A HARAKCHAND RATANCHAND BANTHIA ETC & Ors. v. UNION OF INDIA & Ors.

The first question to be considered is whether the impugned Act is within the legislative competence of Parliament under Entry 52 of List I, and Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Sche dule. It was argued on behalf of the petitioners that the legis ]fttion fell within the exclusive competence of the 'State Legisla tures under Entry 27 of List II. work was a handicraft requiring application of skill and the art of making gold ornaments was not an industry within the mean- ing of Entry 52 of List I, or Entry 33 of List ill of the Seventh Schedule. The opposite viewpoint was presented by Mr. Setal- vad who argued that the Legislative entries must be construed in a large and liberal sense and that the goldsmith's craft was an industry within the meaning of Entry 24 of List II, Entry 3 3 of G List III and Entry 52 of List I and Parliament is competent to legislate in regard to the manufacture of gold ornaments. The relevant entries in the Lists of the Seventh Schedule of the Consti tution are List I, Entry 52-lndustries, the control of which by, the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest; List II, Entry 24 : Industries subject to the H provisions of Entries 7 and 52 of List I; List II, Entry 27 : Pro duction, supply and distribution of goods subject to the provi sions of Entry 3 3 of List III. List ill, Entry 3 3 reads as follows : ' I A B c D E F G H H. ll. BANTHIA v. UNION (Ramaswami, /.) 48& "Trade and c0mmerce in, and the production, sup ply and distribution of,- (a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, and imported goods of the same ·kind as such products; (b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils: ( c r cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other con centrates; (d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and (e) raw jute." Before construing these entries it is useful to notice some of the well-settled rules of interpretation laid down by the Federal Court and by this Court in the matter of construing the entries. The power to legililate is given to the appropriate legislatures by Art. 246 of the Constitution. The entries in the three Lists are only legislative heads or fields of legislation; they demarcate the area over which $e appropriate legislatures can operate. It is well-established that the widest amplitude should be given to language of the entries. But some of the entries in the different lists or in the same list may overlap or may appear to be in direct conflict with each other. It is then the duty of this Court to re concile the entries and bring about a harmonious construction. In In re The Central Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and Lubricants Taxation Act, 1938( 1 ) Sir Maurice Gwyer pro ceeded to state : "Only in the Imlian Constitution Act can particular problem arise which is now under considera tion; and an end~avour must be made to solve it, as the Judicial Coinrnit!ee have said, by having recourse to the context and sch'lffie of the Act, and a reconciliation attempted between two apparently conflicting .iurisdic tions by reading the two entries together and by inter preting, and, where necessary, modifying, the language of the one by that of the other. If indeed such a recon ciliation should prove impossible, then, and onlv then. will the non-obstante clause operate and the "federal 1Jower prevail; for the clause ought to be regarded as a la8t resource. a witness to the imperfections of human expression and the fallibility of legal draftsmanship." (p. 44) fl) [1939] F. C. Jl. 18. 49C SUPREME COURT llBPORTS [1970] I S.C.R. The Federal Court in that case held that the entry "taxes on the sale of goods" "'as not covered by the entry "duties of excise" and in coming to that conclusion the learned Chief Justice observed: ·'Here are two separate enactments, each in one aspect conferring the power impose a tax upon goods; and ii would accord with sound principles of construction to take the more general power, that which extends to the whole of India, as subject to an excep tion created by the particular power, that which extends to the Province only. It is not perhaps strictly accu rate to speak of the provincial power as being excepted out of the federal power, for the two are independent of one another and exist side by side. But the under lying principle in the two cases must be the same, that a general power oug!Jt not to be so construed as to make a nuility of a particular power conferred by the same Act and operating in the same field, when by reading the former in a more restricted sense effect can be giveP to the latter in its ordinary and natural meaning." (pp. 49-50) The rule of constructior. adopted by that decision for the pur pose of harmonizing the two apparently conflicting entries in the two Lists would equally apply to an apparent conflict between two entries in the san1e List. Patanjali Sastri, J, (as he then was) held in State af Bomba; v. Narorhamadas Jerhabai(1), that the words "administration of justice" and "constitution and organization of all courts" in Entry 1 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935 must be understood in a res tricted sense excluding from their scope "jurisdiction and powers of courts" specifically dealt with in item 2 of List II. words of the learned Judge, if such a construction was not given "the wider construction of entry 1 would deprive entry 2 of all its content and reduce it to useless lumber." In The question to be considered is what is the meaning of the word "industry" in Entry 52 of List I, Entry 24 of List II and Entry 33 of List III. Whatever may be its connotation it must bear the same meaning in all these entries which are so inter connected that confiicting or different meanings given to them In the Shorter Qi.ford English Dic would snap the connection. tionary the word "industry" is defined as "a particular branch of productive labour; a trade or manufacture." According to Webs ter's Third New International Dictionary (1961 edn.) the word "industry" means "(a) systematic Jabour especially for the creation (!) 