RAYALA CORPORATION (P) LTD .• & Ors. v. DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT, NEW DELHI

tion from the Reserve Bank of India in his favour for acquiring this amount of foreign exchange and for not surrendering amount in accordance with law. A similar show cause notice was issued to accused No. I in respect of the same amount on 20th January, 1968, mentioning the deposit in favour of accused No. 2 and failure of ai:cused No. I to surrender the amount, and giving an opportunity to accused No. I to produce the pennis sion or special exemption from the Reserve Bank of India. On the 16th March, 1968, another notice was issued addressed to both the accused to show cause in writing within 14 days of the receipt of the notice why adjudication proceedings as contemplated ins. 23-D of the Act should not be held against them in respect of a sum of Sw. Krs. 1,55,801.41 which were held in a bank account in Stockholm in the name of accused No. 2 and in respect of which both the accused had contravened the provisions of ss.

4(3), 4(1), 5(l)(e) and 9 of the Act. The notice mentioned that it was being issued in supersession of the first show cause notice dated 25th August, 1967, and added that it had since been decided to launch a prosecution in rtlSpect of Sw. Krs. 88,913.09. The latter amount was the amount in respect of which the two notices of 4th Novem ber, 1967 and 20th January, 1968 were issued to the two accused, while this notice of l(ith March, 1968 for adjudication proceed ings related to the balance of the amount arrived at by deducting this sum from the original total sum of Sw. Krs. 2,44,713.70. The next day, on 17th March, 1968, a complaint was filed against both the accused in the Court of the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Madras, for contravention of the provisions of ss. 4 ( 1), 5 ( 1 )( e) and 9 of the Act punishable under s. 23 (1) (b) of In addition, the compla/nt also charged both the accused with viola tion of Rule 132-A(2) of the Defence of India Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the D.I. Rs.") which was punishable under Rule 132-A(4) of the said Rules.

Thereupon, both the accused moved the High Court for quashing the proceedings sought to be against them on the basis of this complaint. Those applications having been dismis~ed, the appellants have come up appeals challenging the order of the High 'Court dismissing their applications and praying for quashing of the proceedings being taken on the basis of that complaint. the Act. In these appeals, Mr. A. K. Sen, appe:;ring on behalf of the appellants, has raised three points. In respect of the prosecution for violation of ss. 4 (1), 5 (1 )( e) and 9 of the Act punishable under s. 23 ( 1) (b) of the Act, the principal ground raised is that s. 23 (1 )(b) of the Act· is ultra ,·:res Article 14 of the Constitu tion inasmuch as it provides for a punishment heavier and severer than the punishment or penalty provided for the same acts under s. 23 (1) (a) of the Act. In the alternative, the second point taken is that, even if s.

23 (1 )(b) is not void, the complaint A B c D E F G H 644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] l S.C.R. respect of the offences punishable under that section has not been filed properly in accordance with the proviso to s. 23-D( I) of the Act, so that proceedings cannot be competently taken on basis of that complaint. The third point raised relates the D.I. Rs. punishable charge of violation of R. 132-A(2) of under R. 132-A(4) of those Rules, and is the effect R. 132-A of the D.I. Rs. was omitted by a notification of Ministry of Home Affairs dated 30th March, 1965 and, conse quently, a prosecution in respect of an offence punishable under that Rule could not be instituted on 17th March, 1968 when that Rule had ceased to exist. On these three grounds, the order quashing the proceedings being taken on the complaint in respect of all the offences mentioned in it has been sought appeals. To appreciate ti1e first point raised before us and to deal with it properly, we may reproduce below the provisions of s.

