KHARDAH CO. LTD v. THEIR WORKMEN

to record any findings after infirmity in the enquiry and the evidence to decide It is the duty of the eltquiry officer in an industrial reasons therefor so judge whether they are enquiry conclusions and to indicate briefly the that the Industrial Tribunal can basically erroneous or perverse. precisely clearly record Although the Industrial Tribunal should not as a normal procedure allow evidence to be led by one party in absence of the other or admit evidence after the case has been fully argued unless both the parties agree, the mere calling for the authenticated recorcl to see whether the workman was the Organisiag Secretary could not amount to a breach of the rule. , K"4riti.1r:Ci: Lid, ,, ' "v·.1..:. ·rll1ir Wl1km1n ,.,,_>-<!· !'< "."~!°·' ~01~ SUPREME COURT REPORTS(l964]VOL. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil ApI'eal ' · ' · No. 705 of 1962. · · Appeal by special leave from the Award dated Industrial in Case No. V111·42 September 19, 1961 of the Fourth Tribunal, West Bengal of 1961. H. N. Sanyal, Solicitor·General of India and , P. K. Chatterjee, for the appellant. D. L. Sen and Janardhan Sharma, for the respondents.

#1963. May 2. The Judgment of the Court was deli, vered by GAJENDRAGADKAR J .-This appeal arises out of. an industrial dispute between the appellant, Khardah Co. Ltd., and the respondents, its workmen, The dispute . was in regard to the dismissal of the appellant's employee, Samiran Jadav. The respon dents alleged tbat the said dismissal was unjustified, whereas, according to the appellant, the said emp loyee had been properly and validly dismissed. The to the 4th Industrial dispute which was referred Tribunal, Wesf Bengal, for its adjudicatiOn was whether the said dismissal was justified, and to what relief, if any, was ,the workman entitled? The, Tribu nal has held that the dismissal was unjustified ai; id so, it has directed the appellant to reinstate the said employee to his old post within a month from the date of the publication of the award. It has ·also ordered that the period starting from the date of the dis'missal till the date of reinstatement should be . tre<t,ted. as leave without pay and as such, should be . counted towards the length of service. It is against. this award that the appellant has come to this Coiirt ·· bfspecialleave. · ·· 1965 ... Kh.<liah Co. Ltd. Th1ir W <irkmen Gaj1ndr.i1aJk• J. a's.c.R.. SUPREME COURT ~PORTs 5'09 to work on machine producing The respondent's case was that Jadav had been dismissed by the appellant mala fide with the rnotive of victimising him for his trade union activities. Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union and since he supported the Union's demands very strongly, the appellant wanted to get rid of him. It appears that J adav had been working as a weaver some years past. He was confirmed from April 12, 1954. On service with effect September 19, 1960, he went on a week's leave. When returned on September 26, 1960, he was twill, though, normally, he was assigned work on a plain machine. Jadav was not accustomed to work on the complicated machine which produces twill and so, · he requested the management that he should be asked to do his usual work on a plain machine. This request was. however, turned down. Being unaccustomed to work on the machine producing twill, Jadav met with an accident on September 27, 1960, and was granted medical leave for a week ending on Saturday; October 1, 1960. On October, . 3 1960, when he resumed duty, he again requested the management that he should be permitted to work on the plain machine, but when his request was turned down, he told the management that he would work on the twill machine in the second shift which starts l P.M. On that day, another employee Mahboob. who was ailing a.nd had been on leave, asked for further leave which was refused and he fell unconscious while he was going to operate his machine. As a result, 700 weavers of the appellant stopped work and the weaving section could not resume work at 1 P. M. The management then lock-out on October 5, 1960 which declared a continued until October 29, 1960. On October 3, 1960, the management 1crved a charge-sheet on J adav in which it was .illeged thatJadav had wilfully disobeyed the lawful 1963 K/10rfch Co, Ltd. v. Tluir Workman l.ilO SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. aud reasonable order of his superior and had acted in a manner subversive of discipline. The case against him was that he had moved from one place another in the weaving Department and incited workers of the said department to go on strike. The management alleged that by his conduct, Jadav had committed misconduct under Rule 14(c) (i) and (viii) of the Standing Orders. Jadav was called upon to offer his explanation within 24 hours