H. A. K. RAO, CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT v. COUNCii. OF INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED

K. Srinfrasan and R. Gopa/akrishnan, for the appellant (in C. A. No. 447 of 1965) and the respondent (in C. A. No. 501 of 1965). M. C. Setalvad, K. K. Jain and H. K. Puri, for the respondent (in C. A. No. 447 of 1965) and the appellant (in C. A. No. 501 of 1965). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Subba Rao, C. J. T.hese are cross-appei:ls-the appeal has been filed by H. A. K. Rao, a Chartered Accountant, and the cross-appeal has been filed by the respondent therein-against the judgment and order of the Mysore High Court passed in Writ Petition No. 473 of 1964 filed by the former challenging the validity of the notification issued by the latter tegulating the conduct of elections to the '.::entral Council and the Regional Councils of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. M lSup.Cl/67-3 ) 258 SUPllBMB COUllT l.EPOl.TS (1967) 2 s.c.a. The facts are not in dispute and they may be briefly stated. H. A. K. Rao, the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965, is a cha1 tered accountant by profession and is a fellow member of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, hereinafter referred to as the "Institute". The election to the Central Council and the Regional Councils of the Institute was to take place in the month of August, 196" On February 22, 1964, the President of the Institute issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred by cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to The Chartered Ac coi:ntants Act, 1949 (38 of 1949). hereinafter callei' the Act, noti fying that a member of the Institute shall be deemed to be guilty of misconduct, if, in connection with election to the Councils of the Institute, he was found to have taken part, directly or indirectly, either himself or through any other person, in any of the following activitic<;:-{I) issuing manifestoes or circulars; (2) canvassing votes by visiting places of business or residence of the voters or in any other manner; and (3) organising parties to entertain voters. The appellant in Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965 was a prospective candi date for the Central Council of the Institute. He filed the aforesaid writ petition to quash the said notification on various grounds, which we will consider in the course of the judgment. The High Court held that the impugned notification, in so far as it directed that issuing of manifestoes or circulars was misconduct was illegal and that that part of the notification in so far as it directed can vassing of votes was misconduct was valid. Both the parties are challenging tile said order in so far as it is against each of them. Mr. K. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 44 7 of 1965, attacked the validity of the notification on three grounds, namely, (I) it was beyond the competence of the Central Council, (2) it purported to amend the Regulations, (3) it was in conflict with the Regulations, and (4) it was in viola tion of els. (l)(a) and (I)(g) of Art. 19 of the Constitutio:'.. Mr. M. C. Setalvad, appearing for the Institute, canvassed. the correctness of the order of the High Court in so far as it held that •he issuing of manifestoes and circulars was illegal. 'te contended that the impufned notification was well within the competence of the Institute and was not in conflict with any of the Regulations, but it was really an additional head of disqualification introduced by the Institute in the interests of r.;aintaining high standards in the profession. \t the outset it may be menciJned that the appellant in Civil Ap~ .~I No. 447 of 1965 did not seek to sustain his claim on the basis of his fundamental right presumably in view of the fact that its operation was and is suspended under Art. 358 of the Consti tution during the emergency, though he sought to draw an anology on the provisions of Art. 19 and the decisions thereon in support A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H H. A. K. P.AO v. COUNCIL, !.C.A.L (Subba Rao, C.l.) 259 of his contentions. We do not propose to express any opinion either on the question whether Art. 19 of the Constitution can be invoked in the instant case notwithstanding the fact that the state of emergency is in force or on the question whether the Institute is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution. We put aside Art. 19 altogether, as the appellant did not rely upon it and proceed to consider his other arguments. • Before we consider the relevant provisions of the Act it is necessary to notice at the outset the nature and the objects of the Institute. The Institute is a statutory body having perpetual It is governed by the Act and the succe~sion and a common seal. Chartered Accountants Regulations, 1949, hereinafter. called the Regulations. The Central Council of the Institute shall be composed of not more than 24 members elected by the members of the Insti tute from among the fellows thereof and 6 persons nominated by the Central Government. There are Regional Councils which function in their respective regions subject to the control, super vision and direction of the Central Council or any of its committees. Elections to the Councils are held once in three years. Therefore, the Act, thr ;iugh its provisions, regulates the profession of chartered It establishes a·1 Institute of Chartered Accountants accountants. and provides for the constitution of a Council for carrying out the objects of the Act. The Central Council, inter alia, has the power to admit members to the Institute, to take disciplinary action, and to regulate and maintain the status and standard of the ;:irofessional qualifications of the members of the Institute. It is needless to