April r9 v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & Ors.

temple and members of the public offered worship therein, though there was no formal dedication; and the shops were let out on rent for the upkeep of the dharmasala and temple. They allege that after the State of Punjab death of Ramji Das they came into possession of the properties in question but in January, 1958, the res pondents, namely, the State of Punjab, some of its officials, and the Municipal Committee, Bafnala, by force and without any authority of law dispossessed them from the dharmasala in question and further deprived them of the control and mll.nagement of the said dharmasala and temple and are seeking to interfere with their management and control of the shops appurtenant thereto. The Municipal Com- mittee, it is stated, was put in possession of the dharmasala and has opened its office in its main room. The petitioners first asked for a copy of the orders in pursuance of which these acts were commit- ted, but were unable to obtain the same.

The peti- tioners then made an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the Punjab High Court, which was rejected on the preliminary ground that the matter involved disputed questions of fact. An appeal was also dismissed on the same ground. The petitioners then filed the present petition and contend that the orders in pursuance of which the acts of dispossession have been committed as well as the acts themselves, constitute a flagrant infringement by the State and its officials of the fundamental right of the petitioners to hold and possess the properties in question unless and until they are evicted in due course of law, and accordingly they have prayed that: (i) a suitable writ, order or direction be issued quashing the illegal orders of the State Government, the Deputy Commissioner, Sangrur, and the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Sangrur, if any, culminating in the handing over of possession, management and control over the dharmasala, the tern pie and the shops to the Municipal Committee, Barnala, dist.riot Sangrur; (ii) a suitable writ, order or direction be issued t t Bishan Das v.

Slate of Punjab S. K. Das ], 72 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] prohibiting the respondents from interfering with the management and control of the petitioners over the temple and the shops and wiLh the realization of rent of the shops by the petitioners; (iii) a suitable writ, order or direction be issued to the repondents to wi~hdraw their possession, con trol and management over the dharmasala and other properties and to put the petitioners in possession over the same; and (iv) .such other and further writ, order or direc tion be issued which this Court may deem fit and proper in the interests of the petitioners. It is necessary at this stage to recite briefly some of the earlier history relating to the dharmasala, temple and shops, so far as such history is available from the undisputed documents filed before us. It is not disputed that the land on which the dharmasala, temple and shops stand was "nazul" property of the then State of Patiala.

Sometime in 1909 Lala Ramji Das who was carrying on a joint family business in the name and style of Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das asked for permission to construct a dharmasala on the land in question which was near Barnala railway station and therefore convenient to travellers who come to that place. At first, permission to build a dharmasala was granted by the then Patiala Govern ment in favour of the Choudhuris of Barnala bazar, who were unable however to get together adequate funds for the purpose. Ramji Das then asked for sanction to construct the dharmasala in the name of the firm Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das and at the firm's expense sometime in May, 1909. This sanction was granted and communicated to Ramji Das by the Assistant Surgeon in-charge of Barnala hospital, who was presumably in-charge of public health arrange ments at Barnala. The sanction was made subject to the following conditions (see Ex.

A) : "(l) No tax be taken for this land from them. (2) The shopkeepers will arrange 'Piao' (shed for the arrangement for supplying drinking water} for the passengers and will maintain it. ' t 1 I I I ... 1961 Bishan Das v. State of Punjab S. K. Das]. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 73 (3) Plans of the building which they want to con struct should at first be presented before me (Assis tant Surgeon in-charge). (4) They will be responsible for observing cleanli ness and sanitary rules and will construct good drains. (5) No permission to construct any shop will be granted. The building will be constructed only for the passengers. (6) If the abovementioned conditions are not ful- filled, the State will dispossess them of the land. " In 1909 the dharmasala was constructed with an in scription on stone to the effect "Dharmasala Lala Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das, mahajan, 1909." It appe ars that though one of the conditions was that permis sion to construct shops would not be granted, a number of shops were later constructed with the permission of the authorities concerned for meeting the expenses for the maintenance of the temple and dharmasala.

Soon after, that is in 1911, there was a complaint against Ramji Das (Ex. B) in which allegations were made to the effect that Ramji Das was utilising the dharma sala for his private purpose, etc. Nothing appears to have come out of this complaint. Sometime in Jan uary, 1925, Ramji Das himself appears to have made a statement to the Tahsildar, Barna.la, in which he said: "This inn land was given to me by the Govern I invested money on the ment by way of wakf. building from my own funds for charitable purpose. I do not want to reap any benefit. The Govern ment will be within its rights to keep watch over it and maintain its accounts anyway it likes but it may not be used as a Government building and nor anyone be allowed to have a permanent abode therein. It may be specifically reserved for the con venience of incoming and outgoing passengers. The income derived from the shops by way of rent be spent over its repairs.

