Judgment · Supreme Court

Judgment

J.) That while sub-s. (1) of s. 48 confers a power on the Central Government, sub-s. (2) of s. 16 imposes a duty upon it and therefore, it is obligatory upon the Central Government to ,prescribe the period within which the insurer is to move the' Corporation for referring the claim to the Tribunal. When the law requires a period to be prescribed for doing a thing, that period should be clearly specified with specific reference to the particular purpose. The specific purpose r~ferred to in Sub·s. (2) of s. 16 is, to have the matter refl'rred to the tribunal for decision. "Making of the refer ence is thus in the hands of the corporation and not in these of ]insurer who can only move the corporation for making the reference. Time has to be pre•cribed for enabling the insurer to move the Corporation. Prescribing time for making a reference is not prescribing time for moving the corporation to make the reference. Prescribing implicatfon would not be compliance with the provisions of Sub-s. (2} of •. 16. time by I~ ' West Durby Union v. Metropolitan Life ABBuranee Oo. [1897] A. C. ti47, referred to. While framing r. 12 the Rule making authority lost sight of the fact that Sub-s. (2) of s. 16 contemplates a refer ence not by the insurer but by the corporation. The pro ceeding taken before the tribunal were therefore misconceived. No question of limitation arises because the oeriod within 1962 •• Bt"ndrulcn ld~cl ltUllltlftU Co. Ltd. Lije llUU'Onc. ~dionoflnJi4 l ' 58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963] which an insurer must move the corporation to make a reference has not yet been pre•crfbed as required by Sub·s.(2) of s. 16. It would be open to the appellant to move the corporation under s. 16(2) after such period is prescribed . It was urged by the insurer that the claim cannot treated as barred by time and this was a fit case for extension of time und<r the proviso tor. 12. it appli.,. Held, As r. 12, read by itself does not show clearly to the corporation or it applies to an whether it is permissible to insurer or a chief agent or a special agent, look into the proviso for ascertaining the scope of the main provisions of that rule. Reading it along with the proviso would not violate any well accepted rule of construction. Held (per Sarkar, J.), that the insurer had no right to move the tribunal directly and the proceedings commenced by it before the tribunal were therefore wholly misconceived and no relief could be granted by the tribunal to the insurer. As the insurer had no right to move the tribunal, no question of extending time for it to do so really arose. If the appli cation for extension of time to move the tribunal is treated ""competent under the proviso of r. 12 of the rules, then also, the appellant is not entitled to any relief, for there is no justification on the merits to interfere with the tribunal's order refusing to extend time. The proceedings being in competent, an enquiry as to whether it had been started out of time would be wholly irrelevant and it is therefore unneees· sary to express any opinion on the correct interpretation of r. 12 of the Rules. The proceeding being incompetent from the beginning it is not possible for this Court to grant any relief and, therefore, the appeal must fail in any case. Crvn. APPELLATE JURIBDICT.ION : Civil Appea.1 No. 82 of 1960 . • .Appeal by specia.l lea.ve from judgment end order dated February 17, 1958, of the Court of Life Insure.nee Tribunal, Nagpur, in case No. 16/ XVIA of 1957. B. K. B. Naidu, for the appellant. 8. T. De.8<1i, S. J. l/anaji er:d E. L. Hothi, for ~ the reepondent. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 59

#1962. April 12. The following Judgment.a were delivered. The Judgment C>f Subba Rao and Mudholkar, JJ; was delivered by Mudholkar, J. ·SARKAR J.-The Andhra Insurance Company Ltd., hereafter called the insurer, carried on life insurance and other imluranoe business. On Sep tember 1, 1956, the life insurance business of the insurer became vested in the Life Insurance Corpo· 't ration of India under the provisions of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956. The insurer ( thereupon became entitled to compensation from the Life Insurance Corporation under s. 16 of the Aot. Hbtllusl"" lde•I ln•tiraN• Co. Ltd. v. LiJ• ,,,,.,.,..,. Corporlilion •f lnii• Sar/et" J. \-- ; ).. ,1. On February 19, 1957, the Corporation hav. ing determined the amount of the compensation and obtained the Central Government's approval made an offer of .it to the insurer as provided in s. 16. By the letter making the offer, the Corpora· tionta~laimd~d vtariousitde?uotiotns. The insure; raisehd t e purpose of this appeal to refer to these disputes. 