KAPUR CHAND POKHRAJ v. THE STATE OF BOMBAY

The facts that give rise to the appeals may be briefl:v. stated: The appellant, Sri Kapur Chand Pokhraj, was the proprietor of Messrs. N. Deepaji Merawalla, a firm dealing in bangles and registered' under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946. He did not disclose the correct turnover of his sales to the Sales Tax Department in the three quarterly returns ~urnished by him to the said Department on September 30, 1950, December 31, 1950, and March 31, 1951, respectively. He main tained double sets of books of accounts and knowipgly furnished false returns for the said three quarters to the Sales Tax Officer and thereby committed an offence under s. 24(l)(b) of the repealed Act. Under that Act, sanction of the Collector was a condition precedent for launching of prosecution in respect of an offence com mitted under s. 24(1) of the said Act. The said Act was repealed by the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1952 (.Born. XXIV of 1952), which was published on Octo ber 9, 1952. On December 11, 1952, the Bombay High, Court declared the Act of 1952 uUra vires and the State of Bombay, preferred an appeal against the judgment of the Bombay High Court to the Supreme Court. On December 22, 1952, the State Government, in order to get over the dislocation caused by the Bombay judg ment, issued the Bombay Sales Tax Ordinance II of 1952, whereunder it was provided that the 1946 Act was to be deemed to have been in existence up to November 1, 1952. On December 24, 1952, another"" Ordinance, OJ;llinance III of J 952, was promulgated extending the life of the Act of 1946. On March 25, 1953, the Bombay State Legislature passed the Bom bay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Bom. "III of 1953), (herein after referred to as the repealing Act), repealing the Act of 1946 and the 'Ordinance III of 1952. The material fact to be noticed is that the Act III of 1953, though it repealed the earlier Act and the Ordiirancc extending • • ,. . • Kapur Chand Pokh(aj v. The State of Bombay Subba Rao]. ' S.C.R. ~UPREME COURT REPORTS 253 the life of that Act, made provision for an offence similar to that covered bys. 24(1) of the repealed Act, prescribed a similar procedure for prosecuting persons committing the said offence and saved the liabilities incurred under the repealed Act. During the period when the Ordinance III of 1952 was in force, the State Government issued a notification under s. 3 of that ·Ordinance appointing the Additional Collector of Bombay to be a Collector under the said Ordinance. On July 4, 1953, i. i.'-, after Act III of 1953 came into force; Mr. Joshi, the Additional Collector of Bombay, granted sanction for the prosecution of the appellant in respect of the offence committed by him under s. 24(l)(b) of the repealed Act. After obtaining the sanction, the appellant was prosecuted under s. 24(l)(b) of ihe Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1946. Before the Pre sidency Magistrate the appellant pleaded guilty to the charge. The learned Magistrate accepted his plea and convicted him for the offence for which he was charged and sentenced him to pay a fine of Rs. 200, in default to suffer one month's rigorous imprisonment. The State of Bombay preferred a Revision against the said Order to the High Court of Judicature at Bombay praying that the sentence imposed on the appellant be enhanced on the ground that as the appellant kept double sets of accounts and intentionally furnished false information, the interest of justice required that sub stantive and heavy sentence should be imposed on him. B!lfore the High Court, the appellant pleaded that by the repeal of the Sales Tax Act, 1946,. the· offence, if any, committed by him was effaced and that in any view the prosecution was defective inasmuch as sanction had been given by the Additional Collector and not by the Collector of Sales Tax. The conten tions did not find favour with the lea{'.11ed Judge of the In rejecting them, the learned Judge High Court. enhanced the sentence passed upon the appellant to rigorous imprisonment for a period of one month in each of the three cases in addition to the fine already imposed by the Magistrate. He directed the substan tive sentence of imprisonment in all the three cases to be concurrent. The appellant obtained special leave • j . •' , • .. ) -- Kapur Chand Pokhraj "· The State of Bomba,y Subba Rao]. ' 254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1959] from this Court to prefer the above appeals against the judgment of the High Court. The learned Counsel for the appellant raised before us the same contentions which his client unsuccessfully raised before the High Court. 