The income of rent is Rs. 15 to 16 per moPth. I have appointed one man as inn-keeper at the rate of Rs. 11 per month out of 10 Bishan Das v. State of Punjab S. [{. Das ]. 74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] this income for its supervision. He will remain over there permanently. " This statement was made in the course of an enquiry which was started earlier, the exact date of which is not ascertainable from the documents in this record but may have been instituted in 1920. On April 7, 1928, the Revenue Minister, Patiala State, passed an order which said that though the land on which the dharma sala had been built was originally Government land (nazul property), it would not be proper to declare it as such and the dharmasala should continue to exist for the benefit of the public. The order concluded with the following direction: "It would be proper if the inn be kept as it is for the public benefit, but it is hereby ordered that neither Ramji Das nor any other person will be competent to transfer it in any manner.

Ramji Das will look after it in the capacity of a Manager and the income accruing therefrom will be spent on the inn for the public benefit. And if Ramji Das or any other person or Manager will transfer it, then any such transfer will be considered unlawful and invalid and in such an event the Government will escheat it but even then this inn will be used for the public benefit. No Government servant will make therein a permanent abode and nor would it be sold as Nazool property. " The trouble did not end however with the order of the Revenue Minister. A re-investigation appears to have been ordered, presumably at the instance of the Sana.tan Dharma Sabha, Barna.la. Again, an enquiry was held and it was found by the Nazim, district Barna.la, that the dharmasala and temple were con structed by Ramji Das; that he employed three em ployees-one pandit for worship etc., one for looking after the travellers, and a third to keep the premises clean; that there was no order to take accounts from Ramji Das; and that repairs etc. were carried out from the rents of the shops.

The Nazim, however, said in his order that the 'Sarai' was declared to be that of the State, and presumably he said so on the ground that it stood on Government land. Later, Ramji Das .J.. Bishan Das v. Stale of Punjab S. 11.·. Das]. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 75 obtained further perrni~sion to make a raised platform and other extensions, details whereof are not neces sary for our purpose. We then come to 1954. On Scptcmbc1· 10, 1954, one Go pal Das, Secretary, Congress Committee, Bar na la, filed a petition to Lhe Revenue Minister, l'atiala, in whinh vario1rn allegations were made 11,gaiust Ramji Das n,nrl it was prayed that Ramji Das be sus p0nded and the management of the d harmn, sala etc. be taken over by the State. This petition was en quired into by the Tahsildar, who again found that the dharmasala was constructed by Rn,mji Das on Government land, that the dharmas?.la was for public benefit and that H,amji Das had been managing it all along.

He reported, however, that Ramji Das was bound to render accounts and as he had failed to do so .and considered the property to be his own, he should be removed and past accounts called for. The matter was then referred to the Legal Remembrancer of the State Government. This officer referred to the earlier order of the Revenue ~inister and pointed out that the dharmasala and temple, though built on Government htnd, were not Government propert,y and even th1mgh R::1mji Das w::1s repudiating the existence of a public trust, he was working as trustee of a trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature and could be removed only as a result of a suit under s. 92, Civil Procedure Code. The matter ap pears to have rested there and no further action was taken against Ramji Das on the petition of Gopal Das. We may .refer here to a somewhat earlier order of the Revenue Minister dated December 13, 1954, in which t)lere was a direction th:i,t a deed of trust should be executed appointing ltamji Das and two other persons as trustees.

1\o such trust deed appears ·to have been executed. We now come to the last part of the story. After the death of Ramji Das on December 10, 1957, the petitioners continued the management of the dharma sala, templn anJ the shops appurtenn, nt thereto. This was not seriously disputed before us. The petitioners • Biskan Das v. Slate of Punjttb S. K. Das ]. 76 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1962] paid the necessary taxes and electric charges for which they obtained receipts; they also realised the rent of the shops. On or about December 23, 1957, Gopal Das and some others describing themselves as members of the public, Barnala, made an application that since Ramji Das was dead, new arrangements should be made for the proper management of the dharmasala which is used for the benefit of the public. This led to fresh researches into the old papers, and this time the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bar nala, recommended that in the interest of Government (sometime before this Barnala come into the Punjab State) the Municipal Committee, Barnala, should take immediate charge of the management of the dharma sala.

This recommendation was affirmed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sangrur, who wrote to the Punjab Government for necessary sanction of the recommendation. The sanction has not been produced before us, but learned Counsel for the respnndents has produced before us the letter which the Deputy Com- missioner wrote. This letter says: . "Subject: Management of 'Sarai' near Railway Station, Barnala. Me.mo. One Shri Ramji Das was appointed as Manager vide order of the Revenue Minister of the erstwhile State of Patiala dated 26-12-1987Bk of the pro- perty, as cited subject. The Manager was only to look after the property and to utilize the income of the property for the improvement of the 'Sarai' for public welfare. Shri Ra.mji Das, manager is report- ed to have died and there iq none else to manage 'Sarai'. The S. D. 0., Barnala, has recommended that in the interest of the Government, tho i:nanagc- ment of the 'Sarai' m::ty immediately be entrusted to the ll'L C., Barn::tla.