1s no necessary 1or Ill 1spu es. On August 6, 1957, the insurer ma.de an appli· cation to the Tribunal whioh had been constituted on May 25, 1957 for an order for re-asseSBment of the compensation payable to it. In that application it also made a prayer that the Tribunal might, if ne~ssary, extend the time for making the a.pplica tion by three months from the date of its constitu tion. On September 21, 1957, the insurer filed in the Tribunal another statement giving the details of its claim. The Corporation in its tum filed its written statement in answer ·to the claim of the insurer. ' "'1 The Tribunal by its judgment dated February 17, 1958 held that under s. 16 of the Act an insu· rer had no right to approach the Tribunal directly for deciding any dispute with the Corporation reg arding the a.mount of the oompensation but ha.d /!J6:t. H1ndu1£ar1 Id.al frJsurance Co. Ltd. v. Life lnJuronce CAtJ>orGlion of India Sarkar J. 60 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963)

to move the Corporation to make a reference of tho dispute to the Tribunal and this, the present insurer had not done. It also held that the insurer had not shown any cause why the time to make the reference to the Tribunal should ue extended. It further held that the claim for compensation In the result, the Tribunal dismissed was by time. the insurer's application. The insurer obtained special leave from this Court to a.ppoal a~a.inst tho j111lgment of the Tribu nal and under that leave has prrSl'nted this appeal. Aftor th<> leave was granted, tho insurer amalgama ted with another company called the Hindustan Ideal Insurance Company Ltd. and the latter company was substituted as ~he appellant in the place of the insurer. Now s. l6 of the Act is in these terms : S. 16 ( 1) "Where the controlled busine88 of an insurer h:ui been transferred to and vested in the Corporation under this Act, compensa tion shall be given by the Corporation to that insurer in accordancp, with the principles contained in the First Schedule. (2) The a.mount of the compensation to be given in accordance with t.qe aforesaid principles shall be determined by the Corpo the first insurance, and if the ration Amount so deformined is approved by the Central Governmc-nt it shall be offored to the insurer in full satisfaction of the compensa· tion payable to him under this Act, and if, on the other hand, the amount so offered is not acceptable to the insurer he may within such time as may be prescribed for tho pur pose have the matter reference to the Tribunal for decision.'' It is obvious from the terms of sub-sec. (2) of s. 16, and it is indeed not seriously in dispute, that the i • ( , • ' 195S Hindust•n I deal I nsu•ance of Incli• •• Life lnsur•nCI C or/Jaralion oJ Int/id Sarkar J. 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 61 Tribunal can be moved by an insurer only through the Corporation. An insurer has no right under the section to approach the Tribunal directly. The procedure contemplaten is that an insurer has to the Corporation and the Corporation has thereupon to refer the dispute raised by tha insurer to the Tribunal. l'his inevitably follows from the words : in section, namely, "he may ...... have the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision." The section no doubt does not mention the Corporation but it is clear from the Aot as whole that the refer. nee contemplated was through the Corporation. The insurer had to move some authority to make the reference and the only authority under the Act could be the Corporation. On this part of the case I am in agreement with the view expressed in the judgment of my brother Mudholkar. In the present case however the insurer had directly moved the Tribunal. This it had no right to do. The proceedings commenced by it were therefore wholly misconceived. That being so, the insurer could not have obtained any relief from the Tribunal nor could the Tribunal have granted it any relief. In this appeal, therefore, it is not possible for the Court either to grant any relief to the insurer