INCOME-TAX OFFICER, ALLEPPEY v. M. C. PONNOOSE & Ors.

The facts in one of the appeals ( C.A. 942/ 66) may be stated : One Kunchacko of Alleppey allowed the income tax dues from him to fall into arrears. The Income Tax Officer took steps to recover the arrears through the Tahsildar. Certain shares stand ing in the name o~ the assessee were attached by the Tahsildar. The first respondent Ponnoose claimed to have obtained a decree for a certain sum 'against the assessee. He also got the shares 14 Sup. C.I./69-14 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 1 S.C.R. standing in the name of the as.s~ssee attached in execution i;ro ceedings. Ponnoose filed a pet1t10n under Art. 226 of the Con stitution in the High Court of Kerala in which he challenged the action taken by the revenue officials including the Tahsildar for getting the shares, which had been attached, sold for satisfaction of the income tax dues of the assessee. The learned Single Judge held that the notification empower ing the Tahsildar to exercise the powers of a Tax Recovery Offi- cer under the Act with retrospective effect was invalid.

Conse quently the attachments made by the Tahsildar were quashed. This view was affirmed by a division bench in appeal. A B The Act came into force on first April 1962. Section 2 ( 44) defined the expression "Tax Recovery Officer" in the following terms:- c " 'Tax Recovery Officer' means ( i) a Collector; (ii) an additional Collector or any other officer authorised to exercise the powers of a Collector under any law relating to land revenue for the time being in force in a State; or (iii) any gazetted officer of the Central or a State Government who may be authorised by the Cen- tral Government by notification in the Official Gazette, to exercise the powers of a Tax Reco very Officer". Section 4 of the Finance Act, 1963 substituted a new definition for the original definition of Tax Recovery Officer. It was pro vided that the new definition "shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted".

The new definition was as follows : "Tax Recovery Officer" means- (i) a Collector or an additional Collector; (ii) any such officer empowered to effect recovery of arrears of land revenue or other public demand under any law relating to land revenue or other public demand for the time being in force in the State as may be authorised· by the State Gov ernment, by general or special notification in the Official Gazette, to exercise the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer; (iii) any Gazetted Officer of the Central or a State Government who may be authorised by Central Government, by general or special noti- D E F G H "" •. 1 :4-H-,;::: - A B c I) I.T.O. v. M. c. PONNOOSE (Grover, J.) 681 fication in the Official Gaz.ette, to exercise the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer. " The impugned notification dated August 14, 1963 which was pub lished in the Kerala Gaz.ette dated August 20, 1963 referred to the powers conferred by sub-clause (ii) of clause ( 44) of s.

2 of the Act read with sub-rule (2) of rule 7 of the Income tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962 and authorised the various revenue officials mentioned therein including the Taluk Tahsildar to ex~rcise the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer under the Act in respect of the arrears etc. The concluding portion was, "This notification shall be deemed to have come into force on the fast day of April 1962". The Tahsildar had effected attachment of the shares subsequent to first April 1962 but prior to August 14, 1963. In other words on the date on which he had effected attach ment he was not a Tax Recovery Ofticer but he got the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer by virtue of the notification dated August 14, 1963. The short question for determination, there fore, was and is whether the State Government could invest the Tahsildar with the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer under the aforesaid provisions. of the Act with effect from a date prior to the date of the notification, i.e., retroactively or retrospectively.

Now it is open to a sovereign legislature to enact laws which have retrospective qperation. Even when the Parliament enacts retrospective laws s\,ch laws are--in the words of Willes, J. in Phillips v. Eyre(')-"no doubt prima facie of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought, when introduced for the first time, to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. " The courts will not, therefore, ascribe retros pectivity to new laws affecting rights unless by express words or ' necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature. The Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised ·limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or authority to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible It will to make the .same so as to give retrospective operation. depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by neces&ary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospec tive effect.

