PENTAKOTA SRIRAKULU v. THE CO-OPERATIVE MARKETING SOCIETY LTD

Before adverting to the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant, it is necessary to state a few facts concerning the transactions which have given rise to these proceedings. The C0-0perative Society of which the appellant was the President till November, 1951, held a licence under the Madras General Sales Tax Act for doing business as a E Commi>sion Agent and the Society was earning commission' on the turnover of the sales effected of the agricultural produce of In October, 1950 the Government of its members and others. India promulgated the Gur Control Order fixing "1e maximum price at which gur could be sold in different States. The prices fixed varied from State to State. The prices fixed for sale at F Anakapalli, then in the State of Madras. were somewhat lower than those which had been fixed in other ·States. This gave occasion for the inembers of the Society to sell their jaggery at higher prices than fixed because there was demand for jaggery from merchants at prices higher than the controlled price. It wa.< alleged that while on paper the transactions entered into between G the members of the Society and the purcha.o;ers showed sales at the prices fixed by law, in reality, higher prices were charged. As stated already, the Society was entitled to charge commission on the sales effected through it. As regards this it was stated that commission was earned on the entire price at which the gur was wld, and while the amount of commission payable on the ba.sis H of controlled prices was credited to the Society, the commission earned in respect of the extra price which its members obtained, SRIRAKULU v. MARKETING SOCIETY (Ayyangar I.) 189 B A was, it was stated, not brought to the credit of. the Society in its accounts but appropriated by members of the management. These were the allegations and it is on the basis . of these allegations that the claim against the appellant and others had been made. !heir correctness have yet to be tested in the arbitration proceed mgs. c When this claim was made, inter alia, against the appellant viz., of not bringing into the Society's accounts moneys due to the .. Society ·and which had been earned through sales effected by the Society, he filed, as narrated before, a writ petition and there raised three points challenging the legality of the reference to the Deputy Registrar to enquire into and determine the claim. The first was that the transaction on the basis of which the claim was said to have arisen was illegal being contrary to the Gur Control Order issued by the Central Government under the Essential Supplies Act and such an illegal transaction could not fall within the words "Dispute touching the business of thi: D Society" which alone could be referred to arbitration under s. 51 of the Act; the second was that the reference by the Registrar of the dispute to !)le arbitration of the Deputy Registrar was illegal as contrary to natural justice, because (a) the Deputy Registrar had conducted an enquiry which had resulted in the supersession of the management of the Society under s. 43 of the Act, and (b) the Deputy Registrar being a subordinate of the Registrar could not be expected to act fairly in this matter; and lastly, that the Rr.gistrar should, in this case, have proceeded under s. 49 of the Act and not under s. 51, the. former being more advantageous to him, in that he could challenge any final order against him by resort to the civil courts, whereas an award under s. 51 was subject to departmental appeals and could not be questioned in a civil court. The learned Single Judge rejected the second and the third points but upheld the first. His reasoning was that the transaction of sale above the controlled price was illegal. that illegality was. a bar to a claim for accounting by the Society against its officer or agent, notwithstanding that the contract of agency itself was not illegal. On appeal the learned Judges of the High Court have, as stated earlier, rejected all the three points urged on behalf of the appellant. G E F H Mr. Ram Reddy, learned counsel for the appellant raised be fore us three points. The first of them was that the Registrar should have proceeded under s. 49 and not under s. 51 of the Act. Section 49, which learned counsel says, was attracted to the case runs, to quote only the material provision: L!Sup./64-13 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1965] l S.C.R \ "49. (I) Where in the course of an audit under section 37 or an inquiry under section 38 or an inspection under section 39 or the winding up of a society, it appears that any person who has taken pan in the organization or management of the society or any past or present officer of the society has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other propeny or been guilty of breach of H trust in relation to the society, the Registrar may, of his own motion or on the application of the committee or liquidator or of any creditor or contributory, examine into