11951] S.C.R. 51. A B c 0 E F G H H. R, BANTH!A v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 491 A B c D E F G 11 similar of value; (b) a department or branch of a craft, art, business or manufacture, a division of productive and profit making labour especially one that employs a large personnel and capital espe cially in manufact.iring; ( c) a group of productive or profit making enterprises or organisations that have a technological structure of production and that produce or supply technically substitutable goods, services or sources of income." It was said thai if the word "industries" is construed in this wide sense, Entry 27 of List II will lose all meaning and content. It is not possible to accept this contention for, Entry 27 is a general Entry and it is, a well-recognised canon of construction that a general power should not be so interpreted as to nullily a particular power con In Tika Ramji v. State of Vttar ferred by the same instrument. ) the exp1'¢Ssion "industry" was defined to mean the pro Pradesh ( 1 cess of manufacture or production and did not include raw mate rials used in the industry or the distribution of the products of It was contended that the word "industry" was a the industry. word of wide import and should be construed as including not only the process of manufacture or production but also activites antecedent thereto such as acquisition of raw materials and sub sequent thereto such as disposal of the finished products of that indus_try. But this contention was not accepted. It was contend ed by Mr. Daphtary that if the process of production was to constitute "industry" a process of machinery or mechanical con trivance was essenti-1. But we see no reason why such a limita tion should be imposed on the meaning of the word "industry" in the legislative list$. Similarly it was argued by Mr. Palkhivala that the manufacture of gold ornaments was not an industry be cause it required application of individual art and craftsmanship and aesthetic skill. But mere use of skill or art is not a decisive factor and will not take the manufacture of gold ornaments out It is well settled of the ambit of the relevant legislative entries. that the entries in the three lists are only legislative heads or fields of legi~lation and they demarcate the area over which the appro priate legislature can operate. The legislative entries must be given a large and liberal interpretation, the reason being that the allocation of subjecls to the lists is not by way of scientific or logical definiiion but is a mere enumerntion of broad and com It is not, however, necessary for the pur prehensive categories. pose of this case to attempt to define the expression "industry" precisely or to state exhaustively all its different aspects. But we are satisfied in the present case that the manufacture of gold ornaments by goldsmiths in India is a "process of systematic pro duction" for trade or manufacture and so falls within the connota tion of the word "industry" in the appropriate legislative entries. (I) [1956) S.C.R. 393. SUPREME COUil! lll!PORTS [1970] l S.C.R. It follows, therefore, that in enacting the impugned Act Parlia ment was validly exercising its legislative power in respect of matters covered by Entry 52 of List I and Entry 33 of List Ill. It was contended by Mr. Ashoke Sen that the manufac:ure of gold ornaments cannot be said to constitute an industry unless there was cooperation of labour and capital and there WJ> re!J It was said that if ornament tionship of employer and employee. making activity was largely carried on by self-employed gold smiths individually and there was no participation by labour and capital in the said activity. Reference was made to the • .k:ision of this Court in Banerji v. Mukherjee\ 1 J in which it wa> pdnted out that the word "industry" in s. 2(j J of the Industrial Di>putcs Act, 1947 should be: construed as an activity systematicJli) or habitually undertaken for production and distribution of ~oods or for rendering material services to the community at !Jrge and that such an activity generally involved cooperation of the employer and the employees and its object was satisfaction o: human needs. The same view was taken in the Natio11<1/ Union oi Commcr~ial Employees v. M. R. Meher( 2 ) in which it was pointed ou: that the distinguishing feature of an industry was that for produ~tion of goods or for the rendering of service, cooperation·between capital and labour or between the employer and his employee must be direct. But these decisions arc of no avail 10 the petitioner. be cause they were concerned with the interpretation of the word "industry" ins. 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which reads as fclllows : • "industry means any business, trade, undertaking. manufacture or calling of employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen:" In interpreting the word "industry" in that section the court thought it necessary to limit the scope of the section having regard to the aim, object and scope of the whole Act. The history of the legis lation made it manifest that the Industrial Disputes Act was introduced as an important step in achieving social justice. The Act seeks to ameliorate 1he service conditions of the worker3, to provide a machinery for resolving their conflicts and to encourage It was their cooperative effort in the service of the community. in this context that the expression "industry" was interpreted in Banerjee's case(') and Meher's case('). It was an interpretation adopted by this Court sacundum subjectae materies. But what we are concerned in the present case is the inlerprctation of tlle (I) [1953] S.C.R. 302. (2) :1962) Supp. 3 S.C.R. 157. A B c D E F G H H. R. BANTHIA v. UNION (Ramaswami, I.) 493 A word "industry" in the legislative lists which constitute part of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. decisions referred to above have no bearing