23 and s. 23-D( I) of the Act : - "23. 1'enalty and procedure.-( 1) If any person (2) of section 12, rule, contravenes tbe provisions of section 4, section 5, tion 9, section 10, sub-section section 18, section 18A or section 18B or of any direction or order made thereunder, he shall- ( a) be liable to such penalty not exceeding three respect of times the value of the foreign exchange in which the contravention has thousand rupees, whichever as may be adjudged by the Director of Enforcement in the manner hereinafter provided, or taken place, or is more, (b) upon conviction by a Court. be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. (IA) If any person contravenes any of the pro visions of this Act, or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder, for the contravention of which no penalty is expressly provided, he shall, upon conviction by a court be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

(IB) Any Court trying a contravention under sub section (I) or sub-section (I A) and the authority adjudgin~ any contravention under clause (a) of sub section (I) may. if it thinks fit, and in addition to any sentence or penalty which it may impose for such contra security, gold er vention, direct that any currency, In silver, or goods or any other money or property, taken place, respect of which the contravention has •• - A B c D E F G H A B c D E G H RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 645 shall be confiscated to the Central Government and fur ther direct that the foreign exchange holdings, if any, of the person committing the contravention or any part thereof shall be brought back into India or shall be retained outside India in accordance with the directions made in this behalf. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, property in respect of which contravention has place shall include deposits in a bank, where the said property is converted into such deposits.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 32 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), it shall be laWful for any magistrate of the first class, specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government, and for any presidency magistrate to pass a sentence of fine exceeding two thousand rupees on any person convicted of an offence punishable under section. ( 3) No Court shall take cognizanc-e- (a) of any offence , punishable under sub-section ( 1) except upon complaint in writiilg made by Director of Enforcement, or ( aa) of any offence punishable under sub-section (2) of section 191,- ( i) where the offence is alleged to have been com mitted by an officer of Enforcement not lower in rank than an Assistant Director, of Enforcement, except with the previous' sanction of the Central Government; (ii) where the offence is alleged to have been com mitted by an officer of Enforcement lower in rank than an Assistant Director of Enforcement, except with previous sariction of the Director of Enforcement, or; (b) of any offence punishable under sub-section (lA) of this section or section 23F, except upon com plaint in writing made by the Director of Enforcement or any officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the Reserve Bank by a general or special order; Provided that where any such offence is the contra vention of any of the provisions of this Act or any rule, direction or ord"r made thereunder which prohibits the doing of an act without permission, no such complaint shall be made unless the ner.nn o.-.-nopif nf the offence ...... '1i:1d 646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] I S.C.R. ( 4) Nothing in the first proviso to section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), shall apply to any offence punishable under this section.

" 23D. Power to adjudicate.-( 1) for the purpose of adjudging under clause (a) of sub-section (I) of section 23 whether any person has committed a con travention, the Director of Enforcement shall hold an inquiry in the prescribed manner after giving person a reasonable opportunity of being heard and if, on such inquiry, he is satisfied that the person has committed the contravention, he may penalty as he thinks fit in accordance with the provi sions of the said section 23 : impose Provided that if, at a.ny stage of the inquiry, the Director of Enforcement is of opinion that having regard t" the circumstances of the case, the penalty which he is empowered to impose would not be ade quate, he shall, instead of imposing any penalty him self, make a complaint in writing to the Court. " A plain reading of s. 23 (I) of the Act shows that uµder this sub section provision is made for action being taken against any per son who contravenes the provisions of ss.

4, 5, 9, IO, 12(2), 18, I 8A or I 8B or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder; and els. (a) and (b) indicate the two different proceedings that can be taken for such contravention. Under cl. (a), the person is liable to a penalty only, and that penalty cannot exceed •J>~;:e times the value of the foreign exchange in respect of which the contraventio:l has taken place, or Rs. 5,000/-, whichever is more. This penalty can be imposed by an adjudication made by the Director of Enforcement in .the manner provided in s. 23D of the Act. The alternative punishment that is provided in cl. ( b) is to be imposed upon conviction by a Court whe.n the Court can sen tence the person to imprisonment for a tenn which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Clearly, the punish ment provided under s. 23( I) (b) is severer and heavier than the penalty to which the person is m'ade liable if proceedings are taken under s.