say that the profession of chartered accountant is a respectable one and the duties of chartered accountants are onerous and responsible. Tuey are all educated and qualified men and on their efficiency and integrity depends the stability of many of the institutions in the It cannot, therefore, be gainsaid that the candidate~ country. seeking to become members of the said Council which regulates the conduct of chartered accountan•s shall necessarily be persons of high integrity and above criticism. With this background we shall now proceed to consider the arguments raised in the appeals. • To appreciate the contentions of the parties it will be con venient to collect at one place the relevant provisions of the Act and the Regulations. The Act Section 22. For the purpose of this Act, the expression "'professional misconduct" shall be deemed to include any act or omission specified in any of the Schedules, but nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or .abridge in any way the pGwer conferred or duty cast on 260 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS (1967) 2 s.c.a. the Council under sub-s...--ction (I) of section 21 to inquire into the conduct of any member of the Institute under any other circumstai1ces. Sec1io11 30 (I). The Council may, by notification in the Gazette of India, make regulations for the purpose of carrying out the objects of this Act, and a copy of such regulations sh~ll be sent to each member of the Insti tute. (2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for all or any of the following matters :- (b) the manner in which elections to the Council and the Regional Councils may be held. • THE SECOND SCHEDULE Par/ I A chartered accountant in practice shall guilty of professional misconduct, if he- be deemed to be Clauses (I) to (10) • • • Par/ II A member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he- (i) contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or the regulations made thereunder. (ii) is guilty of such other ::ct or omission as may be specified by the Council in this behalf, by notification in the Gazette of India. THE REGULATIONS Regulation 54-A. Disciplinary actio:i against member in connection with conduct of election : A member of the Institute shall be liable for disciplinary action by the Council if he adopts one or more of the following practices with regard to the election to the Council, namely ; (1} (2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the A B c D E F G H A B c D E F G H H. A. K. RAO v. COUNCIL, LC.A.I. (Subba Rao, C.J.) 261 part of a candidate or of any other person with the con nivance of the candidate, with the free exercise of any electoral right ; Provided that- A declaration of policy or a promise of a particular action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause • . • (4B). The canvassing for votes, 01 soliciting the vote of any elector, or persuading any elector not to vote, for any particular candidate, or persuading any elector not to vote at the ~lection, or exhibiting any notice or sign board (other than an official notice) relating to the election, by a candidate or by any other person with the connivance of a candidate within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth. In exercise of the power conferred under cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act, on 'February 22, 1964, the Coun.:il issued the following notification : ...... a member of the Institute shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if l:i1 connection with election to the Central Council and/or Regional Councils of the Institute, he is found to have taken part, directly or indirectly, either himself or through aily other person, in any of the following activities :- issuing manifestoes or circulars. (i) (ii) canvassing votes by visiting places of business or residence of voteVi or in any other manner; (iii) organising parties to entertain voters. The gist of the said provisions may be stated thus : For the purpose of the Act the expression "professional misconduct" includes the act or omission specified in the Schedule to the Act. The Council also may by notification make regulations in c-innec tion with the conduct of elections. Under Regulation 54-A(2) and (4B) a member of the Institute shall be liable to disciplinary action by the Council if he was guilty of the practice, among others, of undue influence and canvassing as defined therein. On February 22, 1964, the Council issued a notification specifying that a member of the Institute shall be deemed to be guilty of misconduct, if, in connection with the election to the Councils of the Institute, he is found to have taken part, directly or indirectly, either himself or 262 SUPREME COUJ.T REPORTS (1967) 2 S.C.ll.. through any other person, or to have issued manifertoes or cir culars or to have canvassed votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner.· Part I oft he Second Schedule to the Act describes the acts of professional misconduct in relation to chartered accountants in practice requiring action by the High Court and Part II thereof states genernlly that a member of the Institute, whether in practice or not, shall be deemed to be guilty of professional misconduct, if he contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations or is guilty of such other act or omission as may be specified by the Council in this behalf. by notification in the Gazette of India. cl. (ii) Now the question is whether the said notification is invalid for any of the reasons mentioned above. It is said that the power of the Council to issue a notification . is limted by the express pro visions of cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act. As under cl. (i) of Part IJ of the Second Schedule to the Act, the contra vention of the provisions of the Act or of the Regulations