on the question deba!ed in the present case. It is manifest - B c D ft was argued by Mr. Palkhivala that even on the assumption that making of gold articles and ornaments was an industry within the meaning of the legislative entries the control of the said indus try was not declared by Parliament to be expedient in the public interest and, therefore, Parliament was not competent to legislate upon the subject matter of the impugned Act. To appreciate this argument it is necessary to notice briefly the provisions of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act 65 of 1951) which was enacted by Parliament to provide for the development and regulation of certain industries. Under. s. 2 of this Act it is declared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the first schedule. Section 3(1) of the 1951 Act defines a "scheduled industry" to mean "any of the industries specified in the first schedule". The relevant portion of the first schedule is reproduced below : "' "l. METALLURGICAL INDUSTRIES : A. Ferrous (1) Iron and steel (metal). (2) Ferro-alloys. (3) Iron and steel castings and forgings. ( 4) Iron and steel structurals. ( 5) Iron and steel pipes. (6) Special steels. ( 7) Other products of iron and steel. B. Non-ferrous ( 1) Precious metals, including gold and silver, and their alloys. ( 1 A) Other non ferrous metals and their alloys, (2) Semi-manufactures and manufactures." The question presented for determination is whether the manu facture of gold ornaments falls within item 2 "semi-manufactures or manufactures" under the sub-heading B "non-ferrous" of the heading "metallur~cal industries". It was argued that item 2 of sub-heading B canµot be read in isolation but it must be construed in the context of the heading "metallurgical industries" which was G H 494 SUPREME COURT llBPORTS [1970] 1 S.c.R. the controlling factor in the interpretation of the item 2 under the sub-heading. To put it differently the argument was that the heading "metallurgical industries" was the key to the interpreta tion of the item "semi-manufactures or manufactures". It was said that the expression "metallurgical industries" has a definite. technical meaning namely an industry engaged in the actual extrac tion of metal from ores and the processing, manufacturing and converting the base metal into various forms, shapes and classes so as to make them available in a utilisable form for the purpose industries, of various other industries viz. : machine building In electrical industries, ship building industries, railways etc. support of this proposition reference was made to the affidavits of Dr. G. S. Tendolkar, Head of the Department of Metallurgy, Indian Institute of Technology, Powai and of Dr. V. A. Altekar, Head of the Chemical Technology Department, University of Bombay and also to certain standard text books on metallurgy. On behalf of the respondents reference was made to the affidavit of Mr. Dayal, Industrial Adviser to the Government o( India wherein he states that in the process of manufacture of gold orna ments the goldsmith has to "melt gold (pure virgin meta:, old ornaments or scrap); make an alloy of the required specifications; cast it into desired shapes; conven the alloy into semis like rods, strips, wires etc., and fabricate it into the required design, finished articles including ornaments." These involve metallurgical opera tions like melting, refining, making of alloys, casting, annealing, rolling, forging, pressing, punching, soldering, pressing, die cut ting etc., and a goldsmith therefore is employed in the metallur gical industry. It is not necessary for us to express any concluded opinion in this case on the question whether the manufacture of gold ornaments involves any metallurgical process. Even on the assumption that the petitioners are right in saying that the manufac ture of gold ornaments is not a metallurgical industry in the techni cal sense we consider that the heading "metallurgical industry" in the schedule does not control the scope and meaning of the Entry 1-B(2) "semi-manufactures or manufactures''. The headings of the schedule do not follow any logical or scientific pattern but are put in merely as devices for convenient grouping of the industries. For example, there is no warrant for excluding electricity meters used in homes from item 15 ( 1) or for excluding weighing machines used at airports or railway stations or ports from item 15 (3). There are other examples which show that the heading does not control the meaning of the industry. Thus "lubricating oils and the like" in tho item at 2(2) are clearly not "fuels" which is tho heading under which they are found. Again, fire fighting equipment and appliances such as fire extinguishers used in homes or in offices or in cinema halls or as accessories to motor cars B c D F G H - H. ll. BANTHIA v. UNION (Ramaswami, /.) 495 A would clearly be included in tne llldustry at item 8-B ( 14). Simi larly matches [item 36(3)] is not controlled by the heading "timber products" nor is there any warrant for holding that arms and ammunition, item 37, is controlled by the heading "defence industries". As we have already said that there is no scientific or logical scheme in the classification cf first schedule of Act 65 B of 1951 but it is a mere enumeration and grouping cf various items. We are unable to accept the argument of petitioners that the heading metallurgical industries should be construed as having a controlling effect on the meaning of item B (2) "semi-manufac tures or manufactures". c D E F G H \Ve proceed to consider the next question arising in this case as to whether the manufacture of ornaments falls witllin item 1-B (2) "'semi-manutactures and manufactures" of the first schedule. It was said that the expression "semi-manufactures or manufac tures" in regard to gold means the precious metal in various stages of preparation before its production in a pure state. It was argued that "semi-manufactures" would mean gold in the form of ingots, wire, strips, sheets and "manufactures" would