For all the above reasons this appeal is dismissed v. The State of West Bengat

Whereas the Government of Bombay is satisfied with respect to the person known as Shri Lawrence Joachim Joseph DeSouza of Bombay, that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the relations of India with Portuguese Government and to the Security of India, it is necessary to make the following Order:- N ow, therefore, in exercise of the powers con ferred by sub-clause (1) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) the Government of Bomby is pleased to direct that Shri Lawrence Joachim Joseph DeSouza of Bombay, be detained. By Order and in the name of the Governor of Bombay. Under Secretary to the Government of Bombay. Political and Services Department". In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Deten tion Act, 1950 (Act IV of 191!0) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) the grounds of detention, also dated the 8th June, 1955, was served on him along with the order of detention. The validity of the order is challenged on the following contentions.

The order of detention was mala fide. It was passed for the ulterior purpose of preventing his freedom of speech and freedom of professional acti vity in the sphere of Goan affairs by reason of his known views in this behalf. ·

The detaining authority, in exercising its power, failed to apply its mind to the existence or otherwise of the legitimate objects of detention.

The grounds of detention are vague. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 385

The claim of State that no particulars of the grounds could be furnished in public interest is un- sustainable and in any case mala fide. The last two have been urged before us not only as independent points but as reinforcing the first t\vo. The challenge to the validity of the order based on 795G Lau~·e11ce Joachim Joseph D'So11za v. Tlte State 01 Bombay the attack of mala fides and non-application of the Jagan11adhadasJ. mind of the detaining authority, have been urged before us with great insistence. We have been taken elaborately into what is claimed to be the relevant previous background of events. This part of the argu- ment raises, what ultimately are questions of fact which have been fully considered by the High Court. It is, therefore, enough to state, in its broad outlines, the background, which is alleged as follows: (l)(a) There was a sudden search by the police on the 24th August, 1954, at the appellant's place for alleged possession of illicit liquor which, in fact, was not found.

1. . oan po it1cs an l · e cone us10n o order for the purpose of suppressing the freedom of the appellant, to ventilate his point of view on the . G to ~a e up pro1ess10na y t e cause of persons in the position of Carlos. We have been taken through all the material relating to the above allegations and have given our consideration to the same. It is enough to say that we are unable 1to see f th e any reason or High Court to the effect that the material is not enough to make out that the detaining authority was acting otherwise than bona fide. We also agree with the view of the High Court that, what bas got to be made out is not the want of bona fides on the part of the police, but want of bona fides, as well at;? tht> non-application of mind, on the part of the detaining authority, viz. the Government, which for. this pur- . pose must be taken to be different from the police. It is also clear that the allegation of non-appliC'ation of mind by the detaining authority is without uny basis, in view of the affidavit of the Chief Secretary.

The further points that remain for consideration are those which relate to the complaint of vagueness of the grounds furnished and the alleged unsus tainable claim for non-disclosure under article 22(6) of the Constitution on behalf of the detaining autho rity, to get over the alleged vagueness. To appreci ate the points thus raised, it is necessary to have an idea of the grounds of detention as furnished. They are to be found from the relevant communication to the detenue which is as follows: "In pursuance of section 7 of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 (Act IV of 1950) you are hereby informed that the grounds on which a detention order has been made against you, by the Government of Bombay under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of sub section (I) of section 3 of the said Act are that: With the financial help given by the Portuguese authorities you are carrying on espionage on behalf of the Portuguese Government with the help of underground workers.

You are also collecting intelligence about the security arrangements on the border area and you make such intelligence available to the Portu- 388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956) 1956 guese authorities. These activities which are being carried on by you with the object of causing further f_,a;:vrc11cc Joachi11t JoS<·Ph v•so""'' deterioration in the relations between the Portuguese Government and the Indian Government over the question of Goan National Movement, are prejudicial to the security of India and to the relations of India with Portugal. v. Tim State of Bombay - Jag"1uu1dhadasJ.

2. If . b you w1s k to ma e a representation agamst the order under which you are detained, you should address it to the Government of Bombay and forward it through the Superintendent, Arthur Road Prison, Bombay. . . , .

3. You are also informed that you have a right to claim a personal hearing before the Advisory Bo<ird and that you should communicate to Govern- ment of Bombay as soon as possible your intention of exercising or not exercising that right". The objection by the appellant. relating to this is con ta, iued in paragraph 15(g) of his application before the High Court. It is as follows: "The grounds are not specific and no particulars of the activities a,lleged to have been carried on by the petitioner are given, viz. the particulars such as the lengt.h of period for which the petitioner is alleged to have carried on the so-called espionage activities or the details of financial aid alleged to have been received by the petitioner from the Portuguese autho rities or the names of any of the so-called underground workers alleged to be aiding the petitioner or any details of intelligence alleged to have been collected by the petitioner or made available by him to the Portuguese Government".