made thereunder was professional misconduct. the argur, .nt proceeded, the expression "other act or omission" in should be an act or omission other than those provided in the Regulations. Elaborating this argument it was said that under Regulation 54-A(2) the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965 had a legal right to ·canvass within the meaning of the said prO\iso, that the notifica tion in effect depriving him of that right was in derogation of the the said Regulation and, was, therefore, illegal. It was also argued that the said notification was inconsistent with cl. (48) of Regulation 54A, as under that clause canvassing for votes or soliciting votes of electors was prohibited within a distance of 200 meters from the polling booths, thereby impliedly permitting eanvas~;n!! beyond that, therefore, the notification prohibiting canvassing generally was in dirert conflict with the same. The further augument was that cl. ( 48) of Regulation 54-A detracted only to a limited extent from the legal right to canvass and that any prohibition against general canvassing beyond the limits laid down by cl. (4B) of Regulation 54-A contravened both cl. (2) and cl. (48) of Regulation 54-A and was bad. tlistance, and The argument at first sight appears to be attractive, but it involves a fallacy. The Regulations enumerated different heads for disciplinary action in connection with the conduct of an election: but they did not. either expressly or by necessary implication, prohibit the Council from adding addition3l heads of disciplinary action. While the Regulations provide for disciplinary action for undue ir. Ruence and for canvassing for votes ~te. within a distance of 200 r.ietres from a polling booth, the notification placed other acts and omissions under different heads of misconduct. There is no inherent conflict between undue influence and canvasisng of votes by visiting the places of business or the residence of the voters. A B c 0 E F G H H. A. K. RAO v. COUNCIL, J.C.A.I. (Subba Rao, C.J.) H~ A B c D E F G H So took there is no conflict between canvassing of votes within a distance of 200 meters from a polling booth and canvassing of votes by visiting places of business or residence of voters or in any other manner. All the three can stand together. Nor can we agree that apart from the fundamental rights, which the appellant does not claim in this appeal, he has an unlimited right to canvass for votes, either statutory or otherwise. Nothing has been placed before us to sustain any such right. His rights are defined by the statute and we cannot say that such an unlimited right to canvass is implicit in the right to stand for election. We cannot also agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the notification is unreason: ble in the sense that expression is understood in law-. As noticed .earlier, the electorate is an enlight ened body and the elections are to a council designed to maintaia high standards of the profession. The voters are expected to know the qualifications of every candidate and they are certainly in a position to vote for the best ·candidate. Canvassing may be neces for explaining to ·an illiterate voter the qualifications of a candidate and the principles for which he stands or in the case of vast electorate to which the candidate may not be familiar, but no such necessity exists in the case of enlightened voters of a compact If the Council thought that malpractices existed and electorate. undue and unwholesome pressures were brought to bear on the voters and for that reason, with a view to purify the conduct of elections, if it issued the said notification prohibiting canvassing, we cannot say that the Council acted unreasonably in issuing the said notifica tion. It issued the notification in the best intei:.ests of the purity of the elections and ultimately.in the interests of the profession itself. We, therefore, hold that the Council had not only power to issue tlie notification prohibiting canvassing of votes but also that the said notification was not inconsistent with either the provisions of the Act or the Regulations made thereunder. Now coming to the cross-appeal, the High Court held that issuing illegible manifestoes or circulars directly came into conflict with the proviso to cl. (2) of Regulation 54-A which says that a declara~ tion of policy or a promise of a particular action, or the mere exercise of a legal rigl:t without intent to ·interfere with an electoral right, shall not lie deemed to be ir.terference within the meaning of the said clause. Doubtless the proviso to Regulation 54-A(2) saves issuing of manifestoes and circulars from the operation of the substan tive _part of the. clause. The act of issuing· a manifesto or a circular' therefore, does not amount to undue influence with in the meaning of that clause. If the notification says tt tt such issuing of manifestoes or circulars is undue influence, it certainly comes into conflict v,ith that clause. But the notification does not, and· indeed it cannot, amend the definition of "undue influence". The 264 SUPJtl!MB couaT JlEPOl.TS (1967) 2 S.C.ll. said Act, though it does not amount to an undue i~fluence, is con- A stituted a dilferent head of professional misconduct which the Council is authori7.ed to do under cl. (ii) of Part II of the Second Schedule to the Act. From this perspective no conflict between the two arises. We cannot, therefore, agree with the reasoning of the High Court that the notification in so far as it prohibited issuing of manifcstoes and circulars was illegal. B In the result, we hold that the entire notification is valid. Civil Appeal No. 447 of 1965 is dismissed with costs and Civil rtpµeal No. 501 of 1965 is allowed, but, in the circumstances, without costs. R.K.P.S. C. A. 447of1965 dismis:red. c C. A. 501 of 1965 allowed.