mean gold, bricks or standard gold bars, gold castings and so on. We are. unable to accede to this argument. If the meaning contended for by the petitioners is correct item 1-B(l) and (2) of the first schedule In other words en_try No. 1-B would convey the same meaning. (2) would be superfiuous and we cannot attribute tautology to Parliament which cannot be supP,Osed to have used words with out meaning. We are, on the contrary, of opinion that the expres sion "'semi-manufactures or manufactures" should be construed in the light of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. Section XIV deals with "'precious metals and articles thereof". Sub-Chapter ll of Chapter 71 in this section specifically deals with precious metal in unwrought and unworked form and semi-manufactures thereof and sub-Chapter Ill deals with manufactures of precious metals. Headings 71.07 and 71.08 in this sub-Chapter set out un-wrought or semi-manufactured gold while headings 71.12 to 71.14 in Sub-Chapter III set out finished articles of jewellery, goldsmiths' wru:es and other articles of precious metals. The explanatory notes lo Brussels Tariff Nomenclature shows (Vol. II, p. 633) that "pre cious metals in. unwrought or semi-manufactured from but which have not reached the stage of articles" are included under Head ing 71.05 to 71.10. So far as silver is concerned "unwrought and semi-manufactures" are set out at p. 641 and they include forms like uars, rods, sections, wire, plates, sheets and strips, tubes; pipes, hollow bars, foils, powder etc. The enumeration of finished articles of gold, that is to say, manufactures of gold is given at p. 640. The enumeration includes articles and ornaments, for ' 496 SUPREMB COU1T llBPORTS [1970] I SC.It example, jewellery and parts thereof, small objcc~ of personal A adornment such as rings, bracelets, necklaces and articles of per sonal use such as cigarette cases, snuff boxes, powder bo;r;es, lip (pp. 641-646 of fuplanatory notes). In our stick holders etc. opinion the expression "semi-manufactures or manufactures" of the first schedule should be construed in the context and back ground of the classification in the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature. B It follows that manufacture of gold ornaments falls within the expression "semi-manufactures or manufactures" in item l-B(2J of the first schedule and Parliament is, therefore, competent to legislate in regard to t!ie subject matter of the impugned Act. It was contended by Mr. Daphtary It was also contended that the provisions of Act 65 of 1951 clearly indicate that what Parliament intended to control under Entry 52 of Union List was not the manufacture of gold ornaments but industrial undertakings as contemplated by s. 2(d) of that Act. the expression "scheduled industry'" ins. 2(a) of the Act was synonymous with an industrial undertaking under s. 2 ( d) and a declaration under s. 2 of the Act would therefore apply to industries carried on in It W•lS argued that the Act the factories as defined in the Act. was intended to apply to industrial undertakings carried on in factories and not to individual craftsmanship of goldsmiths. Sec tion 3(d) of the Act defines an industrial undertaking to mean: "any undertaking pertaining to a scheduled industry carried on in one or more factones by any person or authority including Govern ment". Section 2(i) defines a "scheduled industry" as meaning any of the industries defined in the first schedule. Chapter III of the Act provides measures for the regulation of scheduled indus tries. Chapter III-A relates to direct management and control of industrial undertakings in certain cases. In our opinion Act 65 of 1951 performs two distinct and independent functions, namely, the public (I) a declaration under s. 2 that it is expedient in interest that the Union should take under its control the industries specified in the first schedule and (2) the setting up of a machinery for imposing controls on industrial undertakings. There is a dis tinction made between "scheduled industries" "industrial undertakings" throughout the Act and separate provision has been made for registration of indtL~trial undertakings for licensing of new industrial undertakings and for the direct management of industrial undertakings by the Central Government in certain cases. Provisions have also been made for regulation of scheduled indus tries. procedure for grant of licences, power to cause investigation to be made etc. We are, therefore, unable to accept the conten tion of Mr. Daphtary that the expressions "industrial undertakin~" and "scheduled industry" are used synonymously in the Act or the ... c D I p G H A B c D F H. R. BANTHIA v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 497 expression "scheduled industry" in s. 2 of the Act should be con strued as a "scheduled industry" carried on in the manner of an "industrial undertaking." Having dealt with and negatived the attack upon the validity of the entire Act we shall now proceed to deal with certain sections of the Act, the validity of which was also questioned. It was argued that the restrictions imposed by sections 4(4), 4(5), 5(1), 5(2), 27(2)(d), 27(6), 16(7), 32 read with 46, 88 and 100 were unreasonable and not in public interest and so are violative It was also said of Art. 19(1) (f) and (g) of the Constitution. that the s~ctions were also violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution because of the confennent of unchannelled, uncontrolled and arbitrary power in the Administrator and other authorities con stituted under the impugned Act. Before examining ,this argument it is necessary to set out the circumstances and the social and economic background in which the impugned legislation was passed. It is stated in the counter affidavit that the impugned Act was passed in order to bring about reduction in the quantity of smuggled gold by rendering smuggling more dangerous and the disposal of smuggled gold in the domestic market more difficult.. Even though import of gold had been banned