The answer thereto of the Under-Secretary to the Government of Bombay is in paragraph 12 qf his affidavit dated the 25th July, 1955, and is as follows: "With 'reference to paragraph 15, clause (g), I submit that it is not necessary to mention particulars of the espionage activities carried on by the petitioner or the details of the financial aid received by him or the n!imes of the persons aiding the said petitioner. It is not in public interest· to disclose these details; nor is it necE>ssary to mention these matters to afford. •.\ ' ·- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 389 the petitioner reasonable opportunity to make a representation". Now the question as to whether the grounds furnishe are vague or not, is ultimately a question that has to be determined on a consideration of the circumstances of each case, as was pointed out by this court in the State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(1) in the J J: 11 10 owmg passage: · d Lau:rence Joachini Joseph D'Souza v.

The State of Bombay - agannadl111das J. 1956 "The contention that the grounds are vague re- quires some clarification. .................... If the ground which is supplied is incapable of being understood or defined with sufficient certainty it can be called vague. It is not possible to state affirmatively more on the question of what is vague. It must vary according to the circumstances of each case. ........... ......... If on reading the ground furnished it is capable of being intelligently understood and is sufficiently definite to furnish materials to enal:ile the detained person to make a representation against the order of detention it cannot be called vague". In the present ca&e, the detenue has been intimated why, in the opinion of the Government the activities of the appellant are considered prejudicial to the security of India and to the relations of India with Portugal. They are the following: ·

1. With the financial help given by the Portuguese authorities, he is carrying on espionage on behalf of the Portuguese Government with the help of under ground workers.

2. He is collecting intelligence about the security arrangements on the border area and making such intelligence available to the Portuguese authorities.

3. He is carrying on these activities with the object of causing further deterioration in the rela tions between the Portuguese Government and the Indian Government over the question of the Goan National Movement. It is true that these allegations are not as precise and specific as might have been desired. But having re gard to the nature of the alleged activities of the ap· pellant, it is not unlikely that no more could be In this context it is relevant gathered or furnished. (1) [1951] S.C.R. 167, 184. 51 390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956] 1956 to notice that the appellant himself does not appear to ha.ve felt that the grounds furnished were so vague Joseph D'Souza as to am per him in his right to make a representa- Lrnvrcucc Joachitn h v. The state of B"mbay --_- J,,ga111wuhadas J. h b · ,f B 7 S tate oJ · <l · h as een recogmse rn t e case rn t1w tion under article 22(5) and section 7 of the Act.

It does not appear that he applied to the Government to be supplied with particulars of the grounds fur- Such a right to call for particulars nished to him. b om ay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya(') as flowing from his constitutional right to be afforded a reasonable op portunity to make a representation to the Board. In that case it has been stated that "if the grounds are not sufficient to enable the detenue to make a repre- sentation, the detenue ............ if he likes, may ask for particulars which would enable him to make the re presentation". The fact that he had made no such application for particulars is, therefore, a circum stance which may well be taken into consideration, in deciding whether the grounds can be considered to be vague. In the circumstances and having re gard to the fact that what is alleged is espionage activity at a time when relations between the two Govern men ts on the affairs of Goa were somewhat delicate, we are inclined to think, with the High Court, that the grounds cannot be considered to be vague.

Assuming however that the grounds furnished in this case are open to the challenge of vagueness, the further question which arises is whether the validity of the order of detention can be su.stained by reason of the claim, in public interest, of non-disclosure of facts made by the Under-Secretary to the Govern ment of Bombay by means of his affidavit filed in the High Court. Now it has been held in Atma Ram· Sridhar Vaidya's case(') by the majority of the Court, that the constitutional right of a detenue under arti cle 22(5) comprises two distinct components.

1. The right to be furnished grounds of detention as soon as may be; and

2. The right to be afforded the earliest opportu nity of making a representation against his detention (1) [19s1J s.c.R. 167, 1s4. - -• • .. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 3!)1 1956 Joseph D'Sotiza v. The State of Bombay which implies, the right to be furnished adequate particulars of the grounds of detention, to enable a Lawrence Joachim proper representation being made. These rights involve corresponding obligations on the part of the detaining authority. It follows that the authority is under a constitutional obligation to furnish reasonably definite grounds, as well as ade- JagannadlwdasJ. quate particulars then and there, or shortly there- after. But the right of the detenue to be furnished particulars, is subject to the limitation under article 22(6) whereby disclosure of facts considered to be against public interest cannot be required. It is how- ever to be observed that under article 22(6) the facts which cannot be required to be disclosed are those "which such authority considers to be against public interest to disclose".

