Morch 22 v. PANDIT MUKAND RAM & Anr.

two suits which were heard together along with two other suits with which we are not now concerned. All four raised the same set of questions except for a few subsidiary matters. They were tried together and by common in the various consent the documents and evidence cases were treated as common to an. They were all governed by one common judgment, both in the first Court and on appeal. The defendants appeal here. The· plaintiff, Mukand Ram, is common to all four cases. He sues in each suit as the reversioner to one Pandit Nanak Chand who was his maternal grandfather. The family tree is as below : .,. ... Nanak Chand d. 23-7-56 'V: l\Ist. Pa to .. d. Jan. 1875 , - . -7---·---:-------;-.-i---- --- 1\Ist. l\Iaha Devi d. 1912 H: Nathmal Das l\Ist. Durga Devi I d. 1888 H: Jwala Prasad • l\IsL Ram Pyare I Bhukhan Saran I Banwari Lal (dead) . . I Sita! Prasad (dead) . l\Ist. Har Devi . d .. 10-!J-19 H: Bhawani Shanker I I : I! Shyam Lal Pyare Lal (Deft.

5) . I · (dead) . I · Brij Lal (de~ii) . I Kanhaiya Lal (Dead) I l\Iukand Ram (Plff. No. I) ~ t:l §" !J' ....... ,~ ~1~~:<S:~ ~ "-. • . ... . ... ~.,, ~ ~ "· § t c ~ .. ;; ;t ~ ~ ~ 0 t::r 11o· (Ii ~ / t,:) 00 9 ~ 00 ~ ~ .... t.'rj ,... t.'rj .a g ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1955 Sahu fl, fadho Das and others v. Pa1uiit Muka11d Rani and another BoseJ. ' • 26 SUPRFME COURT REPORTS [1955] The plaintiff's case is. that the properties in the four suits belonged to Nanak Chand who died on 23-7-1856 leaving a widow Mst. Pato and three daugh ters, Maha Devi, Durga Devi and Har Devi. On his death, his widow Mst: Pato succeeded. She died in January 1875 and the estate then went to the three daughters. Of them, Durga Devi died in 1888, Maha Devi in 1912 and Har Devi in 1919. The plaintiff's rights as reversioner accrued on Har Devi's death on 10-9-1919. But before this came certain alienations which the plaintiff challenges in the present suits.

The suits were filed on 8-9-1931. ln Civil. Appeal No. 92 of 1950, the challenge is tu a mortgage effectt;d by Durga Devi on 3-3-1887 favour of Sahu Bitthal Das. The mortgagee sued on his mortgage, .obtained a decree and in execution pur chased the properties himself. The plaintiff's case is that Durga Devi only had a life estate and, as there was no necessity, the mortgage ·and the subsequent auctinn purchase do not bind him. In Civil Appeal No. 94 of 1950, there are two alie nations, 1both sales. The first, dated 23-9-1918, was by Pyare Lal (son of Durga Devi) in favour of Shyam (This is ncit the Sh yam Lal Lal, son of M ulchand.. who was Pyare Lal's brother). The vendee later sold the properties to the first and second defendants on 5-3-1927. One of the vendees, the first defendant, yet another Shyam Lal: Shyam Lal son of Harbilas. The other sale was by Brij Lal's guardian on be half of Brij Lal, "Brij Lal then being a minor.

It was on 25-11-1919 in favour of Chheda Lal. The first and second defendants. pre-empted this sale after a fight in Court and took possession under the decree which they obtained. Tlie plaintiff's case is that Har Devi was alive at the date of the first sale and as the reversion had not opened out Pyare Lal had no power to sell. case of the second sale, the reversion had opened out but Brijlal heing more remote than the plaintiff got no title, so that sale is also bad. In The defendants' case b that the properties in these I 1955 Sahu Madho Da a11d others v. Pandit M11ka11d Ram tmd anothe Bo.<e .T. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 27 two suits (as also in the other two suits with which we are no longer concerned) did not ·belong to Nanak Chand· and formed no part of his estate; they belong ed exclusively to Mst. Pato as part of her personal estate. On 22-1-1864 Mst. Pato executed a doeument which she called a deed of agreement but which, if it is anything at all, is a will.