23 (I) (a) instead of prosecuting him in a Court under s. 23 (I )(b). The argument of Mr. Sen is that this sec· tion lays down no principles at all for detennining when the per son concerned should be proceeded against under s. 23 (I)( a) and whe;n. under s. 23(1)(b), and it would appear that it is left to the arbitrary discretion of the Director of Enforcement to decide which proceedings should be taken. The liability of a person for more or less severe punishment for the same act at the sole discretion and arbitrary choice of the Director of Enforcement, I c I r F G H RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 647 A it is urged, denies equality before law guaranteed under Art. 14 of the Cqnstitution. B c D E F G H The submission made would have carried great force with us but for our view that the effect of s. l;Z3D of the Act is that the choice in respect of the proceeding to be taken under s.

23(1)(a) or s. 23 ( 1) (b) has not been left to the unguided and arbitrary discretion of the Director of Enforcement, but is governed by Jin this c~~ection, it is pe_r principles indicated by that section. tinent to note that s. 23 ( 1) of the Act as ongmally enacted 1n 1 94 7 did not provide for alternative punishment for the sa!'le contravention a,nd contained only one single provision under which any person contravening any of the provisions of the Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder was . punishable with imprisonment for a term which could exteard to two years or with fine or with both, with the additional clause that any Court trying any such contravention might, if it thought fit and in addi tion to any sentence which it might impose for such cqntraven tion, dire~t that any currency, security, gold or silver, or goods or other property in. respect of which the contravention has taken place shall be confiscated.

No questio,n of the applicability of 'arise whil~ the Art. 14 of the Constitution could, therefore, provision stood as originally enacted. Parliament, by Foreign Exchange Regulation (Amendment) Act XXXIX of 1957, amended s. 23(1) and, at the same time, also introduced s. 23D in the Act. It was by ibis amendment that two alternative. proceedings for the s'ame contraventiqn were In thus introducing two different proceed provided in s. 23 ( 1). ings, Parliament put in the forefront proceedings for penalty to be taken by the Directpr of F,nforcement by taking up adjudication, while the punishment to be awarded by the Court upon convic tion, was mentioned as the second type of proceeding that could be resorted to. Section 23D(l) is also divisible into two parts. The first part Jays down what the Director of Enforcement has to do in order to adjudgepein'alty under s. 23(1)(a), and the second part, contained in the proviso, gives the power to the Director of Enforcement to file a complaint instead of imposing a penalty In our opinion, these two ss.

23 ( l) and 23D(l) m•1st himself. be read together, so that the procedure laid clown in s. 23D(l) is to be followed i;i all cases in which proceedings are Intended to be taken under s. 23 ( 1). The effect of this interpretation is that, whenever there is any contravention of any section or rule mentioned in s. 23 (1 ) , the Director of Enforcement must first proceed UJider the principal clause ot s. 23D(l) and initiate pro ceedings for adjudication of penalty. He cannot, at that stage, at his discretion, clioose to file a COO!plaint in a Court for prose cution of the person concerned for the offence under s. 23 ( 1 )(b). The Director of Enforcement can only file a complaint by acting Ll4Sup./69-12 648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1970] I S.C.R. in accordance with the proviso to s. 23C: 1), which clearly Jays down that the co1I1p1aint is only to be filed in those cases where at any stage of the inquiry, the Director of Enforcement com~ to the opinion that, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the penalty which he is empowered to impose would not be adequate.

Until this requirement is satisfied, he ~not make a complamt to the Court for prosecution of th~ person concerned und.er s. 23 ( 1 )(b). The choice of the proceeding to be taken against the person, who is liable for action for contravea:rtion under s. 23 ( 1), is, thus, not left entirely to the discretion of the Director ot Enforcement, but the criterion for making the choice is laid down in the proviso to s. 230(1). It cannot pcssibly be con t~ded, and no attempt was made by Mr. Sen to contend that if we accept this interpretation that the right of the Dir::ctor' of Enfoccement to make a complaint to the Court for the offence under s. 23 (I ) ( b) can be exercised only in those cases where in accordance with the proviso, he comes to the opinion that the penalty. ~hich he is empowered to impose would not be adequate, the vahdtty of s. 23 (I )(b) of the Act ca,n still be challenged. In this connection, it was urged before us that the language -Of the principal clause of s.

