COMMISSIONER OF SALES TAX U.P v. M/S. S. N. BROTHERS, KANPUR

Dyes and colours and composition thereof. 37. Scents and perfumes.' i.e., The case of Commissioner of Sales Tax is that food colours would fall under item no. 10 'dyes and colours and composition thereof and essence would fall in the entry given in item no. 37 i.e., 'scents and per fumes'. Food colours are edible articles. The expres sion 'dyes and colours and composition thereof' does not relate to item of food but only to colouring and dyeing material i.e., material for colour washing or colour In our opinion, it stands painting or dyeing of fabrics. in contradistinction to bleaching material. Similarly, the entry at item no 37 relates to articles which cater to . the smelling sense i.e., those which appeal to nose. Essence is a flavouring material and its function is to add flavour to the food i.e., to make it more oalatable. It appeals to the tongue or to the palate. By scents and perfumes is meant articles of perfumery.

In our opinion, therefore, the food colours and essences would not fall in the entries at items nos. 10 and 37 of the notification , ' .. 1 856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1973] 2 S.C.R. aforesaid. In our opinion they could not be taxed under section 3A but under section 3 of the Act. " Shri Manchanda, learned counsei for the appellant, assailed the reasoning and approach of the High Court. According to him the words "dyes and colours" in entrv no. IO of the List in the Notification in question and the words ''scents and perfumes" in entry no. 37 qf the said List are unqualified and there being no limitation discernible on their plain and general meaning, they must be held to be wide enough to cover 'food colours' and 'syrup Jn seeking support for this submission reference was essences'. made to the Random House Dictionary of the English Language (prepared in U.S.A.) for ascertaining the meanings of the words "colour" (color, as spelt in this dictionary), "dye" and "essence", as also to Encyclopaedia Britannia Vols.

8 & 17 and Corpus Juris Secundum, Vols. 28 and 70 for the same purpose. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Commissioner of Set/es Tax U.P. v. Indian Herbs Research & Supply Co.(') in which the word "perfume" was held to include "dhoop" and "dhoop batti". The word "perfume'', it may be recalled occurs in the entry no. 37 of the List in the Notification in question. In our opinion the Random House Dictionary cannot serve as a safe guide in construing the words used in the List in the Notifi cation in question for the purpose of deciding whether or not the words used in entries nos. 10 and 3 7 cover food colours and syrup essences : indeed this Dictionary is apt to be a somewhat delusive guide In understanding the meanings of the words and expressions with which we are concerned in the context in which they are used. This Dictionary gives all the different shades of meanings attribu table to the words referred but that is hardly helpful in solving the problem raised in the present controversy.

The words "dyes and colours" used in entry no. 10 and the words "scents and perfumes" uired in entry no. 37 have to be-construed in their own context and in the sense, as ordinarily understood and attributed to these words by people usually conversant with and dealing in such goods. Similarly the words "food colours" and "syrup essences" which are descriptive of the class of goods the sales of which are to be taxed under the Act have to be construed iii the sense in which they are popularly understood by those who deal in them and who purchase and use them. The respondent's learned counsel has in support of In Kishan Chand this view referred us to some decided cases. Chellaram v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer. Chintradripet(') a Bench of the Madras High Court held that Terylene, Terene. De com, Nylon.~ylex etc .. came within the expression "artificial silk" to t~e Madr?s occurring at item no. 4 in the Third Schedule General Sales Tax Act, 1959.

In the course of the 1udgment m (I) {1970) 25 S.T.C. 151. Cl (1968) 21 S.T.C. 367. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H C.I.T, v. s. N. BROS. (Dua, J.) 857 that case it was observed that the import and content of those words have not been defined in the Sales Tax Acts and the Courts are bound to have recourse to the meaning attributable to such words by per; ons who are dealing in and utilising such goods. The ex treme, peculiar and scientific meaning of the goods which might sometimes deviate from the popular meaning, cannot prevail. The meaning which the trade, Government officials and statutes attri bute to the words "artificial silk" was considered by the High Court to be the ordinary and popular meaning of that expression. In Sarin Chemical Laboratory v. Commissioner of Sales Tax(1) this Court held tooth powder to be a "toilet requisite" and liable to sales tax at a single point under s. 3A of the Act read with entry no.