considerable quantities of contraband gold find their way into this country through iilegal channels. The Customs Depart ment is in itself not ip a position to effectively combat smuggling over the long borders and the coast lines and, therefore, the anti smuggling measures have to be supplemented by a detailed system of control over internal transactions so as to make the circulation of smuggled gold more difficult, if not impossible. The loss of foreign exchange caused by smuggling of gold was estimated at nearly Rs. 100 crores per year in the post-devaluation period, and Government felt \hat it was very necessary to reduce the internal demand for gold and erect barriers to the circulation of smuggled gold within the country. The submission of Mr. Setalvad was that the reasonableness of the impugned provisions of the Act had to be judged in the light of the widespread smuggling of gold which, if not checked, was calculated to destroy the national economy and hamper the country's economic stability and progress. Refer ence was made in this connection to the report of the Taxation Enquiry Commission which pointed out that the factual position in regard to the existem;e of widespread smuggling. . ' "Smuggling now constitutes not only a loophole for escaping duties but also a threat to the effective fulfilment of the objectives: of foreign trade control. The existence of foreign pockels in the country accentuates the danger. ·. H 498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1970] 1 s.c.R. The extent of the leakage of revenue that takes place through this process cannot be estimated even roughly, but, we understand, it is not unlikely that it is substantial. Apart from its deleterious effect on legitimate trade, it also entails the outlay of an appreciable amount of public funds on patrol vessels along the sea coa.sls and permanent works along the land border, and watch and It is, therefore, neces ward staff on a generous scale. sary, in our opinion, that stringent measures both legal and administrative should be adop!ed with a view to minimising the scope of this evil." (p. 320). It is in this context that the test for ascertaining the reasonableness of the restriction of the rights ih Art. 19 is of great importance. There are several decisions of this Court in which the relevant criteria have been laid down. It is, however, sufficient to refer to the judgment of Pata.njali Sastri, C.J. in Stale of a passage in Madras v. V. G. Rao('). "It is important in 1his context to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or general pattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases .. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extent and urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, the disproportion of the imposition, the prevailing condi tions at the time, should all enter into the judicial ver dict." It is necessary to emphasise that the principle which underlies the structure of the rights guaranteed under Art. 19 of the Con stitution is the principle of balancing of the need for individual liberty with the need for social control in order that the freedoms guaranteed to the individual subserve the larger public interests. It would follow that the reasonableness of the restrictions imposed under !he impugned Act would have to be judged by the magni· tude of the evil which it is !he purpose of !he rcslraint> to curb or eliminale. Section 4( 4) ol the Act empowers the Administrator to autho rise such person as he thinks fit to also exercise all or any powers exercised by him under the Act (with certain exceptions) and different persons may be authorised to exercise different powers. Section 4(5) states that "any person authorised by the Administra- (1) (19521 S.C.R. 597. 601. A c D E F G H ... H. ll. BANTHIA v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 499 A B c D E F G H tor to exercise any powers may exercise those powers in the same manner and with the same effect as if they had been conferred on that person directly by this Act and not by way of authorisation." . After having heard the argument of Mr. Daphtary we are not satisfied that the delegation of power conferred by s. 4 ( 4) and 4(5) goes beyond the permissible constitutional limits. Delega tion by the Administrator is necessary for the volume of work entrusted to him is great and he cannot be expected to do the bulk impair of it himself. Absence of such power might seriously administrative efficiency. Section 4( 4) contemplates Administrator may authorise such person as he thinks fit to also exercise all or any of the powers exercisable by him under the It must be Act other than the powers specified in that section. assumed that the Administrator will delegate his authority only to competent and responsible persons in pur; uance of the power conferred upon him by s. 4( 4 l of the Act. It was then said that the provisions of s. 5 (1) conferred wide and uncontrolled power without any guidelines and was capable of being used with arbi trary discrimination. But ·s. 5 ( 1) requires that the Administrator shonld have regard to the policy of the Act in making his orders. His orders should be made within the framework of the Act and . As should not be inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. regards s. 5(2) (a) the argument was that unguided power was conferred upon the Administrator or his delegate to regulate or fix the price at which any gold whether it be primary gold, article or ornament should be sold. As the power to fix the price may also be exercised not only in respect of primary gold but also in respect of articles and ornaments the business of the petitioners and similarly other persons will be adversely affected. But the section provides the safeguard that the regulation of the price should be made by the Administrator after consultation with the It was argued that the phrase "so far as Reserve Bank of India. it appears to him to be necessary or expedient for carrying out the provisions of this Act" was a subjective formula and action