230( 1) taken together with the lan guage of the proviso does not justify an interpretation that a complaint for an offence under s. 23 ( 1) (b) cannot be made by the Director of Enforcement except in accordance with the pro viso, particularly because the principal clause of s. 230( I) merely lays down the procedure that has to be adopted by the Director of Enforcement when proceeding under s. 23 (I)( a), and contains no words indicating that such a proceeding must invari:.bly be resorted to by him whenever he gets infocmation of a ~·mlraven­ tian mentioned in s. 23 ( 1). The language does not contain any words creating a bar to his proceeding to file a complaint straight for adjudication under away instead of taking proceedings s. 230( 1). s. 230 ( 1) has the Legislature used specific words ex duding the filing of a complaint before proceedings for adjudicatiau are taken under s. 23D(l). If any such words had been used, no such controversy could have been raised as has been put forward before us in these appeals.

We liave, however, to gather the in tention of the Legislature from the enactment as a whole. Jn this connection, significance attaches to the fact that s. 23D ( 1) was introduced simultaneously with the provision made foc alternative proceedings under s. 23 ( 1) in its two els. (a) and (b). It appears to be obvious that the Legislature adopted this course so as to ensure that all proceedings under s. 23 ( 1) are taken in the man ner laid down in s. 23D( 1). Parliament must be credited with the knowledge that, if provision is made two alternative punishments for the same act one differing from the other without any limitations, such a provision would be void under Art. 14 of It is true that neither in s. 23 (I) itsell · 'nor A B c D E F G I :r: ,_,.1'*' ~-~ RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 649 the Constitution; and that is the reason why Parliament simulta neously introduced the procedure to be adopted under s.

23D(l) in the course of which the Director of Enforcement is to decide whether a complaint is to be made in Court and under what cir cumstances he can do so: We have also to keep in view the general principle of interpretation that, if a particular interpreta tion will enure to the validity of a law, that interpretation must In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in be preferred. holding that, whenever there is a coritravention by any person which is made punishable under either cl. (a) or cl. (b) o.f s. 23 ( 1), the Director of Enforcement must first initiate proceedings urrde,r the principal clause of s .. 23D( 1) and he is empowered to file a complaint in Court only when he finds that he is required to· do so in accordance with the proviso. It is by resorting to the proviso only that he cdll place that person in greater jeopardy of being liable to a more severe punishment under s. 23 (1 )(b) of the Act.

Th& view we have taken is in line with the decision of this Court in Shanti Prasad Jain v. The Director of Enforcement( 1 ), where this Court considered the val; idity of s. 23 (1) (a) and s. 23D which were challenged on the ground of two alternative procedures being applicable for awarding punisllment same act. The court noticed the position the following words:- "It will be seen that when there is a contravention of s. '4 (1), action.with respect to it is to bi: taken in the first instance i.by the Director of Enforcement. He may the matter himself in accordance with either adjudge s. 23(1)(a); or he may send it on to a Court if he considers that a more severe penalty than he can impose is c_ajled for;, Now, the contention of the~ appellant is thst when the case is transferred to a Court, it will be tried in acco~dance with the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code, but that when the Director himself tries it, he will follow the procedure prescribed therefor under the Rules framed under the Act, and that when the law provides for the same offence being tried under two procedures, which are substantially different, and it is left to the discretion af an executive officer whether the trial should take place under the one or the other of them, there is clear discrimination, and Art.

14 is contravened. Therefore, s. 23(1)(a) must, it is argued,. be struck down as unconstitutional and the imposition of fine on the appellant under that section set aside as illegal. " (1)'[1963] 2 S.C.R. 297· A B c D E F G H 650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19'70] l S.C.R. The Court then distinguished the provisions of the Act with the law considered in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali(') and held:- A "Section 23D confers authority on the very officer who has power to try and dispose of a case to send it on for trial to a Court. and that too only when he considers that a more severe punishment than what he is authoris ed to impose should be awarded. " On this view about the effect o[ s. 23D, the Court gave the deci sion that the power conferred on the Director of Enforcement under s. 23D to transfer cases to a Court is not unguided and arbitrary, and does not offend Art. 14 of the Constitution; and s.