'Vo shall now proceed to deal with them seriatim. The main argum<.mt of the learned Counsel was that the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 (Born. III of 1953) in· repealing the Act of 1946 did not save penalties in respect of offences committed ooder that Act and therefore no prosecution w~s maintainable in resp~ct of an offence committed under the Act of 1946. A clearer conception of the argument can be had by looking at the relevant saving provisions enacted in Act III of 1953 and aliio the relevant sections of the Bombay General Clauses Act. Section 48(2) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953 reads: • "Notwithstanding the repeal of the said Act and the said entries, the said repeal shall not affect or be deemed to affect-- (i) any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred ; (ii) any legal proceeding pending 011 the 1st day of Noyember, 1952 in respect of any right, title, obligation or liability or anything done or suffered before the Raid date; and any such proceeding shall be continued and disposed of, as if this Act had not been passed; (iii) the recovery of any tax or penalty which may have become payable under the said Act and the said entries befora the said date ; and all such taxes or . penalties or arrears thereof shall be assessed, imposed and• recovered, so far as may be, in accordance with the provisions of this Act ; ". Section 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act says : . " Where this Act, or any Bombay Act made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enact ment hitherto made or thereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not-- (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the ..... <. " time at which the repeal takes effect; or (b) affect the previous operation of &11y enactment 'M.. • • " "' s.c.R. SUPREME ·coURT REPORTS 255 so repealed or anything dv.ly done or suffered there- under; or . (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed ; or · (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence co.mmitted against •any enactment so repealed; or x958 Kapur Ch1ind Pokhraj v. The State of Bombay Subba Rao J. / • (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect o{ any such right, privilege, obliga tion, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment inay be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed." A comparative study of the aforesaid provisions indicates that while under s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act, there is a specific saving of any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed under the enactment repealed, as distinct from civil rights and liabilities, under s. 48 of Act III of 1953, there is no separate treatment of Civil and Criminal matters; while mider the former provisions legal proceedings are saved, under the latter provisions legal proceedings pending on November I, 1952, in respect of rights acquired or ~ liabilities incurred under tlre repealed Act are saved. By such a study of the two provisions, the arguinerit proceeds, it is clear that the enactment of a specific repealing Act indicates a saving clause "different intention " excludingfthe operation of s. 7 Of the General Clauses Act and the omission under s. 48 of the repealing Act of a clause similar to cl. (d) of s .. 7 of the General Clauses Act, demonstrates that the liabi- In. our view lity ·saved excludes criminal liability. 'the consideration of the provisions of s. 7 of the ·General Clauses Act need not detain us, for s. 48(2)(i) "of· the repealing Act affords a complete answer to the · qliMtion raised. Under that clause, the repeal did not ·affect any right, title or obligation or liability already •acquired, acocued or incurred. The words " liability in the • • ' , ' • • • z958 KapUy Chand P~khraj v. The State of Bombay Subba Rao]. , 256 SUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1959] incurred " are very general and comprehensive and ordinarily take in both civil and criminal liability. In Criminal Law the term " liability" covers every form of punishment to which/ a man subjects himself by violating the law of the land. There is no reason why the all comprehensive word should not carry its full import but be restricted to civil liability alone ? The context does not compel any such limitation. Indeed,• there is no conceivable ground to impute to the Legislature the intention to wipe out the offences committed under the repealed Act, when it expressly retained the same offences under the repealing Act. If there was any justification for preserving Civil liabilities incurred under the repealed Act, there was an equal justification to save criminal liabilities incurred under that repealed Act. The fact that s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act provided se1:Ja rately in different clauses for Criminal and Civil liabili ties, while s.