District Judge is set aside v. First Atldit~nal

Judgment

-The. impugned Act in so far as it confers a power on the Union to acquire lands owned by the States, including coal mines and coal bearing lands is ultra viru. Under the Constitution of India the political sovereignty is divided between the constitutional entities that is, the Union pe~sOnalities possessing and the States, who are properties and functioning through the instrumentalities created the Constitution. The Indian Comtitution accepts the federal concept and distributes the sovereign powers between the coordinate constitutional entities, namely, the Union and the juristic 1962 Sl411 of W111 Dett_tal .. l..inian of !Niio :i74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. States. This concept implies that one cannot encroach upon the governmental functions or instrumenta)itie.o of the other unless the Constitution provides for such interference. The lc~slative fields allotted to the units cover subjects for legis lation and they do not deal with the relationship between the in their allotted fields. This is coordinate units iunctioning regulated hy other provisions of the Constitution and their is no provision which enables one unit to take away the property of another except by agreement. The power to acquire the property of a citizen for a public purpose is one of the implied powers of the sovereign. Under the Indian Constitution that sovereign power is divided between It is implicit in the power of the Union and the States. that it must relate only to property . acquisition by a sovereign of the governed. property. for a sovereign cannot acquire It is also implicit in the concept of acquisition and requisition that they shall be for public purpose on payment of compensation. The \VOrd "person" in Art. 31 does not include ; if Entry 42 were to empower Parliament to acquire "Sl.ltc11 thr.. property of. a State, the State would not have the protection of Art. 31 which is available to all other persons. Therefore, Entry 42 List III docs not authorise either Parliament or a State Legislature to make a law for the acquisition of the pro perty of the other. Nor do the residuary Art. 248 and Entry 97 List I confer any power cm Parliament to acquire the property of a State. The residuary legislative field cannot possibly cover inter-State relation, for that matter is not distributed between the Union and the States by way of legislative Lists. When a specific provision is made for acquisition of property, it would be incongraous to confine that Entry to properties other than those of the States and to resort to the residuary power for acquiring the property of the States. Further the anomaly of the Union the property of the States without compensation acquiring would still remain. ;\!either Entry 24 of List JI nor Entry 52 of List r empo wers a State Legislature before ·Parliament made a law decla ring that the control of a particular industry by the Union is expedient in the public interest or the Parliament, after such to make such a law for acquisition of State land•, declaration, for they deal only with the regulation of an existing industry or an industry that may be started subsequently, but not with acquiaition of lands. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 375 Act 12 of 1952 and Act 67 of 1957 deal only with the regulation of mines an;! further the declarations contained in the said Acts are e'.'prcssly confined to the extent of the regu thereunder and, therefore, the declarations lation provided therein could not be relied upon to sustain the validity of the Act. 1962 St•t• •!West Bm:al v. Union of lnJia No inspiration can be drawn from fcireign con~titutions or decisions made thereunder in construing the express provisions of our Constitution in the context of its different set up. The property of the states can be acquired by. the Union only by agreement. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Suit No. 1 of 1961. S. M. Bose, Advocate-General for the State of West Bengal, B. Sen, S. 0. Bose, Milon K. Banerjee, P. K. Chatterjee,' and P. K. Bose, 'for the plaintiff. M. 0. Setalvad, Attorney-General for India, H. N. Sanyal, Addit·ional Solicitor General of India, Bishan Narain, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for the defendant. B. Sen and I. N .. Shroff, for the Intervener No. 1. S. M. Sikri, Advocate-G~neralfor the State oj Punjab, R. Ganapathy Iyer and P. D .• 'lllenon, for Intervener No. 2. · B. O. Barua, Advocate-General for the State of Assam and Naunit Lal, for the Intervener No. 3. Dinabandhu Sahu, Advocate-General for the State of Orissa, B. K. P. Sinha and. P. D. Menon, for the Intervener No. 4. A. Ranyanadha1n Olietty. and A. V. Rangam, for Intervener No. 5. Eal. Narayan Sinha, and D. Goburdhan, for Intervener No. 6. ··~ 1961 St"'4 of W1Jt Bm;ai •• Union of /Mia SiltM, C. J. 37ti SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. K. S. No. 7. llajela and C. P. Lal, for Intervener P. D. Merum, for Intervener No. 8 . S. M. Sikri, Advocate. General for State of Punjab, and P. D. Menon, for Intervener No. 9. G. S. Pathak, N. S. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, for Intervener No. 10.

#1962. December 21. The Judgment of Sinha, C. J., Imam, Shah, Ayyangar and Mudholkar, JJ., was delivered by Sinha, C. J., Subba Rao, J., deliver ed a separate Judgment. SINHA, C. J .-This is a suit by the State of West Bengal agamst the Union of India for a decla ration that Parliament is not competent to make a law authorising the Union Government to acquire land and rights in or over land, which are vested in a State, and that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisi tion and Development) Act (XX of 1957)-which hereinafter will be referred to as the Act-enacted by the Parliament, and particularly SS. 4 and 7 thereof, were ultra virll8 the legislative competance of Parlia ment, as also for an injunction restraining the defen dant from proceeding under the provisions of these sections of the Act in respect of the coal bearing lands vested in the plaintiff. As will presently appear, the suit raises questions of great (>Ublic importance, bearing on the interpretation of quite a large number of the Articles of the Constitution. In view of the importance of the questions raised in this litigation, notices were issued by this Court to all the Advocates In pursuance of that General of the States of India. notice, the States of Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh have appeared, either through their respective Advocates General or through other Counsel. The National Coal Development Corporation Ltd., with its head 1962 Stat' of West Bengal v. Union of India Sinha, C. J. 1 s.c.R. - SUPREME COURT REPORTS 377 office at Ranchi in Bihar, has also intervened in view of a pending litigation between it as one of the defendants and the State of West Bengal as the plaintiff. We have heard counsel for the parties at great length. The Plaint is founded on the following allega tions. The plaintiff is a State, specified in the First Schedule of the Constitution, as forming part of India, which is a Union of States. By virtue of Art. 294 of the Constitution, all property and assets in West Bengal, which were vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Government of the Province of Bengal became vested in the State of West Bengal for the purposes of the State. The State of West Bengal, in exercise of its exclusive legislative powers, enacted the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, J 954 (W. B. 1 of 1954 ). By notification issued under the Act, as amended, all estates and rights of intermediaries and Ryots vested in the State for the purposes of Government, free from encumbrances, together with rights in the sub-soil, including mines and minerals. The Parliament enacted the impugned Act authorising the Union of India to acquire any !arid or any right in or over land, in any part of India. In exercise of its powers under the Act, the Union of India, by two notifications dated Septem ber 21, 1959 and January 8, 1960, has expressed its intention to prospect for coal lying within the lands which are vested in the plaintiff, as aforesaid. Disputes and differences have arisen between the plaintiff and the defendant as to the competence of Parliament to enact the Act and its power to acquire the property of the plaintiff, which is a sovereign authority. In paragraph !l of the Plaint, a contro versy had been raised as to whether or not the pro posed acquisition was for a public purpose, but at the actual hearing of the case, the learned Advocate· General of Bengal withdrew that contention, .and, therefore, that issue is no more a live one. Notice 1961 Stmef Wut Bmtal •• u.; .. tf lnJi. S ...... C.J. 378 SUPRtMt COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is said to have been duly ~erved.

The Writte11. Statement of the defendant does not deny the allegations of fact made in the Plaint, but denies the correctness of each and all the sub· missions or legal contentions as to the legislative competence of Parliament to enact the Act and as to the power of the defendant to acquire any property It is also denied that the State of West of a State. Bengal is a following statement in·paragraph 12 of the Written Statement brings out the policy underlying the enactment in question : sovereign authority. The "The defendant states that it is in the public interest that there should be a planned and rapid industrialization of the country. For such rapid and planned industrialization, it is essential that the production of coal should be greatly increased as coal is the basic essential industries. Regulation of mines and mineral development under the control of the Union has been declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. It is submitted that in the circumstances, the acquisition of coal bearing areas by the Union is necessary for , the regulation of mines and mineral development and for increased pro· duction of coal in the public interest. The defendant will rely on documents a list whereof is hereto annexed." On those pleadings, the following issues were raised : I. Whether Parliament has legislative compe tence to enact a law for compulsory acqui sition by the Union of land and other properties vested in or owned by the State as alleged in para 8 of the plaint ? .. - 1962 St'ltc of H'tJt Buigal v. l.inion of India ~111.ha, c. J. i S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS :n!J

#2. Whether the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority as alleged in para S of the plaint ? a. W!1ether assuming that the State of 'West Bengal is a sovereign authority, Parlia ment is entitled to enact a law for compul sory acq~isition of its lands and properties ?

#4. Whether the Act or 1\nY of its provisions arc nltra i•ires the legislative competence of Parliament ·1

#5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to auy relief and if so, what relief? After the arguments on behalf of the plaint:ff, and of the States in support of the plaintiff, had been finished, application was marle for amendment of the plaint praying that the !ullowing paragraph may be added as paragraph !JA, which is as follows :- "Alternatively the plaintiff submits that the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Develop ment) Act (Act XX of 1!157) on its true cons truction docs not apply to the lands vested in or owned by the Plaintiff the State of West Bengal. Further the notifications purported to have been issued under the said Act arc void and of no effect." At the request of the learned Attorney-General a short adjournment was gr an tcd to consider the position as to whether or not the amendment sought should be opposed on behalf of the defendant. As the amendment sought was ·not opposed, it was granted and an· additional issue was raised in these terms : "\Vhethcr Act XX of I !107 on its true construc tion applies to l~nds vested in or owned by the Plaintiff State? " 380 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. 1962 .llalt of W ul Rtngal v. Union of !ndi4 Sinha, C. J. . It will thus appear that the parties arc not at issue on any question of fact, and the determination of the controversy depends entirely upon the inter pretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, aud the scope and effect of the Act. The issues joined between the parties arc mainly two, (I) whether on a true construction of the provisi ons of the Act, they apply to lands vested in or owned by the plaintiff; and (2) If this is answered in the affirmative whether there was legislative competence in Parliament to enact the impunged statute. The scope and effect of the Act is the most important question for determination, in the first instance, because the determination of that question will affect the ambit of the discussion on the second question. As already indicated, when the case was opened for the first time by the learned Advocate-General of Bengal, he proceeded on the basis that the Act purported to acquire the interests of the State, and made his fur ther submission to the effect that Parliament had no competence to pass an Act which had the effect of affecting or acquiring the interest of the State. But later he also took up the alternative position that the Act, on its true construction, did not affect the inter ests or property of the State. The other States which have entered appearance, through their respective counsel, have supported this stand of the plaintiff and have laid particular emphasis on those provisions of the Act which, they contend, support their contention that the Act did not intend to acquire or in any way affect the interests of the States. In this connection, the arguments began by rnaking pointed reference· to the following paragraphs in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, set out at pages 16- I 7 of the Paper Book: "According to the Industrial Policy Resolution of I 95fi the future development of coal is the responsibility of the State. All new units in 1962 State of W•st Bengal v. [lnion of lntlia Sinha, C. J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 381 the coal industry will be set up only by the State save in exceptional circumstances as laid down in the Resolution. additional production of 22 million The production of coal in India in 1953 was 38 · milJion tons and the target for production for the Second Five-Year Plan has been fixed at 60 million It has been decided tnat out of tons per annum. . the per annum envisaged. the public sector should produce an additional 12 million tons per annum, the balance being allocated to the private industry for production from existing collieries and immedi ately contiguous areas. in the Out of the additional 12 million tons public sector, the bulk ( 10 million tons per annum) raised by the development of will have to be new coal fields, such as Korba, Karanpura, Kathara and Jhilimili and Bisrampur. Very nearly all tre coal bearing areas however are covered by min'.ng leases held by private persons or prospecting licencees which carry a right to mining lease. Hence it proposed to take power to acquire unworked coal bearing area.s covered by private leases or prospecting licencees which. are found surplus to the production required in the private sector and to work these areas as lessees of the State Government. With the acquisition of zamindari rights by the the State Governments, the rights in minerals are now vested in all areas in the State Governments, and it is not appropriate to use the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for the acquisition of mineral rights, parti cularly because the Central Government does· not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the States. There is no other existing Central or State Legislation under which the Government has powers to acquire immediately the lessee's rights over the coal bearing areas acquired by Government for the 1962 Sl1JI~ of H"t1I Btngnl v. l.,iiirm of India S.nha, C, J, 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l064] VOL. additional coal production. It is accordingly consi dered necessary to take power; by fresh legislation to acquire the lessees' tic;"!Hs over unworked coal-bearing areas on payment of reasonable compensation to the les>ecs, and without affecting the State Government rights as owner of the minerals or the royalty payable to the State Government on minerals. The Bill provides for payment of reasonable the acquisition of the rights of compensation for prospecting licenccrs and mining lessees." affecting "without Besides setting out the policy of the State in the matter of coal mining industry and the actual state of affairs in relation thereto, the Statement of objects and Reasons contains the crucial words on which particular reliance was placrd on behalf of the States, "because the Central Government docs not intend to acrp1ire the proprietary rights vrstcd in the States ... .. :· and, the State It is however well (;ovcrnment ri~IHs as owners."" scttled that the: Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a bill, whrn introduced in Parliament, cannot be used to determine the true meauiug and effect of the substantive provisions of the statute. They cannot lie used except for the limited purpose of understanding the background and the antecedent state of affairs leading up to the legislation. But we cmnot use this statement as an aid to the construction of the enactment or to show that the legislature did not intend to acquire the proprietary rights vested in the State or in any way to affect the State Govern ,\ statute, as ments' righr.s as owners of minerals. passed by Parliament, the expression of the collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an individual, albeit a Minister, of' the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut down the generality of the words used in the statute. It was then contended that the preamble of the 1962 Stat1 of W1St Bmgal v, Uoion of India Sinhtl, C. J 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 383 Act was the key to the understanding of the scope and provisions of the statute. The pre am hie is in these words : "An act to establish in the economic interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its development by provid ing for the acquisition by the state of unworked land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of rights in or over such land, for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, , licence or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith." Particular stress was laid on the I ast two lines of the preamble, showing that only rights "accruing by virtue of any agreement, lease, licence or otherwise" were being sought to be extinruished or modified by the provisions of the Act. But ·this.argument omits to take note of the words of the previous clause in the preamble which has reference to the fact that the Act also was meant for "acquisition by the state of un worked lands containing or likely to contain coal deposits." Before proceeding to deal with the main arguments it is necessary to advert to a submission of the learned Advocate-General of Bengal that the reference to the "State" in the words "acquisition by the State" occurring in the preamble was a reference to the "States" as distinguished from the union. This contention has only to be mentioned to be rejected as the entire object and purpose of the im pugned Act was to vest powers in the Union Govern ment to work coal mines and in that context the word "State" could obviously refer only to the Union Government. The preamble, therefore, does not support the intended to acquire only argument that the Act was the rights of individuals, derived from prospecting licences or based on leases, and to exclude from the 1962 State of IVtst Bengal v, f..lnio11 of India Si'lha. C. J. 384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. pun, iew of the Act the rights of States in coal.bearing lands. Section 4, relating to thr issue of a prelimi nary notification of the intention to prospect for coal in any given area, makes reference to "lands", without any qualifications, and s. 6, which is conse quential upon s. 4 lays down the effect of such notification on prospecting licences and mining leases. Section 7 also speaks of giving notice of the Govern ment's intention to acquire the whole or any part of the land, notified as aforesaid or any rights in or for a over such land. Section !l, which provides declaration of acquisition has also used the same expression, "any land or any rights in or over such s. !l, which is in these land." The proviso terms : "Provided that, whert: the declaration relates to any land or to any rights in or over land belonging to a State Government which has or have not been leased out, no such rleclaration shall be made except after previous consultation with the State Government" authorises is very important in this connection. This proviso for the first time makes specific reference to any land Pr to any rights in or over land "belonging to a State Government.'' Section !lA Central Government to dispense with the necessity of complying with the provisions of s. 8, which provides for hearing any objections raised to the proposal to acquire any land which is notified under s. 7 as the subject-matter of acquisition. Ordinarily, if a notification is made by the Central Government the whole o(any part of of its intention to acquire the land or of any right in or over land, notified under s. 4, it is open to any person interested in the land to object to the acquisition of the whole or any part of the land or of any rights in or over such land. If any such objection is raised, an opportunity has to be given for hearing such an objection or 1962 Stale of West Bengal v. L ·nion of India Sinha, C. J, I S.C.R. SUPREME GOUR T REPORTS 385 sub-section objections, by the "competent authority." But under s. 9-A, the Central Government, if it is satisfied that it is necessary to acquire immediately the whole or any part of the land, or any rights in or over such land, may direct that s. 8 shall not come into ope ration, and, therefore, no proceedings thereunder would be entertainable. Section 10 lays down the consequences of the notification o~•declaration of acquisition under s. 9. On such a declaration the .land, or the rights in or over the land. shall vest in the Central Government, free from all encum brances, and (~) where the rights acquired happen to have been granted under a mining lease by a State Government, the Central Government shall be deemed to have become lhe lessee of the State Government. .\ good deal of argument was addressed to us as to the significance of the provision, contained in s. 10 (~) or the Act. They will be dealt with later in the conrse of this judgment. But it is open to Government to direct by au order in writing that the land or the rights in or over the laud, instead of vesting in the Central Govern ment under s. 10 shall vest in a Govcrnmt'lll Company, which has expressed its willingncsp to comply with the terms and cuncli lions imposed by· the Central 'Government Gompam•' means Government. A in s. !il 7 of the Companies a company as defined In the case where the land or the rights Act, l 95tl. in or over the land become vested in a Government Company, under s. 11 (I), that company shall be deemed to have become a lessee of the State Govern ment, as if the Company had Geen granted the mining lease by the State Government under the 1Iineral Concession Rules. Compensation the Act on account of prospecting licence> ceasing to have effect, or the rights under a mining lease haying been acquired, or for any land acquired under s. 9, has been provided for and the rules Jay down the procedure for determining such compensation, in It is clear on a reading of the provisions for s. 13. :is6 "su1'RE1\1t couRt iU:~oRts [i964J vat. compensation in that section. that·-no-compensation has. been provided for· · in· respect of minerals lying unworked underground.\. Section 14 to 17. Jay down' the method of determining 'compensation and other . cognate matters relatini; to payment of compensation. The rest of the provisions of the Act do not bear on . the present. <iontroversy and, therefore, rieed not be - adverted to. · . . · , · · · · _ . On,a bare reading ofthe p~ovision5 ~f the Act, the expression "any land" or "any rights in or over such land" would appea.r. to cover ·every interest regardless of the person or authority who owns them, including those of a State. Government. But it has.