23(1) (a) cannot be assailed as uni; Qnstitutional. In that case, the argument was that s. 23 (I) (a) s'ITould be struck down, be cause the procedure prescribed by it permitted proceedings to be taken by the Director of Enforcement himself which procedure did not confer the same rights on the defence as the procedure prescribed for trial if the Director of Enforcement filed a com In the case before us, plaint for the offence under s. 23(l)(b). it is s. 23 (1 )(b) which is challenged and on a slightly different ground that it ?rovides for a higher punishment than that pro vided by·s. 23(1 )(a). The answer to both the question.sis found i.n the view taken by us in the present case as well as by this Court in the case of Shanti Prasad Jain(') that the Director of Enforce ment, though he has power to try the case under s. 23 (1 )(a), can only send the case to the Court if he consil"ers that a severer punishment than what he is authorised should be awarded.

The Court in that case also thus a:cepted the principle that s. 23D limits entirely the procedure the Director of Enforce ment has to observe when deciding whether the punishment should · be under s. 2311 )(a) or under s. 23(1 )(b). to Lrnpose However, we consider that, in this case, there is considerable force in the second point urged by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appel lants that the respondent, in filing the complaint on 17th March, 1968, did not act in accordance with the requirements of the proviso to s. 23D(l ). We have held above that the proviso to s. 230( 1) lays down the only manner in which the Director of Enforcement can make a complaint and this provision has been laid down as a safeguard to ensure that a person, who is being proceeded against for a contravention under s. 23 (1), is not put in danger of higher and severer punishment at the choice and sweet-will of the Director of Enforcement.

When such a safe guard is provided by legislature, it is necessary that the authority, which takes the step of instituting against that person proceedings in which a severer punishment can be awarded, complies strictly (I) [1952) S.C.R. 284. (2) [1963J 2 S.C.R. 297. B c D E F G H ·RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 651 with all the conditions laid down by law to be satisfied by him In the present i;:ase, therefore, before instituting that proceeding. we have to see whether the requirements of the proviso to s. 23D( 1) were satisfied at the stage when the respondent filed the impugned complaint on 17th March, 1968. The proviso to s. 23D(l) lays down that the complaint may be made at any stage of the enquiry but only if, having regard to the circumstances of the case, the Director of Enforcement finds that the penalty which he is empowered to impose would not It was urged by Mr. Sen that, in this case, the be adequate. complaint was not filed as a result of the enquiry under the prin· cipa.J clause of s.

23D ( 1) at all and, in any case, there was no material before the respondent on which he could have formed the opinion that the penalty which he was emvowered to impose would not be adequate in respect of the swn c-f Sw. Krs. 88,913.09 which, it .was alleged, had been acquire~ by two ac cused during the period 1963 to 1965 and kept in deposit against law. Arguments at some length were advanced before us on the question as to what should be the stage of the enquiry at which the Director of Enforcement should form his opinion and wi!l It appears to us that be entitled to file the complaint in Court. it is not necessary in this case to go into that question. It is true that the enquiry in this case under s. 23D( 1) had been instituted by the issue of the show cause notice dated 25th August, 1967, that being the notice mentioned in Rule 3 ( 1) of the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1957, On the record, however, it does not appear that, even after the issue of that notice, any such material came before the respondent which could be relevant for forming an opinion that the penalty which he was empowered to impose. for the contravention in respect of the sum of Sw.

Krs. 88,913.09 would not be adequate. The respondent, in the case of accused No. 2, appears to have formed a prima facie opinion that a complaint should be made against him in Court when he issued the notice on 4th November, 1967 under the proviso to s. 23 ( 3) of the Act, and a similar opinion in respect of accused No. 1 when he issued the notice on 20th January, 1968 under the same proviso. There js, however, no information on the record to indicate that, by the time these notices were material had appeared before the respondent in the course of the enquiry initiated by him through the notice dated 25th August, 1967 which could lead to the opinion being formed by impose the respondent adequate penalty by continuing the adjudication proceedings. Even subseqnently, when one of the accused replied to the notice, there does not appear to have been brought before the respondent any such relevant material. that he will not be in a position issued, Mr.