\ 48(2) of the repealing Act clubbed them together in dne clause is not decisive of the question raised, as, for ought we know, s. 48 might be an attempt by the Legislature at precise drafting by omitting unnecessary words and clauses. Nor ciNumstance that a special provision is made under s. 48(2) of the repealing Act for pending proceedings is indicative of any conscious departure by the Legis lature from the established practice embodied in s. 7 of the General Clauses Act indicating an intention to save only offences under the repealed Act in respect of which legal proceedings were pending on a specified date. It is more likely, as the learned Judge of the Bombay High Court P.Ointed out, that cl. 2 was enacted to obviate the~rgument that once a case is sent up the liability merges in the proceedings launched and has to be saved specially. On a fair reading of the terms of the saving clause ins. 48(2) of the repealing Act, we cannot give a restricted meaning to the words "liability incurre<i ", especially when the scheme of the Act does not imply that the Legia lature had any intention to exclude from the saying clause criminal liability incurred under the repealed Act. We, tperefore, hold that the liabjlity incurred, • • ... -- • • • S.C.R. ' SeTPREIVIE COURT REPORTS 257 i. e., the offence committed, under the repealed Act, is covered by the saving clause embodied in s. 48 of the In this view it is not necessary to repealing Act. express our view whether, by reason of the saving clause enacted ins. 48 of the repealing Act,1.the Legis lature indicated a different intention -¢ithin meaning of s. 7 of the Bombay General Clauses Act ~o a,s to exclude its operation in construing the pro visions of the repealing Act. Kapur Chand Pokhraj • v. The State of Bombay Subba. Rao J. '- the offence under Even so, the lear~d Counsel contended that the appellant, who committed repealed Act, should be prosecuted only with. the previous sancti.on of the Collector as provided by that Act, but as the sanction in the present case was-given by the Additional Collector, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence. To appr'eciate this argument it would be necessary to notice the provisions relating to sanction in the repeal ing Act and in the Acts and Ordinances that preceded it. "BOMBAYj SALES TAX ACT, 1946. "Section 24 (J)(b): Whoever-fails, without suffi cient cause, to submit any' return as required by section 10 or knowingly submits a_ false return,. ....... . , shall, in addition to the recovery of any tax that may be due from him be punishable with simple imprison ment which may extend to six months or with fine not exceeding one thousand rupees or with both; and when the offence is a continuing one, with a daily fine not exceeding fifty· rupees during the period of the con tinuance of the offence." " Section 24(2) : No Court shall take cognizance of " any offence under this Act, or under the rules made 'thereunder, except with the previous sanction of the Collector and no Court inferior to that <1f a Magistrate of the Second Class shall try any such offence.': "Section 2(a): "Collector "means the Collector of Sales Tax appointed under sub-section (1) of Sec tioi113." " Section 3(1) : For carrying out the purposes of 33 • • - l(apur Chand Pokhraj • v. The State of Bonibay Subba Rao ]. ' • ' ... • 258 • SUPREME COURT REPORT~ [1959) I this Act, the State Government may appoint any person to be a Collector of Sales Tax and such other persons to assist him as the State Government thinks fit." ORDINANCE No. II of 1952: Under this Ordinance, Bombay Act V of 1946 and in the third the entries relating to the said Act schedule (Lawsj to the Bombay Merged States Act, 1950 were deemed to have continued to be in force up to and inclusive of N ov.,mber 1, 1952. ORDINANCE III OF 1952: "Section 36. Offences and Penalties: Whoevcr (b) fails without sufficient cause, to furnish any return or statement as required by section 13 or 18 or knowingly furnishes a false return or statement ......... ........................................................................ shall, in addition to the recovery of any tax that may be due from him, be punishable with simple imprison ment which may extend to six months or with fine not exceeding two thousand rupees or with both ; and when the offence is a continuing one, with a daily fine not exceeding one hundred rupees during the period of the continuance of the offence." • "Section 37. Cognizance of offences. (1). No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 36 or under any rules made under this Ordinance except with the previous sanction of the Collector and no Court inferior to that of a Magistrate of the Second Class shall try any such offence." "Section 2(6): "Collector" means the Collector of Sales Tax appointed under section 3." ' " Section 3(1) : For carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance, the State Government may appoint any person to be a Collector of Sales Tax, and such other persons to assist him as the State Government thinks fit." • , 1953): BOMBAY SALES TAX AC'f, 1953 (Act III of . " Section 36 : Whoever- (b) fails without sufficient cause, to furnish ~ny return or statement as required by Section 13 or 18 or • • - .>· .. S.C.R. 1'UPREME COURT REPORTS 259 knowingly furnishes a false return or statement......... 