V ALJIBHAI MU~JIBHAI SONEJI v. THE S l'ATE OF BOMBA

The appellants before us were plaintiffs in suits the second Joint Civil instituted by them before Judce (S.D). Ahmedabad, in which they challenged the validity of certain proceedings instituted by the then Government of Bombay for acquiring a piece of land belonging to respondent No. 2 for the purpose of c0n,tructing a bus depot required by the State Trans- p•rt Corporation and for constructing office and ether buildings by the said Corporation. The appe- llants, in addition, sought an injunction restrainm' the State of Bombay and the State Transport Car- peration from proceeding with the acquisition and dispossessing them. The suit was founded on a number of grounds but ultimately when the matter went up to the High Court in second appeal Mr. Rajni Patel who appeared for the appellants based tl!e claim only on three· grounds : ( 1) that the purpese mentioned in the notification under s. 4 of the Land Aociuisition Act, 1894, was indefinite or vague and, tberefore, the notification was bad; (2) that the proceedings were collusive and were initiated by the State Government for the benefit of the owner of the land, the second respondent; (3) that the State Trans- port Corporadon was not a local authority but morely a company and as the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act were not complied with, the acquisition was bad. Mr. J. C. Bhatt who appears for the appellants ltcfQre us has likewise confined his attack to these three grounds. On behalf of the respondents it was contended in the Courts below and ia contended before 190 YaljiM.i M•lii•h•• Son1ji •• Stot1 ef B .. H) M""'-IU. J. 3 S.C.R. SUPRE.\1E COURT REPORtS 689 us that the Corporation is a local authority within the meaning of the expression as med in the Land Acqui sition Act, that even if it is held that it is not a local authority the acquisition was made al public expense, that the purpose of the acquisition is a public purpose and that the appellants are not entitled to go behind the notification of the Government issued under s. 4 ol the Land Acquisition Act and finally that the acqui sition was not mala fide or collusive. In addition, the learn :d Attorney-General, who appeared for the respondents I and 3, contended that the suits were premature inasmuch as they were instituted before the notification under s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made. Taking up the last point first, we may point out that no such plea was taken on behalf of the respon· dents in the trial court. This point was apparently not taken because even before the written statement was filed a notification under s. 6 was in fact made by the State Government. The suits proceeded throughout on the footing that there was no formal In the defect in regard to their maintainability. circumstances we do not think that it would be fair to allmw the suits to be defeated merely on such a technical ground. Coming to the fi1111t point raised on behalf or the appellants it is sufficient to point out that the notification under s. 4 of the Act clearly states that the acquisition is for a public purpose, namely, for 'State Transport'. The notification under s. 6 reite · rates this fact and in addition says that the land was needed to be acquired for the purposes of and at the expense of the State Transport Corporation. There i1 thus a clear declaration of the Government that the purpose of acquisition was a public purpose and a' has been consistently held by this Court in a num· her of cases, recent one, Smt. SOJMwanti v. The ~tate of Punjab (1), the most including ll!t96SJl8.C.R. 17t 196' ' ~ontji · Valjibi.ai Mulji6hoi •• .. S141i of Bo1da, Mudhclku. J; 690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1961) VOL. declaration as to public purpose by . the Govern· ment is final except where it is a colourable exercise of power. Unless, therefore, it is shown that there was collusion as alleged by the appellants, between the respondents 1 and 3 on the one hand and respon· dent No. 2 on the other, the notification will have to be regarded as conclusive on the question that the land was required for a public purpose. Thus, even . though the land was being acquired for a corporation and not for the State the acquisition must nonethe . less be said to be for a public purpose, as has been held in Somawanti' s case (' ), provided that it is not fouud to be a colourable exercise of power by the Government. What is then to be considered is whether the action of the Government can be regarded as colou· rable being collusive or mala fide. The question whether the acquisition was colusi ve or mala fide is one of fact and on this point the High Court and the two courts bel01v have come to the conclusion that the appellants have not been able to substantiate their pleas. It is not for this Court to review the evidence in a case where there are concurrent findings of fact, unless there be exceptional reasons, and we find none here. It must, therefore, be held that the notifications of the Government' issued under ss. 4 and 6 are conclusive on the question that