or its successor-in-interest, the appel lant. The proceeding being incompetent from the beginning, the appellant cannot ask for anything in it. It would have been noticed that the insurer had. asked the Tribunal to extend the time to enable it. to make the application to the Tribu nal: As it had no right to move the Tribunal, no question of extending any time to do so really arose. -i ! \ 1 ·~ Now r. 12 ..,f the Rule framed under the Act ~ provides for "the time within which a reference .. Hindudc.n ldul ln.ntrm&t C.. Ltd. LiJ• /111uratte1 C 01jwol ion of Indio Sark•rJ. 62 SUPltEME OOURT ltEPORTS (1963] may be ma.de to the Tribunal in respect of the de termination of compensation pa.:r_able under the Act." The time prescribed for the present caae was three months from the date on which the compensation was offered to the insurer. Within these three months the insurer had done nothing. Thie rule, however, contains a. proviso which is in these terms : ,- "Provided that any such reference may be admitted by the Tribunal after thti period of limitation prescribed thereunder this rule, if the person ma.king thtJ reference satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient ca.use for not ma.king the reference within the ea.id period. If it ie contended that the insurer was entitled to move the Tribune.I directly under this proviso and had in fact done so, then, I think, it must be held that the Tribune.I was right in its view·tha.t nooause had been shown by the insurer why time should be extended. Therefore if the a.pplica.tion so far as it asked for extension of time is tr11&ted as a. com petent one under this proviso, then also on the merits, the appellant is not entitled to any relief, is no justification to interfere with the for there order that the Tribune.I ma.de in this behalf. The appeal must in any case fa.ii. I do not feel ca.lied upoQ to go into any ques tion of limitation in the present case. The proceed ing being incompetent, an inquiry as to whether it had been started of time would be wholly irrele I, therefore, think it unnecessary to express vant. any opinion on the interpretation of r. 12 of the Rules ma.de under the Act. The result ie that the appeal is dismissed. As to cost.B, I think that as the Corporation itself had not before the Tribune.I contended that the pro ceeding wu incompetent nor had ra.illed any such T < • • ,. ·• 1gs2 Hindusl,. Id.a I Insurane~ Co. Ltd. •• Lift Insur_, CO'fporati(lll ef India Al wlholltM .T. ' r ., 2 s.c.B. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ii· 6a point in its statement of case in this appeal it is not entitled to any. , MuDHOLKAR, J.-The Andhra Insurance Co., Ltd., (hereinafter called the Company) was a com posite insurance company, that is, doing business in life insurance, fire insurance and general insurance. By virtue of the provisions of s. 7(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 (31 of 1956) (here· inafter called the Act) all its assets and liabilities ' pertaining to the life insurance business stood trans· / ferred and vested in the Life Insurance Corporotion on September 1, 1956. Under s. 16(1J of the Act the Company was entitled to receive compensation the Corporation determined in accordance with the principles contained in First Schedule to the Act. On February 14, 1957, the Corporation wro~ to the Company stating, among other things, . that the amount of' compensation payable to it under s. 16( l) of the Act as determined by the , Corporation and approved by the Central Govern ~. ment comes to Rs. 6,14,636. The Corporation made an offer of this amount to the Company in full satisfaction of the compensation payable to it. The Corporation further stated in its letter that the part of the paid up capital of the Company and assets representing such part which have been allocated to the life business of the Company in accordance with s. 18 of the Life Insurance Corporation Rules, (hereinafter called the Rules) amounts to l 9/i6 .~ ;. Rs: 3, 76,117/- and that as the aforesaid assests have not been transferred to the corporation the said amount ofR~. 