Hence it follows that both the obligation to furnish particulars and the duty to con- sider whether the disclosure of any facts involved therein is against public interest, are vested in the detaining authority, not in any other. It was accordingly attempted to be argued in the High Court that the claim of non-disclosure made in the affidavit of the Under-Secretary indicated a decision for non- disclosure, by the Under-Secretary himself and that too at the time of filing the affidavit. On this assump- tion it was contended that the claim for non-disclo- sure was invalid. The High Court, however, on a consideration of the material, felt satisfied that what was stated in the affidavit related to the decision of the detaining authority itself, taken at the time. The learned Judges expressed their conclusion as follows: "There is nothing in the affidavit of Mr. Bamba wala to suggest that it is now that the detaining authority is claiming privilege or applying its mind to the question of privilege ......................... The mean- ing is clear that at no time it was in public interest to disclose the details referred to in the particular paragraph of the affidavit and there is nothing to suggest that this question was not considered by the detaining authority at the time when the grounds were furnished".

No argument has been addressed to us how this con- ... 392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1956] . . - t · v. It' Bombay 1956 - ]agannadhadas ]. B d h• d•ffi clusion is incorrect. But what has been urged before . us is that the decision not to disclose the facts as 1 L awrence oachin' Joseph o•souza well as the ambit of the non-disclosure must be clearly communicated to the detenue at the time The State of when the grounds are furnished. It is urged that if the detenue is furnished information, at least to that extent, it will enable him to present to the Advisory k' is 1 cu Jes m ma mg a proper represen a- tion and to convey to it a request for obtaining the requisite particulars from the State under section 10 of the Act for their own information and considera tion. We are unable to imply any such obligation under article 22(5) and (6). The necessity for such a communication would arise only ifthe detenue, feel- ing the grounds to be ·vague, asks for particulars.

An obligation to communicate the decision not to disclose facts considered prejudicial to public interest may well be implied in such a situation. But in the ab- sence of any such request by the detenue, the non communication of the decision cannot be held to have hampered his constitutional right of representation and an obligation to communicate cannot be implied in these circumstances. In the present case there is no merit in this contention. If the appellant had exercised his right to ask for particulars, at the time, from the detaining authority, there can be no doubt that he would have been furnished then the very in formation which has been supplied in paragraph 12 of the Under-Secretary's affidavit in answer to para 15(g) of the appellant's petition, both of which have been already set out above . . A faint suggestion has been made in the course of the arguments before us that the decision not to dis close particulars is mala fide and that such mala fides has to be imputed in a case where no particulars are at all furnished.

It is suggested that the power not to disclose facts considered against public interest cannot be so exercised as to nullify the consti tutiona 1 right of the detenue for being afforded a proper op portunity of representation. Such a contention as to the mala fide exercise of the power is untenable in the present case having regard to the nature of the . --- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 393 grounds on which the detention is based and the nature of activities imputed therein to the appellant. It is unnecessary, therefore, to deal in this case with a theoretical contention as to whether or not article 22(6) of the Constitution overrides the constitutional right to be furnished particulars under article 22(5) to the extent of denying all particulars and leaving the grounds absolutely vague. All the contentions raised before us fail and this 1956 Lau·re11ce Joac/1im Joseph D'So11za v. Tile State of Bombay ]agannadliadas J. appealis dismissed.

CH. TIKA RAMJI & OTHERS, ETC. v. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & OTHERS. 1956 April 24 (S. R. DAS, C.J., BHAGWATI, VENKATARAMA AYYAR, B. P. SINHA and JAFER IMAM JJ.] Sugarcane, Regulation of Supply and Purchase of-Act passed by State Legislature and notifications issued thereunder by the State Government-Constitutional validity-If repugnant to Parliamentary Acts and notifications made thereunder-If violative of fundamental rights-Parliament's power of repeal-Delegation of siich power, if permissible-U.P. Sugarcane (Regitlation of Supply and Pitrchase) Act, 1958 (U.P. Act XXIV of 1958), ss. 15, 16-U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954-Industries (Develop ment and Regulation) Act, 1951 (Act LXV of 1951) as amended by Act XXVI of 1958, ss. 18-G, 15, 16-Essentfo.l Commodities Act, 1955 (Act X of 1955), s. 16(1)(b)-Sugarcane Control Order, 1956, cl. '1(1)-Constitution of India, Arts.

14, 19(1)(c), (J) and (g), 81, 801, 804, 254. The petitioners challenged the constitutional validity of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act of 1953, and two notifications issued by the State Government on September 27, 1954 and November 9, 1955, the former under sub-sec. l(a) read with sub-sec. 2(h) of s. 16 of the impugned Act providing that where not less than three-fourths of the canegrowers ·within the area of operation of a Canegrowers' Co-operative Society were members thereof, the occupier of the factory to which that area is assigned should not purchase or enter into an agreement to purchase cane except through that society and the latter under s. 15 of the Act assigning to different sugarcane factories specified cane-purchasing centres for supply to them of sugarcane for the crushing season of 1955-56. They contended that the impugned Act was itltra vires the