There are no other parties to it and she purports thereby to dispose of her proper ties after her death. The defendants in Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1950 have called it a will. After sayit1g that she wiTl remain in possession and occupatidn as long as she lives, Pato says that after her death her three daughters will be the owners and will either remain 'in joint possession or will divide the estate in equal shares and, in that event, will take possession of their respective shares and will be the "owners" of them. But before she died Pato made another disposition time .in the year 1875 of her estate during her life which, of course, abrogated the will. This was done orally. The defendants say that this was a family arrangement in which each of the three daughters was given certain properties absolutely so that each be came the absolute owner of whatever fell to her share. Pato also gave properties to each of her four grand sons who were then Uving, _namely Kanhaiya Lal, Mukand Ram, Banwari Lal and Sital Prasad.

The defendants asserted that they also took separate and absolute estates _immediately and said that each has been holding and dealing with the properties. so di vided, separately and as ·absolute owners, ever since. Tolms, at the dates of the transfers now challenged, the properties each alienor had an absolute title to alienated and the plaintiff has none. The trial Court he4l that properties in Pato's hands came from her · husband Nanak Chand, the plaintiff had not shown that properties with which his_foar suits were concerned formed part of Nanak Chand's estate. though most of An issue was also tramed about the family settle ment and one about estoppeJ. On both those points . 1955 Sah1l Madho Da.~ and others v. Pandit Mukand Ram aQl1 another B1HeJ. .. 28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955] the learned Judge found against the plaintiff. result was that all four suits were dismissed. The The High Court reversed these findings on appeal an.d held that all the properties, including the ones in smt, formed part of Nanak Chand's estate.

The learned Judges also held that though there was a family arrangement, it was a purely voluntary settle ment made by Pa to and was not made .as the result of any dispute and that in any case it did not bind the plaintiff who was not a par.ty to it and who does not claim through any of those who were. They also held that there was no estoppel. Accordingly, the plain tiff's claim was decreed in each of the four suits. Appeals were filed here in all four suits by the various defendants but Civil Appeals Nos. 91 and 93 of 1950 were dismissed for want of prosecution, there fore the decree of the High Court in the two cases out of which those appeals arose will stand. We are now only concerned with Civil Appeals Nos. 92 and 94 of 1950. In the lower Courts much of the effort was con centrated on finding out which items out of a large mass of property belonged to Nanak Chand and which did not. We do not intend to look into that because it it is unnecessary on the view we take.

We will there fore assume, without deciding, that all the properties in dispute were part of Nanak Chand's estate. We will deal first with the family arrangement. The learned counsel for the plaintiff argued that the defendants never set up a family arrangement though they have used the words "family settlement". He contended that what they really pleaded was a gift out and out by Pato. that the defendants never suggested a dispute. neither did they suggest that any one ever questioned or doubted Pato's absol11tc title to the property. Therefore, it was on the the present case, which is based argued assumption that the property was not Pato's and that she was laying wrongful claim to it, cannot be allowed because it flies in the face of the defendants' plead ings. It was pointed out ; •• 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 29 There is not much in this objection. The defen-· dants did plead a family arrangement and the matter was put in issue and fought' out.

The defendants' case was that all the property was Pato's. The plain tiff's case was that. it was all Nanak Chand's. The issues were- 1955 Sahu Madho Das and others v. Pandit M11k1111d Ram and 01101/wr Bo.,e J. " 4. Whether Mst. Pa to gave properties sepa rately to each of her three daughters and to daughter's sons and put them in proprietary possessior1 and they remained absolute owners of their properties and what is its effect on the case?.

Whether issue No. 4 was by way nf family settlement and what is its effect on the case?" the arrangement mentioned the case the plaintiff cla.ims, If the properties really belonged These issues are broad enough to cover the present point. to Nanak Chand, as a family settlement becomes all the stronger, for it is clear that Pato laid clain1 to them as her own proper ties of which she could dispose by will, that is what the document of 1864 really is. other hand. they were her properties. as the defen dants say, then she had the right either to gift them outright or to settle them as the defendants say she did by way of a either case. the matter was fully fought out and neither side was misled. family arrangement. Jn If, on The real question we have to decide family arrangement been proved? We is, has the think it has. The direct evidence on this point is that of Shyam first defendant Lal (D.W. I in C.A. 94 '50) and the there.