3,76,117/- will be set off against and deducted from the amount of compensation payable to ·the Company. Certain correspondence ensued· between the Company and the Corporation and it would appear from it that while the Company the oomputa.tion of the a.mount of com- accepted ~ pensation ma.de by the Corporation there was dis agreement between the parties over the valuation I IPlll ,,,,..,.,...c..Lti >li•lrulM ldMI •• Li/1 J,u.,race C••rtd'-t e/ I Mia MuAa/htJ. 64 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1963] of the &88ets of the Company which stood transferr ed to the Corporation. The Company objected to the deductione of Rs. 3,76,117/. Eventually on August 6, 1957 the Company preferred a petition of appeal before the L..ife Insurance Tribunal, Nagpur, constituted by the Central Government under s. 17(1) of the Act, On September 21, 1957 the Company lodged its statement of olsim before the Tribunal. The Corporation resisted the claim put forward by the Company on various grounds. The Tribunal framed 27 issues but it gave its find- ings only on the first three issues and dismissed the claim. We may mention that we are not oonoemed with any of the issues except No. 3 because it is on the basis of its finding thereon that it dismissed the olaim of the Company. That issue is whether the claim of the Company is barred by time. It does not appear from the writter statement of the Corporation that it had raised a plea of limitation. All the same the Tribunal in its order hae aaid that as the Compaay did not lodge a claim before it within three months of February 14, 1957, which was the date on which compensation was offered by the Corporation to the Company it was barred by r. 12 of the Rules framed under the Act. The Tribunal further observed that the Company had to move tho Corporation under s. 16(2) of the Act to make a reference to the Tribunal, it failed to do so and that it did not show any cause whatso ever for its failure to do so, but instead submitted its claim direct to the Tribunal on August 12, 1957. No question, therefore, excusing delay under the proviso to r. 12 arose. • , \ • .. Aggrieved by the decision of the Tribunal the Company moved this Court under Art. 136 of the Conetitution for grant of special leave to appeal. Leave was granted by this Con rt on August 18, 1958. ""' Subsequent to the grant of leave by this Court the · Company in pul'lluanoe of its soheme sanctioned by I 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 65 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh was amalgamat ed with the Hindustan Ideal Insurance Co., Ltd. By reason of this the letter has now been RU bstituted as appellant under the orders of this Court dated April 14, 1959. On behalf of the appell1mt Mr. B.K.B. Naidu contended that since the Tribunal itself waR not appointed before the expiry of the period of three months providrd in r, I 2, the claim made by the Company cannot be treated as barred, by time because in his submission limitation would not commence to run till the date on which the Tribu nal was constituted. Alt.ernatively he contended that this was a fit case in which, under the proviso tor. 12, time should have been extended. 1961 -Hindustan Ide4l "' L je lniuronce Corpo·atinn of ltuli• Ins .. ,ance Co. Ltd. Mudt1olka• J, On behalf of the Corporation Mr. S. T. Desai contended that under sub-s.2 of s. 16 it was not open to an insurer like the Compan,v to prefer a claim directly before the Tribunal and that all that the law entitled the Company to do was to move the Corpl'ra tion to make a reference, that this had to be done within therPupon the Corporation had to make a reference to the Tribunal within the p~1icd of three months prescribed by r. 12. Since this procedure was not adopted the proceedings before the Tribunal were incompetent. three months and Sub-section 2 of s. 16 reads thus : •·The amount of the compensation to be given in accordanre with the aforesaid prinri ples shall bP determined by the Corporation in first instance, and if the amount so determined is approved by the Central Government it shall be offered to the insurer in full satisfaction of the compensation payable to him under this Act, and if, on the other hand, the amount so offered is not acceptable to the insurer he may within such time as may be prescribed for the purpose have the matter referred to the Tri bunal for deoieion." 1962 lliwli1R•on ftiro/ lr.111r,,ru:e CO. Ltd. v. Life ln11nanu Oarparation a/ Indio Mu:f.~olka1 J. 66 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] A plain rPading of this proviRion shows that the reference had to he ma.de not by the insurer but by someone else. Though that someone is not expres sly specified in sub-a. :!, the context shows that that someone would be none other than the Corpo ration. The Central Go..