TAYABALIJAFERBHAITANKIWALA v. M/S. ASHA & CO & Anr.

In the present case the serving of the second notice and whal was stated thei'ein together with the claim as laid and amplified in the piaint showed that the Jandlord waived the first notice by showing an intention to treat the tenancy as subsisting and that this was with the express or implied consent of the tenant., to s~y that he did not want to rely on the second notice and should be, allowed to base his claim for eviction only on the first notice contai:1ing the ground of the default in payment of arrears of rent. rs58 C-E. F-G] It was not open, therefore., to the landlord H -. TAYABALI v. ASHA & CO. (Grover, I.) 555 A B CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1741 of

#1966. Appeal by special leave from the order dated March 18, 1966 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 475 of 1966. M. C. Chag/a and S. S. Shukla, for the appellant. S. T. Desai and D. N. Mishra, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by c Grover J, This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment following circum· of the Bombay High Court and arises in the stances : D E F G H The suit premises consisting of a shed at 130, Shuklaji Street, Bombay are the property of the appellant, and were let out to the respondent as a monthly tenant. By means of a notice landlord dated June 13, 1956 the tenant was informed by the that he was in arrears of rent since July 1, 1953 and was liable to pay to the landlord a sum of Rs. 1,826/- being the amount of rent calculated up to the date of the notice. As he was an habi tual defaulter and had been inaking illegal use of a passage attach ed to the premises without the consent of the landlord hls tenancy was being terminated. He was further calied upon to make pay ment of the amount of arrears. The tenant did not vacate premises and a second notice was sent dated October 18, 1957 calling upon him to deliver vacant possession of the premises which were siated to be in his occupation as a monthly tenant. In the second notice another ground was mentioned for getting the premises vacated. It may be men personal use and occupation of the landlord. iioned that prior to the despatch of the second notice the landlord had been paid and he had received the amount of arrears which In other words the rent were said to be due in the first notice. had been received upto March 1955. On October 30, 1957 the tenant made a tender by means of a cheque of the full amount of arrears then due h:.i! the cheque was returned by the landlord. It was that the same were required On March 31, 1958 the landlord filed a suit for ejectment and for recovery of rent from April 1955 to November 1957 and com· pensation for use and occupation from December 1957 to Febru ary 1958 as also for a certain amount for vacant possession being rack rent of twelve months' rent, the total amount of all the items being Rs; 2448.12 Np. In July 1960 the plaintiff sought and was allowed to amend the plaint by introducing the following para J!TIIPh : L1SupCi/7~S 556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 2 S.C.R. '"Notice dated 13th June 1956 under section 12 of the Bombay Rent Control Act was given by the plain tiff's advocates to the defendants demanding payment of arrears of rent from 1st July 1953 upto date 1956, which has been duly acknowledged. Copy of the said notice is hereto annexed and marked Ex. 'A'." The ejectmcnt was claimed on tl\e grou, nd of default in payment of arrears of rent and for personal use and occupation. The foamed trial judge held that by serving a second notice and by various acts and conduct the landlord showed a clear intention to waive and condone the ground of default in payment of arrears contained in the first notice. As regards the ground of personal requirement the trial court was not satisfied that the premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the plaintiff for his own use. The suit for eviction was dismissed although a decree for Rs. 1822.97 was granted. The matter was taken in appeal to the Court of Small Causes. The appeal court held that there was no waiver on the part of the landlord as regards the default com mitted by the tenant in not paying the arrears of rent within one month after the receipt of the first notice. service of a serond notice and other facts which had been 'ound by the trial court did not amount to a waiver of the first notice. But it was of the view that the demand of the arrears of rent made in the notice dated June 13, 1956 was excessive and illegal which made the notice invalid. The other point about personal neces· sity appears to have been abandoned by the plaintiff before appeal court. The landlord filed a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution in the High Court which was dismLsed Ii mine. In other words, It has been contended before us on behalf of the landlord that the view of the appeal court on the effeci of an excessive demand having been made in the notice was altogether erroneous. In Civil Appeal No. 387 of 1964 (Raghunath Ravji Dandekar v. Anant Narayan Apte)(') this Court laid down that a notice to quit under the Transfer of Property Act would not be bad because by mistake or oversight more was demanded in the notice under s. 12(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Conirol Act, 1947 (Act LVII of 1947). hereinafter called Act than was due. It is urged that since the aforesaid infirmity iii the notice dated June 13, 1956 alone had prevailed with the appeal court the High Court ought to have entertained the peti tion under Art. 22 7 and after setting aside the judgment of apoeal court the suit for ejectment should have been decreed. Reliance has been placed on s. 12 ( 3 )(a) of the Act according to (!) De=ide1 on April 5, 1966. A. B c D E F G H .. TAYABALI v. ASHA & co. (Grover, J.) 557 A B c D E which where the rent is payabk by the months and there is no dis pute regarding the amount of standard rent or permitted increases if such rent or increases are in arr.