6 of the notification, with which we are also concerned in the present case, it being observed that the names of the articles, sales and purchases of which are Jiable to be taxed, give~ in a stat1;1te, unless defined in the statute, must be construed not m a techmcal sense but as understood in common parlance. In this decision re ference was made to an earlier decision of this Court by five Judges in Ramratar Budhiprasad v. Assistant Sales Tax Officer Okola(2) In in which "betel leaves" were not considered as "vegetable". Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. Indore v. Jaswa111 Singh Charan Singh(") the word "coal" was held by this Court to include "char coal", it being observed that, while interpreting items in statutes like the Sales Tax Acts, resort should be had not to the scientific or technical meaning of such terms, but to their popular meaning or the meaning attached to them by those dealing in them. that is In the course of the judgment, to say, to their commercial sense. after referring to certain decisions, including __ the decisions from Amtrnlian, Canadian and English Courts, it was observed : "The result emerging from these decisions is that while construing the word "coal" in entry 1 of Part ITI of Schedule II, the test that would be applied i.> what would be the meaning which persons dealing with coal and consumers purchasing it as fuel would give to that word.

A sales tax statute, being one levying a tax on goods must, in the absence of a technical term or a term of science or art, be presumed to have used an ordinary term as coal according to the meaning ascribed to it in common parlance. Viewed from that angl_e both a mer chant dealin~ in coal and a consumer wanting to pur chase it would regard coal not in its geological sense but in the sense as ordinarily understood and would include 'charcoal' in the term 'coal'. It is only when the Question of the kind or varietv of coal would arise that a diSiinc tioi: would be made- between coal and charcoal; other- (1970) 26 S.T.C. 339. I 1) ill (1967) t9 S.T.C. 469. (1961) 12 S.T.C. 286. 858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl973] 2 S,C.R. wise both of them would in ordinary parlance as also in their commercial sense be spoken as coal. " It may be pointed out that the entry in the case cited read "coal including coke in all its forms".

In Sales Tax Commissioner, U.P. v. Ladha Singh Mal Singh(') cloth manufactured by means of power-looms was held by this Court not to fall within the words "cloth manufactured by miJ]s" in the Notification dated June 8, 1948, issued under s. 3A of the Act and the sale of such cloth was held not liable to be taxed at the· higher rate of 6 ps. in a · rupee. According to this decision power-loom cloth in popular language is never associated with mill cloth. In view of these and some other decisions the learned counsel for the appellant, it may be said in fairness, did not dispute that the words with which we are concerned must be construed in the sense which is imputed to them by the persons who deal in and who consume such articles. "Food colours" and "syrup essence" being themselves known articles of common use, the question arises whether the words and expressions used in entries 10 and 3 7 of the List are intended to take within their fold goods popularly known in common parlance by the names of "food colours" and "syrup essences".

It cannot be gainsaid that "food colours" and "syrup essences" are edible goods whereas "dyes and colours and compositions thereof" and "scents and perfumes" as specified in entries nos. 10 and 37 of the List do not seem prima facie to connote that they are edible goods. This is the reasoning of the High Court and it Indeed, except for appears to us to be both logical and_ rational. items like 'salt' in entry no. 34, the "sugar manufactured by mills" (entry no. 49) and "Banaspati, including refined coconut oil" (entry no. 43) which is capable of being used as medium for cooking is prima facie edible there does not seem to be any other Item no. 25 speaks of "oils of edible article included in the List. all kinds other than edible oils manufactured on Ghanis by human or animal power". This scheme suggests that, apart undoubted edible goods, in cases where the import of the specified goods is wide enough to include bqth edible and non-edible cate gory then the intention has been clearly expressed whether or not to include edible goods.

How in the case of entries nos. 10 and 3 7 we are inclined to think in agreement with the High Court that these entries are not intended to extend to edible colours like food colours and to edible essences like syrup essences. It would indeed be straining the meanings of the words a)ld expressi~ns in th~e entries as understood in popular commercial sense to mclude edi ble colours and essences. · If the intention of the State Government was to include food colours in entry no. 10 and syrup essences in entry no. 37 then in our view these goods could easily have been (I) (1971) 28 S.T.C. 325. A B c D E F G H C.A.T. v. s. N. BROS. (Dua, J.) A B c D specified by their own popularly known description. In any event assuming that another view as to the meaning of these entries is possible we have not been persuaded to hold that the view taken by the High Court is so grossly erroneous that we should in1erfere on special leave appeal under Art.

136 o,J' the Cqnstitution. Shri Manchanda made a passing reference to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 framed under ss. 4 and 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 37 of 1954 and pointed QUI that r. 23 postulates addition of colouring matter to an article of food when permitted. This, according to the argument, suggests that the word 'colour' as used in entry no. I 0 of the List of the Notification in question has been used in a broad enough sense so as to take within its fold edible colour or food colour. We are not impressed by this argument. Rule 23 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules indeed seems to go against the submission. The appellant's ]earned counsel had a{ one stage suggested that the goods intended to be taxed under s. 3A of the Act are all luxury goods and therefore food colours and syrup essences which are. normally used by comparatively richer class of society should be presumed to have b~en intended to be included in items nos. I 0 and 37 of the List. On closer scrutiny of the List, however, this point was rightly not developed. For the reasons foregoing this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. E V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.