-ernmont has not at any rate specifically prescribed the period within which the insurer has to move the Corporation for referr ing its claim to the Tribunal for decision. According to this provision the insurer entitled to have the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision "'\'•ithin such time as may be prescribed for the purpose." "Prescribed" means prescribed by l{ull'B. that the It would, therefore, follow Central Government has to make a rule prescribing the period within which the insurer must move the Corporation for making the reference. Mr. Desai, however, contendij that that is not provision means. A~cording to him the provision bas to be read along with a. 48(:!)(f; of the Act. Section 48 is the provision which confers power on the Central Government to make rules. Clause (f) of sub-s. 2 enable it to prescribe the time within which any matter which mav be referred to the Tribunal for a decision under t he Act may be so referred. There fore, accordini;: to learned counsel, it is the period of limitation for this purpose which the Central Government bas to prPscribe and not the p· riod within which the insurer must move the Tribunal. He, however, says that the inaurer has to move the Corporal ion before the expiry of the period within which the Corporation is to make a refe rence to the Tribunal. 0 . ' r l • • ,. • We cannot accept the contention. On the plain language of sub-s. 2 of s. 16 it is obligatory to prescribl' the upon the Central Government period within which the insurer is to move the , Corporation for r1:fcrring its claim to the Tribunal. No doubt, cl. (f) does not refer to the prescription .-i 1961 Hindus/an Ideal lnsurone~ Co. Ltd. Y. Life liuurtJ11ee Cor/JoTation of fnrlia Mud!r,olkor J. ) 2 S. C. R. SUl>REME COURT REPORTS 57 of time for such a purpose. But the provisions of sub-s. I of s. 48 are wide enough to enable the Central Government to prescribe tl!.e time for this purpose. Under that sub-seJtion the Central Go vernment is empowered to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act. One of the purpose of the Act is to prescribe the time within which an insurer has to move the Corporation for making a reference. While sub-s. 1 of s. 4$ confers a power on the Central Government, sub-s. 2 of s. 16 imposes a duty upon it and, therefore, it is obligatory upon the Central Government to make a rule in this behalf by exercising the power under s. 48 (1). Mr. Des!1i then contends that, the rule actually framed by the Cdntral Government that is, r. 12 must be deemed to be sufficient for his purpose. That rule is in following terms : "Reference to Tribunal.-The time with- ,, in which a reference may be made to the Tribunal in respect of the determination of compensation payable under the Act, shall be as follows, namely :- (i) . .1 ~ • (ii) in the case of an insurer to whom com pensation is payableunder Part A or Part B or Part C of the First Schedule to the Act, within three months from the date on which the compensation determined by the Corporation is offered to the insu- rer; in the case of an insurer to whom com pensation is payable under Part B of the First . Schedule to the Act, within six the date on which the months . from compensation determined by the Corpo ration is offered to the insurer ; (iii) in ·the case of compensation payable to a Chief agent or special agent under the 19G~ Hindu&le.n ltf1ol lnSUJ anc1 Co. L!t/. v. Lift ln1Uf'linC4 Corpor .. lhn of lndi2 JI iulhdkar , ' . 68 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1963) proviso to section 36 of the Act, within three months from the date on which the compensation determined b.v the Corpo- ration is offen'd to the chief a.gent or special a.gent, a.s the case ma:v be : Provided that any such reference may be arlmitted by the Tribunal after the period of limitation prescribed therefor under this rule, if the person making the reference satisfies the 'fribunal that he h&d sufficient cause for not ma.king the reference within the said period." • • According to Mr. Desai, under eub-r. (l) of th.is Rule the Corporation has to make a ref.,renoe to the Tribunal within three months. It would, thArefore, a.ccordin~ to him, follow that the insurer must move the Corporation before the expiry of that p!'lriorl and that, therefore, by framing this rule the Central Government has not only carried out the requirements ofol. (fl of sub-s. 2 of s. 48 but also of sub-11. 