2.1.20 Ex. 18. (C.A. 91) Lastly, there is Bhukhan Saran, who is Maha Devi's daughter's son. He transferred as follows: Houscs,.c:c. in Absolute and 26-3-18 S'ln1bhal. Ex. MM-I Sale (C.A. 92) exclusive owner. 9-1-21 RclinQuish- mcnt. Hilalpa! Ex. DD-1 (C.A. 93) These documents disclose a long line of conduct on the part of the various members of the family and show that from 1877 down to 1922 each dealt with the properties in his or her possession as absolute 1955 Sahu Madho Du> <111d others ' v. Pu11di1 M11ku11d Ram and wrother BoscJ. 2S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 39 owner and set up exclusive proprietary title to the It is true the source of title properties transferred. was not consistently stated, sometimes it was said to be Pato and at others Nanak Chand. but the asser tion to a separate, exclusive and absolute tit!(! in each is common all through. There is only one way in which they could have got these exclusive titles and that is by a family arrangement, for whether the pro party was Nanak Chand's or whether it was Pato's in neither event could any one of the these persons have obtained an absolute estate on the dates with which we are concerned : the grandsons, because the rever sion had not opened out; the daughters because, either way, they would only be limited owners under the Hindu law.

But if there was a family arrangement assented to by the daughters and later accepted and acted on by the sons when they attained majority, their claim to separate and independent absolute titles is understandable. It does not matter whether the claims were well founded in law because what we are considering at the moment is not the legal effect of the arrangement but whether there was one in fact. Now, in spite of all these dealings, the conduct of Har Devi and Mukand Ram and Kanhaiya Lal was not always consistent. They were greedy and while insisting that they be allowed to hold on to what they had got, they wanted to snatch more if and when they could. The ball started rolling in 1890 as soon as Mukand Ram attained majority. There was reference to arbitration in that year to settle dispute with their mother Har Devi. But even there. there was the inconsistency regarding their own pro perties to which we have already referred.

Mukand Ram's later explanation in the witness box that they got those properties for :,/1radh purposes and for a pilgrimage to Gaya cannot be believed. · Next, ther.e was the suit by Mukand Ram and Kanhaiya Lal against their aunt Maha Devi in 1895: S. No. 21I1895. Ex. 31 fC. A. 91). That was occasioned by two sales by Maha Devi on 19-2-83 and 20-5-85. She stoutly maintained tli<~t she had an absolute title. 40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1955 J 1955 The litigation had a chequered career and ultimately Sahu Madho Das the suit was dismissed as barred by time. and fl/hers V, Pundit Mukand Ra1n and another Bose J. ' Next came suit No. 177 of 1897, Ex. GI (C.A. 91), in which Har Devi sued Maha Devi and a transferee. This time it was to set aside an alienation by Durga Devi, Durga Devi then being dead. Her Devi clainied that the property was Nanak Chand 's and that the daughters were limited owners. But again Maha Devi stood by the family arrangement and asserted an absolute title in all the daughters; Ex.

2B I (C.A. 91). We have seen that Har Devi entered the box and admitted the arrangement: Ex. 2F-l IC.A. 91J. The suit very naturally failed, but the result of the litigation is nor relevant because the plaintiff was not a party. What we are examining is the conduct of Har Devi. In 1913 Har Devi tried again after Maha Devi's death, this time against alienees from Maha Devi. This is the suit that went up to the Privy Council. Mst. Hardei v. Bhagwan Singh ('). She failed again. Having failed against Maha Devi in the 1897 liti gation, Har Devi next tried her luck against Maha Devi's grandson (daughter's son) Bhukhan Saran, after Maha Devi's death. The suit is O.S. 52/ 14, Ex. 78 (C.A. 94). This time she succeeded with respect to some items and failed as regards the rest. But again the result is irrelevant : Exs. 6 and 8 (C.A. 94). Now what we are examining at the moment is whether Shyam Lal, D.W. I in C.A. 94, is to be belie ved when he says that Mukand Ram, among others. told him about the family arrangement under which Pato had divided all her property between h .. r daugh ters and their sons.

It is evident from what we have said above that Mukand Ram had been consistently asserting such a title for 3 J years from J 891 to J 922 In parti despite his aberrations in 1890 and 1895. cular he did this whene.,.er he wanted to borrow money or to sell property: and he makes a si!!niflcant admission in the witness box as P.W. 11 in C.A. 91 that- - (I) A.T.R. 1919 P.C. 27. 1955 Salm Madho Das and otlrcr.1 v. Pandit M11k and Ram and another BoseJ. 2S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 41 "In the mortgage or sale of the property over which Mst. Har Devi was in possession none of her sisters or sisters' sons joined. Similarly, in the sale or transfer of the property that came to Durga Devi, none of her sisters or other sisters' sons joined". He also admits that there was a division and sepa rate possession from 1876. He says that it was for con· venience of management and says that it was after Pato's death, but in view of the mass of evidence that we have just analysed, we think it far more likely that he told Shyam Lal just what Shyam Lal says he did.