·· been argued that . on a· close examination of the .. provisions aforesaid of the Act and .keeping certain general principles of interpretaticin- of Statutes in . view, the_ conclusiori follows that the Act does not cover any . property or interest . iri -or over ·belonging to a State Government. \Ve have already indicated that neither the statement of objects and .. reasons nor the preamble are of any help to the · plaintiff or to States which have intervened and have claimed that any property belonging to a State Government is outside the scope and effect of the ·._Act. . . .. Bearing in mind that the. words used in s. 4 ·are comprehensive and unrestricted and apt to include in their sweep lands "belonging to a State" and that · the reference in s. 7 is to lands which are notified under s: 4 (1), we: shall now turn to the arguments'_ bearing upon the interpretation of certain specific • provisions which are however claimed to suggest an it is urged that "any_ . _opposite conclusion: Firstly, person:' used in s. 8 .could not b_e interpreted . as mcludmg a State; This, argument 1s bound up with - the other argument re1ating to the competence of. Parliament to legislate in respect of property belong ing to a State. It will, therefore, be convenient to deal · 1962 ' · " - : - . Stat1 ef.lY'est Bm;sl v. Union of India SW.a, C. I. ' . I .. \ . ' 1?62 State of West Bengal v. Union of lndit1 Sinha, C. J. I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 387 juristic pr rson. with this argument along with that topic. It is enough to point out here that the explanation to s. 8 (1), and particularly the words "undertaken by the Central Government or by any other person", would lend support to the argument· of the lean1ed Attorney General that the word "person" has been used in the generic sense of including both a natural person and Secondly, it was argued with a reference to the words of the proviso to s. !J (I) that where the Act intended to make any mention of a State Government, it had done so specifically as in ss. !), 10, 11 and 18 of the Act, and that, therefore, the substantive provisions of the Act were not inten ded to apply to any rights or interest vested in a State Government. The argument is plausible but not sound. Section !l is the effective scrtion of the Act, which provides that after the Central Govern ment has investigated the prospect of obtaining coal, after the issue ul' a notification under s. +, and after notifying its intention to acquire the land covered by the notification under s. 7, and after disposing of objections, if any, under s. 8, the Central Govern ment has to make the necessary declaration that that land shou lei be acquired. The proviso to s. !l (I) only requires consultation wi•l1 the concerned State the owner of the land, or Government where it is It lias rightly has any interest in or over such land. been pointed ont on behalf of the Gen tral Govern ment that if the right or interest of a State Govern ment were not involved in the acquisition, it would be wholly unnecessary to make any reference to the State Government concerned. It was urged that unless "lands belonging to a State Government" or in which a State Government has an interest in or over such land, WlTC within the operative words of the main provisions it would be in s. meaningless to make a provision for the consultation referred to in the proviso. We see force in this submi ssion. The consultation with the State Government is made a condition precedent to the declaration ( l ), !) 1962 Slatt of Jt',,t Bengal v. L nian of ltulia Sinha, C. J. :i88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19f>4] VOL. to be made by the Central Government in res pect of the proposed acquisition. But consultation docs not necessarily mean consent, though ordinarily consultation betwlrn two governments or two public authorities would signify willingness to accede to the proposal-a situation which is not contemplated with reference to the interests of private persons. the co-operation On the question of the proper interpretation of the proviso to s. !l (l ), a number of readings were suggested, which went to the length of not only re writing the section but of adding words which were not there so as to m;ike the proviso mean what on \'\'e arc not, therefore, plain reading it cannot. mclined seriously to examine tho~e se\'cral alterna tive readings of this part of the section. Similarly the provisions of s. in aid of the JO (2) were pressed construction suggcsteu on behalf of the plaintiff anu the other inter\'cning States, that the interests of a State Government were not wi1hin the purview of the Act. Thi~ :w·t11nt11t is bsed on thr considera tion that if rights ·,;r interest' of a State (;ovcrume11t were also within tl1c purview of the Act, it would be meaningless to provide that the Central Coverr1111ent ur a Government Company, as contemplated by s. 11, to be the lessee of the State should be deemed Government in respect of the rights acquired. We arc unable to aceccds to this construction. Sections liJ (2) and 11 have particular reference to those cases where the property acquired consists of rights uw 1er any mining leases granted by a State Govcrnm t. Apart from the kind of property contemplated oy ss. 10 (2) and 11 (2), as aforesaid, there may be other kinds of property acquired, e. g. coal-bearing land, in which the entirety of the interest is vested in a In such cases, thert' would be no State Government. question of the Central Government or a Government Company becoming or bring deemed to become a lessee of a State Government. Reference was made 1962 State of ~Vest Bengal v. l/nion of India Sin.','a, C. J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 389 to s. 18 but the mention of a "State Government" in the section is consequential upon the provisions of to say, where the Central ss. 10 and 11, that is Government or a Government Company has, by operation of those provisions of the Act. become the In the case of any lessee of a State Government. differences between the Central Government and a State Government on the question of how prospecting is to be done or of how far the mineral Concession Rules shall be observed, is, by virtue of this section, to be resolved by arbitration or in such other manner as the Governments concerned may deci<le. t>ithrr to an It will thus appear that on a proper intcrprc. talion of the relev:.111t provisions of the Act, it cannot be said that either in express terms or by necessary implication the prnvi, ions of the Act are implicable to ri~hls or interests cif a Stale Government .or that It is plain that the Act such lands are exd11ded. is intended to cover lane\ or rights in or over land belonging individual or to a juristic person. Such lane\ may comprise not only surface rights but also mineral rights. The land to be acqui red by the Central Govt. might be_ virgin soil unen cumbered by any prospecting licences or mining leases .granted by the State or by an intermediary, usin!j the expression to mean all interests below the State. Such an interest as aforesaid may be vested interests may be vested in in a State or different different persons by virtue of leases or licences grantee\ by proprietors in permanently\ settled States or by tenure-holders who have expressly obtained minini:: rights. The Act, to use the compen therefore, had dious language "land or any interest in or over land" interests which to cover all those diverse rights and the Central Govt. would be interested to acquire in order to have a free hand in developing the land for coal mining in the public sector, as it is called, The Act may have been more artistically drafted but tha.t r.onstruing it as it is, we have no doubt 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. 1962 Shit of U'tst Btntai v. {j11io11 of Jrulia Sinha, C. J. Parli?.ment intended to acquire a II rights and interests in coal bearing land with a view to prospecting for It must, coal and for exploiting coal bearing mines. therefore, be held that th.e supplemt"ntary issue as regards the intcrprela1ion of the :\ct joined between the parties as a result of the amendment of the plaint must be decided against the plaintiff. the position Starting with that on a true construction of the relevant provisions of the Act, the rights and interests of a State Government in coal bearing land had not been exdudcd from the operation of the Act, either in express terms or by the next question that arises necessary for consideration is the first issue which co\·ers issues 3 and ·1 also. The competence of Parliament to enact the Act has to be determined with reference to specific provisions or the Co11stit11tion, with parti· cu Jar reference to the entries in the Seventh Schednlc List I and List III. implication, J.c~islatures, l'rim1i By Entry 42 ip List III of the Seventh Schedule to the ConstittJtion read with Ari. 2~6 (:!) power to legislate in respect of acquisition and requisition of property is conferred upon the Parliament as well as fr11:ie, this power the State may be exercised by the Parliament in respect of all property, privately owned or State owned. But on belialf of the S1<1tc of \\'est Bengal· and some of tlie intavening Statts it was submitted that the very nature of the right in propen y vested in the State for goven1111ental purposes in1posed a limitation upon the cxcrci'e of the p:iwer of the Union Parliament, affecting St.1tc owned propertv. On behalf of the State of l'unjab--one of the intervening States-it was urged that if acquisition of property was necessa rily incidental to the effective exercise of power by Parliament in respect of any of the entries in Lists I and III, the Parliament may as to legislate so to property vested in it affect the State title of 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 391 provided it does not power of the State. interfere with the legislative Diverse reasons were suggested at the Bar in support of the plea that the State property was the exercise of legislative powers of not subject to the Parliament. They may be grouped under the following heads : - · 1962 State of West Bengal v. Union of India Sinha, C. J. (l) The Constitution having adopted the federal principle of government the £tates share the sovereignty ol the nation with the Union, and therefore power of the Parliament does not ~xtend to cn; Kling legislatiou for depriving the States of properly vested in them as sovereir~n authorities. Entrustrnent of power to legislate must therefore be so read as to imply a restric tion upon the Parliament under Entry 42 of it is sought to be exercised in List Ill when respect of the property owned by a State. (2) Property vested in the States by virtue of Art. 294 ( l) cannot be diverted to Union pur poses by compulsion of Parliamentary legis lation. (il) The Government of India Act, 1935 provided special machinery for acquisition of property of the State by negotiations, and not by cornpul ~ion in exercise of legislative power. That pro vision recognised that the Central Legislature of the Government of India had no power to acquire property of the State by exercise of legislative power, and even though no provision similar to s. l:l7 of the Government of India Act, Hl35 has been enacted iu the Constitution, the recognition implicit· in that provision of the • immunity of the property of the units must also be dccmerl to be suprrirnposed upon the exercise . ':· _. \ Jgoz . . I i l I· I I ·, · Stat1 ef JVtsl Benz al v. Union of Inlia Sinlia, C. J. < .. ''. l .. ',- •• -·--:--.·,,.- -,.,, \ 392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. ·of legislative power v~sted in the Parliament under the Constitution. · . (4) · Absence of power expressly conferred. such as is to be found in the . Australian Constitution, to legislate for acquisition of the property of · the State indicates that it was not the intention of the Constitution makers to confer that power . upon the Union Parliament, under the general · . legislative heads: (5) If power be exercised by the Union to acquire State property under Entry 42 of the Concurrent List, similar power may also be exercised by the States in ·respect ·of Union· property and even to re-acquire the property from the Union by exercise of the· State's legislative power. The power· under Entry 42 can therefore never be effectively exercised by the Parliament. · (6) · It cotild not have been the intention of the . Constitution makers to confer authority upon the· Parliament to legislate for acquiring property · · · of the States and thereby to make t.he right of the :State to property owned by it even more precarious than the right which individuals or .. Corporations have under Constitution to their Individuals and Corporations have · 'property. the guarantee under Art. 31 ( 2) of the Consti- . . · tution that acquisitim1 of their property will be · for public. purposes and 'compensation ·will be Entry 42 awarded for acquiring property. must be read· subject to Art. 31, and inasmuch as Fundamental rights are conferred upon individuals and Corporations against executive or legislative · actions, and States are . not invested with any fundamental rights· exercise able against the Union or other States, the right to legislate for compulsory acquisition of . State property cannot l;>e exercised, 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 393 (7) Unless a law expressly or by necessary impli cation so provides, a State is not bound thereby. This well recognised rule applies to the inter pretation of the Constitution. Therefore in the absenct: of any provision express or necessarily implying that the property of the State could be acquired by the Union, the rights claimed by the Union to legislate for acquisition of State property must be negatived. J9f2 Stot1 of W111 Be1tgal •• Union of lt1rfi4 S'utl1a, C. J, All these arguments, except the purely inter· pretational, are ultimately founded upon the plea that the States have within their allotted field full attributes of sovereignty and exercise of authority by the Union agencies, legislative or executive, which trenches upon that sovereignty is void. Re: (1) Ever since into administrative units, the assumption of authority by the British Crown under Statute 21 & 22, Viet .(1656) Ch. 106, the administration of British India was unitary and highly centralized. The Governor General was invested with autocratic powers to administer the entire territory. Even though the terri tory was divided authority of the respective Governors of the Provinces the Governor-General and the was derived from Governor-General was responsible the British Parliament. There was, therefore, a chain of res the Provincial Governments were subject ponsibility to the control of the Central Government and the Central Government to the Secretary of State. Some process of Rcvol.ution took place under the Govern ment of India Act, HI 19, buJ; that was on I y for the purpose of decentralization of the Governmental power but on that account the Government did not cease to be unitary. The aim of the Government of India Act, 1935 was to unite the Provinces and lndian States into a federation, but that could be '· ' 1962 · Stall of lV1st BeRgal v. UniOll of /11.Jia Sinha, C. J.

#394. SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. ·---~-- achieved only if a substantial . number of the Indian States.agreed to join the Provinces in.the federation. For diverse reasons the Indian States never joined the . proposed federation and the part dealing with fede- . ration never became effective. The Central Govern ment as it was originally constituted under the Govern ment of India Act, 1919, with some modification continued to function. But in.the Provinces certain alterations were made. Certain departments •were administered with the aid of Ministers, who were popularly elected, and who were in a sense responsi ble to the electorate. . The Governor was still au tho' ,rised t,o act in his discretion without consulting. his Ministers in respect of certain matters. He derived . his authority.from the British Crown, and.was subject . to the directions which the Central Government gave to carry into execution Acts of the Central Legis'- . laturein the Concurrent List and for the· maintenance. of means of communication, and in respect of all matters for preventing 'grave menace to the peace or tranquility of India or part thereof.. The admini stration continued to function as an agent of the British Parliament .. Indian By the Independence Act, 1947 a separate Dominion of India was carved out and by· s. 6 thereof the Legislature was for the. first time authorised to make laws for the Dominion. Such · laws were not to be void or inoperative on the grom; id · that they were repugnant to the law of England or to the . provisions of any existing or future Act of . Parliament of the United Kingdom, or to any order, rule or regulation made under any such Act, and the powers of the Legislature of the Dominion included ·power to repeal or amend any such Act, order, rule or· regulation. · The British Parliament ceased to have responsibility as respects .. . . governance of the territories' which were immediately. - · · · before 'suz~rainty of the Crowµ ayer the 1ndian States lapseq that date inc:luded in British India, and _ ·· 1162 --St•lt of W1d B1ntaJ v. Union of In.lie Sinha, C. /. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 395 and with it all treaties and agreements in force on the date of the passing of the Act between the Crown and the rulers of Indian States. The bond i>f agency which bound the administration in India to function as agent of the Birtish Parliament was dissolved and the Indian Dominion to that extent became sovereign. Then came the Comtitution. The territory was evidently ton large for a democratic set-up with wholly centralized form of Government. Imposition of a centralized form might also have meant a reversal of political trends which had led to decentrali zation of the administration and some distribution of power. The Cnnstitution had, therefore, to be in In the a form in which authority was decentralized. era immediately prior to the enactment of the Indian Independence Act, there were partially autonomous units such as the J'rovinces. There were Indian States which were in a sense sovereign but their sovereignty was extinguished by the various merger agreements which the rulers of those States entered into with the Government of India before the Constitution. By virtue of the process of integration of the various States there emerged a Centralised form of administration in which the Governor General was the fountain head of executive authority. The Constitution of India was erected on the founda· tions of the Government of India Act, 1935 ; the · basic structure was not altered in many important matters, and a large number of provisions were incor· porated verbatim from the earlier Constitution. In some respects a greater degree of economic to be secured by transferring unity was sought subjects having impact on matters of common interest into the Union list. A comparison of the Lists in Schedule 7 to the Constitution with the Schedule 7 to the Government of India Act, 1935 discloses that the powers of the Union have l!een enlarged parti<;ularly in the field of economic unity and this was done as it was felr that tl)ere should be .: '·"-, 1962 Stat1 of_ IVest Bingtil · v. Union of In~io Sinha, c. J. ·~·' . 396 SUPRE?>fE COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. centralized control and adminisir;{iio~ in certain fields if rapid economic and industrial progress had to be achieved by the nation. To illustrate this it is sufficient to refer to National Highways (Entry 24), inter-State Trade and Commerce (Entry 42)-to mention only a few being transferred from List II of .the Government of India Act to List I in the Cons ti . tution, to the new entry regarding inter-State rivers (Entry 56), to the new Entry 33 in the· Concurrent <List to_which it is transferred from List II, and to the comprehensive provisions of Part XIII-which seek to make India a single economic unit for Purposes of . trade and commerce under the overall control of the Union Parliament arid. the Union Executive. The result was a Constitution which was not true to any traditional pattern of federation. - There is ·no warrant for the assumption that the Provinces were sovereign, ·autunomous units which had parted· with such power. as they considered reasonable or proper for enabling_ the Central Governm~nt to function for . the'comrrion good. The legal theory on which the Constitution was based was the withdrawal or resump tion of all the powers of sovereignty .into the people of this country and the distribution of these powers save those withheld .from both the Union and the States by reason of the provisions of Part III-bet- ween the Union and the States. .. _ -(a) A truly federal form of Government endsages a compact or agreement between independent and sovereign units to _surrender partially ·their authority in their cC!mmon interest and vesting it in a Union and retaining the residue of- the authority in the constituent units. Ordinarily - ·each constituent unit has its separate Constitu tion by which it is governed in all matters exc.ept those surrendered to . the Union, and the Constitution of the Union primarily operates upon the administration of the units. Our Oo1J.sti1utio1J. was · not t}).e res~lt of ~ny such 196:' -'!ate oJ II 'n1 /Jcn; at '" l 'nio11 oj· India Sinha, C. J. l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 397 (b) (c) compact or agreement : Units constituting a · unitary State which were non-sovereign were tra1isformed by abdication of power a Union. " Supremacy of the Constitution which cannot be altered e~ccpt by the confponen t units. Our Constitution is undoubtedly supreme but it is 'liable to be altered by the Union Parliament alone and the units have no power to alter it. Distrib~tioi{ of powers between the Union and the rcgiona.l units each in its sphere coordinate . and independent of the ulhcr. The basis uf such distribution of power is that in matters of 11ational importance in which a uuiform policy is desirable in the interest of the units, authority is entrusted to tl1c Union, and matters of local concern.remain with the State. (d) Supreme authority of the Court,; to interpret the Constitution and invali<latc action A federal the ColI3titution. violalive of Com; tit~tion, by its very natur~, consists of checks and balanc?s an<l must contain provi sions.for resolving couflicts between the execu tive and legislative authority of the Union and the regional units. In our Constitution characteristic (d) is to Le found in foll force, (a) and (b) are absent. There is un doubtedly distribution of powers between the Union and the States in matters legislative and executive; but distribution.of powers is not always an index of political sovereignty. The exercise of powers lcgis· lativc and executive in the al!otted fields is hedged in by numerous restrictions, so that the powers of the States. are not coordinate with the Union and arc not in many respects independent. Ifft St1l1 of ll'tJI Be"' al y, 1.:nin of Toiia SW.., C. J. 