GOVIND SARAI v. THE STATE OJ<' U.P

The first appellant died, duri.ug th~ pei:dency. <?f this appe~L As a fine has been imposed, agamst him, m addition to the lia bility to pay costs, his widow has been brought on record, as his legal representative, and allowed to continue these proceed ings. The circumstances, under which the contempt proceedings came to be initiated, in the High Court, may be briefly indicated. The second respondent, herein, Sri V. P. Singh, is an advocate, practising at Azamgarh, and he was a member of the Congress organisation, at the material time. He stood for election, for membership of the Prarambhik (primary) Congress Committee, of Tarwa, in the District of Azamgarh, held on 'April 10, 1964. His opponent was one Badri Singh. In that election, Badri Singh was declared elected. The second respondent filed, on April 16, 1964, a suit, No. 132 of 1964, in the Court of the City Munsif, Azamgarh, for having the election of Badri Singh, declared void and inoperative. He had alleged various irregularities, regarding the conduct of the said election. Along with the suit, he had also filed an application, for injunction, restraining the District Election Officer, and other Officers, from holding elections for membership of the District Congress Committee. He had also asked for an injunction, restraining Badri Singh, from taking part in the elections, for membership of the District Congress Committee. The City Munsif had granted the interim injunction, on April 18, 1964. Badri Singh, on being served with interim order, filed an application, dated April 21, 1964, before the City Munsif, praying for vacating the order of interim in junction. At the time, when the election that was challenged, by the 2nd respondent, took place, Sri Ajit Prasad Jain was the Presi dent of the Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee, Shri Govind Sahai was the General Secretary of the said Committee and Sri Ramesh war Narain Singh was the General Secretary of the District Con gress Committee, Azamgarh. It appears that the Working Com mittee of the Indian National Congress had passed a resolution, dated December 4/5, 1960, the substance of which was that any in respect of member of the Congress, having any grievance, any action taken, or decision given, by a Congress Organization, should take advantage of the tribunals provided, to seek redress by way of appeal or reference, and that such matters should not be taken to law Courts. That resolution further provided that initiating of such litigation, and securing of ex parte interlocutory orders, against the Congress Committee and Congress authorities, • • 178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 969) I S.C.R. was highly detrimental to the discipline of the organisation, and its smooth working. The resolution wound up, by saying that the Working Committee resolved that any member, who tuted a suit or other proceeding in law Courts against any Con gress Committee or Official, did so at the risk of being consi dered guility of gross indiscipline and of being summarily, and removed from membership of the without any further notice, Congress, by order of the Provincial Congress Committees con cerned, or the Working Committee. In view of this resolution, Sri Gulzdri Lal ;'lianda, who is stated to have been delegated the authority of the Working Committee, in respect of organisational elections in Uttar Pradesh. issued a directive, dated April 20. 1964, to the President, Uttar Pradesh Congress Committee, Sri Ajit Prasad Jain. to take immediate action against those mem bers, who had gone to Courts, in regard to Congress organisa tional elections, anywhere in Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, Sri Jain, on April 21, 1964, sent out circular letters to all the District Returning Officers in Uttar Pradesh, expelling those Con gressmen, from membership of the Congress, who had fikd suits, in Courts. concerning organizational elections. Sri Govind Sahai and Sri Rameshwar Narain Singh, the appellants herein. also sent, each of them, a Jetter to the District Returning Officer, expelling the second respondent. and removing his name, from the membership o[ the Congress. This decision was duly com municated, to the second respondent. To resume the narrative, regarding the proceedings. connect ed with the suit, the application for vacating the injunction, filed hy Badri Singh, came up for lirial hearing, before the City Munsif. on April 25, 1964. when the second appellant, med an aflidavit, mentioning the fact that the second respondent. herein, who was the plaintifT in the suit, had been expelkd, from the Congress In view of the fact that the very foundation, for organisation. initiating action, vanished, the City Munsif dismissed the injunc tion application, on April 27, 1964, on the ground that the second respondent was no longer a member of the Congress