of the Administrator.in making the orders under s. 5(2)(a) may be arbitrary and unreasonable. But in our opinion the formula is not subjective and does not constitute the Administrator the sole judge as to what is in fact necessary er expedient for the purposes of the Act. On the contrary we hold that in the context of the scheme and object of the legislation as a whole the expression can not be construed in a subjective sense and the opinion of the Administrator as to the necessity or expediency of making the order must be reached objectively after having regard to the rele vant considerations and must be reasonably tenable in a court of law. It must be assumed that the Administrator will generally address himself to the circumstances of the situation before him 500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19 70] l S.C.R. and not try to promote purposes alien to the object of the Act. As A regards s. 5(2)(b) the contention of the petitioners was that sub stantive provisions have been made in the Act for the grant of licence for manufacture, acquisition, possession and disposal and consumption of gold. Referen~ was made in this collllection to s. 8 ( 6) of the Act which confers power on the Administrator to authorise any person or class of persons to buy or otherwise B . acquire, accept or otherwise receive or -sell, deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose of any primary gold or article. Section 11 (I) contains a prohibition in regard to making, manufacturing etc., preparing or processing of any primary gold or ornament or article unless there is authorisation by the Adminis:rator. Section 29 empowers the Administrator to authorise a dealer in any exccp- c tional case to make, manufacture or prepare a primary gold or article." Section 34(2) prohibits sale, delivery, transfer or dis posal ( 1) of primary gold to any person other than a licensed dealer or refiner or certified goldsmith and ( 2) of any article to any person other than a licensed dealer or refiner. But s. 34(3) provides that notwithstanding anything conta!n~d in sub-s. (2) a D licensed dealer may sell or deliver primary gold or article to any person in pursuance of an authori; ation made hy the Administrator or on production by that person of a permit granted by Administrator in this behalf. Again, section 114(1) conf~rs power on the Central Government to make rules by notification for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Section 114(2) (d) & states : · "(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely : - .. ' ( d) conditions, limitations and restrktions subject to which- ( i) a dealer may sell, deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose of any gold on the hypothecation, pledge, mortgage or charge of which he had advanced any loan; (ii) a refiner may refine gold; (iii) a licensed refiner may buy, acquire, accept or receive, gold, or melt, assay, refine, extract or alloy gold or subject it to any other process, or sell, deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose of any gold; F G H 1-: c ~ 'f (: ; I H. R. BANTllIA v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 50 I A B c D (iv) a licensed dealer may buy, acquire, accept or receive or sell, deliver, transfer or dispose of gold." It is manifest upon a review of all these provisions that the power conferred upon the Administrator under s. 5(2)(b) is legislativ.e in character and extremely wide. · A parallel power of subordinate legislation is conferred to the Central Government under s. 114 ( 1) and (2) of the Act. Buts. 114(3) however makes it incumbent upon the Central Government to place the rules before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two successive It is clear that the substantive provisions of the Act sessions. namely ss. 8, 11, 21, 31(3), 34(3) confer powers on the Admi nistrator similar to those contemplated bys. 5(2)(b) of the Act. In these circumstai;1ces we are of opinion that the power of -regula tion granted to 11\e Administrator under s. 5(2)(b) of the Act suffers from excessive delegation of legislative power and must be held to be col)Stitutionally il1valid. E We now come to s. 27 of the Act which relates to licensing of dealers. It was stated on behalf of the petitioners that the con ditions imposed by sub-s. ( 6) of s. 27 for the grant or renewal of licences are uncertain, vague and unintelligible and consequently wide and unfettered power was conferred upon the statutory autho- rities in the matter of grant or renewal of licence. In our opinion this contention is well-founded and must be accepted as correct. Section 27(6)(a) states that in the matter of issue or renewal of licences the Adn\i.nistrator shall have regard to "the number of dealers existing in the region in which the applicant intends to carry on business as a dealer". But the word "region" is nowhere F defined in the Act. Similarly s. 27 ( 6) (b) requires the Adminis trator to have regard to "the anticipated demai; ld; as estimated by him, for ornaments in that region". The eiq'iression "anticipated demand" is a vague expression which is not capable of objective assessment and is bound to lead to a great deal of uncertainty. Similarly the expression "suitability -Of the applicant" in s. 27{ 6) (e) and ''public interest" in s. 27(6) (g) do not provide any objective standard or norm or guidance. For these must be held tliat clausc;i; (a), (d), (e) and (g) of s. 27(6) impose unreas<mable ~!ions on the fundamental right of the petitioner to carry on business and are constitutionally invalid. It was also contended that there was no reason why the conditions for renewal of Jicence should be as rigorous as the conditions for initial grant of licence. The requirement of strict conditions for the ;enewal of licence renders the entire future of the business of t!Tdealer uncertain and subjects it to the caprice and arbitrary will reasons G H 'i ·' 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 19 70] 1 S.C.R. of the administrative authorities. There is justiticaiton for this argument and the requirement of s. 26 of the Act imposing the same conditions for the renewal of the licence as for the initial grant appears to be unreasonable. In our opinion clauses (a), (b), (e) and (g) are inextricably bound up with the oth~r clauses of s. 27 ( 6) and form part of a single scheme. The result is that clauses (a), (b), (c), (e) and (g) are not severable and the entires. 