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL. Legal sovereignty of the Indian nation is vested the people of India who as stated by the preamble have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a the objects Sovereign Democratic Republic specified therein. The Political sovereignty is distri buted between, as we will presently demonstrate, the Union of India and the States with greater weightage in favour of the Union. Article :lOO invests the Government of India and the States with the charac ter of quasi-corporations entitled to sue and liable to be sued in relation to their respective affairs. By Art. 299 contracts may be entered into by the Union and the States in exercise of their rcspecti ve cxecu tive powers and Art. 298 authorises in exercise of their respective executive powers the Union and the States tu carry on trade or business and tu acquire, hold aud dispose of property and to make contracts. These provisions and the entrustrnent of powers to legislate on certain matters exclusive, and concurrently in certain other matters, and entrustment of executi vc authority co-extensive with the legislative power form the foundation of the division of authority. In India judicial power is exercised by a single set of courts, Civil, Criminal and Revenue whether they deal with disputes in respect of legislation which is either State legislation or Union legislation. The exercise of executive authority by the Union or by the State and rights and obligations arising out of the executive autliority arc subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts which have territorial jurisdiction in respect of the cause of action. The High Courts have been invested with certain powers under Art. 226 to issue writs addressed to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Govern ment, for the enforcement of any of the rights con· ferred by Part III and for any other purpose and under Art. 227 the High Court has superintendence over all courts in relation to which it exercises juris diction. The Supreme Court is at the apex -Of the J!Jf2 Stat. of w,,1 Blln/IOI v. Union of India Si•""' C • .I 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 399 hierarchy of courts, civil, criminal, revenue and of quasi-judicial tribunals. There are in India not two sets of courts, Federal and State as are found function ing under the Constitution of the United States of America. By Art. 24 7 power is reserved to the Parliament by law to provide for establishment of courts for better administration (!f. laws made by the Parliament or of any existing laws with regard to the matters enumerated in the Union List, but no such courts have been constituted. Sovereignty in executive matters of the Union is declared by Art. 73 which enacts that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of the Union extends. to the matters with respect to which Parliament may make laws, and to the exercise of such rights, authority and jurisdiction as are exer cisable by the Government of India by virtue of any treaty or agreement. But this executive power may not save as expressly provided in the Constitution or in any law made by Parliame.nt, extend in any State to matters with respect to which the Legislature of the State has also power to make laws. By Art. 77 all executive actions of the Government of India have to be. expressed to be taken in the name of the President. Executive power of the State is vested by Art. 154 in the Governor and is exercisable by him directly or through otlicers subordinate to him in accordance with the ConstitutiOn. The appointment of the Governor is made by the President . a.,nd it is open to· the Presidentto make such provision as he thinks fit for the discharge of the function of a Governor of the' State in any contingency not provid ded for in Ch. II of Part VI. By Art. 162 subject to the provisions of the Constitution, executive power ·of the State extends to matters with respect to. which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws, subject to the restriction that in matters in the Con current List of the Seventh Schedule, exercise of executive power of the State is also subject to and 400 StJPRE~IE COtJRT REPORTS [i964] voi:.. " . . J91i2 Siate·of IV1sr B1ngal . Y. · Union of India Sinha, C. J. limited by the executive power-expressly, conferred by the Constitution or . by any law made by Parlia ment upon the Union or authorities thereof. Exer cise of executive authority of the States is largely . restricted by diverse Constitutional provisions. The, . executive power of every State has to •.be so exerdsed . l . ·_as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State, and not to impede or prejudice the executive power of the Union. The executive power_ of the _Union extends to the giving of such directions to a State as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for those purposes and as to the constru · · ction and maintenance of means of communication . declared to be of national or military importance and ·for . protection 'of railways.·· ·.The -Parliament . has power ·to · dedare highways or waterways to be of national importance; and -the Union may execute those powers, and also construct and mamtain means of communic:ttion as part of its function with respect to naval, military and air force works •. The President may also, with the consent of the •Government of a State, entrust io that Government or to its officers functions in relation to -any matter to which · the executive power of the Union extends: Art. 258 (1). Again the Union Parliament 'may by law made in exercise of authority in respect of matters exclusively within its . competence confer powers and duties or authorise the conferment of powers and imposition of duties· upon the State, or officers or authorities thereof: Art 258 (2). Art. 365 authorises the Presi dent to· hold that a situation ·has arisen - in which the Government of a State cannot be carried on in accor dance with the provisions of the Constitution, if the. State fails to comply with or give effect to any dire ctions given· in exercise of the executive power of the ' . . -. Union. · . . - . · -- ·-;-- These. are the restrictions on the. exercise_ Of the . ·executive power by the States, in normal times; in , . . ~._-.--11 ·'_,>-.-. -.. \ 'V \ __ \ , 401 , • - · ' · .• lS.C.R. c SUPREME COURT REPORTS ',times of emergency· power to override' the exerci~e or- executive power of the State is entrusted to the legislative ·. Union.· ·. Again the field of exercise of ... power being co-extensive with the exercise of the · legislative power of the States, the restrictions impofed upon the legislative power al.so apply to the exerrise of executive power. • . IliZ - St1..te •f JVrsl Ben:•l v. 'Uni•tJ •/ lniid SinluJ, C. J. . including .. · Distribution of legislative powers. is effected by Art. 246. In respect of matters set out in List I of the Seventh Schedule Parliament has exclusive power to make laws: ·in respect of matters set out. in List II the State has _exclusive power to Legislate and in respect of matters set out in List III Parliament and the _State Legislature have concurrent power to legislate. The residuary power, power to tax, by Art. 248 and item 97 of List I iS · vested in the Parliament. The basis of distribution of powers between the Union and States is that only those powers and authorities which ·are concerned with the regulation of local problems are vested in the States, and the residue specially those, which tend to maintain industrial and the economic, commercial unity · of the nation are left with the Union. By Art. 123 the · President. is invested with the power to promulgate Ordinances on matters on whicl\ the Parliament_ is _/competent ·to· legislate, during· recess of Parliament. Similarly under Art. 213 power is conferred upon the Governor of a State to promulgate Ordinances on matters on which the St::ite Legislature is competent to legislate during. recess of the Legislature. · But upon the distribution of legislative powers thus . made and entrustment of . power to the State ' Legislature, imposed even in normal times. Article 249 authorises · the Parliament to legislate with respect to any matter in the State List if the Council of States has declared by resolution supported by not less than two-third of the members present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in the national interest tint Parliam'"1!t restrictions IHI Slatr of Wut B1ngaJ v. i-,,ion of lrti1a Sirz/ra, C. J. / 402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. to make should make laws with respect to any matter enume rated in the State List specified in the resolution. By Art. 252 power is conferred upon Parliament to legislate for two or more States by conseut even though the Parliament m:iy have no power under Art. 246 laws for the State except as provided in Art. 219 and. 250. Such a law may be adopted by a Legislature of any other .State. By Art. 253 Parliament has the power notwithstandin~ anything contained in Art. 246 to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international conference, association or other body. In case of inconsistency between the laws made by Parliament and laws made by the Legis latures of the States, the laws made by the Parlia ment whether passed before or after the State law in matters enumcr;1ted the Concurrent List to the extent of rcp11gn;1ncy prevail over the State laws. It is only a law m:idc by the Legislature of a State which had been reserved fnr the consideration of the President and has received his assent, on a to a Coucurrcnt List containing matter relating anv provision repugnant to the provisions-of an earlier law made by Parli<mcnt or an existing law with respect State. that matter, prevails in Power of taxation (which is exercisable by the States in comparatively minor fields, the more important such as Incomc·tax, wealth·tax, excise duties other than those on cerrain specified articles, and customs, being reserved to the Union) confe rred by various entries under List II on the States is also severely restricted. Property of the Union, save in so far as the Parliament may by law other wise provide, is exempt from all taxes imposed by the State or by any authority within the State. By Art. Z~li imposition of a tax on sale or purchase of \ 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 403 goods where such sale or purchase takes place ~ut­ side the State or in the course of import of the goods into, or export of the goods out of, the territory of India can only be imposed by Parliamentary legis lation. A State is also prohibited unless the Parlia ment by law otherwise provides, from imposing a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity which is consumed by the Government of India or in the construction, maintenance and operation of any railway. Nor can levy of a tax be authorised in respect of water consumed or distributed or sold by any authority established by any existing law or any law made by Parliament for regulating or deve loping any inter-State river or river valley, except in so far as the Parliament may by law so provide. 1Jf2 -Stole •! West •mz.i v. Utti•n If /nji-. SinM, C. J, largely upon than agricultural The States depend financial assistance from the Union. A share in certain taxes levied and collected by the· Union such as tax on non-agricultural income, duties in respect of suc cession to property other. land, estate duty in respect of property other than · agri cultural land, terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railway, sea or air, taxes on railway fares and freights, tax~s on the sale or purchase of news therein, papers and on advertisements published taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers where such sale. or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce, is given to the States. Certain grants-in-aid of the revenues of the States of Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal in lieu of assignment of any share of the net proceeds in each year of export duty on jute and jute products to those States may also be made. Union duties of excise except duiies on medicinal and toilet preparations are collected by the Union but may be distributed in whole or in part among the States in accordance with such principles of distribution as may be formulated. By Art. 275 the revenue of such States as grants-in-aid of . ,, _; ·.,;.!!!!_ State of lV1sl - Bengal . -· v. . Union of Iniia Sinha, C. J. ' ' . '.~ 7;'~-:'--... :·, ' ' " 4i>! sui>.REMF: cotrR.t R.EPoR.fs [1964] vo£. Parliament may determine to be.in need of assistan; may also be made. · · - ' ' It is manifest that the States depend .for finan cial assistance upon the Union,· their own resources, because of their restricted. fields of taxation, being . inadequate. The power of borrowing is exercisable , by the States under Art. 293, but the same cannot be exercised without the consent of the Government vf · ' India, if there is stiU outstanding · any part of a Joan · which has been made to the State by the Government · of India or by its predecessor Government, or . in respect of which a guarantee has been given by the ... Union, or by, its predecessor. : . · . . . . In . times of _· national . political or financial · .. einergency, the States may exercise orily such powers legislative and executive as the Union permits. · \Vhen ·a State of emergency is declared the Parliament has power to make laws for the whole or any part of the_· territory of India with respect to any matter in the State List, and ·the laws made. by Parliament prevail, If, over the Sta, te Laws in the event of repugnar; cy. as.a. result. of war, external aggression or mternal disturbances the security of India or any territory is threatened, the President may declare a· . state of, einergency, ·and the executive power of the Union'. will , thereupon extend to giving directions to the . States, as to manner in which the executive: power· of the States is to be exercised, and the power of the Parliament to make laws will extend to making laws conferring or authorising . conferment of powers and:· imposition. of duties, upon the Union or its officers. and authorities as respect any matter, even if such matter be not enumerated in'the Union List. The· President may also during the emergency . suspend the operation of Art. 268 to 279 and require that all . money Bills shall be submiued to the President for his · - consideration, after they are passed by the Legislature of the State. . · · .. •· . '. I J9fi2 Stat1 of West Bengal v. U11ion of ln~i .. Sinha, C. J . . . ' I. S.C.R; .. SUPREME .cqURT· REPORTS. 405 ·,, · . · The . normal corp; rate existence of.~ States · entitles 'them to enter into contracts and invests them trade or business and the with power . to carry on · ·States·have the right to hold property; But having regard to certain basic features of the Constitution, re5trictions . on the exercise of their powers executive and legislative and on the powers of taxa tion, and dependence for finances upon the Union Government it would not be correct to maintain that absolute sovereignty ·remains vested in the States. This is illustrated by certain striking features of our constitutional set up. ·There is no dual citizenship in India: all citizens are citizens of India and not of the various States. in which they are domiciled. There are no independent Constitutions of the States, apart from the national Constitution of the Union of . India: Ch. II, Part VI from Arts. 152 to 237, deals with the States, the powers of the Legislatures of the States, . the powers of the executive .and judiciary .. What appears to militate against the theory regard ing the sovereignty of the State is the wide power with which the Parliament is invested to alter the boundaries of States, ·and· even to extinguish the existence of a State. There ··is\ no constitutional guarantee against alteration of the boundaries of the States.'By Art. 2·of the Constitution the Parliament may admit into the Union or establish new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit, and by Art. 3 the Parliament is by law allthorised to form a new State by redistribution of the· territory of a State or · by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State, Jncrease the area of any State; diminish the area of any ·State, · aUer the boundaries of any State, and alter the name of any State. Legislation which so vitally affects the very existence of the States may be moved on the recommendation· of the President which in practice means the recomrriendatio.n of the Union · .l\finistry, and if [the proposal in the Bill affects the .~rea, boundaries or name of any of the States,· the "' ' • . • . ' ' • • t . o--~-,- - 11'1 SUI<•] Wtsl .,.,., v. u.; .. •f 1w Si""4, C. J. 406 SUP.REME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. President has to refer the Bill to the Legislature of that State for merely expressing its views thereon. Parliament is therefore by law invested with autho· rity to alter the boundaries of any State and to diminish its area so as even to destroy a State with all its powers and authority. That being the extent of the power of the Parliament it would be difficult to hold that the Parliament which is competent to destroy a State is on account of some assumption as to absolute sovereignty of the State incompetent effectively to acquire by legislation designed for that purpose the property owned by the State for govern· mental purpose. The parliamentary power of legislation to acquire property is, subject to the express provisions of the Constitution, unrestricted. To imply limita· tions on that power on the assumption of that degree of political sovereignty which makes the States coordi nate with and independent of the Union, is to envisage a Constitutional scheme which does not exist in law or in practice. On a review of the diverse provisions of the Constitution the inference is inevitable the distribution of powers-both legislative and executive--Ooes not support the theory of'full sovereignty in the States so as to render it immune from the exercise of legislative power of the Union Parliament-particularly in relation to acquisi tion of property of the States. That the Parliament may in the ordinary course not seek to obstruct the normal exercise of the powers which the States have, both legislative and executive, in the field allotted to them will not be a ground for holding that the it desires, in Parliament has no such power exercise of the powers which we have summarisedted do so. It was urged that to hold that property ves to in the State could be acquired bv the Union, would mean, as was picturesquely expressed by the learned Advocate-General of Bengal, that the Union could take possession of Writer's buildings acquire and l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 407 when~ the SecretJriat of the State Government is functioning and thus stop all State Governmental activity. There cc, uld be no doubt that if the Union did so, it would not be using but abusing its power of acquisition, but the fact that a power is capable of being abused has never been in law a reason for denying its existence, for its existence has to be determined on very different considerations. 1962 Stat1 nf ~Vest H~ngal v. l ·nion of India Sinha, C, J, We might add that this submission is, as it were, a resuscitation of the now exploded doctrine of the immunity of instrumentalities which originating observ~.tions of Marshall, C. J., in ]l'Jc Culloch v. Maryland('), has been decisively rejectd by the Privy Council as inapplicable to the interpretation of the the Canadian States and Australian Constitutions Toronto v. Lambe ('), and Webb v. Outrim (3 ), and has practically been given up even in the United States. The following passage in the judgment of Lord Hobhouse in Lambe's case, though it dealt with the converse case of not reading limitations into provincial power might usefully be set out: respective powers of the Centre under (vide Bank "The appellant invokes that principle to support the conclusion that the Federation Act must be so construed as to allow no power to d1e pro vincial legislatures under sect. 92, which may by possibility, and if exercised in some extra vagant way, interfere with the object of the Dominion in exercising their powers under sect. 91. It is quite impossible to argue from the one case to the other. Their Lordships have to construe the express words of an Act of Parliament which makes an elaborate distri-. bution of the whole field of legislative amhority between two legislative bodies, and at the same time provides for the federated province~ a carefully balanced constitution, under which (I) (1819) 4 WbeaL 316. (21 (1887) 12 App. Oas. 57~. t3J [1907] A.O. 81, ' . Si«te ef We.tt .. 1n:•l · ' v.- . UnW. •f lnii• SVth•, C, J. . . 408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. ' . no one of the parts .c~il-pass laws'foritself except i;;nder the control of the .whole, acting through the Governor-General. · And the ques tion they have to answer is whether the one .. body or the -other has power to make a given law. Jf they find that on the due construction oL the ·Act a legislative power falls within sect. 92, i~. would be quite wrong of them to deny its existence because by some possibility it may be abused, or may limit the range which otherwise would be open to the Dominion Parliament." .___ \ ! ·· It is pertinent also to note that under several .entries.of List I it· is open to the Union Parliament . to legislate directly upon properties which are situate 'in the State including properties which are vested in thz States, for instance, Railways (Entry No. 22), Highwa')'sdeclared by or under· ·law made by Parlia ment to be national -highways (Entry 23), Shipping and Navigation on inland waterways declared by to be -- national watenvays, Parliament by including lightships· etc. (Entry 24), Lighthouses (Entry. 26), Ports declared by or under law made by to be major ports - Parliament 'or existing __ (Entry 27), Ainvays; aircraft and air -navigation, provision of aerodromes etc. (Entry .29), Carriage of passengers and goods by railways, sea or air, or by national. watenvays in mechanically propelled vessels (Entry 30), Property of the : Union and .the Revenue therefrom, _but as regards property situated in a State · subject to legislation by the· State, save in so far as Parliament by law, otherwise provides (Entry 32); Industries,· the control of which by the Union ·is· . declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in (Entry 52), · Regulation and the public interest development of oilfields and mineral oil resources, petroleum and petroleum products, other liquids and -~- substances 1 declared by Parliament by law to be . . dangerously inflammable (Entry 53), Regulation of - . :-· . , I . . -•--.. ! I' !i " !f ~ ' ~ ~ 1 i' I I 1962 St11te of West B1ngal v. lJnion of India Sinha, C J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREM;E COURT :REPORTS 409 mines and mineral devdopment (Entry 54), Regula tion and development of inter·State rivers and river· valleys (Entry 56), Ancient and historical monuments and records and arnhaeological sites and remains declared to be of national importance (Entry 67). These are some of the matters in legislating upon which the Parliament may directly legislate in res pect of property in the States.. To deny to the Parliament while granting these extensive powers of legislation authority to legislate in respect of pro perty situate in the State,' and even of the State, the Constitutional machinery would be to render practically unworkable. It may be noticed that in the United States of America the authority of Congress to legislate on a majority of these matters was derived from the "Commerce Clause." The commerce clause is not regarded as so exclusive as to preclude the exercise of State legislative authority in matters which are local, in their nature or opera tion, or are mere aids to commerce. As observed in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations-8th Edition p. lOOl "Mr. Justice Hughes, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Simpson v. Shepard (');said : the Constitution conferred "The grant upon Congress an authority at all adequate to secure the freedom of inter-state commercial intercourse from State control, and to provide effective regulation of t,hat inter course as the national interest may demand; The words 'among the several States' distin guish between commerce which concerns more States than one, and that commerce which is confined within one State and does not affect 'The genius and character of the. other States. whole government', said Chief Justice Marshall, 'seems to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the State~ (I) (1913) 230 U.S. 352: 57 L. ed. 1511. 1962 Stat1 of WtSI B1ngnl v. l.:nion nf bulia Sinha, C. J. 410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. generally; but not to tho1e which are comple· tely within a particular State, which <lo not affect other States and with which it is not necr'>ary to interfere, for t.he purpose of execu ting some of the general powers of the Govern ment. The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as reserved for the State itself. ·'Thi~' reservation to the States manifestly is only of that authority which is consistent with, and not opposed to, the grant to Congress. There is no room in our scheme of government for the assertion of State pow~r in hostility to the authorized exercise of Federal power. The authority of Congress extends to every part of inter-state commerce, and to every instrumentality or agency by which it is carried on; and the full control by by G>ngrcss of the subjects committed to its regulation is net to be denied or thwarted by the commingling of interstate and intrastate operations. This is not to say that the nation may deal with the internal concerns of the State, as such, but that the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate inter-state commerce is not limited by the fact that intra state transactions mav have become so inter \\"ovcn tl1crcw.tl1 tlut tlic effective government of the former incidentally controls· the latter. This conclusion necessarily results from the supremacy of the national power with its appo inted sphere." Our Constitution recognises no such distinction bet ween the operation of a State law in matter~ which are local, and which arc interstate. TJ an enact falls within the Union List, whether its local or otherwise State legislation in operation is consistent therewith, will subject to Art. 2;H (2) be struck down. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 411 _ The question may be approached from another angle. Even under Comticutions which are truly federal and full sovereignty of the States is recognised in the residuary field both executive and legislative, power to utilise or as it is said "Condemn" property of the State for Uni•Jn purposes is not denied. 