the conduct of such person or officer and make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof <. with interest at such rate as the Registrar thinks just or to contribute such sum to the assets of the society by way of compensation in respect of the mi; annropriation, fraudu lent retention or breach of trust a~ the Registrar thinks just. (2) The order of the Registrar under sub-section (I) shall be final unless it is set aside by the District Court having jurisdiction over the area in which the headquar ters of the society are situated or if the headquarters of the society are situa 1ed in the City o' Madras, by the Ci·y Civil Court, on application made by the party aggrieved within three months of the date of receipt of the order by him: .. and s. 51-the other provision-runs : "Arbitration : Disputes: 51. If any dispute touching the busines; of a registered society (other than a disciute regarding discip'i nary action talcen by the society o· its committee against a paid servant of the society) arises- ( a) ..................................... . (b) ..................................... . (c) between the society or its cor.1mittce and any past committee. any officer, a~ent or servant, or any nast officer, p;ist agent or past servant, or the nominee, heirs or lc~al representatives of any deceased officer, decea.sed a~ent or deceased servant. of the society. or (d) D L r c; Explanation.-A claim by a re~is•ered society for any debt or demand due to it from a member, past member or the nominee. heir or legal renre, en•a•ive of a dcce1sed member, whether such debt or demand be admitted or not, II A B SRIRAKULU v. MARKETING SOCIETY (Ayyangar J.) 191 is a dis1mte touching the business of the society within the meaning of this sub-section. ( 2) The Registrar may, on receipt of such reference, ( a) decide the dispute himself, or (b) transfer it for disposal to any person who has been invested by the State Government with powers in that behalf, or (c) subject to such rules as may be prescribed,' refer it for disposal to an arbitrator or arbitrators." In this connection learned Counsel relied on a decision of the C Madras High Court in Sundaram Iyer v. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies.(') There it was held that it was only case where the provisions of s. 49 were inapplicable that recourse In cases where a matter fell both within could be had to s. 51. ss. 49 and 51, the two provisions were not intended to operate on parallel lines. As s. 51 excluded the jurisdiction of civil D courts, it must be strictly construed and for that reason, in cases where s. 49 was applicable, s. 51 would be excluded. Further, it was held s. 51 was of a general nature providing for a variety · of matters and was almost exh'}ustive of the parties between whom as well as the disputes that could arise in cooperative societies. E Section 49 on the other hand dealt with special types of disputes which arise in exceptional circumstances, segregated out of the larger group dealt with under s. 51. When there was thus an overlapping of the terms of both the sections the provisions of s. 49 alone it was held would be applicable. Based on this line of reasoning, the submission of learned counsel was that the claim in the present case was one "against a person in management of the Society" and "for the fraudulent retention of money or other property of the Society" and, therefore, it was completely covered by s. 49 and that in consequence the Registrar had no jurisdiction to direct an enquiry by the Deputy Registrar under s. 51 of the Act. This argument, however, pto9eeds on ignoring one further c essential requisite for the application of s. 49 (1). Besides the ·two factors to which learned counsel referred and which we have just set out, there is also another condition which has to be satisfied before s. 49 ( 1) could be attracted. The facts giving rise to the charge have to be disclosed in the course of an audit under s. 37 or an enquiry unde• s. 38 or an inspection under s. 39 or on the H windin2 up of the Society. Mr. Ram Reddy, while not disputing that unless this condition is also satisfied s. 49 would not be attrac- F (I) I.LR. [195'~ M•d. 371. ' .. -·);·'·,,-:-'->,: ' \ '-' - 192 SUPRE11E COURT REPORTS [i 965] I S.C.R. A ted, however submitted that there was an enquiry under s. 38 preceding the supersession and _that in consequence the condition It is true that ti(d-e was an enquiry conducted into 1 was fulfilled. the affairs of the Society under_s. 38,,but that by itself is not suffi It has further to be proved that the facts alleged in the cient. claim, and on which it is based, were disclosed at that enquiry. This can be proved or established only if the enquiry report which was submitted to the Registrar was placed before the Court and the facts disclosed therein corresponded with the facts alleged in the statement of claim. Mr. Ram Reddy admitted that the enquiry report was not before the Court and is not"in the record of It is not, therefore, possible to say that there these