PURSHOTTAM DAS GOYAL v. March 17

A preliminary objection was raised by the Learned Solicitor Genera] on behalf of the respondents that no appeal lies to this Court under s. 19 C of the Act from an order issuing notice as nothing yet has been decided by the High Court. Mr. Mohan Behari Lal, learned counsel for th<J appellant combated this argument and submitted that an appeal does lie to this, Court as a matter of right under s. 19. In our opinion, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the res pondents is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. S. 19(1) D says:- "An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt- ( a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court : Provided that where the order or decision is that of the territory, Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." It would appear from a plain reading of the section that an appeal shall lie to this Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a bench of the High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt. No appeal can lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceeding for contempt. The proceeding is initiated under s. 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in It could not ht\ the intention the said proceeding by the High Court. of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The or~er or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of con tenti.on raised bef~r~. th~ High Court a~ecting the right of the party aggneved. Mere 1mtiat10n of a proceedmg for contempt by the issu ance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. This Court, E F G H 512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1978] 3 5.C.R. A B, for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High Court or not. The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be. even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a: contention raised by the alleged contemner asking the High Court to drop the pro ceeding. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the typei of orders which may be appealable to this Court under s. 19. A final order, surely, will be appealablc. Our attention was dra.wn by Mr. Mohan Behari Lal, to s. 20 of the Act which provides : - c D E F "No Court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, 'after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed." It may be so. He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the High Court will be without jurisdiction if it is in violation of s. 20. If the alleged contemner in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being bar rec\ under s. 20 of the Act but the High Court holds tliat tlm proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under s. 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such :iln order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermitent stage in the proceeding may be appealable under s. 19. Tn our consi dered judgment, an order merely initiating the proceeding without any thing further, does not decide anything against the alleged eontemnet and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under s. 19. Io a given cas'e special leave may be granted under Art. 136 of the Consti tution from an order initiating the proceeding. But that is entirely a different matter. What we are. deciding in this case is that the present appeal filed under s. 19 (1) of the Act does not lie and is incompetent. We find some support to the view expressed by us above from the dc8ision of this Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Orissa High Court,(') where it has been held tliat no appeal lies to this Court under s. t 9 of the Act from an order rejecting the prayer of the alleged contcmncr for J1earing the case piecemeal. Mr. Lal placed reliance on the observotions of this Court in Bara dakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrus/111a Mishra('). What has been ckcided therein is this : that on a reference made by the Advoeate General if the Court declines to take cognisance and to initiate proceed ing for contempt, the order is not an order initiating contempt proceed ing. Surely, it is not appealable under s. 19· But there are no oboerva tions by this Court nor on the facts of that case there can be any, to show that ari appeal wonld lie to this Court from an order of the High Court merely initiating the proceeding by issuance of a notice. We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the order does decide G H (I) A.I.R.1976 S.C.1206. (2) [1975] I S.C.R. 524 (at pp. 531-32\. ) - ' • > P. D. GOYAL v. B. s. DHILLON ( Untwalia, J.) 513 some disputes raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the A proceeding on one ground or the other. But unless and until there some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it by the parties, affecting their right, the mere order issu- ing the notice is not appealabJe. '!he appeal is, therefore, dismissed as being not maintainable. B PHP. Appeal dismissed.