1962 State of Wes'. Bengal v. [Tnion of Indio Sinha, C. J. The power to acquire land so\Joght to be exer cised by the Union, whicb is challenged by the State of West Bengal, is power to acquire in exercise of authority conferred by ss. 6, 7 and 9 of the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957. The Act was enacted for establishit>is in the economic interest of India greater public control over the coal mining industry and its development by providing for the acquisition by the State . of land containing or likely to contain coal deposits or of rights in or over such land for the extinguishment or modification of such rights accruing by virtue of any agreement, licence or otherwise, and for matters connected therewith. By .Entries 52 and 54 of List I the Parliament is given power to legislate in respect of : lease, (52) "Industries, the control ofwiiich by the Union is declared hy parliament by. law to be expe dient in the public interest." (54) "Regulation of mines and mineral develop ment to the extent to which such regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to the expe dient in the public interest." In exercise of powers under Entry 36 of the Govem ment of India Act, 1935 which corresponds with Entry 52 of the Constitution the Central Legislature enacted the Minerals & Mining (Regulation & Deve 1948, (LIII of 1948). By s. 2 of the lopment) Act, Act it wa~ declared that it was expedient in the Stat1 Df JV1.•I < · Brngal .. ltn~n of ]ndla Sinha, C. J. ! I ' I ! '412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!964] VOL. ·--- -·- public interest that the Central Govemm~nt should take under its control the regu!a:tfon · of mines and ·oilfields and development of minerals to the extent 'Mille' was defined under the specified in the ·Act. Act as meaning any excavation for the ·purpose of for or obtaining minerals and includes an searching oil well. No mining lease could . be ·given after the commencement of the Act, otherwise than in . accordance with the mies made under the Act •. · By ·. 's: 13 the pJ"ovisions of the ~ct:were. to be binding o!l . the Government, whether m the. nght of the Domi nion or·. of a State.' By the declaration by s. 2 "the' minerals became. immobilized. The Act is ·on the Statute Book, and the declaration, in the future . application of the -Act. since the Constitution must · ·.also remain in force, as if it were made'-under Art.'52 . of the Constitution. - . ·· - -- - •• o. After the Constitution, -. the Industries - (Deve- · lopment & Regulation) Act; 1951 (65 of 1951) was enacted by the Parliament ... By s. 2 it was- declared that it is. expedient in the public interest that the take under its control the industries Union should ' specified in the First Schedule' In the Schedule item (3) ·"Coal, ·including Coke and other derivatives" ·was induded as one. of such industries. The Legis- . lature then enacted the .Mines & Minerals (Regula- · .- tfon & Development) Act, 1957 (LXVII of 1957). Bys. 2 a declaration in terms similar to the declara tion in Act Liii of 1948 was made; · The Act deals with au· minerals except oil, and enacts certain amendments in• ACt Lill of-1948. There being a.· declaration in the Parliament terms "of item .· 52 - acquired exclusive authority to legislate in respect of. · CoaI' industry set~ out in the Schedule tO Act 65 of 1951 and the State. Government had no authority · . · ·in that behalf. · . -- - · · - -· Jn the American Constitution there is xio express - : · j>ower conferred u,Pon the Con¥re5s to m~ke a ,Ja:iy f{i,r. · IS62 State r1f TVat Bt,,gdl v. l}nitm of India Sinha, C. J. l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 41:.1 acqt!isition of any property for a public purpose. But it has been held by a long course of decisions that it i5 open to the Congress to lc."islate in respect of matters within its competence even if such legis lation may have a direct impact upon the States' In the Sfr; tes of Oklahoma E.r rights, to property. Rel. Leun Uo. Phillips v. Gny P. Atkinson Company ('), it was held that in enacting flood control legisla tion which authorised construction of a reservoir, the Congress had the power to condemn lands owned It was observed "The Tenth by a constituent State. Amendment docs not deprive 'the national govern ment of authority to resort tu all means for the exercise of a granted power which arc appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end' U11itcd States v. Darby (:H2 U.S. p. 12.J) xx x Since the cu11Structi•1n of this dam and reservoir is a valid exercise by Congress of its commerce power, there is no interference with the sovereientv of the State. United States . v. Appalachian u Electric Power Co. (:Hl U. S. 428). The fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the \Vaync Country v. United States, United States. 5;1 Ct. cl. (!<') 417, allirme<l in 252 U.S. 57J." Similarly it was held in '!'he Uhero/;ee Nntion v. 'l'he Southern Ifonslis Railwli.y Cu. ('), ,that Congress has to construct the power to authorise a Corporation territory of the Cherokee a Nation, for the United States may exercise the right of eminent domain even within the limits of the several States for purposes necessary to the execution of powers granted to the general government by the Constitution. through railway Power LO effectuate its lcgislati ve authority which is entrusted in absolute terms bei11g essential for carrying out of the powers, does not depend upon the consent of the States, and cannot be thwarted bv any opposition on the part of the States. The exte11t of this power was aptly described by Strong, J., in (1) (194-0) 313 U.S. 5(18: 85 L. ed. 1487. (2) (1889) 135 U,S. 6411 34 L, ed. 295. 41-1 SUPRE:vtE COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. 1961 Kohl v. Unite1l Str1tes (') • ,\ldlt of U.'ot !1tn:al v. I 'nion of fnl111 .~inlia, (., J. to appropriate "ll has not been "criomly contended during the argument that the United States Government is without puwcr lands or other property within the States for its own uses and to enable it to perform its proper functions. Such an authority is essential to its indcpen· <lent existence and perpetuity. These cannot be preserved if the obstinacy of a private person, or if any other authority, can prevent the acyuisition of the means or instruments by which alone governmental functions can be performed. The powers vested by the Consti tution in the General Government demand for their exercise the acquisition of lands in all the States. These arc needed foe forts, armories and arsenals, for navy yards and light houses, for custom·houses, post ollices and Court-houses, and for other public uses. If the right to acquire property for such uses may be made a barren right by the unwillingness of property holders to sell, or by the action of a State prohibiting a sale to the Federal Government, the consti tutional grants of power may be rendered nugatory, and the Government is dependent for its practical existence upon the will of a State, or even upon that of a private citizen. This cannot be. No one doubts the existence in the state governments of the right of eminent domain-a right distinct from and paramount It grows to the right of ultimate ownership. out of the necessities of their being, not out of It may the tenme by which lands arc held. be exercised, though the lands arc not held by grant from the Government either mediately or irrnncdi.itcly, and indcpcndrnt of the consi deration whether to the Government in case of a failure of heirs. The right is the offspring of political necessity; and (I) {t876) 91 L".S. 449. they would cscheat 1962 State of H-'e5t B1nzal v. l..lniort oj' India 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 415 it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law." In the United States of America power to ta~e private property for public use is called by American lawyers eminent domain. the power of the It is take property upon payment of just State compensation for public use: it is an inherent attribute of sovereignty-not arising even out of the. Constitu tion, but independently of it, and may be exercised in respect of all property in the States for effective enforcement of the authority of the Union against private property or property of the State. In Attorney-Oeneral fur British Columbia v. Canadian Pacific Railway ('), one of the questions fell to be determined before the Judicial Committee was whether power under s. 91 read with s. 92 of the British North America Act 1867 which secures the Dominion Parliament exclusive legislative authority in respect of lines of steam ar other ships, railways, canals, telegraphs, and other works and undertakings connecting any province with any other, or others could be exercised so as to authorise use of crown lands in the province for a railway. The Judicial Committee observed at p. 210: "It was argued for the appellant that these enactments ought not to be so construed as to enable the Dominion Parliament to dispose of Provincial Crown lands for the purposes mentioned. But their Lordships cannot concur in that argument. In Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. the Parish of Notre v. Corporation (1899 A. C. 367) Dame company (a case as the present) the right to legislate railway in all the provinces through which fully recognised. In Toronto it passes was Corporation v. Bell. Telephone Co. of Canada de Bonsecours relating to (I) [1906] A.O. 204. 1962 ~"I411 o J HI;,, Bmg11l v. Union of India --· Sinha, C. J. 416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964JVOL. (1905 A. C. 52) which related to a telephone company whose operations wer.e not limited to one province, and which depended on the same sections, this Board gave full effect to legis lation of the Dominion Parliament' over the .streets of•Toronto whicl1 arc vested .in the city corporation:" To constru\! the section now in such a manner as to exclude tli'e power of Parliament oveP Provincial Crown ·lands would in their Io.ordships' opinion, be inconsistent with the terms of the sections which they have to ......_ c,onstruc, with the· whole scope and purposes of thc-·lcgislation, and with the principle acted in, the previous decisions of this Board. Their Lords.hips that tl\e think/ tl1erefore, Dominion Parliament had .full power if it thought fit,. t9 anthorize the-use· ofprovincial Crown lands by the company for tlfe purposes of this railway." It.is not considered as inconsistent with a true fi.:clcration like Australia to have a provision like s. (:ll) of the Commonwealth of Austral~a Act, 1900 which specifically empowers the Common wealth to acquire "State" property, if needed for a Commonwealth purpose, on terms of payment o( con;i· In this connection it is to be noticed that pcnsation. , there· is under the Common wealth of Auslralia Act a provision as regards vesting of property in States and m the Commonwealth on lines somewhat similar to Art. 294-. In Canada, the decision of the Privy Council have held that the acquisitiqn of ·property by the Dominion for implemcnting;!'or carrying out Dominion legislation under powers vested' in Parlia ment in that, behalf by s. !Jl was not inconsistent with what might be termed the legislative sovereignty of the Provinces in the fields marked out for them by s. 02. And fltstly. even in America which is a true federation, since tbc Constitution of the U. S. makes no provision for the State Constitution·s, these being I ~ 1!102 -Sla11 ef W1.•t llmg•I •• Unian •f 1"'64 Sirm, C. J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 417 determined by their own laws, it has been held that the power of eminent domain of the Congres' for the purposes of effectuating Congressional purpose com In prehends the right to expropriate State property. these circumstances we are unable to appreciate the argument that if the Constitution were to be held to be a Federation, the States being considered as the federative units, such a status necessarily involved a, prohibition or negation of the right of the Union to acquire the property of the State for the purpose of giving effect to its legislative powers. Therefore the power of the Union to legislate in respect of property situate in the States even if the States are regarded qua the Union as Sovere.ign, remains unrestricted, and the State property is not immune from its operation. Exercising powers under the diverse entries which have been referred to earlier, the Union Parliament could legislate so as to trench upon the rights of the State in the property vested in them. If exclusion of State property from the pur· view of Union legislation is regarded as implicit in those entries in List I, it would be difficult if not impossible for the Union Government to carry out its obligations in respect of matters of national impor tance. If the entries which we have referred to earlier are not subject to any such restriction as suggested, there would be no reason to suppose that Entry 42 of List III is subject to. the limitation that the property which is referred to in that item is of In individuals or corporations and not of the State. its ultimate analysis the question is one of legislative competence. Is the power conferred by Entry 42 List I II as accessory to the effectuation of the power under Entries 52 & 54 incapable of being exercised in respect of property of the States? No positive interdict against its exercise is perceptible in the Constitution : and the implication of such an interdict assumes a degree of sovereignty in the States of such legislative plenitude as transcending the express 418 SUPREME COUR.T REPORTS[l964] VOL. "" "'"" •f ll'ut Btn1"1 •• v.; .. of 1.Ji. Si.ola, L. J power of the Union. The Constitution which makes a division of legislative and executive powers between the Union and the States is not founded on such a postulate : and the concept of superiority of the Union over the States ip the manifold asptctl already examined negatives it. !le. (2). By Art. 294 (a) all property assets immediately before the commencement of the Constitution wert: vested in the British Crown for the Dominion of India, became vested in the Union, and property vested for the purposes of the Government of the Provinces, became vested in the the Government of corresponding States. Under India Act all property for governmental purposes was vested in the British Crown. and by . .,irtue of the that property became vested in the Constitution Union and the States. By virtue of cl. (b) the rights, liabilities and obligatious of the Government of India and the Provinces, devolved upon the Union and the corresponding States. intended A considerable point was made of the fact that Art. 294 had vested certain property in the State and it was submitted that subject to the right of the State by agreement to convey that property under Art. 2118, the Constitution that the State should continue to be the owner of that property and ·that this vesting must be held to negative the Union's right to acquire any property vested in the State with It was pointed out by the learned out its coment. Attorney. General that so far as the plaintiff-the State of West Bengal-was concerned it did not own the coal-hearing lands on the date of the Consti· tution, and that it got title thereto only afte~ they vested in the State by virtue of the provisions of the Bengal Acquisition of Estates Act of 1954 (W. B. l of 1954) and that the property thus acquired subse· quently was not within the scope of Art. 294. We 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 419 have nodoubt that this would be an answer to the claim of the plaintiff in this suit and particularly in the context of the challenge to the validity of the notifi cation now impugned but we do not desire to rest our decision on any such narrow ground. 1962 fO:ta11 of West Bengal v. Uniofl of Tttidia Sinha, C. J. Article 298 runs : "298. The executive power of the Union and of each State shall extend to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal of property and the mak· ing of contracts for any purpose : Provided that- ( a) (b) the said executive power of the Union i;hall, in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect which Parliament may make laws, be to legislation by in each State subject the States; and the said executive power of each State shall, in so far as such trade or business or such purpose is not one with respect to which the State Legislature may make laws, Parliament." legislation subject The ai·gument was that the Constitution intend· rd and enacted that property allotted to or vested in a State under the provisions of Art. 294 or 296 shall continue to belong to that State unless and until by virtue of the pqwer conferred on the State by Art. 298 it chose to part with it, and that without a Constitutional amendment of these Articles such property cannot be divested from the State. We eonsider that this submission proceeds on a miscon ception of the function of Arts. 294 and 298 in the scheme of the Constitution. To start with it has to 1961 Sl4uof Wut Bnigal •• u.;,. of /Mia sw..,c. J. 420 SUPRE1fE COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. be pointed out that when Art. 298 confers on States the power to acquire or dispose of property, the refo· rence is to the executive power of the State to acquire or dispose of property which would apply without distinction to property vested under Art. 294 or under 296 by eseheat or lapse or as bona vacantia, or pro perty acquired otherwise. BesiJes, Art. 298 is merely an enabling Article-conferring on the State as owner of the property, the power of disposal. That cannot on any reasonable interpretation be construed as negativing the possibility of the State's title to pro perty being lost by the operation of other provisions of the Constitution. Art. 298 has therefore no relevance on the proper construction of Art. 294. Article 294 was modelled on s. 172 of the Government of India Act, 1935. As pointed out by the Federal Court in In re the Allocation of L<.mds und Buildings in a Chief Commissioner's Province('). "Up to April 1st, 1937, when the greater part of the Act came into force, the Government of India was a unitary Government, to which all the Provincial Governments were subordinate; and hence all lands and buildings helonging to Government or used for governmental purposes of were vested in His Majesty 'for the purpose of the Government of India.' This had been the legal position ever since the Government of India Act, 1858 (sec s. :rn of that Act. and s. 28(1) and (3l of the Government of India Act. which immediately preceded the Act of I !J:l.5). But the setting up of a number of autonomous Provinces, ind<'pendcnt of the Central Govern· ment and dividing with the latter the totality of executive and l~gislative powers in British India, and the separation of the powers conncc· tcd with the exercise of the functions of the Crown in its relations with the Indian State; thenceforward exercised (which were to be (I) [1~41J F.C.R. 20, 23. l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 421 exclusively by His Majesty's Representative appointed for that purpose) made an allocation necessary among these three authorities of the lands and buildings which had hitherto been vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the It is this alloca Government of India alone. tion which was effected, or attempted to be effected, by the provisions of s. 172, sub·s. (1 ), paras, (a), (b) and (c)." 1962 Stalt of H't.Jl Bt1,gal •• u.; .. ef bidia suw., c. J. Section 172 which effected this distribution ran : "172. (1) All lands and buildings which imme· diately before the commencement of Part III of this Act were vested in His Ma jcsty for the purpose of the Government of India shall as from that date-- (a) than under a in the case of lands and buildings which are situate in a Province, \'est in His Majesty for the purposes of the government of that Province unless they were then used, otherwise tenancy agreement between the Governor-General in Council and the Gcivernment of that thereafter Province, for purposes which will be purposes of the Federal Govern ment or of His :Majesty's Representative for the exercise of the functions of the Crown in its relations with Indian States, or unless they are lands and buildings formerly used for such purposes as afore said, or intended or formerly in tended to be so used and ·are certified by the Governor-General in Council or, as the case may be, His Majesty's Representative, to have been retained for future use for such purposes, or to have been retained the purpose of more temporarily 1962 $141, of tt'tJ' Btng"I v. ( .'nion of lndin Sinha, C J. 422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. advantageous disposal by sale or otherwise; ................................................... " Jmt like 3. 17'!. being the forerunner of Art. 294, ss. 174 and 175 are phrased in terms similar and correspond to Arts. 296 and 2!18. The right of the States r.o property, which d, volved upon them by Art. 294 (a) was therefore no different ofrom the right they had in the after acquired property: the Constitution docs not warrant the property acquired at the a distinction between inception of the Constitution, and in excrci~e of executive authoritv. Article '.!!H does not contain any prohibition against transfer of property of the State and if the property is capable of being trans ferred by the State it i~ capable of being compulsorily acquired. A ttorney-C:enm,"/ l\'ipissin.g Central Railway Co. and A ltorney-GerMml f"' Canada('), is in this context imtructive. (/1wbec v. The Dominion legislation-the Railway Act, 1919 of Canada -made provi~ion for the expropria tion of lands for the purpose of railways and for the payment of compensation for the lands so taken and under s. 189 of the enactment the raiiway company was empowered wrth the consent of the Govemor General-in-Council to take "Crown lands" for the use of the railway. Section 109 of the British North America Act which corresponds to Art. 294 ran : "109. All lands, mines, minerals: and royalties belonging to the several Provinces of Canad;l, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick at the Union, and all sums then due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals, or royalties, shall belong (t) (1926) A. C. 715, 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 423 to the several Provinces of Ontario, Quebec. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in which the same are situate or arise, subject to any trusts existing in respect the~eof, and to any mtercst other than that of the Province in the same." St..il• of We.~t Btngal •.. Union ·of ln, in Si.U..,C. J. The right of the Provinces to continue to retain and enjoy their property so vested was further emphasized by s. ll 7 which read : "117. The several Provinces shall retain all their respectiv.: public property not otherwise disposed of in this Act, subject to the right of Canada to assume any lands or public property required for fortifications or for the defence of the country." The Governor-General of, Canada referred to the Supreme Court questions as to the effect of these provisions and its competence in relation to Provincial Crown Lands. It would be seen that the lands were not requir ed either for fortifications for the defence of the country within s. 117. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provision applied to the Provincial lands and was competently enacted by the Dominion Parliament, Sir John Simon appearing for appellant-Province made two submissions : ( 1) That on a proper construction of the Railway Act, it could be held applicable only to Crown Lands vested in the Dominion and not to Provincial Crown Lands, relying for this purpose largely on the provision in s. 189 of the impugned Act for taking the consent of the Governor-General-in-Council., (:t) By reason of Provincial Crown Lands being vested in the appellant by s. 109 of the Imperial Act, read with s. 117, the Provinces were entitled to retain their respective property not otherwise disposed of by the Act; and that the purpose for which the Railwa~ Ml •t11te sf Wtt~ 811Jzsl •• Un;.. •/ lnii• ~i...V, c. J. 424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!lU4] VOL. Act made provision did not fall within the last limb of s. 117 vesting in the Dominion Government a right to take property for certain limited purposes. For this reason, if the Act on its proper construction invol ved interference with Provincial Lands the same was unconstitutional. The agreement for the respon· dent---the Dominion-was that whens. II i of the British North America Act vested in the Dominion the power to take DC>minion land for defence etc. it was a reference Lo executive and not legislative action. They submitted that the section was not intended to ensure that the Provinces retain their public property for all time but wa5 m~ant merely as a distribution of public property on the date of the Confederation. Viscount Cave, after disposing of the question relat ing to the con; truction of s. 18!1 in the following terms : "The section applies in terms to all lands of the Crown lying on the route of the railway, no distinction being made between Dominion and Provincial Crown lands." dismissed as not vcrv material the contention raised that as reference had been made to the Govcmor General-in. Council that it was onlv it indicated Dominion property that was intended to be covered by that provision. Dealing with the main constitutional objection to the validity of the taking of Provincial property, Viscount Cave pointed out that it was not the first occasion when the impact of Dominion legislative power under s. !ll of the British Korth America Act the Provinces arose upon the property vested in before the Privy Council, for in At/rJrney-Geneml J()r British Co/'ltTnbfo v. Cmuidian Pacific Uailway Co. ( 1906 A. C. 2M) the argument had been advanced that the legislative power of the Dominion ought not to.be construed so as to deprive the Provinces of their l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 425 proprietary interest in what had been vested in them by the British North America Act. Viscount Cave quoted the passage in the judg· ment we have already extracted.and continued : 1962 !tat1 of Wist Bmtal v. U11ion of lrti'UJ S1'nlta, C. J. the Crown "It was argued that .the eff~ct of ss. 109 and 117 of the British North America Act was to vest in each of the Provinces the beneficial land ·situate in the interest Provine~. subject only to the right of Canada under. the reservation contained in s. 117 to assume land' required for purposes of defence. But the reservation in queS!ion appears to refer to executive, and not to legislative, action; and while the proprietary right of each Province in its own Crown lands is beyond dispute, that right is sul-ijcct to be affected by legislation pasied by the Parliament of Canada within the limits of the authoritv conferred on that Parliament ................. where the legislative power cannot be effectually exercised without affecting the proprietary rights both of indivi· duals in a Province and of the Provincial Government, the pow~r so to affect those rights is necessarily legislative power." involved Re. (3). 