after receipt of the charge-sheet .. taking part After Jadav gave his explanation, an enquiry was held. At the initial Stf\ges of the enquiry, Jadav appeared, but, later, he did not take part in the that Jadav proceedings. The appellant contends deliberately refrained in ~he proceedings, whereas according to the respondents, the enquiry was conducted unfairly, and so, it became impossible for Jadav to participate in it. This enquiry was conducted by the Manager himself. After the enquiry was over, the Manager decided that J ad av was guilty of the charge, and so, dismissed. him on November 21, 1960. The respondents' case was that the dismissal was purely vindictive and was not justified at all. On the other hand, the appellant's case was that Jadav had been working in the weaving depart· ment both on plain looms and on looms that produce twill. When he returned to duty on October 3, 1960, the departmental Overseer, Mr. Jha asked Jadav to go to his loom, but he refused to obey his orders. The appellant further alleged that Jadav moved inside the weaving department and incited the workers to stop work. The appellant also pleaded that a proper enquiry had been held against Jadav and it was as a result of the said enquiry that he was dismissed for misconduct under Rule 14 (c)(i) & (viii) of the Company's Standing Orders. Regarding the incident of Mahboob, the appellant alleged tha( . 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 511 Mahboob was ab5ent on October 3, 1960 and, therefore, no question of his working on any machine arose on that day. In other words, the appellant's contention was that the Union's version that strike was .spontaneous because Mahboob fainted, was untrue and the strike was in substance, the result of the instigation of Jadav. J:hva.Ji Ca. Ltd v. Tluir W111k11n1 Gaj111drag«ik.,- J. Before the Tribunal, some oral evidence was led by the parties and reliance was placed by the appellant on the proceedings of the enquiry itself. The Tribunal held that the management had delibera tely suppressed the fact that Mahboob had gone to the mill on October 3, and prayed for extension of leave which was refused, and so, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the strike could not have been instigated by Jadav. The Tribunal further commented on the fact that after the enquiry was held, no finding was recorded by the Manager who held the eoquiry, and it appeared to the Tribunal that the conclusions on which the management prest1mably acted in dismissing Jadav were of such a . character that "no person acting fairly and honestly could have reached them". The Tribunal also held that Jadav was not used to work on a twill loom, and so, his request that he should be allowed to work Its conclusion, on a plain loom was not unjustified. therefore, was that a grave charge had been unjustly framed againstJadav and that showed want of good faith and vindictiveness. On these findings, in favour of the Tribunal answered the question respondents and directed reinstatement of Jadav. On behalf of the appellant, the learned Solicitor General has strenuously urged before us that the appe llant has held a proper domestic enquiry and has dis missed Jadav because the management thought that the enquiry disclosed the fact that the charges framed against Jadav had been established. He contends that it is firmly established by decisions of this Court ' Kh4rdah C.. Ltd. •• Their Workmen Caj1111liilt•dkar . J. ll12 SUPREME COURT'MPORTS (1964) Vdt. that an Industrial Tribunal will not' interfere 'with the . action of the management in dismissing iis emp· loyee after holding an enquiry into. his alleged mis· conduct unless it is shown that the lnanagemenfl1as not acted in good faith, or that the dismissal amounts to victimisation or unfair labour practice, or wliere the management has been guilty of a bask error, or violation of a principle of natural justice, or when on the materials, the finding is completely baseless .or perverse, vide Indian Iron &> Steel 0(ff1'piJ'T!!J Lid. v. Their Workmen. ('). There is no doubt that'this Court has consistently refrained from interfering ,with the conclusions reached by the enquiry.officer who Conducts domestic enquiries against industHal emp· loyees unless one of the four tests·laid, down'in the · case of the Indian Iron ih Steel Co. 'Ltd •. (1) is satisfied, because we have· generally accepted' the view that if the enquiry is fairly held and.leads'to the conclusion that the charge 'framed against tlii: employee is proved, the Industrial Tribunal'shou~ not sit in appeal over . the finaing re~orded. 