1958 Kapur Chand Pokhr6-j v. The State of Rom bay Subba Rao ]. shall, in addition to the recovery of any tax that may be due from him, be punishable with simple imprison ment which may extend to six months or with fine not exceeding two thousand rupees or with both ; and when the offence is a continuing one, with a daily fine 'hot exceeding one hundred rupees during the period of the continuance of the offence." "Section 49 (2) :e Any appointment, notification, notice, order, rule, regulation or form made or issued or deemed to have been made or issued under the Ordinance hereby repealed shall continue in force and be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions of this Act, in so far as such appointment, notification, notice, order, rule, regulation or form is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, unless it has been already, or until it is superseded by an appointment, notification, notice, order, rule, regula tion or form made or issued under this Act." THE BOMBAY SALES TAX (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1956. (BOMBAY ACT NO. XX XIX OF 1956) "Section 3. Amendment to. section 3 of Bom. III of 1953: In section 3 of the said Act, for sub-sec- · tion (1), the following sub-section shall be and shall be deemed ever to have been substituted, namely:- (1) for carrying out the purpose of this Act, the State Government may appoint- (a) a person to be the Collector of Sales Tax, and (b) one or more persons to be Additional Collec tors of Sales Tax, and (c) such other persons·to assist the Collector as ' the State. Government thinks fit." NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY T'HE STATE GOVERNMENT UNDkR SECTION (3) OF THE ORDIN ANGE III OF 1952: "Government ,of Bombay is pleased to declare the, "Additional Collector of Sales Tax,. Bombay State, Bombay, as "Collector of Sales Tax, Bombay State, Bomba,y" ~or purposes of the Bombay Sales • • • • Kap1ir Chand Pfhhraj v. The State of Bombay Subba Rao ). • 260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1959] Tax (No. 2) Ordinance, 1952 (Bombay Ordinance No. . III of 1952)." It will be seen from the aforesaid provisions that under the Acts as well as under the Ordinances, knowingly furnishing a false return or statement is made an offence punishable with simple imprisonment or fine or with both. The only difference is that under the Ordinance and the Act of 1953, the maximum• amount of fine is increased from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 2,000. Under the. Ordinance as well as under the. Acts, no Court can take cognizance of the said offence except with the previous sanction of the Collector. The term " Collector " is defined in similar terms in the Ordi nance as well as in the Acts, i.e., a person appointed as " Collector " by the State Government. The notifica tion issued by the State Government under Ordinance III of 1952, appointing the Additional Collector as Collector of Sales Tax must be deemed to have con tinued to be in force under the Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1953, by reason of s. 49 (2) of that Act, as it is common case that no fresh notification was ma.de under that Act repea, ling that made under that Ordinance. Shortly stated, the Bombay _Act III of 1953, introduced the same offence and provided for the same machinery that its predecessors contained. On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, the argu ment of the learned Counsel for the appellant is .that as the State Government appointed the Additional Collector as Collector of Sales . Tax in exercise of the power conferred on it under the Ordinance III of 1952 and not under the power conferred on it by the repeal ed '.Act, the sanction given by the Additional Collector to prosecute the appellant is invalid. The first answer to this contention is that, as the State Govern ment had the power to appoint any person including an Additional e:ollector as Collector of Sales Tax both under the repealed Act as well as the Ordinance III of 1952, the appointment may reasonably be construed to have been made in exercise of the relevant power in respect of the offence saved under the Ordinance. The second answer is more fundamental. There is an essential distinction between an offepce and • • • ' • I ... ' ( .. ,; . , • Kapur Chaqd Pokh[aj v. The Stal• of Bombay S14bba RaB j. • S.C.R. -SUPREME COURT REPORTS 261 prosecution for an offence. The former forms part of the substantive law and the latter of procedural law. An offence is an aggregate of acts or omissions punish able by law while prosecution signified the procedure for obtaining an adjudication of Court in respect of such acts or omissions. Sanction or prior approval of an -authority is made a condition precedent to pro- • secute in regard to specified offences. Prosecution without the requisite sanction makes the entire proceeeding ab ini~o void. It is intended to be a safeguard against frivolous prosecutions and also to give an opportunity to the authority concerned to decide in the circumstances of a particular case whether prosecution is necessary. Sanction to prosecute for an offence is not, therefore, an ingredient of the offence, but it really pertaif!S to procedure. In Max wt!ll's Interpretation of Statutes, the following passage . appears at page 225: "Although to make a law punish that