2 of s. 16. It is difficult to appreciate this argument for two reasons. The first one is that when the law requires a. period to be prescribed fo; doing & thing, that period should be clE>arly specified with specific reference to the particular purpose. The specific purpose referred to in Hub-s. 2 of s. 16 is "to have the matter referred to the Tribunal for decision." Making of the reference is thus in the hands of the C'-0rporation and not the insurer who can only move the Corporation for making the refenmce. Time is required to be prescribed for doing this act by the inaurer. Prescribing time for ma.king a. reference is not prescribin!! time for moving the ,. Corporation to make the referl"nce. It ma.y be that · when the latter period is prescribed it . would be • possible to say that before the expiry of that period the insurer must move the Corporation. But • 19112 Hindusfa11 l1hal lnsurJnca Co.Ltd. v. Life lnsuronce Corporatiori oj Indid M udlmlf, at J . 2 s.c.R. SUPREME C'OURT REPQR,TS 69 prescribing time by implication would not be com pliance wfoh the provisions of sub-s. 2 of s. 16. For, when a period is prescribed for doing an act the person who has to do that act is entitled to do it even on the last day. If the construction of learned· counsel is accepted it would mean that the insurer would be within time under r. 12 if he moves the Corporation on the date· on which the period of three months expires. If he does that how would it be. possible for the Corporation to make a refe rence to the Tribunal al·.o on \he same <lay ? The second reason for not accepting the construction placed by learned counsel is that the proviso to r. 12 empowers the Tribunal to admit a reference after the period of limitat.ion prescribed therefor if the "person making the reference" satis fies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not. making the reference within the prescribed period. The proviso thus indio'.l.tes that the reference to the Tribunal contemplated by r. 12 is to be made by the insurer and not by the Corporation. This appears to be so from the language of the proviso itself. ·No doubt r. 12, considered without the proviso, may well be construed as applying to reference to be made by the Corporation. But considering the rule along with the proviso it would appear that the rule was meant to govern a refe rence by someone else and not the Corporation. That someone could be either the insurer or a chief agent or special agent wh? also is entitled to compensation!under the proviso to s. 36. J..earned counsel then advanced a rather novel argument. The argument is this. While the open ing words of r. 12 may apply to the Corporation as to an insurer, a chief agent or a special agent sub-rr. (i), (ii) and !iii) thereof apply only to the Corpo- ration, whereas the proviso applies only to an insu l'er or a ohief agent or special agent as the case may be. If the provision, that ie, the whole or r. 12-ii i I I 70 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (Hl63] I9RI n;nd.,••n Id.al I"'""""' Co. Lil. would not be rendered 1·eciundant. read thus, the contention procredP, there would be no lacuna in the rnles, and the provibo lo r. 12 Y, Lift lruuran~ Oorporolion of Intli4 M 11dJiolA ar J. All that l\Ir. Desai could s1<y in support of Lis contention thut •ub-rr. (i), (ii) and (iii) of r. 12 must be eonst1 ucd to apply to the Corporation alone is that such a construction would avoid a lacuna ill the rules. But what is the lacuna? We have already pointed out that tho lacuna is in not vrescribing the time within which an insurer must move the Corporation for making a reference. That l .. mna will not be removed even if we accept the const1 uction pressed by learned counsel. That apart, upon the language of the sub·rules, they cannot be oonstrued as applying to the Corporation alone. Learned counsel then contendl'd that if we construe the proviso in such a way us to make the substantive provisions of r. 12 applicablti to an insurer or a chief agent and not to the Corporatian we would be limiting the scope of the main enact ing provision and that is not permissible. There is no doubt that where the main provi sion is clear its effect cannot be cut down by the proviso. But where it is not clear the proviso, which cannot be presumed to t,e a surplusage, can properly be looked into the ascertain the me1ming .By looking at and 1;eope of the mai.n 1 roviMion. the provii;o for this purpooe the rule of ::onitl uction refened to by learned counsel will not be infring ed. In the West Derby Union v. M etrapolitJm Life . A68'urance Co .. (1) Lord Watson observed: " ......... I p.erfoctly admit the.t there may be and are many oases which the terms of e.n intelligible proviso may throw conaidera.ble • (I) ( 1897) A.C. 