court in Sushilabai Ramachandra Kulkarni v. Narayanrao Gopalrao Deshpande &Ors.,(1) the Gujarat High Court in Vidyaben v. Jagdishchandra N. Bhatt(') and the High Court of Orissa in Ananda v. Haribandhu(') have taken the same view. The Full Bench of the Bombay High ·Court in Sushilabai (supra) has considered exhaustively the various decisions bearing on the point and we endorse the analysis contained in the judgment of Kantawala C. J ., who has spoken for the Bench. For these reasons we confum the judgment of the High Court and . dismiss the appeal with costs. S.R. Appeal dismissed. A B c D E ' . • (I) A.I.R. 1975 (Bombay) 257. (2) A.LR. 1974 Guj. 23. (3) A.LR. 1967 Orissa 194.