Orga nisation. The second respondent movtd an application, before the City Munsif, on May 9, 1964, for taking proceedings in con tempt, against the appellant and Sri Ajit Prasad Jain. but that application was dismissed on May 30, 1964, on .the ~round that the present appellants were not parties to the suit. 1:he .second respondent filed Criminal Miscellaneous Contempt Apphcatt~n No. 76 of 1964. in the High Court. After settmg out the circum stances. under which he filed the suit, and the order of expul sion, passed against him. the second rc:spo~de1:1 alleged .that the act of the appellants. along w1th Sn Ajlt. I rasad Jam. had directly interfered with the normal course of iusucc, hy hamper ing the progress of the suit. A B c D F G H - ';. A B c D E F G H GOV!ND SAHA! V. U.P. STATE (Vaidialingam, J.) 179 Sri Ajit Prasad Jain, and the appellants, fil".'1 written state ments, containing identical pleas. Th~ir contention was. that the second respondent was bound by the rules and regulat~ons, of the Indian National Congress, and that they had full nght and justification, for expelling him, and removing his name, from the membership of the Congress. That action, expelling the they contended, had been taken on the second respondent, strength of the resolution of the Congress Working Comm.ittee'. re ferred to earlier. They had further contended that their ob3ect, in enforcing the Circular, dated December 4/5, 1950, was only to enforce discipline in the Congress, and not with a view to render the second respondent's suit infructuous, or interfere with the Court's proceedings. They ultimately pleaded that none of them were guility of any contempt of Court. So far as Sri Ajit Prasad Jain is concerned, it is seen that, after filing his written statement, he was appointed Governor of Kerala. T,he High Court, in view of Art. 361, clauses (2) and (3), held that the proceedings could not be continued against that party, and hence discharged the rule. Regarding the appellants, the High Court held that their con duct directly tended to interfere with the suit proceedings, pend ing in Court, initiated by the second respondent, and, as such, amounted to contempt of Court, of the City Munsif, Azamgarh. In view of the fact that no expression of regret was made, by them, ·the High Court sentenced each of the appellants, to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, and also pay costs of the State, as well as the second respondent, herein. Mr. R. K. Garg, learned counsel for the appellants, urged that the second respondent was a member of the Congress Orga nisation, and he was bound by the Resolutions, passed by the same. The appellants had only acted, in accordance with the directions, given by the appropriate. officers of the Concress or ganisation, and they were bound to obey the instruction~, given to them. When, in the course of the discharge of their duties, they had been directed to enforce the resolution, of the Congress, dated December 4/5, 1950, they issued the Circulars, expelling the .second respondent, from the Congress. Their object, in ex pellmg the second respondent, was not in any manner intended to interfere with the proceedings, pending in the suit. Tue fact !hat the injunction application was dismissed, because it became infructuous, by the second respondent having ceased to be a mem ber of the Congress Organisation, was certainly not a circum ~ta~ce which. could be put against the appellants, in the matter of 1ssumg the cJrcular, concerned. Tuer~ bas been nc; app~arance, on behalf of the respondents. After g1vmg due cons1deralion, to the contentions, urged by the 180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1969] t S.C.R. le~oo counsel, for the appellants, we are High Court has rightly found the appellants guilty of contempt of Court. satisfied . that the A The original first appellant, Sri Govind Sahai, and the second appellant, had each sent letters to the District Returning Officer,' expellmg the second respondent, and removing his name, from the membership of the Congress. There is no dispute, about this B fact. It 1~ als~ not disputed that the second appellant filed an affidavit, m Suit No. 132 of 1964, drawing the attention of the C01.