the land was required for a public purpose. We must, however, point out that before effect can be given to a notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 6 of the Land Acquisition Act the terms of the proviso to that section should be satisfied. Section 6(1) and the proviso read thus : ~'Subject to the provisions of Part VH of this Act, when the appropriate Government is satis fied after considering the report, if any, made under section 5-A, sub-section (2), that anv (11 [1963] 2 S.C.R. 114 '.: 3 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 691 particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to ·such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders : /JU V•ljibh•i MuQiMal s .... ji •• ital• of s ..... _, Mrd},./kN J. Provided that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority." The proviso clearly precludes the Government from making a notification under sub-s. (1) of s. 6 unless the compensation to be awarded for such pro peity (a) is to be paid by a company, or (b) is to come wholly or partly out of (i) public revenues or (ii) some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. It is no doubt true that it has been the appe• llants' case throughout that the State Transport Cor poration is a company. It is also a fact that the entire compensation is to come out of the funds of the State Transport Corporation. If, therefore, we accept the contention of the appellants on this point the terms of the proviso will be said to have been satisfied. On the other hand it has been the case of the respondents that the State Transport Corporation is not a com pany but a local authority. The reason why this contention is raised on behalf of the respondents is that the provisions of Part VII of the Act have not been complied with here and, therefore, if in fact the acquisition is on behalf of a company it will have to be said to be bad on the ground of non·compliance with the provisions of Part VII. The expression 'company' has been defined thus in s. 3( e) of the Land Acquisition Act: "the expression 'Company' means a Company registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1882 196S Yaljibhai Muljibhai :iont}i •• Stat1 of B om6ay .MudAa1kar J. 692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. or under the (English)· Companies Acts, 1862 to 1890, or incorporated by an Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom or by an Indian law, or by Royal Charter or Letters Patent and includes a society registered under the Societies Registration Act 1860, and a registered society within the meaning of the Co· operative Socie· ties Act, 191.2." The State Transport Corporation is not regis· tered under any Companies Act nor has it been incor· porated under Royal Charter or Letters Patent. Nor again, is it a ~ociety registered under the Societies Registration Act, !860. ft is not incorporated by an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; but it is incorporated by an "Indian law". In this con· nection it is necessary to refer to certain legislation. The Central legislature enacted the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1948, which received the a•sent of the Governor-General on April 16, 1948, and came into force in the erstwhile province of Bombay by virtue of a notification made shortly thereafter. Section 2 of the Act defin~s mean a Road Transport Corporation appointed by the Provincial Government in pursuance of this Act. Section 4 of the Act provides for the appoint· ment of a Road Transport Corporation by the Provin· In exercise of those powers the cial Government. State of Bombay appointed the State Road Transport Corporation. Section 4 of the Act further provides that a Corporation appointed by a Provincial Government in pursuance of this Act shall be a body corporate having prepetual succession and common. seal and may sue and be sued by or under relevant provincial law. On May 26, 1950, the State legislature of Bombay enacted the Bombay State Road Tramport Act, 1950 (25 of 1950). But it is not clear as to when it came into force. However, nothing turns on the date on which it came into force. The fact, however, is not disputed that this Act was actually put into force. By Act 64 of 1950 Parliament repealed "Corporation" 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 693 Road Transport Corporation Act, 1948, and replaced it by an entirely new law. The earlier Act consisted only of 7 sections but the new law is an elaborate piece of legislation dealing with the establishment of Road Transport Corporations in the States, their constitution, powers and duties, incorporation, finance, accounts, audit etc. Section 3 of that Act deals with the establishment of Road Transport Cor porations in the States and s. 4 provides that every corporation shall be a body corporate by the name notified under s. 3, having perpetual succession and a common seal and shall sue and be sued by the said name. Section 4 7 of the Act contains special provi sions relating to Bombay and reads thus : IHI Yt2ljibhai 1\-111/jiW.i Son1ji v. Stall cf o.,,.11r, Mudno; ku J. 