Ramdhandas v. UNION OF INDIA

the Constitution is for the protection of fundamental rights under Art. 19(1)(f) and (g), Art. 31 and Art. 14 of the Constitution. The second and the third appli- cants are merchants who used to import considerable quantities of glass chatons upto 1957. The first appli- cant is an Association of merchants, some of whom were importers and some the actual users of glass Import of glass chatons-which form an chatons. important part of the raw materials for the manufac- ture of glass bangles and other similar articles of wear -could, be made only on licences granted by license ing authorities. Since 1955 the matter has been regu- lated by the Imports (Control) Order, 1955. This Order which was made by the Central Government in exer- cise of powers conferred by sections 3 and 4-A of the Import and Export Control Act, 1947, prohibited the import of a large number. of goods including inter alia glass cbatons, except under and in accordance with a licence, granted on application by the licensing 864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] • ' • • .. • • 1 v. GI Ch x96x Das Gupta ]. authorities under the Act. Policy statements are made from time to time by the Government of India, 1::;0, 1": :s indicating the policy for the issue of Import licences. users' Association The policy as regards the import of glass chatons for the period January, 1957 to the end of March, 1958 Union °! India was that the import was totally prohibited .. Since April 1958, the policy as laid down is that import was permitted only under the Export Promotion Scheme. It appears that in view of this policy statement no application was made at all by the second or third applicants or other merchants for the import of glass chatons, in 1957 or thereafter and no licence was issu ed to them. Licences were however issued in favour of the State Trading Corporation, for the import of glass cha tons of the value of five lakhs of Rupees, for the period April-September, 1958, and again, for the import of these goods of the value of Rs. 1,25,000 for the period October, 1958 to March, 1959. The present application was made on April 27, 1959. The prayer is that respondents 1 and 2-i.e., the Union of India and the Chief Controller, Imports, should be directed (i) to "forbear from giving the State Trading Corpora tion any preference over the petitioners, in the grant of permits", (ii) not to create a monopoly in favour of the State Trading Corporation, (iii) to cancel the import permits already granted in favour of respon dent No. 3-the State Trading Corporation and the petitioners also prayed that the respondent No. 3 should be directed not to import on the basis of im port licences already granted. It has to be mentioned at once that the periods of the import permit "already granted" as referred to in the petition has already expired and consequently, the last two prayers mentioned above cannot possibly be granted. There was no application at all by the second and the third applicants, or any of the mer chants who form the association, the 1st appellant for the issue of any import licences; there can be no question therefore of respondents 1 and 2 being given any preference over the petitioners in the grant of permits. Nor is there, as far as can be made out, any scheme to issue fresh licences in favour of the 1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 865 State Trading Corporation so that apart from what hfas already happened there is _no 1 uture act10n "to crea~e ~,monopo y m avou:? t e State Tradmg Corporat10n . Therefore the pet1t10ners usm' Association cannot be given any relief on the present application. quefstion offanhy Glass Chatons Impo, ters c;. I96, v. Learned Counsel however submitted that so long as Union of India / • Para. 6(h) of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, remains it will be useless for his clients to make any application Das Gupta J · for licences. Para. 6 lays down a number of grounds on which the Central Government or the Chief Con- troller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licence. The ground mentioned in the clause (h) is "if the licensing authority decide to canalise imports and the distribution thereof through special or specia- lised agencies or channels". Learned Counsel has argu- ed that this provision in clause (h) of Para. 6 is void being in contravention of Art. 19{l)(f) and (g), and Art. 31 of the Constitution. He also urged that to the extent s. 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947, permits the Central Government to make an order as fo Para. 6(h) s. 3 itself is ·bad. In view of these submissions the learned Counsel was permitted to urge his contentions against the validity of Para. 6{h) of the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, and also his limited attack against the validity of s. 3 of the Im- ports and Exports Control Act, 1947. The requirement as regards any goods that they cannot be imported except and in accordance with a licence is undoubtedly a restriction on the right to carry on trade in such goods and also on the right to acquire property. Learned Counsel does not however contend that by itself this requirement of s. 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act is an unreasonable restriction. His attack is only against the further restriction which follows from the provisions in s. 6{h) of the Order that the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports may refuse to grant a licence or direct any licensing authority not to grant licences-"if the licensing authority decides imports and the distribution thereof to canalise 109 866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] z96x through special or specialised agencies or channels". The argument is that the further restriction on the . ht t e rig t to acquire pro- Users' Association perty that results from this provision is totally unrea- to carry on tra e an Ch Importers & d h . h ·d Gl . sonable. v. Union of Tndia Das Gupta ]. It is obvious that if a decision has been made that imports shall be by particular agencies or channels the granting of licence to any applicant outside the agency or