Now sub sec. (8) by its terms applies to a case v. Oommissi mer of lneome-Ta:r, Puni••

Now sub sec. (8) by its terms applies to a case where no payment of tax has been made ~nd, therefore, there is no first day of January of a financial ye&r in which tax was paid, from which day the calculation of interest h11.s to commence. Neither, the asaessee contend~, can any question of a shortfall between eighty per cent of the tax pay able on regular assessment and the amount paid arise where nothing had been paid. The assessee really says that as the language of sub·seo. (6) stands, it can have no operation in his case and therefore he has been wrongly charged with inter est. To clear the ground we may state before proceeding further that the assessee has no other objection to the orders under sub·sec. (8) m&king him laible for interest. The question thus raised is one of construction (6)and (8). The assessee relies on a of sub· secs. rule of construction applicable to taxing statutes which has been variously stated. Rowlatt J.put it in these words in Cape· Brandy Syndicate v.lnland Revenue Commissiones, ('). "In a taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used." The object of this rule is to prevant a taxing statute being construed "according to its intent, though not according to its words": In re Bethlem Hospital ('). This Court has accepted this rule. (I) (I92I) I K.B. 64, 7I. (2) (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 475, +sg. ~ ~ 196t Gunahai Saigal v. Oommissi mer of lneome-Ta:r, Puni•• SqrkarJ. 3 S.C.R .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 899 Bhagwati J. in A. V. Fernandez v. The State of Kerala (1 ) said, "If ......... the case is not covered within the four corners of the provisions of the tax imposed by ing statute, no tax can be inference or by analogy or by trying to probe into the intentions of the legislature and by considering what was the substance of the matter." It has been said that "If the provision is so want ing in clllrity that no meaning is responsibly clear, the courts will be unable to regard it as of any effect.'' : see lnland Revenue Commissioners v. Balil noch Distillery Oo. Ltd. (2 ) The assessee therefore contends that on the plain words of sub-ss. (8) and (6) he cannot be charged any interest and in fact in a case like his, sub-section (8) has to be regarded as of no effect. Now it is well recognised that the rule of construction on which the assessee relies applies only to a taxing provision and has no application to all provisions in a. taxing statue. It does not, for example, apply to a provision not creating a charge for the tax but laying down the machinery for its calculation or proceedure for its collection. The provisions in a taxing statute dealing with machinery for assessment have to be construed by the ordinary rules of construction, that is to say, in accordance with the clear intention of the legis~ lature which is to make a charge levied effective. Reference may be made to a few cases laying down this distinction. In Commissioner of Income-tax v. Mahaliram Ramjidas (1) it was said, "The Section, although it is part of a taxing Act, imposes no charge on the subject, the machinery of and deals merely with (I) (1957) S.C.R. 83 7, 847. (21 (1948) I All. E. R, 6'6, 625. (3) A.l .R. (1940) P.C. 124. 126-127. 900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] 195B Guraaliai Saigal v. C1mmissioner •f /ttcome-Tax, Punjab assessment. In interpreting provisions of this kind the rule is that that construction should be preferred which make the machinery workable utres valeat potius quam pereat." In India United Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Excess Profits Tax (1) This Court observed, "That section is, it should be emphasised, not a charging section, but a machinery sec- tion. And a machinery section should be so construed as to effectuate the charging sec- tions." We may now profitably read what Lord Dunedin said in Whitney v. Commissioners(') of Inland Reve- nue: \ r- "My Lords, I shall now permit myself a genral observation. Once that it is fixed that there is liablity, it is antecedently highly improbable that the statute should not go on to make that liability effective. A statute is designed to be work!j.ble and the interpreta tion thereof by a Court should be to secure that object, 'tmless crucial omission or clear direction makes that end unattainable. Now there are three stages in the imposition of a tax: there is the declaration of liability, that is the part of the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment, Lia.bi· lity does not depend on assessment. That, ex hypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact sum which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person taxed does not voluntarily pay." (I) (1955) I s.c.R. BIO, 816. (2) (!925) IO T.C. 88, no. ·~ ~ 1962 Gursahai Saigal v. Commissioner of Income· Tax, Punjab Sar/car J. 3S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 901 There is one other case to which we think it useful to refer and that is Allen v. Trehearne wheres. 45(5) of the English Finance Act, 1927 which laid down that "Where in any year of assessment a person ceases to hold an office or employment ...... charge· able under Schedule ·E'tax shall be charged for that year on the amount of his emoluments for the period beginning on the sixth day of April in that year and ending on the date of the cessation" came up for constmction. It was contended that a sum of£10,000 which became payable to the assessee as the executor of the deceased holder of an office under the terms on which the office was held was not liable to tax under the secti0n as it could not te said to be " his emoluments" since it was payable after his death. It was observed by Scott L.J., "the rules ..... .in Section 45, Sub-section ( 5) and (6), are rules affecting assessment and collection, and that if there is any difficulty in the precise applicability of the language of those bub-sections, it should be interpreted largely and generously in order not to defeat the main