S. T. Desai on behalf of the respondent drew our attention to. para. 3(E) of the petition presented by accused No. 1 for B c D E F G H 652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19 70] 1 S.C.R. certificate under Art. 132(1) and Art. 134(l)(c) of the Consti tution in this case which contains the followi.rg pleading : - "In this case, having issued show cause notice dated 25-8-67 in respect of the subject matter of the pending prosecution and having taken various acts, taking state ments, taking recorded statements, investigations, the respondent did not hold an enquiry for the purpose of his forming an opinion that the accused is guilty of violations and that the penalty is not adequate and as such, the prosecution filed in C.C. 8756 of 68 is liable to be quashed on this ground. " Relying on this pleading, Mr. Desai urged that it amounts to an admission by accused No. 1 that, during enquiry, various 1tate ments were taken and recorded and investigations made, so that we should not hold that there was no material on the basis of which the respondent could have formed the opinion that it was a fit case for making a complaint.

The pleading does not show that any statements were taken or recorded during the course of the enquiry held under s. 230( 1) of the Act in the manner laid down by the Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal Rules, 1957. Under those Rules, after a notice is issued, the Director of Enforce ment is required to consider the cause shown by suc:.i person in rei.ponsc to the notice and, if he is of the opinion that adjudication proceedings should be held, he has to fix a date for the appearance of that person either personally or through his lawyer or other authorised representative. Subsequently, he has to explain to the person proceeded against or his lawyer or authorised repre sentative the offence alleged to have been committed by such person indicating the provisions of the Act or of the rules, direc tions or orders made thereunder in respect of which contravention is alleged to have taken place, and then he has to give an opport unity to such person to produce such documents or evidence as It is on the conclusion he may consider relevant to the inquiry. of such an inquiry that the Director can impose a penalty under In the present case, there is no material at all to s.

23(1)(a). show that any proceedings were taken in the manner indicated by/ the Rules referred to above. There docs not appear to have been any cause shown by either of the two accused, or considera tion of such cause by the respondent to decide whether adjudication It is true that there is some n.1aterial proceedings should be held. to indicate that, after the issue of notice dated 25-8-1967, some investigations were carried on by investigations would not be part of the inquiry which had to be held in accordance with Adjudication Proceedings and Appeal It appears that, at one stage, before the complaint Rules, 1957. was filed, a writ petition was moved under Art. 226 of the Consti tution in the High Court of Madras praying for the quashing of thr respondent; but A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 653 the notice dated 25th August, 1967. The order made by the High Court on one of the interim applications in connection with that notice shows that, while that writ petition was pending, some investigations were permitted by the Court, but further penal proceedings in pursuance of .that notice were restrained.

This clearly indicates that whatever statements were recorded by the respondent as mentioned in the petition of accused No. 1 referred to above must have been in the course of investigation and not in the course of the inquiry under s. 23D( 1) of the Act. The record before us, therefore, does not show that any material at all was available to the respondent in the course of the enquiry urider s. 23D( 1) on the basis o.f which he could have fonned an opin'ion that it was a fit case for making a complaint on the ground that he would not be able to impose adequate penalty. The complaint has, therefore, to be held to have been filed without satisfying the requirements and conditions of the proviso to s. 23D(l) of the Act and is in violation of the safeguard provided by the Legislature for such contingencies. The complaint, insofar. as it related to the contravention by the accused of provisions of ss.

4 ( 1), 5 ( 1 )( e) and 9 of the Act! punishable under s. 23(1){b) is concerned, is invalid and proceedings being taken in pursuance of it must be · quashed. There remains for consideration the question whether proceed ings could be validly continued on the complaint in respect of the charge under• R. 132A( 4) of the DJ.Rs. against the two accused. The tWo relevant clauses of Rule 132A are as follows : '····' "132A. (2) No person other than an authorised dealer shall buy or otherwise acquire or borrow from, or sell or othenvise transfer or lend to, or exchange with, any person not being an authorised dealer, any foreign exchange, ' ( 4) If ariy person contravenes any ;if the provisions of this rule, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, · or with both; and any court trying such contravention may direct that the foreign exchange in respect of which the court is satisfied that this rule has been contravened, ~hall be forfeited to the Central Government.