channel would frustrate the implementa tion of that decision. If therefore a canalization of imports is in the interests of the general public the refusal of imports licences to applicants outside the agencies or channels decided upon must necessarily be ·held also in the interests of the general public. The real question therefore is: Is the canalization through special or specialized agencies or channels in the inte- rests of the general public. , A policy as regards imports forms an integral part of the general economic policy of a country which is to have due regard not only to its impact on the internal or international trade of the country but also on monetary policy, the development of agriculture and industries and even on the political policies of the country involving questions of friendship, neutrality or hostility with other countries. It may be difficult for any court to have adequate materials to come to a proper decision whether a particular policy as regards imports is, on a consideration of all the various fac tors involved, in the general interests of the public. Even if the necessary materials were available it is possible that in many cases more than one view can be taken whether a particular policy as regards im ports-whether one of heavy customs barrier or of total prohibition or of entrustment of imports to select ed agencies or channels-is in the general interests of the public. In this state of things the burden on the person challenging that the government of the country is not right in its estimate of the effects of a policy as regards imports in the general interests of the public will be very heavy indeed and when the in respect of any particular Government decides commodity that its import should be by a selected I I S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 867 v. C i961 bl t 1 h channel or through selected agencies the Court would proceed on the assumption that that decision is in the interests of the general public unless the contrary is Glass Chatons Importm & 1 clear y s own. onsequen.t .Y, we are _una e o accept users' Association the argument that a de01s10n that imports shall be canalised, is per se not a reasonable restriction in the Union of India interests of the general public. We wish to. make it clear that while the decision that import of a parti- Das Gupta J. cular commodity will be canalised may be difficult to challenge, the selection of the particular channel or agency decided upon in implementing the decision of canalisation may well be challenged on the ground that it infringes Art. 14 of the Constitution or some other fundamental rights. Noisuch question has how- ever been raised in the present case. The attack on the validity of Para. 6(h) of the Imports Control Order, 1955, therefore, fails. The contention that s. 3 of the Imports and Exports Control Act, 1947, is bad to the extent that it permits the government to make an order as in Para. 6(h) of the Imports Control Order, 1955, consequently also fails. . ; The attack on this provision in Para. 6(h) of the order that it contravenes Art. 31 is not even plausible. Assuming for the purpose of this case that the right to carry on trade is itself property, it is obvious that there is no question here of the acquisition of that right. What happens if a licence is refused to an applicant under Para. 6(h) is that the applicant can no longer carry on trade in these goods. When licence is granted to the agencies or channels through which imports have been decided to be canalised, these agencies or channels can carry on trade but this is not because of an acquisition by these agencies or channels of the right to carry on trade which the un successful applicants for licence had. Article 31 of the Constitution has therefore no application. It was next urged that the grant of licences to the third respondent, the State Trading Corporation of India while none has been granted to the second and the third petitioners has resulted in a denial of equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Con stitution. If these petitioners had applied for licences • 868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) v. r96r under the Export Promotion Scheme and still the Gia" Chatons State Trading Corporation had been :preferred it would perhaps have been necessary to consH,ler whether the Importm & Usm' A"ociation preference accorded to the Corporation was based on reasonable and rational grounds. It is clear however Union of India that though it was open to these petitioners to apply for licenqes uuder the Export Promotion Scheme they Das Gupta J. made no application for licence thereunder. There is no scope therefore for the argument that they have been discriminated against. In the result, we are of opinion that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief under Art. 32 of the Con stitution. The petition is accordingly dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed. April II· HIRALAL PATNI v. LOONKARAM SETHIYA & OTHERS (K. SUBBA RAO, RAGHUBAR DAYAL and J. R. MUDHOLKAR, JJ.) Civil Procedure-Receiver, continued by preliminary decree till discharged-Final decree silent-Whether receiver automatically discharged-Lease by reuiver to party-Term of leas. expiring Dispossession o/ lessee by receiver-,Summary procedure or civil suit-Code of Civil Procedure, I9D8 (V of 1908), 0. 40. ' ' The John Mills comprising of three textile mills and one flour mill were jointly owned by several persons. The financier of the Mills filed a snit for recovery of the amount due to him. During the pendency of the suit a receiver was appointed to take possession of the flour mills but he was not empowered to run the mi!ls directly without further directions of the court. A preliminary decree was passed in the suit directing among other things that the receiver was to continue until discharged. Thereafter, an arrangement was made for running the mills and the court directed that the appellant, who was one of the co owners of the mills, he given a lease of the flour mill for three In the lease deed the appellant under years by the receiver. took to deliver back possession to the receiver upon the expiry • ..