'at the said enquiry and should not interfere with the .Ina· na~ement's right to dismiss a workman who is founCi guilty of misconduct. It would be noticed that the essentiarbasi1 ;on which this view is founaed is that the enquiry ,con· ducted by the management before a domestic tribu· nal must be a fair and just enquiry and 'in btirigfog home to the workman the charge framed against · him, principles of natural justice must be observeCi. Normally, evidence on which the charges are sought to be proved must be led at such an enquiry, in the It is true that in presence of the workman himself. the case of departmental enquires held against 'public servants, this Court has observed in the State of 'M !J· sore v. S.S. Makapur ('),that if the deposition ofa witness has been recorded by the enquiry offic;:er in the absence of the public servant and a copy there<>f is given to him, and an opportunity is given to him (I) (1958) I L.L.J, 260. (2) (1963) 2 LC. R. Sf!, 1961 Khord4A Co. Lli. v. Their W".bnm Gajmi<ogU.k., I. 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 513 to cross examine the witness after he affirms in a general way the truth of his statement already recor ded, that would conform to the requirements of na tural justice; but as has been emphasised by this Court in M/s. Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Ganga dhar (' ), these observations must be applied with cau tion to enquiries held by domestic Tribunals against In such enquiries, it is the industrial employees. desirable that all witnesses on whose testimony the management relies in support of its charge against the workman should be examined in his presence. Recording evidence in the presence of the workman concerned serves a very important purpose. The · witness knows that he is giving evidence against a particular individual who is present before him, and therefore, he, is cautious in making his statement. Besides, when evidence is recorded in the presence -of the accused person, there is no room for persuading the witness to make convenient statements, and it is always easier for an accused person to cross-examine the witness if his evidence is recorded in his presence. , Therefore, we would discourage the idea of recording statements of witnesses ex parte and then producing the witnesses before the employee concerned cross-examination after serving him with such pre viously recorded statements even though the witnesses concerned make a general statement on the latter occasion that their statements already recorded cor rectly represent what they stated. In our opinion, unless there are compelling reasons to do so, the nor mal procedure should be followed and all evidence should be recorded in the presence of the workman who stands charged with the commission of acts cons tituting misconduct. In this connection, it is necessary to point out that unlike domestic enquiries against public servants . to which Art. 311 of the Constitution applies, in industrial enquiries, the question of the bona fides or mala fides of the employer is often at issue. If it (I) [1964] Vol. 2 S. C. R. 809. \ l" IHJ n..t.AC..W. v. n,;, Worilmm 514 SUPRENIE COURT REPOR. TS (1964] vor.. is shown that the employer was actuated by a de1ire to victimise a workman for his trade union activities, that itself may, in some cases, introduce an infirmity in the order of dismissal passed against such a workman. The question of motive is hardly relevant in enquiries held against public servants, vide Union Territory of Tripura v. Gopal Chandra ). That is another reason why Dutta Ohoudhuri (1 domestic en4uiries in industrial matters should be held with scrupulous regard for the requirements of natural justice. Care must always be taken to see that these enquiries are not reduced to an empty formality. . / Take the present case where, after the enquiry was held, the Manager who held th,e enquiry has not recorded any findings, and so, we do not know in his mind and how he what reasons weighed appreciated the evidence led before him. The learned Solicitor-General contends that there was hardly any need to record any findings or to make a foinial report in the present case, because the Man ager who held the enquiry was himself competent to dismiss the employee. We are not impressed by this argument. The whole object of holding an enquiry is to enable the enquiry officer to decide upon the merits of the dispute before him, and so, it would be idle to conterid that once evidence is recorded, all that the employer is expected to do is ,, to pass an order of dismissal which impliedly indicates that the employer accepted the view that the charges . framed against the employee had been proved. One of the tests which the Industrial Tribunal is entitled to apply in dealing with industrial disputes of thi~ character is whether the conclusion of the enquiry officer was perverse or whether there was any basic error in the approach adopted by him. Now, such an enquiry would be impossible in the present case because we do not know how