" H The charge in the complaint against the two accused was that they had acquired foreign exchange to the extent of Sw. Krs. 88,913.09 in violation of the prohibition contained in R.132A{2) during the period when this Rule was in force, so that they became liable to punishment under R.132A(4). Rule 132-A as a whole ceased to be in existence as a result of the notification issued by the Ministry 654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] l s.c.R. of Home Affairs on 30th March, 1955, by which the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1965 were promulgated. Clause 2 of these Amendment Rules reads as under : - ·• 1n the Defence of India Rules, 1962, rule ! 32A (relating to prohibition of dealings in foreign exchange) shall be omitted except as respects things done or omitted to be done under that rule. " The argument of Mr. Sen was that, even if there was a contraven tion· of R. 132A(2) by the accused when that Rule was in force, the act of contravention cannot be held to be a "thing done or omitted to be done under that rule," so that, after that rule has been omitted, no prosecution in respect of that contravention can be imtituted.

He conceded the possibility that, if a prosecution had.already been started while R. 132A was in force, that prose cution might have been competently continued. Onte the Rule wu omitted altogether, no new proceeding by way of prosecu tion could be initiated even though it might be in respect of an offence committed earlier during the period that the rule Wll!i in forte. We are inclined to agree with the submission of Mr. Sen that the language contained in cl. 2 of the Defence of India (Amendment) Rules, 1965 can only afford protection to action already taken while the rule was in force, but cannot justify initia tion of a new proceeding which will not be a thing done or omitted to be done under the rule but a new act of initiating a proceeding after the rule had ceased to exist. On this interpretation, the complaint made for the offence under R. 132A(4) of the D.I.Rs .. after 1st April, 1965 when the rule was omitted, has to be held invalid.

This view of ours is in line with the general print 'pie emm cia!M by this Court in the case of S. Krishnan and Others v. The in the State of Madras('), relating to temporary enactments, following words : - "The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the absence ol special provision to the con trary, proceedings which are being taken against R per.;on under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the 9tatute expires. " Mention may also be made to a decision Of a learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in Seth Ju~ndar Das and Others v. ·Stale('), where a similar view was taken when considering the effect of the repeal of the Defence of India Act, 1939, and the (I) [19511 S.C.R. 621. (2) A.J.R. 1951 All. 703. A B c D E F G H ,,, A B c D E F G H RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 655 Ordinance No. XII of 1946 which haci amended s. 1 ( 4) of that Act. On the other hand, Mr.

Desai on behalf of the respondent relied on a decision of the Privy Council in Wicks v. Director of .Public Prosecutions('). In that case, the appellant, whose case came up before the P~ivy Council, w_as convicted for contra~en­ tion of Regulation 2A of the Defence (General) RegulaUons framed under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 as applied to British subjects abroad by s. 3 ( 1) (b) of the said Act. It was held that, at the date when the acts, which were the subject matter of the charge; were committed, the regulation in qu.esti0iJ1 was in force, so that, if the appellant had been prosecuted unme diately afterwards, the validity of his conviction could not be open to any challenge -at all. But the Act of 1939 was a tempo.rary Act, and after various extensions it expired on February 24, 19.45. The trial of the accused took place only in May 1946, and he was coovicted and sentenced to four years' penal servitude on May 28.

In these circumstances, the 'QUestion raised in the appeal was : "Is a man entitled to be acquitted when he is proved to· have broken a Defence Regulation at a time when that regulation was in opera tic.!Jl, because his tri.al and conviction take place after the regulatioa h• expired?" The Privy Council took notice of sub-s. (3) of se¢Dn 11 of the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939 whicli. laid down that "the expiry of this Act shall not affect the opera tion thereof as respects things previously done or omitted to be done". It was argued before the Privy Council that the phrase "things previously done" does not cover offences previously com Illitted. This argument was rejected by Viscount Simon on behalf of the Privy Council and it was held that the appellant in that caec could be convicted in respect of the offence which he had committed when the regulation was in force. That case, however, is distinguishable from the case before us inasmucq as, in that case, tlte saving proyision laid down that the operation of that Acfitsclf w111 not to be affeeted by the expiry as respects things previously dooe or omitted to be done.

