ABDUL AZIZ v. THE DISTI. MAGISTRATE BURDWAN & Ors.

Ywo grounds were furnished to the petitioner in Justification of the order of detention. It was stated firstly, that the petitioner and his associates were members of an extremist party (CPI-ML), that on 16th August 1971, they armed themselves \\ith lethal weapons like firearms, choppers and daggers with a view ~o pro moting the cause of their party, 'that they raided the house of one Durgapada Rudra and murdered him and that the aforesaid inci dents created a general sense. of insecurity, as a result of which the residents of the locality could not follow their normal avocations for a considerable period. The second ground of detention is that on 22nd May, 1971 the petitioner and his "associates raided the house of Smt. Kshetromoni Choudhury "and murdered one Umapada Mallick who was staring in that house. This incident is also stated to have created a general sense of insecurity amongst the residents of the locality. Learned counsel appearing in suoport of the petition contends that these two incidents are but simple cases of murder, gennane 648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1973) 2 S,C.R. to law and order, but which could have no impact on "public order" as such. A short answer to this contention is that the murders are stated to have been committed by the petitioner and his associates with the definite object of promoting the cause of the party to which they belonged. These, therefore, are not stray e>r simple cases of murder as contended by learned counsel. Such incidents have serious re~cussions not merelly on law and order but on public order. We may mention that a similar contention was rejected by this Court in Writ Petition No. 190 (If 1972 decided on 31st July 1972. It is then contended that the order of detention was passed during the pendency of a prosecution launched against the peti tioner for the very same incidents in regard to which the order of detention has been passed and thereby the order is vitiated. One of the two incidents is a leged to have taken place on 16th August I 971 and immediately thereafter the petitioner was arrest ed. He was produced before the Judicial Magistrate, Kaina on 10th September 1971 who enlarged him on bail on 6th October 1971. The petitioner was eventually discharged by the learned Magistrate on 16th December 1971, but in the meanwhile, the order of detention was passed on 16th November 1971 anc! the petitioner was arrested in pursuance of that order on 17th Decem ber 1971. In regard to this contention it may be sufficient to draw attention to the decision of this Court in Wri~ Petition No. 112 of 1972 decided on 17th August 1972. It W?.S held therein that the mere circumstance that a detention order is passed during In con th.: pendency of a prosecution will not vitiate the order. ceivable cases it may become necessary to pass an order of deten tion in anticipation of an order of discharge or acquittal. The next challenge to the or~er of detention is that the delay of .about 40 days caused in considering the representation made by the petitioner is fatal to the order. The petitioner's represen tation was received by the Governreent on 13Th January 1972 and was rejected on 22nd February 1972. Apparently therefore there was delay in considering the representation but, the affidavit .of the Deputy Secretary Horne (Special) Department, Government of West Bengal, shows that the representation could not be consi dered earlier because although the war with Pakistan had end~. its after-effects were still looming large in West Bengal and the officers of the State Government had to take appropriate steps for the retam of the refugees who had taken shelter in West Bengal. The delay, thus, is satisfactorily explained. The last contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the Mainten~nce of Internal Security Act, 197 i having been passed for the maintenance of internal security; it was not open to the Parliament to confer power on the appropriate Government B c D E F G H A B c D ABDUL AZIZ V. DIST. MAGISTRATE BURDWAN ( Chandrachud, J.) 649• to pass orders of detention for the maintanance of public order,. as "internal security" cannot comprehend "public order". Lean_ied. counsel draws support to his argument, partly from the long title· to the Act, which describes it as "an Act to provide for detc'!tion: in certain cases for the purpose of maintenance of internal security and matters connected therewith". We see no merit in this con-· tention. In the first place, under Entry 3 of Lis(Jil of the Seventh: Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament has the power to legislate on "Preventive detention for reasons connected with tbe security of a .State, the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community". Section 3 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act COl).fers power on the Centr~l Government and' the State Government to pass orders of detention with a view to• preventing any person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the. security of the State or the maintenance of public order. This power cannot be controlled by anything stated in the long title of the Act. Besides, the long title describes the Act as one for providing for detention for the purpose of maintenance of inl.:rnal security and "matters connected therewith". _ "Internal' Security" is an expression of width sufficient to comprehend the· conoept of public order. Internal disturbances can tbreaten _the· seeurity of the State and such disturbances may assume grave pro- portions so as to have a direct impact on public order. In the result the petition fails and is dismissed. G.C. Petition dismissed.