1935, India Act, to acquire land was vested under Power the Government Entry 9 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, exclusive· ly in the Provinces. For any purpose connected with a matter in respect of which the Central Legislature was competent to enact law5, the Central Executive could require the Province to acquire land on behalf of and at the expense of the Union. This however did not mean that incidental to the exercise of the right to legislate in respect of Railways, Ports, Light houses, power to affect the right of the citizens and 1962 SttJlt of W tn llaogal v. r r,.u., o,.f tnJM SinM, C. /, 4'.!6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [l!Jtl4) VOL. corporations and of Provinces in land was not cxer· cbable. As already observed even under Constitu tions where a larger slice of sovereignty remains effectively vested in the (component unity) such as the United States of America power to legislate vrsted in the Central or national subjects includes the power to legislate so as to extinguish rights in State property. Under the Government of India Act, 1935 the Central Government could require the Province to acquire lands on behalf of the Union if >t wa• private land, and to transfer it to the Union if it was the State land. The Provincial Government had manifestly no option to refuse to comply with the direction. Provision for fixation of compensation did not affect the nature of the right which the Central Govern· ment could exercise. In broad outline the governmental structure under the Constitution vis·a-vis the Union and the States is based on the relationship which existed beiween the Central Government and the Provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935, and that in this respect the Constitution has borrowed largely from the earlier constitutional document. But even with the Provinces being autonomous within spheres allotted to them and there being a clistribu · t10n of property and assets between the Central Government and the Provinces under !'art III of Ch. VII in almost the same term, as is found in the corrtsponding Arts. 294 and 298, it was not consi · dered an infraction of the autonomy of the Provinces to vest such a power in the Central Govemmenl fur s. 127 of the Government of India Act enacted : "127. The Federation may, if it deems necessary to acquire any land situate in a Pro, vince for. any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which the 'Federal Legislature 1 S.C.R. SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS 427 has power to make laws, require the Province to acquire the land on bf half, and at the expense, of the Federation or, if the land belongs to the Province, to transfer it to the Federation on such terms as may be agreed, or, in default of agreemcrJt, as may be determined by an arbi· trator appointed by the Chief Justice of India." 1962 Slatr rt/ U'1sl Btrigal v. '· Unitm of lndi,1 s;,,;,n, c. J. and thus property vested in a Province under s. 172 could be required to be transferred to the Central Government if it was needed for a central purpose, It would therefore be manifest that the right of the Centre to require the Province to part with property for the effeccive perl; mnance of central fur.c· tions was uot co!11idered as detracting from provincial autonomy. What however is of relevance is the presenc.e of s. 127 in that enactment which empowered the Central Government to require the Provinces to part with property owned by them if the ~ame was needed It was for the purposes of the Government of India. however suggested that the compulsor\' acquisition of provincial property hy the Central Government was there specifically provided for and that the absence of such a provision made all the difference. But this, in our opinion, proceeds on merely a superficial view of the matter. A closer examination of the scheme of distribution of legislative power in regard to compul sory acquisition of property under the Government of India Act diicloses that though the power to com· pulsorily acquire property was exclusively vested in the Provinces, the Central Government could satisfy its requirements of ,property for Central purpose by utilising provincial machinery, and that it was in that context that a specific provision referring to Provinces having at the direction of the Central Government to transfer provincial property was nee It i~ therefore difficult to appreciate the ground ded. • 1961 , .. Statt oj lVtJI Bengal UnW.. oj Indio Sinha, C. /. 428 SUPRE.\'1E C..'OURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. on which the existence of a provision in the Govern· mcnt of India Act for assessment of compensation for land which the Provinces were bound to transfer on being so required by the Central Government and the deletion of that prO\·ision in enacting the Constitution may affect the exercise of the power vested in the Union Parliament. Re. (4): The Australian Constitution contains an express power authorising legislation by the Par· liament of Australia for acquisition of State property. But the Constitutions of the United States of America and Canada contain no such express provision. The power of the Union Parliament to enact legislation affecting title of the constituent States to property vested in them, is on that account not excluded. If the other provisions of our Constitution in terms of sufficient amplitude confer power for enacting legis lation for acquiring State property, authority to exercise that power cannot be defeated because the express power to acquire property generally docs not specifically and in terms refer to State property. Re. (·i): In the Constitution of India as originally enacted there was an elaborate division of powers by providing three entries relating to acquisition and requisition of property. List I entry 33 "Acquisition or requisitioning property for purposes of the Union". List II Entry 36 "Acquisition or requisitioning of property, except for the purpose of the Union, subject to the provisions of Entry 42 of List III"; List Ill Entry 42 ''principles on which compensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purpose of <he Union or of a State or for any other public pur pose is to be determined, and the form and the man· ner in which such compensation is to be given". By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 the ,, 1962 Stale of Jt',st Bengal v. { 'nion of India Sinha, c·. J, 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 429 three Entries were repealed, and a single Entry 42 in the Concurrent Li~t "Acquisition and Requisit10n of to acquire or property" was substituted. Power requisition property may since the amendment, be exercised concurrently by the Union and the States. But on that account conflicting exercise of the power cannot be envisaged. Article 31 (2) which deals with acquisition of all propert~•requires two condi tions to be, fulfilled (l) acquisition or requisitioning must be for a public purpose (2) the law under which the property is acquired or requisitioned must provide for payme1,1t of compensation either fixed thereby, or on principles specified thereby. By cL (3) of Art. 31 no such law as is referred to in cl. (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have efficacy unless such law has been reserved for the consideration of the President and has received his assent. As the President exercises his authority with the ad vice of the Union Ministry, conflict by the effective exercise of power of acquisition in respect of the same subject matter simultaneously by the Union, and the State, or by the State following upon legislation by the Uninn cannot in practice be envisaged even as a possibility. Article 25.4 also negatives the possibility of such conf1icting legislation. By cl. (1) of that Article if a law made by the U:gislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law competently made by Parliamer.:. the State law is, subject tu cl. (2), void, Clause 12) recognises limited validity of a State law on matters in the Concurrent List if that law is repugnant to an existing or earlier law made by Parliament, only if such law has been reserved for the consideration of the President, and has received his assent. By the proviso authority is reserved to the Parliament to repeal a law having even this limi ted validity. Assent of the President to State legis lation intended to nullify a law enacted by P~rlia­ ment for acquisition of State property for the purposes of the Union lie5 outside the realm of practical possibility. . ,- ; ' - l .') 19~~ i · ·State of W1Jt _Bengal ,. v. !Inion of India ·--- . 3inha. c. J. . ·. ' " - ' .. • ; ~I . 430 SUPRE~IE COURT: REPORTS Ll9G4J VOL. ' ' - - . . ' . . . - Re. (6): ' The submission_ that Art. 31 has no . applic~­ tion to the acquisition or requisition of property of a State is, based on no s'.Jlid foundation. This argument was based on three' grounds:-· {a)· Fundamental rights are declared in favour.· , of j1f citizens and .others against.legislative or . executive. action of the Government' and the: Parliament of: ludia and the Govern-· ment and the legislatures of the States· and all local or other authorities within the terri 'iory of. India, or under· the 'control of the, Government of· India arid not in-favour of , the States against Union- action;' · .. . ' r • ·•· ' {b) Article 31 gives· protection to the rights of · _ persons,· and a State is not a person within . . the meaning o.f that ·Article. _ . . . {c) Entry 42 in the Concurrent· Lisi is by virtue of Art. 13 and 245 subject. to Art. 31. • . Therefore private property .. ·may be acquired consis.tently with the prohibitions . , in the. COnstitution, but State.· property may. be acquired without a public purpose · _ : : and without paymen't of compensation. .. !t is difficult to agree with the vie~ that under the. -·scheme 9f the Constitution fundamental rights may be claimed by' individuals .,or' corporations only and · never by the. State: · ' ... · . · · ' By Art. 13 {I) all laws in force 'before the C<institution : to the extent . of inconsistency "with . , Ch. -III are declared void : and by cl. (2) the State · _'_)s prohibited from .making · any law which t:i.kes· 'away or abridges fundamental rights, and the laws . · _-, · made in contravention of the __ prohibition are void. I ' ! ' .. . ' . I , •• State of f-Vor En.gal Y. Union of India 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 431 The fundamental rights are primarily for the protec tion of rights of indi v.iduals and corporations enforce legislative action of a able against executive or Governmental agency, but it has to be remembered that all laws pre-existing which are inconsistent with and post constitutional laws which conuavcne the prohibitions are to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention void. Some of these rights are declared in form positive but subjeci to the restric tions authorising the State to make laws derogating the protection e. g. 15 (4), from the fullness of 16 (:i), 16 (4), 16 (5), ...... 19 (2), (3), (4), (ii), (G), 22 (3), 22 (6), 2:3 (2), 25 (2), 28 (2) & (3) : thero: are certain articles which merely declared rights·e. g. 17, 25 (l), · 26, 29 (I) and 30, (l): and there are others merely prohibitory without reference to the right of any person. body or agency to enforce them e.g. 18 (l), :!3 (l), 24 and 28 (!). j1Jcie, Prima these declarations involve an obligation imposed not merely upon the "State", but upon all persons to respect the rights so declared, anJ the rights are enforceable unless the context indicates otherwise agaimt every person or agency seeking lu infringe them. The rights declared in the form of prohibition must have a concomittant positive content; without rnch positive c@nlent they could be worthless. Relief mav be claimed from the High Court or from this Court, against infringement of the prohibition, by any agency, unless the protection is expressly restricted to State action. There are still other Articles in the fonn not of rights but fundamental disabilities e. g. 18 (2), 18 (3), 18 ( 4). Again there are certain Articles e.g. 19 (g). Part JI, 24 (2) which appear to recognise affirmative rights of the States. Article 31 is cou· ched in negative form, but recognises the existence in enrv of at least one important power vested sovereign State, not by virtue of its Constitution, but 1961 Stolt of WrH 8tntd .. l "t.ion of India 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1046] VOL. \\"hich of compensation springing from its very existence as a State viz, the power to acquire property for public purposes on the American payment Jurists call 'eminent domain'. Article 31 (2) enun· ciatcs the restriction subject to which this power of eminent domain is to be exercised. For the purposes to consider of the present case it is unnecessary whether Art. 3 l ( l) recognises the existence of the police power. Before Art. 31 was amended by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment Act, l!liiii), there was conflict of opinion in this Court as tu the inter· relation of cl. (I) and (2). Some Judges held that cl. ( 1) & (2) dealt with subject of eminent domain : other Judges were of the opinion thar Art. 31 (I) dealt with the police power and Art. 31 (2) with eminent dcimain ; some .Judges did not express any definite view. After the amendment by the Consti· (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, cl. (l), (2) tution and (:?A) of :\rt. 31 rea<l as follows : - ( l) No per.;on shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. (:?) ~o property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which for the pro· provides for compensation perty so acquired or requisitioned and either lixes the amount of the compensa· tion or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which the compensation is to he determined and given; and no such law shall be Cd!lcd in question in any the ground that the compen Court on sal ion provided by that law is not ade quate. ( ~ .·\) Where a law does not provide transfer of possession of any property to for the the ownership or right to the State 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 433 or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisition or requisi tioning of property, notwithstanding that it deprived any person of his property". 1962 State of West Bengal v. Union of India Sinha, C. J, In J\avr~lappam K ottarathi/ K ochuni v. Slate of ,Alladras (1), it was held that els. (I) and (2) of Art. 31 as amended grant a limited protection against the exercise of different powers. By cl.(:!) of Art. 31 property is protected against compulsory acquisition or requisition. The clause grants protcclion in terms of widest amplitude against compulsory acquisition or requisition of property, and there is nothing in the Article which indicates that the proper!)' protected is to be of individuals or corporations. Even the 'person' which is used in cl. ( l) is not expression used in els. (2) and (2A), and the context does not warrant the interpretation that the protection is not to be available against acquisition of State property. Any other construction would mean that properties of municipalities or other local authorities-which would admittedly fall within the definition of State in Part III either cannot be acquired at all or if acquired may be taken without payment of compen· sation. Entry 42 in List III and cl. (:.') of Art. 31, operate in the same field of legislation : the former enunciates the content of legislative power, and the latter restraints upon the exercise of that power. For ascertaining whether an impugned piece of legisla tion in relation to acquisition or requisition of pro· perty is within legislative competence, provisions must be read together. The two provisions bcin~ parts of a single legislative pattern relating to the exercise of the right which may for the sake of convenience be called of eminent domain the expres sion 'property' in the two prov.isions must have the same import in defining the extent of the power and In other words delineating Art. 31\2) imposes restrictions on the exercise of restraints thereon. (I) [1960] S S.O.R. 887. --- - -------~-:, -,---,---,..,..-------------------. , . 434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. - , ( ., - - . 1962 Sltt1 ef W1JI -. Btttgal •• . Union a/ I11dia Sin.ha, C. 1- legislative power under E~try 42 of List UL Property vested in the State may not therefore j:ie acquired under a statute enacted in exercise of legidative power under Entry. 42 -unless the Statute complies with the requirement of the relevant· clauses of Art. 31. --- Ite. (7): •, l. - . In Director of Ratirming -and Distributirm v. The Corporatirm of Calcutta ('), it was held by this Court by a majority : ' ' · · · "The law applicable _to ~ndia _before Constitution was as authoritatively. laid down by the Privy Council in L. R. 73 I. A. 271. · .The Constitution_ has not made any change in the_ legel positjon.-. On ·the other hand it has clearly indicated that the laws in force before January 2G, l !J50, shall continue to have vali"c dity even _in the new set-up except in so far as· they were in conflict with the express provisions' -of the Constitution. The rule of interpretation· . of statutes that the State is not bound by a; statute unless it is so provided in express terms or by necessary implication, is still good law". · It was observed at p. 172 : -- "The immunity of Government from the opera- • tion of certain statutes, and particularly statutes creating . offences, is based -upon the funda mental concept that · the Government or its _ officers cannot be a party to committing ·a crime-analogous to the 'prerogative of perfec; tion' that the King can do- no wrong. \\That; ever may have -been -the historical reason of the rule, it has -been adopted in our country on grounds of public policy as a rule of inter; this rule is not pretation of statutes. That _ (tl [1961J 1s.c.R.158. . ' ·- IHI S111te ~West Btngal .. UnUm of India Si.i..,c. J. I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 435 peculiar or• confined to a monarchical form of Government." The Court thereby approved the principle of exemp tion of the sovereign from the general words of a Statute enunciated by the Judicial Committee in Province of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of Bombay (1 ), in the following terms : "The general principle to be applied in con· sidering whether or not the Crown is bound by general words in a statute is not in doubt. The maxim of the law in early times was that no statute bound the Crown unless the crown was expressly named therein, "Roy n'est lie par ascun statute si il ne soit expressement nosme." But the rule so laid down is subject to at least one exception. The Crown may be bound, as has often been said, "by necessary implication". If, that is to say, it is manifest from the very terms of the statute, that it was the intention of the Legislature that the Crown should be bound, then the result is the same as if the Crown had been expressly named. It must then be inferred that the Crown, by assenting to the law, agreed to be bound by its provisions,'' But the rule that the State is not bound, unless it is expressly named or by necessary implication in In considering the statute is one of interpretation. the true meaning of words or expression used by the Legislature the Court must have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute to be read in its entirety. The Court must ascertain the intention its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire Statute; it must compare the .clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. Again in interpreting a Constitutional' document provisions conferring legis lative power must normally be interpreted liberally the Legislature by directing (I) (1946) L.R. 73 I.A, 271, 27•. 1962 Stat1 of WtJt Rtngnl v. (],,ion of Itilia SW... C.J. 43G SUPREME COURT REPORTS [!!JG!] VOL. No provision and in their widest amplitude. Vide-Nnvinclwndru 'l'hc Commissioner of /ncom.e-ta:r, Maf1itlnl v. Bombay City('), E1.try .1:! in List III does not, pri111'' Jaci:e, contain any indication that the expression "Property" therein is to be understood in any restricted sense : nor do the other pruvisions of the Constitution for reasons already stated suggest a restricted mraning. The ground of absolute sovereignty <;>f the States which may not be interfered with by taking property vested in the States IJy Parliamentary legislation has no legal basis. Again denial of power to the Union Parliament to legislate on allotted topics of lcgis· Lttion, in a manner ;tffccting the propcrt y vested in a State, may render l'arliamcntary lcgislati1•n virt.ually incfTcctivc. the Constitution sui; ge>ting a restricted meaning of the word 'property' in the context of legislative power has been brought to our notice. Regard hcing had to the extensive powers which the. Union Parliament and Executive have for using State property, in the lan::rr pub1ic interest, the restriet1011 suggested that the power docs not extend to the acquisition of property of tlte States docs not seem to be c.ontemplatecl. By making the rcqui>ite declarations under Entries 51 of List I, the Union Parliament assumed power to regulate mine> and minerals and thereby to cleny to nil agencies not under the control of the Union, authority to work the mines. It could scarcely be imagined that the Consti tution makers while intending to confer an exclusive power to work mines ancl minerals under the control of the Union, still prevented effective exercise of that power by making acquire the land vested in the States containing minerals. The effective exercise of the power would depend-if such an argument is accepted-not upon the exercise of the power to undertake regulation and control by issuing a notification under Entry f>I, but the territory of which uµJn the will of the State in mineral bearing land is situate. Power to lcgi>late for reguTation and development of mines and minerals impossible compulsorily (<) [1955] I S.C.R. 829. 1 S.C.R .• SUPREME COURT REPORTS 437 under the control of the Union, would by necessary implication include the power to acquire mines and to legislate for acquisition of minerals. property vested in the States cannut therefore ·be denied to the Parliament if it be exercised consis tently with the protection afforded by Art. 31. Pcwcr 1962 St,1le flj. IYtst B1ng'll •• lf11icn of India Sfo.i'l, C. J. The followiug findings will accordingly be recorded on the issues: Issue l in the affirmative. 2 3 4 5 not such as to disentitle the Union Parliament to exercise its legislative power under Entry 42 List III. ans11·1·r coycred by answer on issue 2- in tl1c HC}~ativc. in the negati1r: Finding on additional ·· issue in the affirmative. The snit will therefore stand dismissed with costs. SuBBA R.rn, J.