I also fully agree with the views of tho S. D. 0., 1hrnala, who has accordingly been directed to hand over the mana.gement to the M. C. in anticipation of nppl'Oval of the Govern- ment. " In pursuance of the direction given hy the Deputy Commissioner, the Kanungo presumably in accordance • ;. J 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 77 Bishan Das v. State of Punjab S. K. Das J. with the orders of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barnala, dispossessed the petitioners from part of the dharma sala on January 7, 1958, and made over charge of the same to the Municipal Committee, Barnala. The petitioners challenge these orders as being without authority of law and complain that these orders and the acts committed in pursuance thereof, amount to a flagrant violation of their fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution. They say that they have been deprived of property by the State and its officers in pursuance of executive orders without authority of!aw; they have been denied equal protection of the laws; and their fundamental right to hold property has been violated in the most arbitrary manner which is destructive of the basic principles of the rule of law guaranteed by the Con stitution.

On behalf of the respondents an affidavit has been made by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Barnala, in which it has been stated, inter alia, that "the property is trust property of a public and charitable character and the petitioners are not entitled to claim any property rights in respect of the same". Assuming that the property is trust property of the nature suggested, no attempt has been made in the affidavit to show under what authority of law the State or its executive officers were justified in taking the action that was taken against the petitioners in respect of the dhar masala. Learned Counsel for the respondents has sought, to justify that action on the ground that the petitioners were mere trespassers and as the land on which the dharmasala stood belonged to the State, the respondents were entitled to use the minimum of force to eject the trespassers. Secondly he has con tended, on the strength of the decision of this Court in Bohan Lal v.

The Union of India('), that there is a serious dispute on questions of fact between the par ties in this case and also whether the petitioners have any right or title to the subject matter of dispute; therefore, proceedings by way of a writ are not appro priate in· this case inasmuch as the decision of the (r) [1957] S.C.R. 738. Bishan Das v. State of Punjab S. K. Das]. 78 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1962] Court would amount to a decree declaring a party's title and ordering restoration of possession. We consider that both these contentions are unsound and the petitioners have made out a clear case of the violation of their fundamental rights. There has been some argument before us as to the true legal effect of the sanction granted in 1909 to Ramji Das subject to the conditions adverted to earlier: whether it was a lease in favour of the firm Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das; whether it was a Iicenc~upled with a grant or an irrevocable licence within the meaning of s.

60(0) of the Easements Act, 1882. These are disputed ques tions which we do not think that we are called upon to decide in the present proceeding. The admitted posi tion, so far as the present proceeding is concerned, is that the land belonged to the State; with the permis sion of the State Ramji Das, 011 behalf of the joint family firm of Faquir Chand Bhagwan Das, built the dharmasala, temple and shops and managed the same during his life time. After his death the petitioners, other members of the joint family, continued the management. On this admitted position the peti tioners cannot be held to be trespassers in respect of the dharmasala, temple and shops; nor can it be held that the dharmasala, temple and shops 'belonged to the State, irrespective of the question whether the trust created was of a public or private nature. A trustee even of a public trust can be removed only by procedure known to law.

He cannot be removed by an executive fiat. It is by now well settled that the maxim, what is annexed to the soil goes with the soil, has not been accepted as an absolute rule of law of this country; see Thakoor Chunder Parmanick v. Ramdhone Bhuttacharjee (');Lala Beni Ram v. Kundan Lall(') and Narayan Das Khettry v. Jatindranath (3 ). These decisions show that a person who bona fide puts up constructions on land belonging to others with their permission would not be a trespasser, nor would the buildings so constructed vest in the owner of the land by the appliu1ttion of the maxim quicquid planta It is, therefore, impossible to hold· tur solo, solo cedit. (1) (1866) 6 W,R. 228. (2) (1899) L,R. 26 I.A. 58. (3) (1927) L.R. 54 I.A. 218. • Bishan Das v. State of Punjab S. K. Das], 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 79 that in respect of the dharmasala, temples and shops, the State has acquired any rights whatsoever merely by reason of their being on the land belonging to the State.