27(6) of the 1'.ct must be held invalid. Section 27(2) ( d) of the Act states !ilat a valid licence issued by the Administra- tor "may contain such conditions, limitations and restrictions as the Administrator may think fit to impo~e and different conditions, limitations and restrictions may be imposed for different classes of dealers." On the face of it, this sub-section confers such wide and vague power upon the Administrator that it is difficult co In our opinion s. 27 (2) ( d) of the Act must be limit its scope. struck down as an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners 10 carry on business. It appears, however, to us that ifs. 27(2) (d) ands. 27(6) of the Act are invalid the licensing scheme contemplated by the rest of s. 27 of the Act cannot be worked in practice. Parliament to enact fresh legislation imposing appropriate condi tions and restrictions for the grant and renewal of licences dealers. In the alternative the Central Government may mako appropriate rules for the same purpose in exercise of its rule· making power under s. 114 of 1he Act. It is, therefore, necessary We now proceed to deal with ss. 32 and 46 of the Act which are also challenged. Section 32 states : "Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no licensed dealer shall ,either own or have at any time in his posses- sion, custody or control primary gold in any form except . in the form of standarcl gold bars ; Provided that such dealer may, unless the Central Government (having regard to the needs of the trade, volume of business and public interest) otherwise directs, own or keep in his posse!'Sion, custody or control not more than- (a) four hundred grammes, if he does not employ any artisan, (b) five hundred grammes, if he employs not more than ten artisans, ( c) one thousand grammes, if he employs more t1'an ten but not more than twenty artisans. A B c D E F G H A B c D E F H. R, BANTWA v. UNION (Ramaswami, I.) 503 ( d) two thousands grammes, if he employs more than twenty artisans, of primary gold in any form other than in the form of standard gold bars." Section 46 enacts : ' ''The total quantity of primary gold in the posses- sion, custody or c_ontrol, whether individually or collec tively, of the artisans employed by a licensed dealer shall not, at any time, exceed the limits specified in section 32".: Section 32 of the Act authorises a licensed dealer to keep any quantity of standard gold bars and provides a Jlmit upon his. hold ing of primary gold depending on the number of artisans he employs. The definition of the term "standard gold bar" under s~ 2(u) does not contemplate the standard gold bar being cut into pieces. A standard gold bar being of a pre~cribed weight and purity cannot in m;my cases be handed over to a certified gold- smith without cutting the same. -If a dealer, therefore, has to give a cut piece of 'standard gold bar to a certain goldsmith the remaining portion of .the standard gold bar will be treated as · primary gold in. his hands. Hence the limits prescribed under s. 32 and 46 of the Act are rendered meaningless in view of the statutory definition of the term "standard gold bar" as it stands at present. We are of opinion that ss. 32 and 46 constitute an unreasonable restriction on the right of the petitioners to carry on trade or business and must be held to ·be invalid. Section 88 of the Act has also been challenged. Sect.ion 88 reads thus : "( 1) · A dealer or refiner who knows or has reason to believe that any provision of this Act or any rule or onler made thereunder . bas been, · or is being, contravened, by any person employed by him in the course CJf such employment, shall be _deemed to have abetted an offenec against this .Act.. . .. G (2) Whoevet abets, or is deemed under sub-section ( 1 ) to have abetted, an offence against this Act, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine." H This section extends the scope of the vicarious liability of dea!er il.nd makes him responsible for the contravention of any provision of the Act or rule or order by any person employed by him in the course of such employment. The rational basis in law 14Sup.Cl/69-3 504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS for the imposition of vicarious liability is that the person made responsible may prevent commission of the crime and may help In one sense the dealer to bring the actual offender to book. is punished for the sins committed by his employee. It may perhaps be said if the dealer had been more alert to see that the law was observed the sin might not have been committed. But the section goes further and makes the dealer liable for any past contravention perpetrated by the employee. It is evident that the dealer cannot reasonably be made liable for any past misconduct of his employee though the dealer can b~ made liable for any act done by his employee in the course of the employment and whom he can reasonably be expected to influence or control. The maxim qui facit per a/ium facit per se is not generally applicable in criminal law. But in s. 88 it has been extended beyond reason able limits. We are, therefore, of opinion that s. 88 imposes an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners and is unconstitutional. We shall now proceed to deal with s. I 00 of the Act which also has been challenged. This section imposes a statutory obli gation upon a dealer to take all reas:mable steps to satisfy himself as to the identity of persons from whom any gold is bought. The section does not specify the nature of steps which a dealer should take for satisfying himself as to the identity of the person from whom any gold is bought. The