Petitions dismissed v. Tht State of Bhopal

The facts which have given rise to the appeal arc that the 11th May, 1951, at about Sabir was murdered on 6-30 p.m. The First Information Report was made by Qudrat Ullah the other accused at 6-45 p.m. the same day, i.e., within about 15 minutes of the occurrence. The pcosccution case was shat there was an exchange of abuses between the shop of the First Informant, Qudrat Ullah. The cause of the quarrei was that on the evening of occurrence while Qudrat Ullah was sitting in his shop and the deceased was sitting just' below appellant came out of his 'house an<l on seeing him, the such a deceased the appc11ant "dishevelhl condition", which annoyed and gave exchange of abuses. On hearinl'l the prosecution witnesse< arrived at the spot this noise, and saw the appellant and the deceased grappling with each othe1". The appellant stated to have asked Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which Qudrat knife is Ex. 'II', with which the Ullah did ; this then fled away. As appellant stabbed the deceased and in front a result of the injuries the deceased fell down of Qudrat Ullah's shop ; son1e witnesses stated that he fell on the wooden plank in front of the shop. Qudrat Ullah picked up the knife which had been to why he was asked him as rise to an the shop, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 659 dropped by the appellant, put the deceased in a rick shaw and took him to the hospital from where he went to the Police Station and made the First Information Report. An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was made by a person who was a co-accused. A First not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict it under ·s. 145 of that Act. mdker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, In nor to corroborate or this case, therefore, it is not evidence. It cannot be used as evidence contradict other witnesses. Information Report is against 1957 .Nisar Ali v. T 1" State •f Uttar Praduh Kapur J. The Sub-Inspector went to the spot, started investi gation and arrested the appellant the same evening at his house. The post-mortem examination of the deceased showed and, the doctor, death was due to.shock and according to haemorrhage on account of the punctured wound thc>se injuries to the chest, injuries could be caused with a sharp-edged weapon. injuries on the person of the deceased the lungs causing The appellarn and the deceased both belong to a sect of Jogis. Evidence discloses that the deceased and the appellant were quite friendly with each other, and so were the deceased and Qudrat Ullah, who is a butcher and had a shop which is a part of his house. Adjacent to the shop is the house of the appellant. Eye witnesses of the occurrence were Yad Ali, P.W. 1, Banne, P.W. 2 and Mohd. Ahmed, P.W. 3. Having been told by to the occurrence, Ashraft, sister of the deceased as later and found the deceased P.W. 4 came to the spot lying unconscious. Shakir, P.W. 5, brother younger of the deceased, on arriving near the shop of Qudrat Ullah heard the appellant and the deceased exchanging abuses, but was not a witness of the assault as just at that time he had gone, at the reque.::t of Qudrat Ullah, to fill his Chillum for the hookka and when he came back he found the deceased lying unconscious and the appellant running away towards his house. The evidence of Yad Ali, P. W. 1, is that he heard the deceased and the an exchange of abuses between -appellant and when he moved about 4 or 5 paces he 1957 Nisar Ali v. Tiu State of Uttar Pradesh Kapur]. 660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] and so is "We may appellant stabbed the deceased "in his grip", saw them grappling with each other. The appellant he asked Qudrat Ullah to hand over a knife to him which the latter deceased did and with it the and then went away to his house. The statement of Banne is similar the statement of Mohd. This evidence was not accepted by Ahmed, P. W. 3. the learned Sessions Judge and he acquitted both the accused. The State took an appeal only against the It held appellant which was allowed by the High Court. that he falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah handed over his knife to the respondent on his demand. There was no enmity between him and Sabir and he had no motive to get him killed by the respondent. It does not at all appear probable that after abetting the murder of Sabir he at once took him on a rickshaw to the hospital and from police station and the respon is so inconsistent dent. This conduct of Qudrat Ullah with the part said to have been played by him in the little hesitation in rejecting occurrence the evidence about the part played by him." the eye-witnesses by deposing lodged a report against there went at once that we have concede The High Court, however, accepted the eye-witnesses as against the appellant's testimony and observed : case against slightest doubt "We are satisfied that the prosecution has established is not presumption of the prosecution. The become doubtful merely because fudge ·said that there was a doubt about his guilt." respondent. There about his guilt. The innocence has been fully rebutted by learned Sessions case against him does taken by person could the learned The learned Judges also to the conclusion Judge was that the view taken. one "which no reasonable It was a wholly erroneous view of the evidence which inasmuch as a murderer escapes punishment". the circum stances of the case and considering that there was some the appellant the High Court sentenced provocation, to 'transportation for life.' in gross miscarriage of justice resulted In S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 661 There is a passage in the Judgment of the High Court which appears to be disconsolate indicative of a wrong approach in deciding the guilt Judges of an accused person. Although