'the existing Corporation' and "(l) The body known as the Bombay State Road Transport Corporation and the Board thereof, referred to io the notification of the Government of Bombey, No. l 7b0/5, dated the 16th November, 1949 (hereinafter referred to 'Board' respectively) shall, notwithstanding any defect in, or invalidity of, the enactment or order under which they were constituted, be deemed for all purposes to have been validly constituted as if all the provisions of the said notification had been included and enacted in this section and this section had been in force continuously on and from the said date, and accordingly- transactions (a) all action by, and all with, the existing Corporation or Board, including any action or transaction by which any property, asset or right was acquired or any liability or obligation whether by contract or otherwise, was incurred, shall be deemed to have been validily and lawfully taken or done; and (b) no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedin~ shall lie against the Govern ment of Bombay or any member of the 196~ V dji6hoi Mulji&hoi Sonfji •• Slllie of Bom6•j' Mullh•lk•r J. 694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. Board or any officer or servant of the existiug Corporation in respect of any action taken by, or in relation to the setting up of, the existing Corporation or Board merely on the ground of any defect in, or invalidity of. the enactment or order under which the existing Corporation or Board was constituted. (2) On the establishment of a Corporation under section 3 in the State of Bombay (herein 'the New Corporation')- after referred to as the existing Corporation and Board (a) shall be deemed to be dissolved and shall cease to function; (b) all property and assets vesting in the existing Corporation shall vest in the new Corporation; (c) all rights, liabilities and obligations the existing Corporation, whether arising out of any contract or otherwise, shall be the rights, liabilities and obliga gations, respectively, of the new Corpo ration; and ( d) all licences and permits granted to all contracts made with, and all instruments executed on behalf of the existing Corpor ation or Board shall be deemed to have been granted to, made with, or executed on behalf of, the new Corporation and shall have effect accordingly." It will be clear from these provisions that the old recognised as having always Corporation was had valid legal status and deemed to have been properly incorporated. On the establishment of a Corporation under s, 3 of the Act of 1950 the old '·

#1963. Valji6!•i Muliibhoi Son1ji v. $tall oj s ... 1.,, MudhalkM J. ' 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 695 impliedly It is contended by Corporation was dissolved. But all action by and including any transaction with the old Corporation action or transaction by which any property or asset etc., was acquired by or for the old Corporation was lawfully taken or deemed to have been validly or done. that in consequence It is common ground the Bombay of the passing of the Act of 1950 Act of 1950 stood repealed and was in fact expressly repealed by the Bombay Act 29 of 1955. The provisions which we have set out above clearly show that the State Transport Corporation having been incorporated by an Indian law is a Company. Since, however, the compen sation to be awarded for the acquisition is to be paid only by the Corporation and no portion of it was paid by the Government, could it be said that the terms of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 6 have the learned been satisfied ? Attorney·General on behalf of the respondent that the funds of the Corporation have themselves come out of public revenue inasmuch as they consist of moneys provided by the State of Bombay. Even assuming that the funds of the Corporation consist only of the moneys which have been provided by the State of Bombay it is difficult to appreciate how they could be regarded as part of the public revenue. No doubt, the source of the funds would be public revenue but the funds themselves belong to the Corporation and are held by it as its own property. They cannot, therefore, be regarded as 'public revenue' in any s~nse. It was then said by reference to several provi sions of the Act that the Government is entitled to exercise control over the Corporation, that the pro fits earned by the Corporation would go to the government, that if the Corporation was wound up all its assets would also go to the Government and that ~herefore, the Corporation could be regarded as noth: \ng more than a limb o'f the Government. Even though tnat may be so. the Corporation is. certainly not a department of Government but is a separate legal 1961 -V i~iJli•i M •/jibh1i •• St111 (lf BPm'O' Son1ji Mu•holkar J. , 696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (I 964] VOL. entity and, therefore, moneys coming out of public revenues whether invested; loaned or granted to it would change their original character and become the funds or assets of the Corporation when they are invested in or transferrt>d or loaned to it. While, therefore, the terms of