proceedings. is correspondence between the facts disclosed in that report as a result of the enquiry under s. 38 and those found in the Statement of Claim which was referred by the Registrar to the Deputy Regis- trar for arbitration under s. 51. The case must, therefore, be held not to fall under s:-49 of theAct. There can be no doubt that if s: 49 does not apply, subject to_ the other argument about illegality 0 to which we shall ·advert, the order of the Registrar proceeding under s. 51 is not open to -objection. This first point, therefore, has to be rejected. - · - B c The next contention of learned Counsel was that the dispute about the retention of money belonging to the Society by the appel- E !ant was not "a dispute touching the business of the Society." The argument was that the expression _"business of the society" included only what was legally permissible as the legitimate business of the Society and since the business activity out of which the claim against the appellant was alleged to arise involved a contravention of the Gur Control Order it was not "a· dispute touching the F business of the society. We are unable io agree with this submis sion. In so far as it irnpinge.5 on the third point urged by learned counsel based on the maxim Ex turpi causa non oritur actio 'we shall deal with it in considering that submission. But that apart, we do not see any basis for the argument that the claim made before the arbitrator was not a dispute touching the business of _ G the Society. It could not be disputed that the sale of the produce belonging to the members of the Society was part of the business .of the Society, and then the charging of commission for those sales and the crediting of the Society's accounts with that commission would equally be the business of the Society. Apart, therefore, from the question of illegality raised by reason of the sale being H at prices in excess of the controlled price, it is not capable of argument that the failure on the part of the :qijiellant to credit ..... SRIRAKULU. v. MARKETING SOCIETY (Ayyangar J.) 193 A B c D to the ,.Society the full amount of commission due on the sales effected by him on behalf of the· Society and the resistance by him of that demancr; would 'n<(t be a dispute touching the business of the Society. This objection is clearly without substance and must be rejected. The la 't of the Points urged by learned counsel was that the trnn.~action of sale which gave rise to the commission alleged to be ii:1properry retained was illegal and that therefore the Society could not, in law, make a claim on the basis of such an illegaJ.transaction. We see no substance in this point either. No illegality attached to th.e contract between the appeUant al!d the Society; that was It arose out of his position as the PI8Sident of perfectly legal. the Society and he was, in law, bound to account for the moneys he recel.ved on behalf of the Society. The fact that he entered into illegal transactions would have no bearing on the right of the Society to make the claim for an account of tlie commission due to th~ Society which he unjustly withheld. We consider the reason ing of the learned Judges of tlie Division Bench rejecting this argument to be correct. Moreover tl1is· matter has been examined by this Court in a decision reported as Kedgr Nath Motani v. · Prah!ad Rai(1) and· in view of this decision learned counsel for !'he appellant did not himself press this point very seriously. E Bifore parting with this case, however, there is one matter to which it is necessary to advert. The learned Judges, after · all<?wing tlie ,appeal of the Societ~. stated iq their judgment : "Lastly, we must observe that this Comi is averse to lend its helping hand to persons who want to defraud .others. Even assuming that any error of law was commit- ted by Tribunals, that would not .be a ground for invoking tile extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, when it is not in furtherance of justice but tends to encourage dishonesty." Mr. Ram Reddy pointed out to us that the correctness ot the <tllegations mnde in the claim filed before the arbitrator have yet to be decided rmd there wa~, therefor.,, no justification for the learned Judges assuming that the facts qated therein were proved and that tl1c appellant had been guilty of fraud or dishonesty in his conduct of the business of the Society. We sec force in tltis complaint of learned counsel. Jn the circu1mtanccs. we would add that. having regard to the stage at which the matte.r wa~ before the Court, the learned Judges were in error in making F G H (l) [196~] I S.C.R. 861. 194 SUPREME COURT REPO~TS [1965] I S.C.R. lbcsc ob, crv:itions. Tt is ciCllr that they did not intend to prejudice A the appellant in his defence before the Deputy Registrar in the ~rbitration proceedings under s. 51 of the Act but it is possible that it might have such ~n effect. What we have said cJrlier mtL~t suffice to lfapcl any such apprchcn, ion or effect. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. one set. B