~rt, to the order of expulsion, from membership, pa, sed a' agamst the second respondent, and. it is substantially in view of this that the application, for temporary injunction, was dismis- sed. We arc of opinion, that these acts arc of each a nature, as C to interfere with, or prejudice the second respondent in the pro ceedings, cormected with this suit. Oswald, in his book 'Contempt of Court', Third Edition, says, atp. 6; - . "To speak generally, Contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect. or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties ht1gant or their witnesses during the litigation." this Court, This statement, has been quoted, with approval, by Das, J., whr> delivered the majority judgment, in the dcci, ion, reported as Pratap Si11Kh v. Gurbaksh Si11Kh ( 1 ). More or less, under similar in the said decision, has held that circumstances, certain actions. taken bv the officers therein, amounted to con tempt of Court. From the fact,, noted in that decision, it emer- ges that an Officer of the Forest Department, against whom an order for recovery of certain amounts. had been made, had in stituted a suit for having that order declared null and void. When 1he summons in the suit. was served on the State Government, the Under Secretary to the Government, in the concerned Department, sent a memorandum, to the Chief Conservator of Forests, draw- ing his attention, to a Circular letter, issued by the Government, on January 25, 1953. In that Circular letter, the Government had indicated that any attempt, by a Government servant, seek decision, in a Court of law, in respect of matters, arising out of employment, or conditions of service, without exhausting the normal official channels of redress, was considered to be con trary to official propriety and subversive of discipline, and such conduct would justify the initiation of disciplinary action, against the government servant. The Under Secretary, in his communi cation to the Chief Conservator of Forests, had stated that the (I) (196~] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 818, 84~. -- D E F G H '• ... ' GOVIND SAHA! V. U.P. STATE (Vaidialingam, !.) 181 A B c D E officer, who had instituted the suit, had not exhaust~ his detiart therefore, he had rendered himself liable mental remedies and to disciplinary a'ction ' as per the Government Circular letter, of 'The lJ_nd~r Secretary fui; ther added that the January 25, 1953. Chief Conservator should mtllllate what action he proposed to take, against the particular officer. On receipt of this letter, disciplinary proceedings were initiated, against the office~, 'Yho had filed the suit. Promptly, that officer filed an applicat~on, before the High Court, for taking action for contempt, aga_mst the officers, mentioned therein. The defence was that the actton, taken, was perfectly competent, and it did not amount to con tempt of Court. The High Court negativ~ ~e defen~e _co!lten tion and held that the officers, who had Jllltiated d1SC1plinary proceedings, were guilty of contempt of Court. This Court, on appeal, approved of the decision of the High Court. In that decision, Das, J., and Subba Rao, J., (as he then was), took the view that the action, of the officers, who initiated the disciplinary proceedings, against the person, who had filed a suit, amounted to contempt; whereas, Raghubar Dayal, J., held to the contrary on facts. But, Raghubar Dayal, J., also agreed with the proposition that, if any pressure is put on a party, in order to make it act in a particular manner, with res that would amount to contempt of pect to a pending action, Court, in which the matter be pending.. But, the learned Judge was of the view that, inasmuch as disciplinary proceedings had been initiated, in view of the Government Circular Jetter, dated January 25, 1953, there was no question of contempt. With respect, we are in agreement with the majority view, in the above decision. F G H In the instant case, the passing of the orders of expulsion, by the two appellants, against the second respondent, and the filing of a supporting affidavit, in the suit by the second appel lant, clearly indicate that it was a deliberate attempt, by the · to interfere with, or prejudice the second respon appellants, dent, in the conduct of the litigation, instituted ·by him. It is no answer that the action, by way of expulsion, was taken on the basis of the Resolution, of the All India Congress Working Com mittee, and to enforce discipline, in the Congress Ore:anization. As emphasized by Das, J., in Pratap Singh's Case( 1 ) ,~'any con duct, which interferes with, or prejudices parties litigant during the litigation, is undoubtedly Contempt of Court'. The High Court, in this case, was justified in holding the appellants guilty of contempt. We agree with the said conclusion. Before closing the discussion, on this matter, we may state that Mr. Garg referred us, to the decision in Webster v. Bake- (I) (1962] Supp 2 S.C.R. 838 (2) [1916) I Ch. 300 - 182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1969) I S.C.R. -. well Rural Council('), and urged that, on down therein, the appellants were not guilty of contempt. The consideration of this English decision, need not detain us much, hccausc it has been adverted to , by Das, J., in Pratap Singh's Case('). and distinguished. Therefore, Websters Case( 0 ) does not apply, to the facts of the instant case. the principles, The result s that this appeal fails, and is dismissed. A B Y.P. A ppcal dismissed. • - (0 [1962] Supp. 2 s.c.R. 8J8. (2) [1916: 1 Ch.;()().