the enquiry officer· approached the question and what conclusions he (I) [1963J Supp. IS, C.R. 266. ". · :l S.C.il. SUPREME COURT R,EPORTS 515 l!Jf3 Khardah Co. Ltd. •• Tluir W' or km1n Gaj1ndrazadkar J. In our J reached before he decided to dismiss J adav. opinion, therefore, the failure of the Manager to record any findings after holding the enquiry con stitutes a serious infirmity in.the enquiry itself., The learned Solicitor-General suggested that we might consider the evidence ourselves and decide whether the dismissal of J adav is justified or not. We are not prepared to adopt such a course. If industrial to domestic en adjudication attaches importance quiries and the conclusions reached at the end of such enquiries, that necessarily postulates that the enquiry would be followed by a statement containing It may be the conclusions of the enquiry officer. that the enquiry officer need not write a very long or elaborate report ; but since his findings are likely to lead to the dismissal of the employee, it is his duty to record clearly and precisely his conclusions and to indicate briefi y his reasons for reaching the said conclusions. /Unless such a course is adopted, it would be difficult for the Industrial Tribunal to decide whether thf' approach adopted by the enquiry officer was basically erroneous or whether his .con clusions were perverse. if the argument urged before us by the learned Solicitor-General is accepted, it is likely to . impair substantially the value of such domestic enquiries. As we have already observed, we must insist on a proper enquiry being held, and that means that nothing should happen in the enquiry either when it is held or after it 1s concluded and before the order of dismissal passed, which would expose the enquiry to the criticism that it was undertaken as an empty for mality. Therefore, we are satisfied that the Industrial Tribunal was right.- in not attaching any importance to the enquiry held by the Manager in dealing with the evidence the merits of the dispute adduced before it. itself on Indeed, It is well settled that if the enquiry is held to be unfair 1 the employer can lead evidence before the Klwbh C.. Lid. •• TiNWotkmm G~lldkor J. 516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. Tribunal and justify his action, but in such a case, the question as to whether the dismissal of employee is justified or not, would be open before the Tribunal and the Tribunal will consider the merits of the dispute and come· to its own conclusion without having any regard for the view taken by the mana gement in dismissing the employee. If the enquiry is good and the conduct of the management is not mala fide or vindictive, then, of course, the Tribunal would not try to examine the merits of the findings as though it was sitting in appeal over the conclusions of the enquiry officer. I In the present case, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the dis missal of Jadav was not effected in good faith and has been actuated by a desire to victimise him his trade union activities. That is a conclusion of fact which cannot be said to be perverse, and so, it is not open to the appellant to challenge its correctness of the merits before us. There is one point to which we ought to refer It appears that the before we part with this appeal. main dispute between the partic::s was whether the strike on October 3, 1960, was spontaneous, or had been instigated by· Jadav. The respondents contended that the treatment given by the manage ment to Mahboob caused this strike and 700 weavers struck work spontaneously,. whereas the appellant urged that Mahboob was not present on the said date,,,and so, the story that his request for leave was not acceded to and he had to work is altogether false and the strike had really been instigated by Jaclav. On this point, the Tribunal has made a categorical finding against the appellant and in doing so, it has relied upon the minutes of the Emergency Works Committee meeting held on October 3, 1960, at 3 P.M. with the Manager himself in the chair. These minutes show that when an enquiry was made as to why the strike had commenced, it was definitely reported to the Committee that Mahboob, who had ,...,.,. Co. I.Ii. y, Thllir W eriwlm 3 S.C.R. SUPRENIE COURT REPORTS 517 leave, he gone on leave, had extended his leave and after the reported on expiry of the extended October 3, and pleaded that he was still unwell and ~ should be given still further lf~ave, but "nobody paid any heed to his prayer", and so, presumably he had to resume duty. The minutes further show that the Labour Officer informed the members of the Com mittee that Mahboob had produced a certificate of fitness on September, 22, 1960 and after dis cussion, it was unanimously decided to refer his case to the Mill's Medical Officer on