But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the courts that the person or authority exercising sub ordinate legislative functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye-law which can operate with retrospective effect; (see Subba Rao J., in Dr. lndramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W. R. Nathu & (I) 40 Law J. Rep, (N.S.) Q.B. 28 at r. )7. F G H .. - 68% SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 'HO] I S.C.R Others(' )-the majority not havi!lg expressed any different ·opinion on the point; Modi Food Products Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax U.P.( 2 ); India Sugar Refineries Ltd. v. State of Mysore(') and .General S. Shivdev Singh & Another v. The State of P1U1iab & Others('). lt can hardly be said that the nnpugned notification promul gates any rule, regulation or bye-law all of which have a definite signification. The exercise of the power under sub-clause (ii) of cl. ( 44) of s. 2 of the Act is more of an executive than a legisla tive act.

It becomes, therefore, all the more necessary to consider how such an act which has retrospective operation can be valid in the absence of any power conferred by the aforesaid provision In Straw to so perform it as to give it retrospective operation. board Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union(') an industrial dispute had been referred by the Governor to the Labour Commissioner or a person nominated by him with the direction that the award should be submitted not later than April 5, 1950. The award, however, was made on April 13, 1950. On April 26, 1950 the Governor issued a notification extending the It was held that in the absence of a provi time up to April 30. sion authorising the Stat~ Government to extend from time to time the period within which the Tribunal or the adjudicator could pronounce the decision the State Government had no authority to extend the time and the award was, therefore, one made without jurisdiction and a nullity.

This decision is quite apposilr and it is difficult to hold in the present case that the Taluka Tehsildar could be authorised by the impugned notification to exercis~ pow ers of a Tax Recovery Officer with effect from a date prior to the date of the notification. It may next be considered whether by saying that the new definition of "Tax Recovery Officer" substituted by s. 4 of the Finance Act, 1963 "shall be and shall be deemed always to have been substituted" it could be said that by necessary implication or intendment the State Government had been authorised to invest the officers mentioned in the notification with the powers of a Tax Recovery Officer with retrospective effect. The only effect of the substitution made by the Finance Act was to make the new defi nition a part of the Act from the date it was enacted. The legal fiction could not be extended beyond its legitimate field and· the -aforesaid words occurring in s.

4 of the Finance Act 1963 could not be construed to embody conferment of a power for a retros pective authorisation by the State in the absence of any e~prcss (t) [1963] S.C.R. 721. (2) A.LR. t960 Mys. 326. (2) A:l.R. 1956 AIL 35. (4) [1959] P.LR. 514, lS) [1953] S.C. R. 439, A II c n E F G H • .. I.T.O. v. M. C: PONNOOSE (Grover, J.) 683 A B c D E F provision in s. 2( 44) of the Act itself. It may be noticed that in a recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in B. S. Vodera etc., v. Union of India & Others( 1 ) it has been observed with reference to rules framed under the proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution that these rules can be made with retrospective operation. This view was, however, expressed oW:ing to the language employed in the proviso to Art. 309 that "any rules so made shall have effect subject to the provisions of any such Act". As has been pointed out the clear and unambiguous expressions used in the Constitution, must be given and unrestricted meaning unless hedged in by any limitations.

Moreover when the language employed in the main part of f,rt. 309 is compared with that of the proviso it becomes clear that the power given to the legislature for laying down the conditions is identical with the power given to the President or the Governor, as the case may be, in the matter of regulating the recruitment of Government servants and their conditions of service. The fegis lature, however, can regulate the recruitment and conditions of service for all times whereas the President and the Governor can do so only till a llrovision in that behalf is made by or under an Act of the appropriate legislature. As the legislature can legis late prospectively , 'as well as retrospectively there. can be hardly any justification for sayip:g that the President or the Governor should not be able to make rules in the same manner so "llS to give them prospective !as well as retrospective operation.

For these reasons the ambit and content of the rule making power under Art. 309 call' furnish no analogy or. parallel to the present case. : The High Court was consequently right in coming to the con-' • clusion that the *ction taken by the Tahsildar in attaching the· sfiares was unsuslainable The .appeals ~erefor~ fail and are dismissed with costs. One hearing fee. Y.P. Appeals dismi11ed. - (I) [1968] 3 S.C.R. 575. I ,I