After all, he was borrowing money from Shyam Lal on each of these occasions; so there is reasons to believe that he would have told Shyam Lal what he had so repeatedly asserted to his other trans ferees. We accordingly believe Shyam Lal. That at once shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff, and what is his explanation.? First, a division of the estate for convenience of management (but that does not explain the long chain of unchallenged transfers bar Har Devi's efforts in four cases); and second, that the grandsons got property absolutely for the purposes of shradh and pilgrimage: (~n explana tion which we disbelieve). We are therefore left with the plaintiff's admission to Shyam Lal and that ad mission, coupled with the conduct and actings of the family, firmly establishes the family arrangement. We accordingly hold that, whether the property belonged to Pato or to Nanak Chand, Pato claimed an absolute right which the daughters acknowledged, and in re turn they and their sons were given separate absolute estates in separate portions of the property immediately.

This arrangement bound the daughters because they were parties to it and received good considera tion. But so far as the sons are concerned, they were minors at that to this arrangement, for no one that they were represented guardians who entered into it on their behalf. Therefore. the properties they received were so fnr as they arc c1)11cerned, gifts pure and simple time and were not parties suggests ;:.1 1955 Sah11 Madho Das and. ot/u:n; v. Pa11di1 Muka11d Ra111 and Cl11other Bose J. ' 42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1955] If it was (rom Palo with the assent or her daughters. It dot:s not matter whether the properties were Palo's exclu sive properties or whether they came to her from her husband because, either way, the title to the proper ties resided in her and she was the only person com petent to pass it on to another. If her title was abso lute. the sons got absolute estates. limited title of a Hindu widow. they obtained a limited title good during her life, and. as the daughters con sented to the gifts and obtained properties for them selves as a result of the arrangement that resulted in these liifts, thf'y would not be permitted to question the gifts; and the Privy Council so held in Har Devi's suit against the aliences from Maha Devi: fl.1st.

Hardei v. Bhagwan Si11gh ('). But so far as the grandsons are concerned, !he' mere fact that each received a separ<1te gift from Pato at a time when they were not compe tent to assent or to dissent would not i11 itself bind them. To achieve that result, there would have to be something more; and it is to that something more that we will now direct our attention. But before doing that, we will pause to distinguish Rani Mewa Kuwar v. Rani Hulas Kuwar ('); Klwnni Lal v. Gohind Krish11a Narain ('), and Ramsumra11· Prasad v. Shyam Kumari('). It is well settled that a compromise or family arrangement is based on assumption that there is an antecedent title of some sort in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is, each party relinquish ing all claims to property other than that falling to his share and recognising the right of the others, as they had previously asserted it, to the portions allot ted to them respectively.

That explains why no con veyance is required in these cases to pass the title from the one in whom it resides to the person recefv It is assumed ing it under the family arrangement. that the title claimed by the person rece1v111g property under the arrangement hijd always_ resided in him or her so far as the property falling to his .or her share is concerned and therefore no conveyance is (I) A.LR. 1919P.C. 27. (3) [1911) 38 I.A. 87, 102. (2) [1874111.A.157. 166. (4) [1922.149 J.A. 3-!2, 348. /955 Sa/111 Madho Das and others v. Pandit Mukand Ram and a11<>1/wr nose .f. 2 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 43 necessary. But, in our opinon. the principle can be carried further and so strongly do the Courts lean in favour of family arrangements that bring about har mony in a family and do justice to its various mem bers and avoid, in anticipation, future disputes which might ruin them all. that we have no hesitation taking the next step (fraud apart) and upholding an arrangement under which one set of members d1an dons all claim to all title and interest in all the pro perties in dispute and acknowledges that the sole and absolute title to all the properties resides in only one of their number <provided he or she had claimed the whole and made such an assertion of title) and are content to take such properties as are assigned to their shares as gifts pure and simple from him or her, or as a conveyance for consideration when considera tion is present. ·respective The legal position .in such a case would he this.