-·-1 regret my inability to agree. The summary of the pleadings and the issues raised thereon arc set out in the juclgmcut of the learned Chief Justice and I need not restate them. Learned Advocate. General of \-Vest Bengal contended that the State of West Bengal and the Union of India are sovereign authorities in their respective spheres allotted to them by the Constitu tion, and therefore it would be inconceivable that one sovereign authority could acquire the property o( t)le other : they could do so only by mutual agreemc·nt. 1961 Sllltt •I Wut Btntel •• uw. •f luia E11bba Rao, J. 438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 964) VOL. That apart, the argument proceeded, on a construction of the relevant entry, i. e., entry 42 of List II I, in the context of the scheme of the Constitution and particularly of Art. 31 thereof, it would be clear that the said entry could not be invoked by the Cnion to acquire the land of the State. Learned counsel appearing for the States of ~fadhya Pradesh, Orissa, Assam and Madras sup ported the Advocate-General of West Bengal. The Advocate-General of Punjab, while supporting the argument of the Advocate-General of West Bengal, also raised an alternative contention, namely, that if the acquisition of State property was necessarily incidental to the effective exerci.~c of any of the powers conferred on Parliament under Lists I and III of the Seventh Schedule to the Conslitulion, it could make a law. for acquiring such property, provided it did not interfere with the exercise of the govern mental functions of the State; and that the power to acquire land of the Stat.c was not necessarily inci· dental to the regulation of mines. Learned Govern· ment pleader for the State of flihar supported the Union of India in its contention that Parliament can make a law providing for the acquisition of State property by virtue of entry 42 of List III. Learned Attorney-General, appearing for the Union of India, argued that entry 42 of List III, on its natural and grammatical construction, sustains the impugned law; he would also seek to support it on the basis of entries 52 and iH of I .ist I and entry In any event, he contended, the 3:l of List Ill. impugned law could be made by Parliament by virtue of Art. 148 of the Constitution and entry 97 of List I. He also questioned the correctness of the the States arc proposition sovereign authorities in their respective fields and advanced the theorv that under our Constitution the States are subordinate to the Union. that the Cnion and 1962 Stat1 of U.-'vt Bengal •• Clnioa tif lndi• Subba Rao, J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 439 Before I attempt to construe the relevant provi sions of the Constitution, it would be convenient to have a conspectus of the Constitution as far as it is material to the present enquiry, as the arguments, to some extent, are linked with the scope and nature of the powers of the Union and the States thereunder. The Constitution purports to have been enacted by the people of India who. have solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic. India is described as a Union of States. The pream ble to the Constitution indicates that the political sovereignty of the country rests in the people of India and the legal sovereignty is divided between the constitutional entities of the Republic of India, namely, the Union and the different States. Part V of the Constitution deals with the Union and the instrumentalities through which it is authorized to function, namely, the lc_:;!sLture, the executive and the judiciary. Part VI provides for the States and the organs through which they can function, namely, the legislature, the judiciary. the executive and Part XI lays down the relation between the Union and the States : it distributes the. legislative powers and regulates the administrative relationship between them; it devises various methods to resolve conflicts that may arise in the exercise of their powers. Article 2-16 demarcates the legislative fields with precision and emphasizes the exclusive power of the Union and the States to make laws in respect of the matters enumerated in the Lists in the Seventh Schedule :rnd allotted to the Union or the States, as the case may be. Even in regard to the executive power, Arts. 73 and 162 mark out the respective fields of the Union and the States. ·Chapter II of Part XI provides for the control of the Union over the States in certain specified cases. Part XII deals with finance, pro perty, contracts, rights, liabilities, obligations and suits; it distributes the reve11ues between the Union and the States, provides for the allocation between them of certain taxes collected by the Union, creates 1962 Stott uf JVtst BtnKal v. l:"nion of India Subba Roo, J. 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. separate consolidated funds described as the consoli· dated fund of India and the consolidated fund of the State, aod euacts certain exemptions, among others, of State properties from Union taxation and Union properties from State taxation and authorizes the Union as well as the States to borrow money on the security of their respective properties subject to cer· tain limitations. Chapter III of part XII deals with acquisition of property, assets, rights, liabilities and obligations in certain cases; under Art. 294, "A:o from the commencement of this Consti· tution- (a) (b) all property and assets which immediately before such commencement were vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Govern ment of the Dominion of India and all immediately property and assets which before such commencement were vested in His Majesty for the purposes of the Govern ment of each Governor's Province shall vest respectively in the Union and the cor responding State, and all rights, liabilities and obligations of the Government of the Dominion of India and of the Government of each Governor's Province, whether arising out of any con tract or otherwise, shall be rights, liabilities and oblig'ations respectively of the Govern ment of India and the Government of each " corrcspon mg. rate, ........................... . s d o Under Art. 29fi, any property accruing by way of escheat or lapse, or as bona ~·aC/.lntia, if it is property situate in a State, shall vest in the State and in any \'est in the lJ nion. Article 29i other case it sha II vests all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters of 1962 Stale of Wist Bengal v. Union of India Subb1 R~oJ J. l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT .REPORTS 441 or be India in the Union. Article 298, which was subs tituted by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, extends the executive power of the Union and of each State to the carrying on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and di; posal of property and the making of contracts for any pur pose subject to the legislative powers of the Union, or of the State, as the case may be. Article 300 says that the Government of India . and the Govern' ment of a State may sued by the name of the Union of India or by the name of the State, as the case may be, i.e., they:may be sued as juristic personalities. Chapter I of Part XIV provides for the mode of re<:ruitment and regulation of conditions of service of different services in the Union and the States. Part XV provides for an independent machinery for elections to the Parliament and the State Legislatures. Part XVIII deals with emergency provisions whereunder the President, when the security of India or any part of the territory there of is threatened by war, external aggression or internal disturbances or when the constitutional machinery of the States fails or when the financial stability or credit of India or any part thereof is threatened, may, by proclamation, declare·an emergency to that effect; in those events, subject to certain safeguards, the Centre is aut~orized to take over the administration of the State in whole or in part for a specified period. Article :l68 provides for the amendment of the Cons titution; and in· regard to certain provisions thereof, such as the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, the repre sentation of the States in Parliament, the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislatures of not less than one-half of the States by a resolution to that effect passed by those Legislatures. Under the scheme of our Constitution, sover eil\n powers are distributed between the Union and the States within the spheres allotted to them. The lJ nion exercises the sovereign powers within its sphere :·stqt1 of West Bengal · v. Unior1 of India Sub ha Raa, J. • \ \_ ', ' ' ' I ' i ' ' ' ' . 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS[l964]VOL. , :__ __ _ -7--- ... - - · · throughout the territories cifindia, and the States exer cise their sovereign powers within their respective territories in . respect of their allotted . fields. The Legislatures of the' States as well as the Parliament arc elected on adult franchise. The legislative field of the Union is much wider than that of the States; · and in case of conflict in the common field allotted to . them, the Union law generally prevails over the State law. In, regard to Bills passed by a Legislature of a State; the· Governor may, and in the case of bills derogating from the powers of the High Court shall, reserve them for the consideration of the President: though this is in theory a limitation on the legislative . ·power of the State, in practice the Governor only acts 1 on the .advice of the ministry which has the confidence . of the. Legislature. · Except in the case of· a.·bill ·. ·· derogating.from the powers of the High Court when . the .Governor is . bound t!J refer it to the President, in other .cases it is not likely that the Governor would refer a bill to the President contrary to the advice . of ~ the ministry. · In a few cases of legislation where inter-State element or conflict of laws are involved, sanction of the. President, is ·made a condition prece dent for their validity: see Arts. 200, 254, 304 etc. • ~ · C~ming to the executive field, both the Uni~n and. the State cxecutivts arc manned by ministers responsible to. their respective Legislatures elected on adult franchise. The executive powers of the Union as wel! as of the States extend to matters in respect of which they have. power to make laws, though the executive of the Union can give directions to a State . to ensure compliance· with the laws made by Parlia- · ment and any existing law which applies in that State. The State. is also enjoined to exercis·e its powers in such a \vay as not to impede or restrict the • exercise ofthe power of the Union executive; and the to give directions to the State · as may be necessary. for that' purp0se, S9 Joo, the µnjon executiye ~ap. ~ivr: is empowered ··~-- executive oC the U.nion • . • 1962 ' Slate of Wtst Bengal v. Un.ion of India Subba &a, J. 1 S.C.R. SUFREME COURT REPORTS 443 importance. It is also authorised directions to a State as to the construction and main tenance of means of communications declared to be of national confer powers on States in respect of matters to which the executive power of the Union extends. By and large, with minor exceptions, the Union as well as its exclusive field, the State executive functions in and the Union executive's directives arc intended to facilitate the carrying out of the Union purposes. Every State has its judiciary and the highest court in a State !s the High Court of judicature. The expenditure of the State judiciary is charged on the consolidated fund of the State concerned but the Judges of the High Court are appointed by to the Supreme Court of President; and appeals lie India in certain matters and it has also extraordinary powers to entertain appeals in other matters or to issue writs to enforce fundamental rights. But both the High Courts and the Supreme Court interpret the State and the Union laws and resolve conflicts, if any. An integrated system of judiciary has b~en accepted by the Constitution and the judicial control operates both ways, though the final word is with the Supreme Court. That cannot by itself affect the federal principle, as even in Australia an appeal lies to the Privy Council, under certain circumstances, from the decisions of the High Court of the Common wealth of Australia. In financial matters, though the States and the Union have consolidated funds of their o\vn, the sources allotted to the States are comparatively meagre and those allotted to the· Union appear to be perennial; the States also depend upon the Union for allocation of funds from and out of the taxes collected by it :md also for grants; though there is no direct control bv the Union over the field of finance of the States, tl{ere will always be indirect pressure on the States in that field. The Union, being in charge SJatt of U.'tJI Btngal 1962 .. l/,aio11 of ludia .('ubba Rao, /, 444 SUPREME COlJRT REPORTS[l964] VOL. of the purse strings, can always, to use an euphemistic term, pursuade the States to take its advice. In case of emergencies, such as, war, external aggression, in:crnal disturbances, failure of the constitutional machinery and financial instability, extraordinary powers are conferred on the Union, subject to cercain limitations, to interfere with the States' administration; but the provisions relating to emergency situations arc really in the nature of safety valves to protect the country's future. Parliament has also the power to change the boundaries of the territories or form new territories, but that is also an extraordinary provision to meet certain emergencies. There is also another side of the picture. Parliament shall consist of the President and two IIQuses respectively kn<'wn as the Council of States and the House of the People; the Council of States sl•all consist, apart from the 12 nominated members, not more than :!:ls representatives of the States and the Union territories. /\ part of the Parliament is, therefore, comprised of the representatives of the State Legislatures. Though the powers of the Council of States arc not co-equal with those of the House of the People, to the extent it exercises its legislative powers the States als'l h~vc control over the Cnion. The States are also cntitk<l to be consulted in the matter of th<: amendment of certain provisions of the Constitution : vidc Art. 36~. reveals The foregoing resume of the provisions of the Constitution the following picture : The political sov~rcigi:t '.s the p~ople of India a1J.d ~he _legal sovereignty 1s d1v1dcd between the conslltutional entities i. e., the Union and the States, who are juristic pcrsonaltid l?°ssessing P;<;>periics and fun ctioning through the rnstrumentahucs created by the Constitution. Though the jurisdiction of the Union is confined to some subjects, it extends throughout Jndia, whereas that of the States is confined to their 1962 State of H "es f Bengal v. Unio11 of India S 1bho Rao, J. ' 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 41:3 territorial limits. Within their re1pective spheres both in the legislativ~ and exewtive field; they arc supreme; their. inter se relationship is regulated by specific provisions. The relation between the Union and the States cannot be found the legislative fiel<ls demarcated by the Lists, but can only be dis the specific constitutional provisions covered forging links between them. The!~mergency powers of the Union to meet extraordinary situations do not affect its exclusive fields of operation in normal times. federation On the basis of a comparison of the Indian Constitution with that of America, it is argued that none of the important criteria of a present in the Indian Constitution. "Federalism in the United States embraces the following elements : ( l) as in all federatiom, the union of several autono mous political entities, or "States", for common legislative powers purposes; (2) the division of between a "National Government'', on the one hand and constituent "States", on the other, which division is governed by the rule that the formrr is "a govern ment of enumerated powers" while the latter arc governments of "residual powers"; (3) the direct operation, for the most part, of each of Ihese centers of Government, within its assigned sphere, upon all persons and property within its territorial limits; ( 4) the pro.vision of each center with the complete apparatus of law enforcement, both executive and judicial; (5) the supremacy of the "National Govern ment" within its assigned sphere over any conflicting asserti.on of "state" power; (6) dual citizenship." The aforesaid elements are no doubt present in the American Constitution, but it is not possible to that unless all the said criteria exist a contend constitution cannot be described as a federal one. Though on paper the American Constitution is a typical federation, in practice the· Supreme Court of the United States of America by evolving and deve loping many legal doctrines and implied powers has , . \~.-'/'-; · .... :-- ~ \ '·, . 1952 : · - .!tcte of JY1jl 81ngal ; • v. {J niot1 of India Suhba Rao, J. • 446 SUPRE:ME COURT REPORTS [1964]°VOL. . invested the Federal Govemmen~·with"!arge powers to: enable it to interfere · indirectly in the States field,· . though the Even . in regard· to judicial power, . American Supreme Court was originally conceived · to be a Federal Court concerning itself with federal laws, in fact it authoritatively interprets· the State . laws when they come. into conflict with federal laws. The point is that even in America· ·there is no federa · tion in the orthodox sense of . the term. · I - . -- . - , . So too;· the Constitution of Australia clearly demarcates the exclusive fields of the Commonwealth ·and the States and jealously. guards the State rights,· . but in practice the States have been reduced to the · position of agencies of the Commonwealth Govern-. ment. . This was brought about beca'use of the financial grip the Centre has over the State : see . · \Vheare on "Federal Government." . ' . ! • But in Canada · the position is the reverse. Though the Centre and the Provinces have their distinctive Lists of powers, the Central Government limited powers of control over the has certain governments of the ten Provinces of Canada; the residuary powers are given to the Centre and not to the States~ Though undoubtedly some elements of unitary form of government are present,' the consti tutional ct.istom evolved practically a· federal State· and, as one author puts ·it, "no dominion govern-· ment which attempts to stress the unitary elements in the · Constitution . at. the expense of the .federal elements would survive." It is, therefore, clear that in ·every federal Constitution there are either textu- · ally or customarily some unitary elements. The - real test to ascertain whether a particular Constitu- · tion has accepted the federal principle or; not ·is whether the said · Constitution · provides» for division of powers in such a way that the general :tnd regional governments are each within its sphere subs tantially independent of the other •.• The. reservation ? ' ; · · .. ·.,..--- -~ , • ' ' SUPREME COURT,REPORTS , ' 447 1 S.C.R. . ·- '\' ·.\ ' ' · · · ··f b d ',of the residue of power or the power to interfere with-- - 1961 s · States',affairs in emergencies in the Union may affect .. 1 r d "'' • "'1 · · h b I a ance o power m a e erat10n, ut oes not· , t e ·Bengal destroy its . character •. ·Some Constitutions show a v. :·marked bias towards the ·Federation and the others Clftion •f lnaia towards the States, but notwithstanding the varying Subba Rao; J. emphasis they accept the federal principle as their basis. Though some authors, accepting the American Constitution as the yardstick for a federation, prefer to describe Constitutions with a bias towards Union as quasi-fed~rations,· I do not think it is inappropriate to describe all Constitutions which substantially accept the federal principle as Federations. ·Apply- · ing this test,• I have · no doubt that the Indian . Constitution is a federation, as the units in normal · times exercise exclusive sovereign powers within the · ·fields allotted fo them. . · · A further distinction is sought to be made be tween the American Constitution and the Indian Con stitution on the basis of the historical evolution of the two countries. \Vhile in America, the argument pro ceeds, the pre-existing sovereign States ·were brought ·together under ·a federation, in· India the Constitu tion conferred certain 'powers on the existing adminis trative units or such units newly constituted. The status of a political entity under a particular constitu-· tion does not depend upon its history but upon the pro visions of the constitution. ·.The pre-existing indepen dent States may not be given any appreciable power under a constitution, while newly formed States may enjoy larger. power under another ·constitution. A federal structure· is mainly conceived to harmonize·· exhting conflicting interests and to provide against future conflicts. India is a vast country: indeed, it is described as a sub-continent. Historically, before the advent of the Constitution, there were different Provinces enjoying in practice a fair amount of auto nomy and· there were innumerable States with vary-. ing forms of government ranging from pure autocracy. . - . - 1962 Stait nf ll'tsl Btr:;1l v. l.lnio11 of India 448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1964] VOL to guided democracy. There were also diffe rences in language, race, religion etc. There were also foreign pockets expected sooner or later to be incorporated with the main 'country. In those cir cumstances our Constitution ;1dopted a federal struc ture with a strong bias towards the Centre. under such a structure, while the Centre remains strong .to prevent the development of fissiparous tendencies, the States arc made practically autonomous in ordi nary times within the spheres allotted to them. With this backgruund I shall no~ proceed to cun~ider the aq~uments advanced by learned counsel. I shall first take up the argument based upon entry .J:,! of List Ill. i.e., acquisition and requisitioning of property. The provisions relevant to the said ques tion arc as follows: Article :!Iii: (I) Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, Parliarncnt ma,· make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India, and the Legi, lature of a State may make laws for the whole or any part of the State. (2) No law made by Parliament shall he the ground that it deemed to be invalid on would have extra-territorial operation. Article 21G: (I) Notwithstanding a11ythi11g in clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to make l:iws with respect to any of the matrcrs enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as "Union List"). (:!) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and, subject to clause(!), the Legis lature of any State also, have power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enume rated in List Ill in the Seventh ScJ1cdule (in 1 s.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 449 this Constitution referred to as the "Concurrent List"). (:1) Subject to clauses (1) and (~), the Legislature of a State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred to as the "State List"\. 1962 St1te of We.it Bengal v. L'nion of India S11b/,.a Ha1J, J. The entries relevant to acquisition, as they stood be fore the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, l\156, read as follows: Entry 33 of List I. Acquisition or requmtion ing of property for the purpose of the Union. Entry 36 of List 11. Acquisition or requisition ing of property, except for the purposes of the Union, subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III. Hntry 12 of List Ill. Principles on which com pensation for property acquired or requisitioned for the purposes of the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given. After the said amendment, entry 33 of List I and entry 36 of List II were omitted; and entry 42 of List III, as substituted by the Seventh Amendment reads: "Acquisition and reqms1t1oning of property". Article 31. (1) No person shall be deprived of his.property save by authority of law. (2) No property shall be compulsorily acq uired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides 1952 Slalt of JV 1st B"'lal v. Un;.. of JnditJ Subba Rao, J. 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19G4] VOL. for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either iixcs the amount of the compensation or specifirs the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compen sation to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that is not adequate. (2A) Where a law docs not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corpora tion owned or controlled bv the State, it shall not be deemed to provide' for the compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property, not withstanding that 1t deprives any person of his property. (;J) \u such law as is rcfc11cd tu in clause ( ~) made by the Legislature of a State shall have t:ffect unless such law, ha1 ing been reser- 1rd for the consideration of the Prcsidcllt, has rc~eivcd his assent. I have already held that the sovereign powers have been distributed betweeu the constitutional entities, namely, the Union and the States; one such sovereign power is the power to acquire or requisition the pro perty of a citizen for a public purpose. The doctrine of "Eminent Domain" is defined by Willis as "the legal capacity of sovereign, or one of its governmental agents to take private property for a public use upon the payment of just compensation". l\icholas in his book on Eminent Domain, Vol. I, describes it as a power of the sovereign to take a property for public In Chimnjit Lal use without the owner's consent. Ghou. Ylhri v. 