'f I, 6~2. • ' 1962 Hindust,.,n Ideal . 1uuronce Co. Ltd, v. LiJe /nJ11rtmce Co1poru.1ion of Ltd. Mudho/kar J. -+ I -1 I 2 S.C.R. SUPREME CO ORT ,REPORTS 71 ·light on the ambiguous import of the statu· . tory words." Tn the same case Lord Herschell admitted that a proviso may be a useful guide in the selection of one or other of two possible constructions of words in the enactinen t or to show the soo pe of the latter in a doubtful case. Here we find that r. 12 read by itself does not show clearly whether it appeals to the Corpora tion special agPnt. It is thernfore, permissible to look into the proviso for' ascertaining the scope of the main provisions of r. l:!. As we have stated earlier the proviso cannot, upon its proper construc tion apply to the Corporation.· When, therefore, we read r. 12 as a whole, that is, along with the proviso we woµld not be violating any well-accept ed rule of construction though by so reading it we came to the conclusion that r. 12 applies only to an insurer or a chief agent or a special agent but not to the Corporation. We may further point out that the proviso would be rendered useless if we are to bold that r. 12 deals with a reference made by the Corpora tion . only. The reason why we say that it will be rendered useless is this. Supposing an insurer moves the Corporation beyond three months for the Corporation be making a reference, would bound to make the reference ? Upon the terms of aub-s. 2 of s. 16 the Corporation would only be bound to make a reference if is moved by the in surer within the prescribed period. If that is so, then no occasion would ariRe for enabling the in surer to move the Tiibunal for condoning the delay. According to Mr. Desai, however, the Corporation could be compelled by mandamus to make the refe rence. The short answer to that is that there being no duty upon the Corporation to make a reference after the expiry or the period prescri'Jed by r. 12 no mandamus can issue to it. 1961 •• Binli.;stan ttlul lruur~1i.c. QJ. U4. Life Jn1uranc• Cwj>otaho11 of India Jlu4/wlk«' J, 12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1963] Another reason for not accepting the conten tion of learned couusal is that the proviso speak of the person making the reference eatisfying the Tribu nal that he has sufficient cause for not making tho reference withiu the samtl period. If the insur<r is not the person making the reference, how can he be said to be permitted to Hatisfy .the Tribunal about the sufficiency of the cause for condoning the delay in making the reference ? Mr. Desai, how ever, suggest that we should read the words "if the person making tho rtlference satisfies tho Tri bunal. .. etc." as if they read "if the person at whoso instance the reference is made satisfies the Tri buual. .. etc." That would be re-writing the pro vi. sion which we cannot do. It seems to us that while framing r. 12 the rule making authority lost sight of f~ct that sub s. 2 of s. 16 conttin:plates a reference not hy the insurer but by the Corporation. Learned counsel urged that we should not place an interpretation upon the rule which will leave a serious lacuna in the working ol the act. We appreciate his conten tion but there is no esoa.pe from the result. The proceedings before the Tribunal were mis conceived because the only way in which they could be initiated was by a reference by the Corpo ration and there was no such reference. No question of limitation arises because the period within which an in8urcr must move the Corporation to make a reference has not yet been prescri berl as required by sub-s. 2 of s. 16. It will be open to the Appellant to move the Corporation under a. 16(2) after such period is prescribed. • • • In the result we quash all the proceedings be fore the Tribunal but in the particular circumsta nces make no order as to costs. • Appeal Dismisse.d.