statutory obligation imposed by the section is uncertain and incapable of proper compliance. It must be held that the section imposes an impossible burden upon the dealers and constitutes an unreasonable restriction. We proceed to consider next the question arising in this case whether the provisions with regard to licensing of dealers and certification of goldsmiths are discriminatory and violate guarantee of equal protection under Art. 14 of the Constitution. Reference was made to ss. 27 and 39 of the impugned Act and it was argued that the provisions with regard to licensing of dealers were more harsh than in the case of registered !!Oldsmiths. But in our opinion licensed dealers and certified separate classes and the classification made by the impugned Act is a reasonable classification. A licensed dealer is essentially a trader who does the business of buying and selling ornaments while a certified goldsmith is a craftsman who does the actual manufacture of ornaments and does not trade in ornaments. A licensed dealer can make or manufacture ornaments from his own gold but a certified goldsmith can make or manufacture new ornaments for his customers onlv from their !!old. A licensed dealer can sell ornaments to the public and can- keco readv stock of such ornaments for the purpose of sale while a certified gold- ioldsmiths B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H H. a. BANTlllA v. UNION (Ramaswami, J.) 505 smith is not permitted to do the business of selling ornaments. A licensed dealer may have in his possession primary gold in the form of standard gold bars without any limit and melted gold in the form other than the standard bars in quantities rangiarg from 400 to 2,000 grammes. A certified goldsmith cannot have in his possession more than 300 grammes of primary gold. A licensed dealer can employ as many persons as he likes as his artisans but a certified goldsmith cannot employ more than one hired labourer to assist him in his work as goldsmith and even this hired labourer cannot make, manufacture, prepare or process any ornament. When a law is challenged as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitu tion it is necessary in the first place to ascertain the policy under lying the statute and the object intended to be achieved by it. Having ascertained the policy and object of the Act the Court has to apply a dual test in examining its validity ( l) whether the classification is rational and based upon an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others that are left·out of the group and (2) whether the basis of differentiation has any rational nexus or relation with its avowed policy and object._ In the present case both the tests are satisfied and we hold that ss. 27 and 39 of the impugned Act do not violate the guarantee under Art. 14 of the Constitution. The only other point that remains to be decided is whether as a result of some of the sections cf the impugned Act being struck down, what ii left of the impugned Act should survive or whether the whole of. the impugned Act should be declared invalid. We are of opinion that the provisions which are declared invalid cannot affect the validity of the Act as a whole. description the real test is whether what remains of the statute is so inextricably bound up with the invalid pa1t that what remains cannot independently survive or as it is sometimes put whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legisla ture would have enacted at all that which survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires. The matter is clearly put in Cooley on Constituitonal Limitations, 8th edn. at p. 360 : In a case of this _ "It would be inconsistent with all just principles of tl-cese enactments void constitutional law to adjudge because they are associated in the same act, but not con nected with or dependent on others which are unconstitu tional. Where, therefore, a part of a statute is unconsti tutional, that fact does not authorise the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter depending on each other, op~ating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning, that it cannot be pre sumed the legislature would have passed the on<> without ·~ ·"'" ' i 506 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS [1970] l S.CR. the other. The constitutional and unconstitutional pro visions may even be contained in the same section, and yet be perfectly distinct and separable, so that the first may stand though the last fall. The point is not whe ther they are contained in the same section; for the dis tribution into sections is purely artificial; but whether they are essentially and inseparably connected in sub stance. If, when the unconstitutional portion is stricken out, that which remains is complete in itself, and capable of being executed in accordance with the apparent legislative intent, wholly independent of that which was rejected, it must be sustained." Applying the test to the present case we are of opinion that the provisions held to be invalid are not inextricably bound up with the remaining provisions of the Act. It is difficult to hold that Parliament would not have enacted the impugned Act at all with out including that pan which is found to be ultra vires. The Act still remains substantially the Act as it was passed, that is, an Act to provide for the control, production, manufacture, supply, distribution, use and possession oi gold and gold ornaments and articles of gold. Jn the result we hold that the following pro visions of the impugned Act are invalid. Sections 5(2)(b), 27(2)(d), 27(6), 32, 46, 88 and 100. The petitioners are, therefore, entitled to a writ in the nature of mandamus under Art. 32 of the Constitution commandin,g respondents not to take any steps to implement any of the invalid provisions of the Act. Writ petitions 282, 407 and 408 of 1968 are allowed to this extent. There will be no order with regard to costs in any of these petitions. V.P.S. Petitions a/lowed in part. A B c D E F ' •.. • . . . , •• l ... _, 1 , ' ·~