'l'hc Union of hitlia ('), Mukherjca, .J., as he then was, accrptcd this definition when he said: "It is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate private property belonging (t) [1~50] S.C.R. 869, 901·902. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 451 to individual citizens for public use. This right, which is described as eminmt domain in American law, is like the power of taxation, an offspring of political necessity, and it is supposed to be based upon an implied reservation by Government that private property acquired by its citizens under its protection. may be taken or its use controlled for public benefit irrespec tive of the wishes of the owner." 1962 Sla!t rrf li'es! Bentnl v. L·11io11 rj India .~1 bb · Raa, J It is, therefore, clear that the power to acquire the property of a citizen for a public purpose is one of the implied powers of the sovereign. In our Cons titution, before the Constitution (Seventh Amend ment) Act, 1956, this power was divided and distri buted between the Union and the States; the Union, by virtue of entry :l3 of List I could acquire a pro perty for Union purposes, and by virtue of entry :J(j of List II a State could acquire a property for State purposes: the result was that a State could not acquire a property of a citihen for a Union purpose, and the Union could not acquire a property of a citizen for a ·State purpose. To avoid this difficulty 33 of List I and entry 36 of List II were omitted and the present entry 42 of List III has been substituted for the earlier entry 42 in the said List. Now the Legislature of a State both Parliament and can make a law providing for the acquisition and requisitioning of property for Union or State pur poses. But the crucial point that is implicit in the power of acquisition by a sovereign is that it must relate only to the property of the governed, for a sovereign cannot obviously acquire its own property. This sovereign power of Eminent Domain under our Constitution is conferred on, or divided between, the Union and the States. Prima Jacie, therefore, entry 42 of List III can only mean acquisition and requi sitioning of private property by a State. It is also implicit in the concept of acquisition or requisition· ing that the acquisition or requisitioning shall be for /H'I Slfd• •f lfot B1ngal v. UlliMI 11f lnii~ Stai• R.,, J. 452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1!!64] VOL. a public purpose on payment of just compensation. The said concept has acquired a well defined conno· tation not only in the foreign countries from which it is borrowed, but also in the legislative history of our country. That is why our Constitution laid down in express terms that any law made shall not violate the fundamental rights. One of the funda mental rights is that enshrined in Art. 31 (:!) and it says that no property shall be complllsurily acquir ed or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of law, which provides for compen sation fur the property so acquired or requisitioned. The scope of entry 42 of List J II would be apparent if it is read along with the said article. Unless it is held that Art. :!I(:!) applies also to a law of acquisi tion of a State property by the Union, the result will be that Parliament can make a law providing for the acquisition of a property bf a State fur a purpose which is not a pttbli1; purpose and witl1out payment of compensation, while it cannot do so in the case of If Art. 31, docs acquisition l.f" privcitc property. not govern the L11v of acquisition of a State property, it indicates that .entry -I'.! of List Ill docs not deal with acquisition of a State property, for otherwise it would lead to the anomaly of acquisition of a State property by a law of Parliament without safeguards inherent in the doctrine of Eminent Domain. That is why learned Attorney-General made an attempt to persuade us to hold that Art. 31 (2) applies also to a law providing for the acquisition of a State property. He contended that after the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, Art. 31(1) is separat· ed from Art. 31(2) and that the phraseology of Art. 31(2), if independently construed, is wide enough to take in acquisition of a State property. And for this position he relied upon the judgment. of this Court in Kavalappam Kottarathil Kochuni v. The Sf,a~ of lr/1Adras ('). There, this Court held that (Fourth Amendmeut) Act, after the Constitution 1955, els. (1), (2) and (2A) of Art. 31 dealt with ( n c J 9601 3 s.c.R. 887. 1 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 453 different subjects-els. (2) and (2A) dealing with acquisition and requisitioning, and cl. (1) with deprivation of property with authority of law. That decision has no bearing on the construction of cl. (2) of the said Article vis-a-vis the question of acquisi tion of a State property. The fact that this Court held that the two clauses of the Article deal with two different subjects does not mean that cl. (1) has no bearing on the interpretation of cl. (2) of the same Article. Clause (2) of Art. :n reads : 1962 Stille of West Btngal v. Union of india Subba _Ra~, J. "No property shall be compulsorily acquired or requisitioned save for a public purpose and save by authority of a law which provides for compensation for the property so acquired or requisitioned and either fixes the amount of the compensation or specifies the 'principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensa tion is to be determined and given; and no such law shall be called in question in any court on the ground that the compensation provided by that law is not adequate." Clause (2A) thereof reads : "Where a law does not provide for the transfer of the ownership or right to possession of any property to the State or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State, it shall not be deemed to provide for the compulsory acquisi tion or requisitioning of property, notwith -standing that it deprives any person of his property." It is true that cl. (1) opens out with the words "no person" whereas cl. (2) does not repeat that expres sion; but in the context, I find it difficult to hold that cl. (1) deals with property of a person aud cl. (2) deals with property of persons and St.ites. Article 31 deals with a fundamental right in regard . \ '·. 1952 · State of iv es: Bengal v. linion oj India Sulba Rao, J, · ' . _, 454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. ---~~------- . ._.-. -- cl. (2) with acquisition of to property-cl. (I) -with deprivation .of property, ·property. As cl. (1) makes it clear that property shall be of a person, it is not necessary to mention over again that the property acquired should be of a person. The idea of compulsory acquisition and requisitioning in cl. (2) indicates that the acquisition or requisitioning is by a State of a person's property. That is made clear by cl. (2A) which says that the law of acquisi tion shall provide for the transfer of ownership or right to possession ·of any property to the State· or to a corporation owned or controlled by the State. The transfer of property is to the State and a fortiori the transferor must be one· other than the State. In the context it can only mean the person mentioned . in cl. (1). The use of the definite article in the expression "the State" is a further indication that · transfer inter se between State and State or Union If and State is not contemplated by that clause. that was the intention it - would have provided ex· · pressly for a transfer between a State and a State. Even so, the learned Attorney-General contends that State is also a person. "Person" has not been defi ned in the Constitution; but a perusal of the various provisions of Part III clearly shows that the express ion "person" is used in - contradistinction to "State." . Indeed, most of the f1;1ndamental rights are conferred . on a person or a citizen against infringement· of his rights by a State. The expression "person" in Arts. 14, 18, 20, 21, 22, 25 and 27 does not and cannot include a "State". Indeed, there is no other article in this part wherein the expression "person" is used in the sense of "State". Prima facie, therefore, the - expression "person" in Art. 31 will not include . "State". There is nothing in the said Article which compels me to give a strained meaning particularly when the Article ·is consistent with the recognized . _concept of Eminent Domain and fits in squarely with the scheme offundarriental rights. But it is said that-· if a State cannot be a "person", a corporation or a 19~2 State of JVest Brugal v. Union of India Subha Rao, J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 455 company will have to be excluded from its scope. There is no definition of the expression "person" in the Constitution; but it is defined in th~ General Clauses ,\ct, 18!l7, as including any company or asso ciation or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. Though this definition is an enlargement of the natural meaning of the expression "person'', even the extended meaning does not include the State. Anyhow the question whether the said eJtpression takes in a corporation or not, does not call for a In this context two decisions decision in this case. of this Court may usefully be referred to. In Director of /11itioni11y rmrl Distrilmtio1i v. The r!orpomtion of Calru./ta ('),it was held that "the rule of interpreta tion of statutes that the State is not bound by a statute unless it is so provided in express terms, or by necessary implication, is still good law". Though that rule has been laid down in the context of a statute, there is no reason why a differeut principle should apply in the construction of the Articles of the Constitution. If that rule of interpretation is applied to Art. :H (~) of the Constitution, it will have to be helJ that, as the said rule does not in terms or by necessary imp! ication provide for the acquisition of State property, a State property cannot be the subject-matter of the said rule. Reliance is placed upon another judgment of this Court in The State of Hih·tr v. Hani 8onalxiti 1,·umnri ('),_in support of the c.rntcntion that the expression "person" embraces a State. There, the decision was that when the State disobeyed the order of injunction issued by the court, the said order could be enforced against the the manner prescribed by 0. XXXIX, State r. ~ (3), (If the Code cf Civil Procedure. A plaintiff mo y apply to the court for a temporary injunction to restrain a defendant from committing the injury complained of. Under 0. XXXIX, r. 2 (3) of the code, "In case· of disobedience, or of breach of any Ol (1961] 1 s.c.R. 158. (2) [1961] l s.c.R. 12s. 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]VOL. /961 S1at1 of JYest Btntai v. l./nicm of /,,,;,. Sullha Raa, J. such terms, the Court granting an injunction may order the property of the person guilty of such disobedience or breach to be attached, and may also order such person to be detained in the civil prison for a term not exceeding six months, unless in the meantime the Court directs his release." This Court, on a construction of els. (1) and (3) of r. 2 of 0. XXXIX of the Code of Civil Procedure held that the expression 'person' in r. 2 (3) has been cmplo}ed compendiously to designate everyone in the group "Defendant, his agents, servants and workmen" and not for excluding any defrndant against whom the order of injunction has primarily been passed. But at the same time, this Court made it clear that the provision for detention docs not apply to the State; and this could only be because the State is not a "person" who could be detained. The decision is based upon the phraseology of the two clauses of 0. XXXIX, r. 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure and does not lay down as a general proposition that the expression "person" wherever it appears shall include a "State". The historical background of Art. 31 and entry 42 of List III also docs not bear out the construction that acquisition of a State property is contemplated by the entry 42 of List III. In the Government of India Act, 19:1ii, acquisition was a provincial subject, being entry 9 of List I I, Section 2!J!J of the Govern ment of India Act, 1!135, read : (I) ::-\o person shall be deprived of his property in British India save by authority of law. (2) Neither the federal nor a Provincial Legis lature shall have power to make any law authorising the compulsory acquisition for land, or any public purposes of any I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 457 commercial or industrial ·undertaking, or any interest in, or in any company owning, any commercial or industrial undertaking, unless the law provides for the payment of compensation for the property acquired and either fixes the amount of the compen sation, or specifies the principle::; on which, in which it is to be determined." the manner 1962 Stat1 of w,,, Bengal v. Uni .. ef Indio Subba Rao, J. . Broadly, els. (1) and (2) of s. 299 of the said Act correspond respectively to els. (1) and (2) of Art. 31 of the Constitution, under the said Act, the Federal Legislature could not make a law acquiring the land of a Province for the simple reason that the subject of acquisition of land was exclusively a Provincial subject. But s. l :!7 provided for the contingency of the Federation requiring the land belonging to a Province. The section read : "The Federation may, if it deems it necessary to acquire any land situate in a Province for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which the Federal Legislature has power to make laws, require the Province to acquire the land on behalf and at the expense, of the land belongs to the Federation or, if Province, to transfer it to the Federation on such terms as may be agreed or, in default of agree ment, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief .Justice of India." A combined reading of the said provisions indicates that though under the Government of India Act the federal Legislature could not make a law empowering the Federation to acquire the land belonging to a Province, the Federation may require the Province to transfer to it the land owned by the Province on terms agreed upon between them or, in default of agreement, determined by an arbitrator: that is to 1952 Statr of IVtJl Bingal v. Union of India Suhba Rao, I, 458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. say, under the Government of India Act transfrr of lands owned by a Province to the Feclcration cou Id be effected only under an agreemrnt or an award. the Constiu1i:un, bdorc it was amended Under I !15li, Parliament as well as State Legislatures were empowered to make laws for acquisition of lands for their respective purposes-Parliament for the Union purposes and a State Legislature for the purposes of th.: State. Prima Jncie the relevant entries, namely, entry :33 of List I and entry :lli of List II, could have related 01ily to acquisition of private lands for purposes of the Union or the State, as the case mav be. But if the Union or the State wanted the lar{d held by the other, it could secure the same only under Art. 2!J8 (I). as it stood then. The said article read : "The cxec:utiw power of thr Union and of each State shall extc~1tf, subjrcl to any law made by the appropriate l.q.islaturc, to the grant, sale, disposition or mortgage of any property held for the purposes of the Union or of such State, the case may br, and to the purchase or acquisition of property for those purposes respectively, and to the making of contracts." l!J5(i, :!!18 (I). By this article clearly sho\\·s The phraseology used that the land held' b\· the Union or the State for the Union or the State' purp:Jses respectively, could be transferred to the other only in the manner indicated in Art. the Constitution (S~vcnth Amendment) Act, the subject of acquisition and requisitioning of land was placed in List III as entry 42, and entry 33 of List I and entry :lti of List II were deleted and Art. :l98 was substituted by a new Article. The changes made in Art. 298 arc not material for the present purposes. It is, therefore, manifest India Act, 1935, compulsory acquisition of land wa~ a provincial subject, that under the Constitution, as it the Government of that under 1962 Stlltt of IV tit Bt11,(al v. i·nion of India 5i,bba Rii~. J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 459 originally stood, Parliament could make a law for acquiring such a property for the Union purp0ses and the State Legislature for the State purposes by virtue of different entries and that, after the amend· ment, both Parliament and State Legislatures could make a law for the acquisition of such a property by virtue of entry 42 of List III. But if the Federation or a province under the Government of India Act, or the Union or the State under the Constitution wanted a property owned by the other, it could secure it only under an agreement and not otherwise. This scheme clearly demonstrates that a law whether made by Parliament or by a State Legislature cannot provide for the acquisition of property owned by the other. that Parliament cannot make a law by virtue of entry 4~ of List III for the acquisition by the Union of the property owned by a State. therefore, hold I, Reliance is then placed upon Art. 248 of the Constitution, read along with entry 97 of List I '.)f the Seventh Schedule to sustain the wider power of the Parliament. Article 248 reads : (1) Parliament has exclusive power to make law with respect of any matter not enumerated in the concurrPnt List or State List. (2) Such power shall include the power of making any law imposing a tax not men tioned in either of those Lists. Entry 97 of List I. Any other matter not enumeraled in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those Lists. It is contended that if acquisition of a State property does not fall under entry 42 of List III it must fall under entry 97 of List I. Emphasis is laid upon the 1962 State of YYe.st Bengal ,v. Union of lndia Subba Rao, J. 460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964]. VOL. -words "any matter;' in Art. 248 and a contention i~ the expression "any matter" haq the ·advanced widest connotation and, therefore, it empowers the Parliament to make a law In rcgarJ to any subject, taking over of the property of a State. including this argument : firstly, a There are two answers to residuary entry· cannot. travel beyond the scope of the division of powers. The sovereign legislative power is divid_ed between different entities. The entire legislative 1ieldjs divided between the Union and the States. The me1hod of allocation adopted is by enumeration of subjects. 'Ihe residuary article apd the entry are- , the devices . adopted to/ entrust to the Union any subject omjttC'd by mistake or otherwise. The residuary legisliHive fi>ld cannpt possib.ly .co>1er inter-State relation; for that matter is not <listribtited between the Union and the ?t~tes by way o( le1nsla· I ive Lists. Tb at apart, whcri a specific provision is 111aclc for acquisition of a property, it would be incongruous to confine thfit ei:it~y to prqpert'ies other than those of the Sta\es and to. resqrt to the resid1Jary p,0..yer (or acquiring tJ:ie properties of States. If the power of aeq uisition can be construed to mean only acquisition of properties in the States and not p,roperties ,belonging to the States, it m11st be held t!J.at tl]C power: of acqpisitio~ is limited to that extent. Further if Art. ::JI (2) applied only to a law ef acqui sition of a private property as I have alrea<ly held, the anomaly that ;irises if the said clause does not apply to entry +2 of List III will equally arise in respect of entry 97 of List I-I would, therefore. that Parliament· cannot maKe a law for the acquisition of a Sta, te property by virtue of entry 97 of List I. There would B~-mapy anomalies ln the working bf the Constitution if the· contention of the Union the subject of "acquisition arn;I ..yas accepted. As requisitionirg" is in the Concurrent List both Parlia meni and a State Legislatm'e can make diffefeIJt 1962 Sttrtc of U'est Bengal v. Union of InditJ Subba Rao, J. 1 s.c.R. SUPREME cou:R.t REPORTS 461 laws for acquiring the property of the State or of the Union, as the case may be. Under the law made by Parliament, the State property can' be acquired and on acquisition it becomes the Union property; then under the law made by the State, the same property can be reacquired by the :::itate as the Union-property. It is said that this vicious circle cannot arise under the Constitution. Reliance is first placed upon Art. 31(3) of the Constitution, which says : "No such law as is referred to in clause (2) made by the Legislature of a State shall have effect unless such law, having been reserved for the consideration of the President, has received his assent." But I have held that Art. 31 (2) has nu applir:ation to a law providing for the acquisition of a State property and if so, cl. (:3) thereof will also not apply to such a law. Even if Art. :H(3) applies, there is nothing which prevents the President from giving his consent to a State to acquire the Union property, though the Union executive may ordinarily be relied upon not to do so. But we must test the validity of a contention on the legal possibilities and not on what a particular executive may or may not do. If so, Art. <ll(:l) cannot always prevent the cunl1ict It is said that Art. 254(1) would indicated above. invariably resolve such conflicts in iavour of the law made by the Parliament. But Alt. 254( 1) can come in aid of the law made by Parliament only if there is repugnancy between that law and that made by the State Le~islature. But in the illustration given there is no such repugnancy, for the law made by Parliament provides for the acquisition of the pro perty of the State, whereas the law made by the State provides for the acquisition of the propaly owned by the Union. The moment the State prc> pcrty is acquired by the Union it becomes the pro perty of the Union. In such a context there is no 1162 Sllzt1 of WtJI B'"l°' •• U11itln 01· I11tli. S116ba RaD, J. 