the proviso could be said to have been satisfied because compensation is to be paid by the Corporation, the acquisition will be bad because the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acqui sition Act have not been complied with. In order learned Attorney to get out of this difficulty the General argued that the State Transport Corporation is a local authority. The expression "local authority" is not defined in the Land Acquisition Act but is defined in s. 3 (31) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, as follows : "'local authority' shall mean a municipal committee, district board, body of port commis legally entitled to, sioners or other authority or entrusted by the Government with, control or management of a municipal or local fund:" The definitions given in the General Clauses Act, 1897, govern all Central Acts and Regulations-made after the commencement of the Act. No doubt, this Act was enacted later in point of time than the Land Acquisition Act ; but this Act was a consolida ting and amending Act and a definition given there in of the expression "local authority" is the same as that contained in the earlier Acts of 1868 and I 887; The definition given ins. 3 (31) will, therefore, hold good for construing the expression "local authority" occurring in the Land Acquisition Act. We have already quoted the definition. It will be clear from the definitiOn that unless it is shown that the State Transport Corporation is an J'J(j!f Y alji6/Jai MuljiW..i SfJfllji •• St•ll of B11111t.1 M•dMlw J, 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 6g.7 'authority' and is legally entitle i to or entrusted by tae Government with control oc management of a local fund it cannot be regarded as a local authority. No material has been placed befnre us from which it could be deduced that the funds of the Corporation It was no doubt local funds. can be regarded as submitted by the learned Attorney-General that the Corporation was furnished with funds by the Govern ment for commencing its business ; but even if that were so, it is difficult to appreciate how th~t would make the funds of the Corporation local funds. Learned Attorney-General then relied upon the provisions of s. 29 of the Bombay State Road Transport Act, 1950, which provides that the Corpo ration shall for all purposes be deemed to be a local authority. No doubt, that is so. But the definition contained in this Act cannot override the definition contained in the General Clauses Act of 1897 which alone muKt apply for construing the expression occur· ring in a Central Act like the Land Acquisition Act unless there is something repugnant in the subject OI' context. Though land acquisition is now in the concurrent list and, therefore, the State can legislate, the Bombay Act not having received the President's assent, cannot prevail against the meaning of the expression 'local authority' in that Act. No repug· nancy is pointed out. Then again, the Act of 1948 had empowered the Province of Bombay, among other provinces, to appoint Road Transport Corporations and conferred power on the Provincial Govrrnments under ss. 5 and 6 to deal with compensation and winding up of Cor In pursuance of this power porations so appointed. and after the commencement of the Coastitution the Bombay Act of 1950 had been enacted by the State Legislature of Bombay. But by the repeal of the Act of 1948 by the Central Act of 1950 the foundation for the continuance anc;l e~tcnce of the Bombay Act 1963 l'aljibfo Muljibhai Sofleji v. Slllt1 o/JJomff.v MadhoJka1 J. 69s·· SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL; of1950 disappeared. Moreover, siuce s. 41 of the Central Act provided thl\t a Corporation shall be deemed to be a local authority within the meaning Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and not within the mean' ing of any other . law, the provisions of s. 29 of the Bombay Act could in ·no circumstan·ces be said to In view of all this the learned Attorney· survive. General did not press his argument on the point further. acquisition In our view impugned the benefit of a this case having been made for Corporation, though for a public purpose, is bad because no part of the compensation is to come out of public revenues and the provisions of Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act have not been complied with. We, therefore, allow the appeals and decree the suits of the appellants with costs in all the courts. Appeals allowed. 1969 M•J 9. SRI GOPAL JALAN & COMPANY "· CALCUTT A STOCK EXCHANGE ASSOCIATION LTD. (A. K. SARKAR, M. HIDAYATULLAH and J. C. SHAH JJ.) Oompany-.Allotmenl of iliaru-Forfeiture of ahar...... Forftiletl. •haru reiaauetl.-lf jilinv of relurn compul1ory-Tli.• Oompaniu .Act, 19ti6 (I of 1966), •· 75. :, ~, The respondent-company did not file any return of the re-issued forfeited 1hares under•• 75 (I) of the Act arid there-. fore the appellant·shareholdar moved the High Court for an: • order requiring it to do 10. · · , Held that the wo.rd1 "allotment of shares" have been iiled ili·.;'15:to lndi~te ch• lll"Catloa of 11uifc. by appropriation out f,