which, at the time when it was done, was not punishable, is contrary to sound principle, a law which merely alters the procedure may, with perfect propriety, be made applicable to past as well as future transactions." In the instant case when the repealing Act did. not make any change either in the offence or in the pro cedure prescribed to prosecute for that offence and expressly saved the offence committed under the repealed Act, the intention can be legitimately im puted to the Legislature that the procedure prescribed under the new Act should be followed, even in respect of offences committed under the repealed Act. If so, it follows that, as sanction pertains to the domafn of procedure, the sanction given by the Additional Collector appointed by the State as Collector of Sales_ Tax was valid . Even so, it was contended that "the notification appointing the Additional Collector as Collector of Sales Tax issued imder Ordinance No. II of 1952 would not enure to the prosecution launched under· Act III of 1953. This argument ignored the express provisions of s. 49 (2) of the said Act (already extract ed supra), wqich in clear and express terms laid down • • Kapur Chand Po~hraj v. The State of Bomb.iy Subba Rao ]. 262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS• [1959] that notifications issued or orders made under the repealed Ordinance would be deemed to have been made or issued under the provisions of the Act and would continue to be in force until superseded by appropriate orders or notifications under the new Act. It was not suggested that any fresh notification revoking that made under the Ordinance was issued under the repealing Act. If so, it follows· that the notification • issued under the Ordinance appointing the Additional Collector as Collector of Sales Ta~ continued to be in force when the said Collector gave sanction to pro secute the appellant. In this view it is not necessary to consider the scope of the Bombay Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1956. ). Lastly, a strong plea was made for reducing the sentence of imprisonment given by the High Court to that of fine. It was said that the Magistrate "in exercise of his discretion gave the sentence of fine and. the High Court was not justified in enhancing the same to imprisonment without giving any reasons which compelled them to do so. Reliance was placed in this context on two decisions of this Court-Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab(') and Bed Raj v. The State of Uttar Praaesh (2 In the former case, the Sessions Judge convicted each of the 7 accused under s. 302, Indian Penal Code read with s. 149, Indian Penal Code. As the fatal injuries could not be attributed to any one of the accused, he refrained from passing a sentence of death, but instead he convicted them to imprisonment for life. The High Court, without giving any reasons, changed their sentences from transporta tion "to death. Bose J. who delivered the judgment of the Court, in holding that the High Court should not have interfered with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge, made the following .observation at page 156: • "But the discretibn is his and if he gives reasons on which a judicial mind could •properly found, an appellate Court should not interfere. The power to enhance a sentence from transportation to death showld very rarely be exercised and only for the strongest (1) [1954] S. C.R. •45- (2) [1955] 2 S. C· R. 583. • • • ( r· • ' .. S.C.R. ~UFREME COURT REPORTS 263 It is not enough for an appellate possible reasons. Court to say, or think, that if left to itself it would have awarded the greater penalty because the discre tion does not belong to the appellate Court but to the trial Judge and the only ground on which an appellate Court can interfere is that the discretion has been im properly exercised, as for example, where no reasons •are given and none can be inferred from the circum stances of the case, or where the facts are so gross that no normal Judicial. mind would have awarded the lesser penalty." In the latter case, the appellant along with another was convicted by the Sessions Judge under s. 304 Indian Penal Code and sentenced to three years' the High Court rigorous imprisonment. On appeal enhanced the sentence to ten years. In enhancing the sentence, the learned Judges gave the reason that the deceased was unarmed and the attack was made with a knife and it could not be said that the appellant did not act in a cruel or unusual manner. This Court, in allowing the appeal on the question of sentence, made the following obs~rvation at page 588: " A question of a sentence is a matter of discre tion and it is well settled that when discretion .has been properly exercised along accepted judicial lines, an appellate Court should not interfere to the detri ment of an accused person .except for very strong reasons which must be disclosed on .the face of the judgment .................. In a matter of enhancement there should not be interference when the sentence passed imposes substantial punishment. Interference