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19134] vot. though the Union and conflict between repugnancy between purpose of the Union law can be defeated by the exercise of a power under a State law. Article 254(2) also saves the laws of the States if the previous con sent of the President has been taken; such a consent is legally possible, though ordinarily the Central Executive can be expected to withhold· it. The Constitution could not have intended such an un resolved States. Secondly, if the contention of the Union be correct, Parliament can make a law making a pro vision for acquiring the entire property of a State It can indirectly prevent the without compensation. State from functioning; it can acquire the buildings owned by the State and used for its offices; it can take away the substratum of the State's jurisdiction by acquiring not only its offices bu, 'llso its buildings and works, which arc maintained for the public good. Though Parliament may not be expected to create such a situation, nothing will prevent it from doing so. A construction which may prevent the State from functioning as visualized by the Constitu tion cannot easily be accepted unless it is clearly It is said that expressed in the Constitution itself. Parliament can destroy the State under Art. :~ of the Constitution and, therefore, nothing more untoward can happen to a State if this limited power is con ceded, as a larger power has already vested in thr. Parliament. Article 3 only enables the Parliament to make a law for the formation of a new State, increase or alteration of boundaries of any State, decrease of the area of any State or alteration of the name of any State. Such a power is expressly given to the Parliament and, therefore, it can func tion under that Article. Bnt that has nothing to do with a power to acquire the property of a State. Thirdly, when the Constitution created legal entities and distributed the sovereign powers between them, it is unreasonable to construe the ambiguous provi sions of the Constitution in such a way as to create 1962 -Sta11·0.f West Bengal v. Union ef /ntli• Subia Rao, J, 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 463 in the the Union, conflicts between them or to make .ine a creature of the other. It is said that if such a power is not conceded to the Union, the States may not cooperate implementation of the policies conceived in the interest of the whole country. This argument may have some relevance in America or in Australia wher.i:: the States are powerful under ·their respective Cfonstitutions, but absolutely none under our Constitution whereunder the States are practically beholden to the Union in It was necessary in America to evolve many ways. implied powers to implement national policies; in India the Constitution has conferred on the Union ample powers in that direction. In such a situation this Court should be very reluctant to curtail the already limited powers of the States and should not, by construction, convert the federal structure into a unitary form of government which the Constitution has rejected. At this stage another argument advanced by learned Advocate-General for West Bengal may be noticed. He contends that under Art. 294 of the Constitution all the coal .mines vested in His l\1ajesty . for the purposes of the Province vested in the State of West Bengal as from the commencement of the Constitution; and that, therefore, unless there is an express constitutional provision for divesting them, they could not be acquired by a law made by Parlia ment. I shall consider the decisions cited at the Bar If the argument in this context at a later stage. advanced on behalf of the Union is correct, viz., that there is a legislative power in the Parliament to acquire the property of a State, Art. 294 cannot be in the way of the Union law providing for the acqui sition of the State property. That apart, Art. 294 applies only to the property vested in the State at the commencement of the Constitution anti not to property that has been. subsequently acquired by it. In this case, the zamindaries where the coal-mines are \ .1962 ·-: lil4luf IV1JI Benztrl •• Union of India Subb~ Rao, J. · 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] VOL. " .. -~--~- situate vested in the State of \Vest Bengal subsequent to the commencement of the Constitution by reason of a State law. But itis contended that though the surface soil of the zamindari was with the zamindars, the coal·mines vested in His . Majesty before the Constitution and that at the commencement cif the . ~Constitution' continued to vest in the State. ·But this argument is contrary to series of decisions given by the Privy Council : see Harinarayan Singh Deo v. &riram -Chakravarti ('); Durga Prasad Singh v. Brajnath Bose (2 ); Bashi Bhushan llfisra v. Jyoti. Prasad Singh Deo ('); Rajkumar Thakur Girdhari Singh v. lllegh Lal Pandey ('); and Raghunath Roy .. Maru:ari v. Durga Prasad Singh (5 ). Though these. ·. decisions were given in dispute between zamindars and their tenants, the observations - in some of the judgments run_ counter to the argument. of learned Advocate~General. He has not placed. before us any authority to support his contention; but he alter natively suggested that though the estates with the coal·mines may have belonged to the zamindars, the . reversion in the said estates was' with His l'vfajesty and subsequently with the State. This is contrary fo the principles of permanent settlement,· for under the permanent settlement the British Government granted to the zamindars a permanent hereditary property in their lands for all times to come and fixed a moderate asse5sment of public revenue on such lands, which could not be increased under any circumstances. The sannads granted under the permanent settlement regu· I aticms did not reserve_ any reversionary right to the Government. As I have held that, even if any interest had vested in the State, it could be divested by an - Act-of an appropriate Legislature if the requisite . . power was conferred on it by the Constitution, I do not propose to express my final opinion on question. · The constitutional validity of the impugned the basis of Act is next sought to be sustained on (1) (1910) U.R. 37 Cal. 723. (3) (1916) J.l.R. 44 CaL 585. (2) (1912) J.L.R. 39 Cal. 696. (4) (19171 J.L.R. 45 Cal. 87. (5) (1919) J.L.R. 47 Cal, 95, 1962 ~lalt1 of Wut Bmzal Y, Uniou of India S1JlbCJ Rao, J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 465 entry 52 and entry 54 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. They read : Entry 52 of List I : Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in . the public interest. Entry 54 of List I : Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent to which regulation and development under the control of the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest. Before construing these two provisions, it would be convenient to read entries 23 and 24 of List II, the State List : Entry 23 of List II : Regulation of mines and mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to regulation and develop· ment under the control of the Union. Entry 24of List II: Industries subject to the provisions of entries 7 and .52 of List I. A combined reading of the fou.r entries shows that ordinarily the industries and the regulation of mines and mineral development are the State subjects. But if Parliament makes a law declaring that any parti cular industry should be under the control of the Union in public interests or the regulations of any mines or mineral development should be under its control, to that extent entries 24 and 23 of List II shall yield to entries 52 and 54 of List I. Under the Industries {Development and Regulation) Act. 1951 (65 of 1951), Parliament has declared that "it is expedient in the public interest that the l 1nion should ·take under it~ control the industries specified in the First Schedule", which include coal and, therefore, it is argued, the subject of coal industry passed on to arliament and the impugned Act made thereafter -- 1961 SW1 of W11f 81~1al •• traion of ltUlio 466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. for acquisition of coal bearing lands was well within its power. If I may say so, there is a fallacy in this' argument. A declaration under entry 52 of List I would no doubt enable Parliament to make a law in respect of an industry, that is to say Parliament may make a law in respect of an existing industry or an industry that may be started subsequentjy. So too, before the declaration a State Legislature could have made a law in respect of an industry by virtue of entry 24 of List II. But neither entry 24 of List II nor entry 52 of List I empowers the State Legislature before the said declaration or the Parliament after such a declaration to make a law for acquisition of lands. If the State Legislature before the declaration or the Parliament after the declaration wanted lo acquire the land it can only proceed to make a law hy virtue of entry 42 of List III. As I have held that entry 42 of Li1t III does not enable Parliament to make a law providing for the acquisition of a property of a State, entry .52 of list I cannot be relied upon for such a purpme. Reliance is also placed upon the Coal ~lines (Comervation and Safety) Act, 1952 (Act XII of 1952) in support of the contention that the declaration contained therein gave vitality to entry 54 or List I and that the impugned Act could be smtained under that entry. Section ~ of that Act says : "It is hereby de, lared that it is expedient in the public interest that the Central Gqvernment should take under its cJntrol the regulation of coal mines to the extent hereinafter prov, ided." The simple amwer. to this argument is that the decla· ration was limited to the control and regulation of coal mines to the extent provided by that Act, and such a dedaration, with its limited scope, could not be taken advantage of to sustain the impugned Act. Further, under the entry "regulation of mines" ~law cannot be made for the acquisition of coal bearin~ 1962 Stat• of Wut Bm1al •• u.; .. ef '""" Subba Raa, J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 467 lands themselves, particularly when there is a speci fic entry for acquisition. Nor can the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act 1957 (Act 67 of 1957) be successfully invoked in this case, for that Act, which contains a declaration that it is expedicQt in the public interest that the Union should take under its control the regulation of mines and the development of minerals to the extent provided therein, was passed on December 28, 1957, whereas the impugned Act was passed on June 8, 1957. That declaration was also confined to the extent of the regulation provided thereunder and therefore could not be relied upon for purposes other than those It follows that Parlia comprehended by that Act. ment cannot rely upon the declaration in either of the three Acts i.e., Act 65 of 1951, Act 12 of 1952, and Act 67 of 1957, to sustain the impugned Jaw which was solely made for the purpose of acquiring the coal bearing areas. Sustenance is sought to be drawn from Ameri can, Australian and Canadian decision in support of the Union's contention that a federal law can provide for the acquisition of a property owned by a State. Before adverting to the decisions of a foreign court, it would be necessary to know the relevant fundamen tal differences between the constitution of the said country and our own. In America there is no ex press power conferred on the Congress enabling it to make a law for the acquisition of any property for public purposes. There is also no concurrent List giving a common field of operation for the Federal and the State units. The power of acquisition was evolved by judicial decisions by invokmg the doctrine of implied powers. The law of that coun try, therefore, may not be of much relevance in com tming the provisions conferring express powers on the different units under our Constitution. Nor the deci sions cited on behalf of the Union lend any support IJGZ SU/1 of WI.II B1n1d v, l!Non of /Mia Ss.bbtJ Roo, J. 468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964] vor.. In State of Okla· to the contention advanced. hoTrUJ Ex. Rel. Leon C. Philips v. Guy F. Atkinson Campany (1 ), the Flood Control Act of 1938 autho· rized the construction of the Denison Reservoir on the Red River as part of a comprehensive scheme for the control of floods in the Mississippi River and its tributaries. That law was made by the Congress in the exercise of its commerce power. The effect of the construction of dam and reservoir for the pur· pose of flood control on a stream running between two States W3S to inundate lands in one State. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the land was owned by a State was not a barrier to its condemna It also observed that the tion by the United States. State Government could not prevent the exercise by the Federal Government of its power of eminent domain for flood control purposes. merely because the State boundary would be obliterated by the floo ding of the land taken. It was observed therein: '·Since the construction of this dam and reser voir is a valid exercise by Congress of its com merce power, there is no interference with the sovereignty of the State ........................ .. The fact that land is owned by a ~late is no harrier to its condemnation by the United Sratcs ................... Nor can a state call a halt to the exercise or the eminent domain power of the federal government because the su liseq ucnt flooding of the land taken will obi i - tcrate its boundarv." h docs not appear from the report, though the phra seology used is wide, that what had submerged or obliterated w:ts State owned property or the State terri tory. Assuming that the StatP. property had submer ged because of the operation of the Federal Jaw, thi, decision can be understood to have laid down onlv the limited proposition that the Congress in exercise of its commerce power can make a !aw incidentally <I) (IS40) 85 L. ed. 1487, l:i05. 1962 .. Stat~ ofWut Bmgal Unior~ of lntlia .<ubbo Rao, J. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 4-69 encroaching upon the State property. The decision in The Cherokee Nation v. The Southern Kans<U Railway Company ('), does not carry the matter fur ther. There it was held that the Congress had power to authorize a corporati9n to construct a rail road through the territory of Indian tribes. It was pointed out that Cherokee Nation was not a ·sovereign nation but was under the political control of the government of 1he United States and, therefore, it could not be said that the right of eminent domain within its territory co.uld only be exercised by it and not by the United States. It wa,s observed therein: "The lands in the Cherokee territory, like the lands held by private owners everywhere within the geographical limits of the United States, are held subject to the authority of the general government to take them for such objects as are germane to the execution of the powers granted to it; provided only, that they are not taken without just compensation being made to the owner.'' • This case, therefore proceeded on a different basis altogether, namely, that the entire territory was direc tly under the Federal Government and that the Fede ral Government could exercise its power of eminent domain in resprct of that territory. Nor doe1 the decision in Kohl v. United States('), support the defendant. There it was held that the United States could acquire lands in Cincinnati for a post office and other public buildings under the power of eminent domain. The property sought to be acquired there was the private property in the State and the decision therein throws little light on the present q ucstion. The decisions of the Supreme Court of America are clear on the point viz., that in exercise of the pow~r c?nferred on the Congress, expressly or by 1mphcat1on, a law can be made to acquire (2) (187;) 23 L. ed. 449. (I) (1889) 34 L. ed. 295. 502. 1962 Sta" of Wm s..,.i •• Umoa of /NIU SabH RM, J~ 470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. private property in a State for carrying out a federal purpose. But they are not decisions on the question whether the said law can provide for the condemna tion of the property owned by the States. In Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd edn., Vol. I, at p. 169, the following passage appears: "Despite the phraseology of the Fifth Amend ment to the Constitution of the United States to the effect that "private property" shall not be taken for public use except upon payment of just compensation, it has been held that there is no implied limitation therefrom which inhi bits the taking of public property by the federal government and the latter may acquire property of a state or one of its agencies or 1ub-divisiomi." "Although the federal government has the power to acquire such property, the relative positions of the federal and state governments are such that it would seem that the United States could not for the sake of mere con venience, take the property of a state which was devoted to the public use the !oss of which ~ould s~ously cripple the state in carrying on 1t~ functions ............................................ . In case of necessity, as distinguished from mere convenience, the State would have to yield in any event." The said passage makes a distinction between a State property and a property devoted by a State for a public purpose-the former can be acquired and the latter ordinarily cannot be acquired by the federal government. These principles are not based upon any particular power conferred upon.the Congress, but appear to have been envolved on a pragmatic approach to concrete problems arising in that country. SW. of Wut B,.,.I •• U.U..oJW. S.bha RM, /. 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 4'71 Such an approach cannot have any relevance to our Constitution where the powers have been described with particularity. The passage in "Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States", Vol: 1, at p. 180, namely, "that, in cases of conflict, the power of eminent domain of the States must yield to the con1titutionally superior power of eminent domain of the United States is well settled", does not relate to the acquisition of property owned by States but &o the resolution of a conflict between the powers of eminent domain of the Union-and the States when both or them seek to acquire property within a State. That doctrine is based upon the supremacy given by &he comtitution to the Government of the United State1 in all matters within the scope of its sovere· ignty. The said discussion shows that the law in America on tk.e question raised in the present case is In view of the admitted differences in the not clear. comtitutional provisions, it would not be safe to rely upon it in construing the provisions of our Constitu· tion. The Australian decisions also do not help us, for s. 51 of the Australian Constitution expressly provides that the Commonwealth can make a law for the acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person: see Wynes' Legislative, Executive and judicial Powers in Australia, p. 441. If at all, the said provision indicates that in a federal form of government one sovereign unit cannot acquire the property of another unless the Constitution expressly provides for it. In Canada this question was subject of judicial scrutiny. It may be mentioned that in Canada there is no concurrent List conferring the power of eminent domain expressly on both the Union and the cons· tituent States. Reliance is placed on behalf of the Union on the decision of the Privy Council in 1962 S1nt1 of lV1st s,,,'gai •• Unioo of Indio Sublui Rao, J. 472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1964) VOL. Attorney-General fur tlie Dominion of Car.ada v. Attorney-General for the Provincl'.8 of Ontario, Quebec and Nova Scotia (1). Sections 91 and 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, distributed legislative pow-:rs between the Dominion and the Provinces of Canada. Under s. 108 r hereof certain items of property were transferred to the Dominion, one of them being "rivers and lake improvements, and public harbours". The residue of proprietary rights not transferred to the Dominion bys. 108 and Schedule Ill remained vested in the provinces sub ject to ss. 109 and 117; and the residuum of legisla tive jurisdiction not comprised in ss. Ill and 92 vested in the Dominion. The questioru raised in the appeal were whether under s. I 08 the river was transferred Dominion could make a law under s. 91 affecting fisheries and fishing rights in the river. The Privy Council held that the proprietary rights in the river vested in the Province on the date of the British North America Act, 1867 and that s. 108 by trans ferring rivers and lake improvements did not transfer the proprietary rights in the rivers. On the second question, it held that s.·!JI empowered the Dominion to make a law taxing the right to fish in the rivers. Lord Herschell recognized a broad distinction bet ween proprietar~· rights and legislative jurisdiction and observed that the fact that such jurisdiction in respect of a particular subject-matter was conferred on the Dominion Legislature afforded uo evidence that any proprietary rights with respect to it wne is observed at transferred p. 730: the Dominion, and whether the Dominion. It "If, however, the Legislature purports to confer upon other proprietary rights where it possesses none itself, that in their Lordships' opinion is not an exercise of the legislative jurisdi~tion conferred bys. 91. If the contrary were held, follow that the Dominion might it would (l) (1898] A.C. 700. 1961 Stat1 of West Bengal. v. Union nf lndi• Subba RtJ1J, J. I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 4i3 practically transfer to itself property which has, by the British North America Act, been left to the provinces and not vested in it." This decision, therefore, is an authority for the posi tion that when the constitution vests particular pro perties in one of the governing units, the other can not by legislation take over those properties, for if that is allowed one can destroy the other. This decision supports the broad contention of the learned Advocate-General of West Bengal that the propertie11 vested in a State cannot be taken over by the Union in exercise of a legislative power. The wide sweep of this decision has been restricted to some extent, by the Judicial Committee in Attorney-General for British Columbia Canadian Pacific Railway Company ('). There, the judicial Committee held that ss. 91 and 92, read together, empowered the Dominio!l to dispose of prnvincial Crown lands, and therefore of a provincial. foreshore, for the purposes of the respondent railway, which was a railway connecting several provinces., continental In coming to that conclusion the Judicial Committee relied upon its earlier decisions in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Corporation of the Pari8h of Notre Dam~ De Bonsecours ('), and 1'oron to Corporation v. Bell Telephone Co. of Canada ('). Though Crown lands ve1ted in a province, the Constitution Act con ferred an express power on the Dominion enabling it to make a law for inter-State purposes affecting the Crown lands. The same view was reiterated by the Privy Council in Attorney-General for Quebec v. Nipissing Central Railway Company an'd Attorney ). The Canadian cl~cision do General for Canada (1 learned not support the wide contention of the Attorney-Gene~al that properties vested in ~ State can be acquired by Union law by virtue of either entry 42 of List III or entry 52 of List I of our Constitution. Apart from the fact the rele vant provisions of the other constitutions are not (1) [190•[ A.C. 204. (3) [1905) A.C, 52. (2) [1899) A,C; 367. (4) 1926) A.O. 715. 1961 Slo1, of Wut Bmtal •• l.'"iola of /111did Su66a Ra., /. 474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (196t] VOL. pari ma~ia with those of the Indian Corntitution, the decisions cited do not constitute a clear authority to support either of the two rival contentions, though they contain some observations which may be relied upon by either side. In these circumstances,· it would not be proper for this Court to draw any inspiration from the foreign constitutions or the decisions made thereunder in construing the express · provisions of our Constitution in the context of its different set-up. I have referred to the decisions only out of respect for the argument advanced. To co11clude : The Indian Constitution accepl:I the federal concept and distributes the sovereign powers 1'etween the co-ordinate constitutional entities, namely, the Union and the States. This concept implies that one cannot encroach upon the govern mental functions or instrumentalities of the other, unless the Constitution expressly provides for such interference. The legislative fields allotted to the units cover subjects for legislation and they do not deal with the relationship between the two co-ordinate fields : this is units functioning in their allotted regulated by other provisions of the Constitution and there is no provision which enables one unit to take away the property of another except by agreement. The future stability of our vast country with its unity in diversity depends upon the strict adherence of the federal principle, which the fathers of our Constitu tion have so wisely and foresightedly incorporated therein. This Court has the constitutional power and the correlative duty-a difficult and delicate one to prevent encroachment, either overtly or covert! y, by the Union of State field or vice verna, and thus maintain the balance of federation. The present is a typical case where the Court should stop the Union from overstepping its boundary and trespassing into the State I would, therefore, hold that the impugned Act, in so far as it confers a power on the field. ... •. 1 $.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 475 Union to acquire the lands owned by the State, inclu ding coal mines and coa bearing lands, is u.ltra virea. I find on issues l, 2 and 3 against the defendant, In view of my findings on the said issue, I do not pro pose to express my opinion on the additional issue. In the result, there will be a decree in favour of the plaintiff in terms of els. (a), (c) and (d) of paragraph 11 of the plaint. The plaintiff is entitled to costs. Br COURT: In view of the judgment of the majority, the suit stands dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. /962 S1at1 of Wist B,.,111 v. Uni .. of lit& Subh&., J. SHRI DURGA PRASAD & ANOTHER v. 196• D.....W,11. THE BANARAS BANK LIMITED (B. P. SINHA, C.J.,, P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.) S1<preme Court, ApptUatejuri$4iction of-Cerlifirme graxt"'1. if 0011tpetent-•Oourt immtdiately btlow' by High Court, Meaning of-Constitution of India,, A.rt. 133 (1). The Official Liquidator of the respondent Bank advertised for sale, the two houses belonging to the Bank. These houses were sold to the second appellant with the sanction of the court. The second appellant thereafter transferred the houses to the first appellant reciting in the deed that the latter was the real owner and that the sale deed from the Official Liquidator was obtained btnami for him. The Official Liquidator moved the High Court at Allahabad foe an order declaring the sale null.and void and for an.order re-transferring the houses to the Bank, A