the learned recognised the principle that the onus was not on the accused, yet one of such that it comes perilous! y near to putting accused if it does not actually do so. The High Court has said: the observations is the burden on "The respondent himself did not have to say that he did not find were innocent, he must immediately on hearing known who was present there and who was not." the courage If he have come out of his house and must have the noise them at the spot. 1957 Nisar Ali v. Tiu Sta4 of Uttar Pradtsh Kapur]. criminal This passage jurisprrnknce as ciple of innocence of an accused person that it has stated by eminent authorities " .... that it of the prosecution to prove subject to any statutory exception." (1) is so destructive of the cardinal prin presumed proved the rule the duty the prisoner's guilt ..... . become necessary to reiterate to the till otherwise It was next contended that the witnesses had falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah and because of that the Court should have rejected the these witnesses testimony of as against the appellant also. The well-known maxim f alsus in uno f alsus in omnibus was relied upon by the appellant. The argument raised was that because the witnesses who had also deposed against Qudrat Ullah by saying that he had handed over the knife the Courts below appellant had not been believed by should not have as against him, the High Court accepted the evidence of these witnesses to convict the received general appellant. acceptance India ; nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be dis regarded anJ not that' it must be disregarded. One American author has stated : This maxim has not in different jurisdictions in (1) Woolmington v. The Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A. C. 462. 1957 Nisar .Ali v. Tht Stat1 of Uttar Pradtth Kapur J, 662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1957] " .... the maxim is in itself worthless ; point of validity ........ and secondly, in point of utility because it merely .tells the jury what they may do in any event, not what they must do or must not therefore, ·it is a superfluous form of words. do, and It is also in practice pernicious ...... " ( 1 ) The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances but it is not what may be called "a mandatory rule of evidence". Counsel for the appellant drew our attention to a judgment of the Privy passage from an unreported Council, Chaubaria Singh v. Bhttneshwari Prasal Pal. "The defendants own evidence and that of several of his witnesses is of no use to him. He cannot contend on the oath that any court of law can place reliance of people who have admittedly given false evidence upon the other branches of the case." This passage is a very slender foundation, if at all, the status of anything for conferring on the doctrine ;md the Privy Council higher than a rule of caution cannot be said their weighty approval to any such controversial rule which has been termed as "worthless", life" and "in practioe pern1c10u," in works of un doubted authority on the law of evidence('). to have given as a maxim "absolutely The High Court was not unmindful of what the witnesses commission of the offence and having taken consideration, it said : to Qudrat Ullah"s part stated "While the learned Sessions Judge wa.-; right in acquitting Qudrat Ullah, he was completely wrong in acquitting the respondent of whose guilt there was not the slightest doubt. The direct evidence made out a clear case against him and there was no sound reason for disregarding it." After discnssing discrepancies pointed High Cmrt held "there is the eviden,:e of the witnesses and the appellant the slightest doubt out hy 11ot (1) Wign1ore on Evide11cc Vol. III para Ioog. (2) '"'igntor{' Vol. III para 1009. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 663 It was because of the above two contentions raised by counsel for the appellant and because it was a case of reversal of a judgment of acquittal that we allowed counsel to go into the evidence which he analysed and drew our attention· to its salient features and to the statements of witnesses and the discrepancies in the improbabilities of the case ; but we are satisfied the learned Judges were coming to the conclusion of the trial of the judge was the prosecution witnesses we have come evidence of rightly convicted. rightly displaced. Upon a review the view the appellant was the conclusion justified 1957 Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh Kapur]. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the judgment of the High . Court is affirmed. Appeal dismissed. V. C. K. BUS SERVICE LTD. ti. '95'/ February 19. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, COIMBATORE. VENKATARAMA AYYAR. s. K. DAS AND GAJENDRAGADKAR JJ.) Road Transport-Permit for stage carriage-Renewal-W he th er to implied a continuation of the original permit-Whether subject condition of validity of the original permit-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (IV of 1939), ss. 57, 58. the appellate authority, the unsuccessful applicants The appellant was granted a permit for stage carriage hy the Regional Transport Authority under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, but on appeal Central Road Traffic Board, by the order of the order granting the permit was set aside and Central Road Traffic Board was appro\'ed hy the Government the High Court for a re"ision. The appellant. thereupon. moved writ of certi01'<1ri to quash the proceedings of the Central Road Traffic Board an<l the Gowrnment. During the pen<lency of these proceedings there was a stay of operation of the order setting aside the grant of the permit to the appellant. with the result that he the cancellation of his continued to run his buses notwithstanding permit. Before the expiry of the original perio<l