whose recommenda tion the leave should be considered. These minutes, therefore, clearly prove that Mahboob had gone to further the Milt on October 3, had asked leave, and his request for further leave was not granted. We ought to add that these minutes have been signed by the. Joint Secretary on the employer's side and the Joint Secretary on the employees' side, and their correctness cannot be impeached. It is in the light of these statements that the plea made by ,the appellant before the Tribunal had to be con sidered by it. therefore, The plea specifically made was that Mahboob was absent on· October 3, and, was no question of his working on any machine. This plea would seem to suggest that Mahboob was absent from the Mill and that undoubtedly is not true. The learned Solicitor-General invited us to consider this plea in the light of the statement made by one of the witnesses in the domestic enquiry. This statement was that Mahboob and the witness had gone to the Labour Officer for extension of leave to the Labour Officer had granted Mahboob and leave. This statement would show that leave had been gra~ted to Mahboob the morning of October 3, but as we have already seen, the Labour Officer himself told the members of the Works Com mittee at 3 P.M. on the same day that leave had not been ~ranted to Mahboob because he had produced 1963 KlumlAh Co. Ltd. v. Their WMkmm 518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. >- a certificate of fitness dated September 22, and the Works Committee had resolved that Mahboob's case should be referred to the Mill's Medical Officer on whose recommendation action should be taken. Thus, there can be not doubt that even if the plea made by the appellant is liberally construed and is read in the light of the statement made by one of the witnesses at the domestic enquiry, the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that the stand taken by the appellant was wholly untrue and that Mahboob had not been given leave on October 3. That being so, if the Industrial Tribunal took the view that the refusal of the management to give leave to Mahboob exasperated the workmen, we cannot hold that its conclusion -is erroneous or that its propriety can be successfully challenged before us. The incident in regard to Mahboob forms the main background of the strike and the anxiety of the appellant was to show that Mahboob was not present on that date. Therefore, once the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the version given by t~e appellant was untrue, it naturally changed the com. plexion of tllle whole of the charge-sheet framed by the appellant against Jadav. That is why Industrial Tribunal came to the concluiion that the conduct of the appellant in dismissing J adav showed lack of good faith and appeared to have been in spired by the desire to victimise Jadav for his trade union activities. The learned Solicitor-General commented on the fact that the Tribunal had allowed the respon to call for the register of trade unions after the arguments had been heard before it. It appl'ars that both the parties appeared before the Tribunal on January 19, 1961, when arguments were heard and the award was reserved. The Union then filed an application praying that the trade union record may be called for, and the Tribunal ordered that the n:cord be called for. The grievance made by ·the 196$ . \~ . 3 $.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS-.419-- . leam~d Solicitor-General· is that ·it is improper to ·· have· allowed additional evidence ·to be called for · after the arguments had been heard. We do not think there is any force in this argument, because the only· purpose for which the record was called for by the Union was to show that Jadav was the Organis ing Secretary of the ,Union. Since that fact was presumably disputed by·· the appellant in arguing the· case before the Tribunal, the Union urged that the • record kept by the Registrar of Trade Unions would show that the appellant's plea was not well founded. · If, in such circumstances, the Tribunal sent for the record to satisfy itself lhat the record showed that Jadav was the Organising Secretary of the Union, we do not think any serious grievance can bi made by _ the appellant about the conduct of the Tribunal. It is perfectly true that in dealing with industrial matters, the Tribunal cannot allow evidence to be led by one party in the absence of the other, and should not accept the request of either party to admit · evidence after the case has been fully argued unless. both the parties agree. In the present case, however, what the Tribunal has done, is merely to send for authen.ticated record to see whether Jadav was the Organising .Secretary of the Union or not. The result is, the appeal fails and is disml~sea · with costs. Appeal dismissed.