object of liability laid down by Rule 1 of Schedule E." Dealing with the words "his emoluments" occurring in the sub-section the learned Lord Justice said, "It is quite true that strictly speaking the emolunent in question never became his in the sense that the quantitative amount of £10,000 became his property. It never became payable to him, because he died. But that it was his emolument under the agreement with the Company in a broad sense seems to me to be obvious, and in order to prevent the Revenue's failure to get the tax which was intended by Rule 1 of .Schedule E, it appears to me to be legitimate to treat the words in {I) (1938) 22 T.C. 25, 26 27. j ~. J 902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963) 1962 GrwJahai l!aigal v. Commi•sioa~r of lncome-Tax1 Pun.JU Sarkar J. question as meaning' on the amount of the emoluments attaching to the office which he held'." On this interpretation of Sub-section (5) tax was assessed in this case. to any equita hie Now it seems to us that we are dealing here with a provision which lays down the machinery for the assessment of interest. That sub-section (8) intended to and did in the clearest term impose a charge for interest seems to us to be beyond dispute. It says that interest calculated in a certain manner "shall be added to the tax." We do not here have to resort rule of constructin or alter the meaning of the language usd or to add to or vary it in order to arrive at the conclnsion that the provision intended to impose a liability to pay interest. That is the plain affect of the language used. But the Sub section also provides that the interest for which liability was ereated, has to be calculated in a .certain manner. It is this provision which has given rise to the difficulty. But obviously this provision only lays down the machinery for as~essing the amount of interest for which liability was clearly created; it in substance says that in cslculating the amount of interest the machinery of calculation laid down in sub.sec. (6) shall be applied. The proper way to deal wi.th such a provision is to give it an interpretation which, to use the words of the Privy Council in Mahairam Kamjidas's( 1)case "makes the machinery workable, utres valeat potius quam pereat". We, therefere, think that we should read suh·sec.(6), according to the provision of which terest has to be calculated as provided in sub-sec.(8) in a manner which makes it workable and thereby prevent the elear intention of sub-sec.(8) being defeated. Now, how is that best done? As we have (1) A.J.R. (1940) P.C. 124, 126-127. 1962 GurJahai Sa ·gal •• Commi'1ioner of Income· Tax, Punj•• SJrkor J, 3 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT EPORTS 903 ealier said sub-sec.(6) deals with a case in which tax has been pa.i 1 and therefore it says that interest would be calculated "from the 1st day of January in the financial year in which the tax was paid". This obviously cannot literarily be applied to a case where no tax has been paid. If however the por· tion of sub-sec. ( 6) which we have quoted above is read as, "from the 1st day of January in the finan· cial yea~ in which the tax ought to have been paid", the provision becomes workable. It would not be doing too much viol~nce to the words .used to read them in this way. The tax ought to have been paid on one or other of the dates earlier mentioned. The intention was that interest should be charged from January 1 of the financial · year in which the tax ought to have been paid. Those who paid the tax but a smaller amount and those who did not pay tax at all would than be put in the same position substantially which is obuiously fair and was clear· ly intended. Which is tb.e precise financial year in any case would depend on its facts and this, would make no difference in the construction of the provi sion. With regard to the other question about there being no shortfall between eighty per cent. of the amount of tax found payable on the regular assess ment and the amount of tax paid in a case where no tax was paid, it setms to us the position is much simpler. If no tax is paid, the amount of such shortfall will naturally be the entire eighty per cent. We also think that the case before us is very near to Allen'B oaBe(l) ..__ I It remains now to refer to sub-s.(9) of s. l8A. That sub·section provides for payment of penalty in tenms of s. 28 upon submission of estimates under sub·secs. (2) and (3) known or reasonably believed to be untrue or upon failure without (I) (1P8i 22 T.C. l.S. 16, 17. ' ' 1961 Gursahai Saital •. Cur salrai Saigal lneome•Tax, Punjab Sarkar J. 904 SUPREME COtJRT REPORTS [1963] reasonable cause to comply with the provisions of sub-sec.(3). We are unable to see that this provi sion in any way affects the construction of sub the solution of the secs.(6) or (8) or assists in difficulty which has arisen in this oase, The penalty liability under sub-sec.(9) is penalty in the real sence, and is leviable for reasons different from those on which the levy of interest (6) and (8) is besad. under sub-secs. sub-seo. (6) and (8) which his in addition to the The result, therefore, is that these appeals are the High Court dismissed aud the decision of answering the question framed is upheld for the reasons earlier mentioned. The respondent will get the costs of these appeals. Appeals dismissed. 1982 August 31. SHAM KARTIK SINGH v. MATH ORA (P. B. GA.JENDRAGADKAR, K.C.DAs GUPTA and RAGHUBER DAYAL, JJ.) Te,,ancy Law-Sir la.nds-Suit for ejeclment oflenanta Decree-Appeal-Pending appeal provision made for filing particulars in suits for ejectment-Statute providing penal~y .of di•missal of suit for failure to file particulars-Retrospeciivity -If substantial compliance sufficient - U .P .Tenancy Act. 1939 (U.P. 27 of 1939), ss. 6.16,19-U, P. Tenancy(Amen~ment)Act 1941(U.P. [I) o/ 19"7),s.31. The appellants filed suit under the U.P Tenancy Act, 1939 for the ejectment of the respondents who were tenants of si;. The appellants filed the necessary extracts of pap~rs in support of their case. The trial court decreed the suits +- 4 0