is only called for when it is manifestly inadequate." These observations are entitled to great weight. But it is impossible to lay down a hard and fast rule, for each case must depend upon its own facts. Whether in a given case there was proper exercise of judicial discretion by the trial Judge depends upon the circum stances of that case.. In the present case, the appel lant kept double sets of account books and submitted fal:te returns for successive quarters, omitting from the turn-over shown by him in the returns substantial amounts. Upder s. 24(1) of .the. Act, infringement of • • , Kapur Chand Pokh~aj v. The State of Bombay Subba Rao]. • Kapur Chand Pokhraj 'v. The Slate of Bombay Subba Rao ]. • 264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ' [1959] the provisions of the Act is made puniRhable. The offences under that section are of different degrees of moral turpitude. They range from a mere infringe ment of a rule to conscious and deliberate making of fals(l returns. For all the offences, the section fixes the maximum punishment of simple imprisonment which may extend to six months. The magistrate, who tries the offenders under that section, is given a wide discre- • tion to mould the punishment in such a way as to make it commensurate with the n&ture of the offence committed. Though the appellant adopted a tiyste matic scheme to defraud the State by keeping double sets of account books and therefore deserved deterrent punishment, learned Magistrate, presumably because the appellant pleaded guilty, without giving any reasons, gave him the lenient punishment of fine of Rs. 200. It is obvious that the sentence shorild depend upon the gravity of the offence committed and not upon the fact that the accused pleaded guilty or In the circum made an attempt to defend the case. stances the High Court was certainly justified in enhancing the sentence from fine to imprisonment and fine and it had given good reasons for doing so. The Hig[t Court thought and, in our view, rightly that as the appellant had kept double sets of account books, it was eminently a case in which a substantive sentence ought to have been imposed. The Magistrate has im properly exercised his discretion within the meaning of the aforesaid observations of this Court and therefore, the High Court was certainly within its right to enhance the sentence . Bnt the High Court committed a mistake in award ing a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for a· period of one month, which it is not entitled to do under the provisions of s. 24(1) of the Act. Under that section the Court had jll'tisdiction only to give a maximum sentence of simple imprisonment extending to 6 months but had no power to impose a sentilnce of rigorous im prisonment. This mistake, if any, should· go to the benefit of the appellant, for the High Court might have imposed a sentence of longer period of simple imprison ment if it had realised that it had no pow~r to sentence • • r•. ... • ,. . S.C.R. ~UPREME COURT REPORTS .265 the appellant to rigorous imprisonment. Be it as it may, as the High Court had no power to impose a sen tence of rigorous imprisonment we change the sentence from rigorous imprisonment to simple impriso.nment for a period of one month in each case. 'Vith this modification the appeals are dismissed. Kapur Chand Pokhrf!lj v. The Statt of Bombay • Appeals dismissed . Subba Rao j. • March 24. • SHRIMATI SHANTABAI v. STATE OF BOMBAY & OTHERS (S. R. DAS c. J., VENKATARAMA AIYAR, s. K. DAS, A. K. SARKAR and VIVIAN BosE JJ.) • Fundamental Rights, Enforcement of-Unregistered document conferring right to cut and appropriate wood from forest land-Pro" prietary interest vested in State by subsequent enactment-Claim founded on rights accruing from such document, if maintainable Constitution of India, Arts. I9(I)(f), I9(I)(g)-Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Larrds) Act, r950 (No. I of I95I). By an unregistered document the husband of the petitioner · granted her the right fo take and appropriate all kinds of wood from certain forests in his Zamindary. With the passing of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1950, all proprietary rights in land vested in the State under s. 3 of that Act and petitioner could no longer cut any wood. She applied to the Deputy Commissioner and obtained from him an order under s. 6(2) of the Act permitting her to work the forest and started cutting the trees. The Divisional Forest Officer too.k action against her and passed an order directing that her name might be cancelled and the cut materials forfeited. She .moved the State Government against this order but to no effect. Thereafter she applied to this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution and con tended that t.he order of Rorest Officer infringed her fundamental fights under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) : , Held (per curiam), that the order in question did not infringe the ffmdamental rights of the petitioner under Arts. 19(1)(f) and 19(1)(g) and the petition must be dismissed. " • > n • •