~ars for a period of six mor.ths or more and the tenant neglects to make payment thereof until the expiration· of the period of one month after notice referred to in sub-s. (2), the court shall pass a decree for eviction in any such It is argued that the notice dated suit for recovery of possession. June 13, 1956 was the only notice which after the amendment introduced in the plaint by paragraph 3A was to be treated ~s a valid notice and since there had been non-compliance with demand made in that notice the court was bound to pass a decree for eviction. As there was failure to exercise High Court had the power and the authority to interfere in a peti tion under Art. 227 of the Constitution. jurisdiction It seems to us that on the facts which have been established It is abundantly clear that he the landlord was bound to fail. had, in the second notice dated October 18, 1957, treated tenancy as subsisting and not only the respondent was described as a monthly tenant but also in the plaint, even after the amend ment had been allowed, rent was claimed upto November 1957; thereafter the amount due was described as compensation for use and occupation. The plaintiff was thus fully alive to the distinc tion between rent and damages for use and occupation and it can not be said that he had abandoned the second notice and asked for the same to be treated as non-est or that he had relied solely on the first notice dated June 13, 1956. Under s. 113 of Transfer of Property Act a notice given under s. 111. cl. (h) is waived with the express or implied consent of the person to whom it is given by any act on the part of the person giving it showing I11ustration (b) is in an intention to treat the lease as subsisting. the following terms : "(b) A, the lessor, gives B, the lessee, notice to quit the property leased. The notice expires, and B remains in passession. A gives to B as Jessee 8 second notice to quit. The first notice is waived". G H If only the Ja11guage of the illustration were to be considered a~ soon as the second notice was eiven the first notice would stand waived. Counsel for the appellant has relied on the observation of Denning, J., (as he then was) in Lowenthal v. Vanho11te(1) that where a tenancy is determined by a notice to quit it is not revived by anvthing ~hort of a new tenancv and in order to create a new tenancy there must be an express or implied agreement to that effect and further that a subsequent notice to quit is of no effect unless, with oJier circumstances. it is the basis for inferring (I) (1947] I K.B.D. 342. 558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1970J; 2 S.C.R an intention to create a new tenancy after the expiration of first. The Privy Council in Harihar Banerji & Ors. v. Ramsashi Roy & Ors.(') had said that the principles governing a noti.al to quit under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act were the same in England as well as in India. For the purpose of the present case it is wholly unnecessary to decide whetl:ier for bringing about a waiver under s. 113 of the Transfer of Property Act a new te nancy by an express or implied agreement must ~.:>me into exis tence. All that need be observed is that s. 113 in terms d0es not appear to indicate any such requirement and all that has to be seen is whether any act has been proved on the part "Jf the pre:ent appellant which shows an intention to treat the lease as subsisting provid.~d there is an express or implied consent of the person to whom the notice is given. A B c Jn the present case there can be no doubt that the serving of the se:ond notice and what was stated therein together with the claim as laid and amplified in the plaint showed that the landlord waived the first notice by showing an. intention to treat the tenancy as subsisting and that this was with the express or implied consent of the tenant to whom the first notice had been given because he had even made· payment of the rent which had been demanded though it was after the expiration of the period of one month given in the notice. It was in It further appears that the ren: was sent by the tenant treat ing the tenancy as subsisting and not as having come to an end fa;;t by virtue of the first notice. There is another significant which shows that it was the second notice which was considered bv the landlord to be the effective notice. the norice sent m October 1957 that the landlord, for the first time, rais~d In the suit requirement of per• the ground of personal necessity. mnal necessity was made one of the main grounds on which evic tion was sought. In the first notice which was sent in June 1956 It was not no such requirement or ground had been mentioned. open. therefore, to the landlord to say that he did not want to rely on the second notice and should be allowed to base his action for eviction only on the first notice containing the ground of the dP.fault in ryayment of arrears of rent. We are satisfied that the suit of the landlord was rightly dismissed though we have sustained its dismissal on different reasoning. The appeal, therefore, fails and it is dismissed with costs. Y.P . . ~~~~~~~~~ (I) 4S I.A. 222. Appeals dismissed. I> ., E G