The Act could, therefore, be held to be in operation in respect of acts already committed, so that tlte conviction could be validly made even after the expiry" of tlte Act in respect of an offence committed before the expiry. -In tlte case before us, the operation of R. 132A of the DJ.Rs. has not been continued after its omission. The language used in the notification only affords protection to things already done under tile rule, so that it cannot permit further application of that rule by instituting a new prosecution in respect of something already done. The offence alleged against the accused in the present case is in respect of acts done by them which cannot be held to be acts under that rule. The difference in the language thus 'makes (1) 11947] A.C. 362. 656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1970] 1 S.C.R it clear ihat the principle enunciated by the Privy Council in the case cited above cannot apply to the notification with which we are concerned.

Reference was next made to a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Hirata/ Sutwala_('), but, there again, the accused was sought to be prosecuted for an offence punishable under an Act on the repeal of which section 6 In the case of the General Clauses Act had been made applicable. before us, s. 6 of the General Clauses Act canriot obviously apply on the omission of R. 132A of the DJ.Rs. for the two obvious reasons that s. 6 only applies to repeals and not to omissions, and applies when the repeal is of a Central Act or Regulation and not If s. 6 of the General Clauses Act had been applied, of a Rule. no doubt this complaint against the two accused for the ollence punishable under R. 132A of the D.l.Rs. could have been insti tuted even after the repeal of that rule. The last case relied upon is /. K. Gas Plant Manufacturing In Co., (Rampur) Ltd. and Others v.

The King Emperor('). that case, the Federal Court had to deal with the effect of sub-s. ( 4) of section 1 of the Defence of India Act, 1939 and the Ordinance No. XII of 1946 which were also considered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Seth J11gmendar Das Ii: Ors. ('). After quoting the amended sub-s. (4) of s. 1 of tile Defence of India Act, the Court held : - "The express insertion of these saving clauses was no doubt due to a belated realisation that the provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) ::.pply only to repealed statutes and not to expiring ~tatutes, and that the general rule in regard to the expiration of a temporary statute is that unless it contains some special provision to the contrary, after a temporary Act has expired, no proceedings can be taken upon it and it ceases to have any further effect. Therefore, offences com mitted against temporary Acts must be prosecuted and punished before the Act expires and as soon as the Act expires any proceedings which are being taken against a person will Ipso facto terminate.

" The Court cited with approval the decision in the case of Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutions('), and held that, in view of s. 1(4) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, as amended by Ordi nance No. XII of 1946, the prosecution for a conviction for an offence committed when the Defence of India Act was in force, was valid even after the Defence of India Act had ceased to be in force. That case is, however, distinguishable from the case (I) A.l.R. 19l9 M.P. 93. (3) A.l.R. t9ll All. 703. (2) (1947J F.C.R. 14'! (4) (1947) A.C. 362. A B c D E F G H RAYALA CORP. v. DIR. ENFORCEMENT (Bhargava, J.) 657 A before us in two respects. In that case, the prosecution had been started before the Defence of India Act ceased to be in force and, secondly, the language introduced in the amended sub-s. ( 4) of s. 1 of the Act had the effect of making applicable the principles laid down in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act, so that a legal pro ceeding could be instituted even after the repeal of the Act in res- B pect of an offence committed during the time when the Act was in force.

As we have indicated earlier, the notification of the Ministry of Home Affairs omitting R. 132A of the D.I.RS. did not make any such provision similar to that contained in s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. Consequently, it is clear that, after the omission of R. 132A of the D.I.Rs., no prosecution could be insti- tuted even in respect of an act which was an offence when that Rule was.in force. c In this connection, Mr. Desai pointed out to us that, simul taneously with the omission of R. 132A of the DJ.Rs., s. '4(1) of the Act was amended so as to bring the prohibition contained in R. 132A(2) tinders. 4(1) of the Act. He urged that, from this simultaneous action taken, it should be _presumed that there was no intention of· the Legislature that acts, which were offences punishable under R. 132A of the D.I.Rs., should go unpunished after the omission of that rule. It, however, appears that when s.