If the State thought that the constructions should be removed or that the condition as to resump tion of the land should be invoked, it was open to the State to take appropriate legal action for the purpose. Even if the State proceeded on the footing that the trust was a public trust it should have taken appro priate legal action for the removal of the trustee as was opined by the State's Legal Remembrancer. It is well recognised that a suit under s. 92, Civil Pro cedure Code, may be brought against persons in possession of the trust property even if they claim adversely to the trust, that is, claim to be owners of the property, or against persons who deny the vali- . dity of the trust. Learned Counsel for the respondents has drawn our attention to the statement of Ramji Das made in 1925 and the order of the Revenue Minister dated Decem. her 13, 1954, and bas contended that Ramji Das him. self admitted that he was a mere trustee.

Be that so; but that does not give the State or its executive officers the right to take the law into their own hands and remove the trustee by an executive order. We nmst, therefore, repel the argument based on the contention that the petitioners were trespassers ·and could be removed by an executive order. The argument is not only specious but highly dangerous by reason of its implications and impact on law and order. As to the second argument, it is enough to say that it is unnecessary in this case to determine any dis puted questions of fact or even to determine what precise right the petitioners obtained by the sanction granted to their firm in 1909. It is enough to say that they are bona fide in possession of the construc tions in question and could not be removed except under authority of law. The respondents clearly viola. ted their fundamental rights by depriving them of possession of the dharmasala by executive orders.

Those orders must be quashed and the respondents must now be restrained from interfering with the .>"'.; 80 BUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] I \ z96z -- Bishan Das petitioners in the management of the dharmasala, temple and shops. A writ will now issue accordingly. Before we part with this case, we feel it our duty state 0j' Punjab to say that the executive action taken in this case by the State and its officers is destructive of the basic s. K. Das J. principle of the rule of law. The facts and the posi tion in law thus clearly are (1) that the buildings con structed on this piece of Government land did not belong to Government, (2) that the petitioners were in possession and occupation of the buildings and (3) that by virtue of enactments binding on the Government, the petitioners could be dispossessed, if at all, only in pursuance of a decree of a Civil Court obtained in proceedings properly initiated.

In these circum stances the action of the Government in taking the law into their hands aud dispossessing the petitioners by the display of force, exhibits a callous disregard of the normal requirements of the rule oflaw apart from what might legitimately and reasonably be expected from a Government functioning in a society governed by a Constitution which guarantees to its citizens against arbitrary invasion by the executive of peace ful possession of property. As pointed out by this Court in Wazir Chand v. The State of Himachal Pra desh('), the State or its executive officers cannot in terfere with the rights of others unless they can point to some specific rule of law which authorises their In Ram Prasad Narayan Sahi v. The State of acts. Bihar (') this Court said that nothing is more likely to drain the vitality from the rule of law than legislation which singles out a particular individual from his fellow subjects and visits him with a disability which is not imposed upon the others.

We have here a highly discriminatory and autocratic act which de prives a person of the possession of property without reference to any law or legal authority. Even if the property was trust property it is difficult to see how the Municipal Committee, Barna.la, can step in as trustee on an executive determination only. The reasons given for this extraordinary action are, to (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 408. (2) [1953] S.C.R. 1129. t 2 S.C.R. SUPR:ffiME COURT Rll:POR1'S 81 quote what we said in Sahi's case (supra), remarkable for their disturbing implications. For these reasons, we allow the application with costs and a writ will now issue as directed. Bishan Das v. State of Punjab Petition allowed. S. K. Das j. CARL STILL G. m. b. H. & ANOTHER v. THE STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS (S. K. DAS, J. L. KAPUR, M. HIDAYATULLAH, J.C. SHAH and T. L. VENKATARAMA ArYAR, JJ.) Sales Tax-Construction works-Interpretation of contract Supply of materials-Legality of tax thereon-SaZ.s Tax authoritieJ; taking proceedings to levy tax-Writ petition to ~uash proceedings -Maintainability-Bihar Sales Tax Act, r947 (Bihar I9 of r947), s.

2-Constitution of India, Arts. 226, 227. On December 19, 1953, the appellant, a company registered in West Germany, entered into a contract with a company in India to set up a complete coke oven battery ready for produc tion as well as by-products plants at Sindri in the State of Bihar, agreeing to erect and construct buildings, plants and machinery and deliver and supply accessories and articles from Germany and also locally from India, an.d render services fully described in the First Schedule, for an all inclusive price of Rs. 2,31,50,000. The contract provided that in case the con tractor failed to complete the works within the period specified therein the Indian company might take possession of the works and the materials which would become its property and com plete the works and deduct from the agreed price the expenses incurred in such completion. Under cl. l5(ii) of the contract all materials brought by the contractor upon the site shall im mediately b.ecome the company's property, hut such of them as during the progress of the works were rejected by the company ceased to be Company's property, and after the coke oven and by products plants had been constructed the contractor was entitled to remove the surplus materials. The clause further provided that the company shall not be liable for any loss if the materials were destroyed by fire or otherwise. Under the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1947, in a contract for execution of works, the materials used 11