COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS & EXCISE, COCHIN & Ors. v. A. S. BAVA

The relevant facts are as follows: MI s. A. S. Bava. hereinafter referred to as the petitioner, is a firm of dealers in Tobacco. By two orders of adjudication dated March 31. 1963, the Assistant Collector of Customs demanded the payment of duty under Rule 40 of the Q:ntral Excise and Salt Rules, 1944. The petitioner D filed appeals against these Oiders en or aho11t July 4, 1963, to the Collector of Customs & Central Excise. The petitioner made a representation on October 3, 1963, rtquesting that it may not be required to deposit the duty demanded pending appeal. The Col iector, bi iclter dated January 9, 1964, rejected the representation and requested the petitioner to deposit the duty within 15 days of a. tile receipt of the letter. On the petitioner failing to deposit the amount, the appeals were dismissed on December 4, 1964. There upon, as already stated, the petitioner filed two petitions under art. 226 and the petitions having been allowed. and the appellant having obtained special leave, the appeals are now before-us. The High Court allowed the petitions on the ground that the notifica- 1' tion No. 68/63 dated May 4, 1963, issued under s. IZ of the EJ<: cise and Sait Act, 1944, hereinafter referred to as the Excise Act, declaring that s.' 129 oi fut. Customs Act. 1962. relating to matters ·~~!fled therein shall be applicabie in r~gard to like matters in respect of the duties imp<>sed by s. 3 · of the Exeise Act was in excess of the pcwers conferred.u.nder s. 12 of the Excise Act. The High Court also rejected the argument of the Collector of Cus- G .toms and Central Excise that th6 petitioner having invoked s. 129 of the Customs Act, 1962~ in the appeals preferred by it by .pray ing for the dispensation .of de{>Osit, was precluded from proceed ing under art. 226 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the appellants has raised three points B before us: ' (I) The petitions .under art. 226 were not maintainable as the petit\oner. did not avail himself of the remedy of revision pro vided. by s. 36 of the Excise Act. L/P(N)ISCl-7(•) 84 BuPl\BKE COUllT llllPOllTS [1968] 1 8.C.11. (2) The petitioner having availed of the remedy under s. 129 A of the Customs Act was debarred from challenging the impugned notification, dated May 4, 1963. (3) The impugned notification applying s. 129 of the Customs Act was good. There is no forco in the first point. First, the point was not taken in ihe High Court. Secondly, it is settled that the existence B of a remedy by way of revision does not bar the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertail) a petition under art. 226. Moreover, the petitioner had alleged that the Collector had no jurisdiction to demand the deposit or duty pending the appeals as the notifica tion dated May 4, 1963, was bad insofar as it applied s. 129 of the Customs Act. petitioner to have filed revisions. In these circumstances it was not necessary for the C There is equally no force in the second point. If the petitioner had not applied for dispensation of the deposit of the duty, the appellants would have contended .that the petitions under art. 226 were not maintainable. Moreover. as already stated, the petitions raised a question of jurisdiction. D To appreciate the third point, it is necessary to extract the relevant statutory provisions. Section 12 of the Excise Act autho rises the Central Government to apply provisions of the Sea Cus toms Act, 1878, now replaced by the Customs A~t. 1962, in the following terms: "12. The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that any of the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, relating to the levy of an from customs duties, drawback of duty, exemption warehousing, offences and penalties, confiscation, and procedure relating to offences· and appeals shall, with such modifications and alterations as it may consider necessary or desirable to adapt them to the circumstan ces, be applicable in regard to like matters in respect of the duties irpposed by section 3". The relevant part of the impugned notification dated May 4, i Y63, reads as follows: "In exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 12 of the Central Excise & Salt Act, 1944 (I of 1944) ...... the the provisions of .... .. Central Government declares that Section t 29 of matters specified herein shalt be applicable in regard to like matters in respect of the duties imposed by Sec. 3 of the first mentioned Act ............ ". the Customs Act, 1962, relating ' Section 129 of the Customs Act reads thus: "129. (I) Where the decision or order appealed against relates to any duty demanded in respect of goods E F G B A B c COLIJ!CTOR OF CUSTOlllS ll. BA.VA (Si:kri, J,) which are not under the control of customs authorities or any penalty levied under this Act, any person desirous of· appealing against such decision or order shall, pend ing the appeal, deposit with the proper officer the duty demanded or the penalty levied : Provided that where fo any particular case the ap that the deposit of duty pellate authority is of opinion demanded or penalty levied will cause undue hardship to the appellant, it may in its discretion dispense with such deposit, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem fit. (2) If upon any such appeal it is decided that the whole or any portion· of such duty or penalty was not leviable, the proper officer shall return to the appellant such amount of duty or penalty as was not leviable." I> the duty or. penalty levied pending an appeal. It will be noticed that s. 129 requires an appellant to deposit In other words. before an appeal can be heard the appellant must deposit the duty or penalty levied. But under s. 35. of the Excise Act, a person aggrieved by any decision or order has an unfettered right to appeal. The question that arises in these appeals is whether the provisions of s. 129 of the Customs Act can be said to be provi- B sions relating to 'procedure ...... relating to appeals' within s. 12 of the Excise Act. As we have already said, the appeals are filed under s, 35 of the. Excise Act. Section 129 of the Customs Act debars the hear ing of them unless the duty or penalty is paid. This, it seems to r us, is not procedure relating to appeals. This Court in Hoosein Kasillrl Dada ((ndia) Ltd., v. The State of Madhya Pradesh(') had to consider a similar provision in s. 22 of the Central Provinces and Berar Sales Tax Act, 1947. Section 22(1), as originally en- acted, read thus : · G B "22. (!) Any dealer aggrieved by an order under this Act may, in the prescribed manner, appeal to the pres cribed authority against the order: Provided that no appeal against an order of assess ment, with or without penalty, shall be entertained by the said authority unless it ·is satisfied that such amount of tax or penalty or both as the appellant may admit to be due from him, has been paid." (') [!HS] S.C.R. 987; 4 S.T.C. 114, 86 SUPREllll COURT Blll'OBTS [1968] 1 s.c.11. It was amended thus: "22. (l) Any dealer aggrieved by an order under this Act may, in the prescribed manner, appeal to the pres- :ribed authority against the order: Provided that no appeal against an order or assess- ment, with or without penalty shall be admitted by the said authority unless such ·appeal is accompanied by a satisfactory proof of the payment of the tax, with penalty, if any, in respect of which the appeal has been prefer- red. A B S. R. Das, J., as he then was, repelled the argument of the 0 Jearned1 Advocate that 'the requirement as to the deposit of the amount of the assessed tax does not affect the right of appeal it self, which still remains intact, but only introduces a new matter of procedure'. and observed: "There can be no doubt that the new requirement 'touches' the substantive right of appeal vested in the appellant. Nor can it be overlooked that such a require- ment is calculated to interfere with or fetter, if not to . impair or imperil, the substantive right. The right that the amended section gives is certainly less than the right which was available before. A provision which is calcu lated to deprive the appellant of the unfettered right of appeal cannot be regarded as a mere atlteration in pro- Indeed the new requirement cannot be said cedure. merely to regulate the exercise of the appellant's pre existing right but in truth whitt:.~s down the right iiself and cannot be regarded as a me ~ rule of procedure." D B These observations are fully applicable in the present case. r Section 35 of the Excise Act gave a right of appeal, but s. 129 of the Customs Act whittles down the substantive right of appeal and accordingly it cannot be regarded as "procedure relating to appeals" within s.' 12 of the Excise Act. The appeals accordingly fail and are dismissed with costs. G One hearing fee. V.P.S Appeals dismissed.