The arrangement or compnimise would set out and define that the title claimed by A to all the pro perties in dispute was his absolute title as claimed and asserted by him and that it had always resided it would effect a transfer hy A to B, C him. Next. the arrangement) of and D (the other members properties X. Y and Z; and thereafter B. C and D would hold their derived from A. But in that event. the formalities of ·law about the passing of title by transfer would have to be observed. and how either registration or twelve years adverse possession would be necessary. But in the present case. we are dealing with an arrangement made in 1875 at a time when the Transfer of Property Act was not in force and no writing was required; and, as there is no writing, the Registration Act does not apply either. Therefore. the oral arrangement of 1875 would be sufficient to pass title in this way and that, in our opinion. is what happened. titles under the But these rules only apply to the parties to the settlement and to those who claim through or under them.

They cannot be applied to the minor sons who were not parties either personally or through their guardians and who do not claim title either through 44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19551 1955 Sa/111 Madho Do.~ and otht•rJ v. Pandit M11ka11d Ra111 and a1101hrr Bose.I. Pata or her daughters. So far as they are concerned. what they received were gifts pure and simple and the only assent that could be inferred from mere acceptance of the gift and nothing more would be ass e~t _to that particular gift and not assent to the gifts s11111larly made to others; and for this reason. When Mukand Ram attained majority he had two titles to choose from. One from Pata as a limited owner coupled with the assent of the daughters to her gift to him. In that case, he would hold a limited estate till the reversion opened out. The gift would be good during Palo's life time because she had that title to convey, and thereafter, till the three daughters died, because they assented to it and obtained con siderable benefit for themselves from the transaction out of which it arose.

The other title would be an absolute one on the basis that Pata w~s the absolute owner of the properties. That title could only be referable to the family arrangement, and if Mukand Ram, knowing the facts, assented to the arrangement ex post facto, he will be precluded from challenging it for reasons which we shall now explain. If the properties were Nan.ak Chand's, which is the assumption on which we are deciding this case, then Pata was a limited owner under the Hindu law, but as such she represented the estate and any title she conveyed, whether by gift or otherwise, would not be void; it would cinly be voidable. It would be good as against all the world except the reversioner who succeeded when the reversion opened out and he is the only person who would have the right to avoid it; and it would continue to be good until he chose to avoid it. Therefore, if he does not avoid it, or is precluded from doing so, either because of the law of limitation or by his own conduct, or for any other rl'!ason, then no one else can challenge it; and the law is that once a reversioner has given his assent to an alienation, whether at the time, or as a par.t of the transaction, or later as a distinct and separate· act, he is bound though others may not be, and having given his assent he cannot go back on it to the detriment of other persons; all the more so when he himself receives a 1955 Salm Madho Das and others v.

Pandit MukanN Ram and another Bose J. 2 S.C.R. SUPRE'\1£ COURT REPORTS 45 benefit: see Raia /14odll// S11d1111 Singh v. Rook. ('('); Bi joy 001111/ v. I\. rish110(). ;rnd Rmngo11da A 1111ago11da v. Bhausahehc'). Lcird Sinha. delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in the l11st of these three cases, said at page 402: -·- ''It is sett.led law that an alienation by a widow i11 excess of her powers is not altogether void but only voidable by the reversioners. who may either singly or as a body be precluded from exercising their right to avoid it either by express ratification or hy acts which treat it as rnlid or hinding". This was followed in Dlii_ram Singh v. fugal Kishore(') though the ground of that decision was estoppel. \Ve are now founding on another principle which is not grounded on estoppel and which. indeed. is not pecu liar to Hindu law. Estoppel is rule of' evidence which prevents a party from alleging and proving the truth.

Here the plain tiff is not shut out from asserting anything. We are assuming in his favour that Pato had only a life estate and we are examining at length his assertion that he did not assent to the family arrangement. .The princi ple we ar€? applying is therefore not estoppel. It is a rule underlying many branches of the law which pre cludes a person who, with full knowledge of his rights, has once elected to assent to a transaction voidable at his instance and has thus elected not to exercise his right to avoid it. from going back on that and avoiding it at later stage. Having made his election he is hound by it. So far as the Hindu Law is concerned, Lord Dune din explained in Rangaswami Gounden v. NacMappa Goundenfl. a case in which a widow gifted properties to her nephew, that thou~h the reversioner is not called upon to exercise his right to avoid until reversion falls in and so on assent can be inferred from mere inaction prior to the death or deaths of the limited owner or owners. he is not bound to wait and "of course something might be done even before (I) [1891] 24 I.A. 164.

169. [19271 54 LA. 396.. (!!) <2) [1906] 34 I.A. 87. (4) 1952 S.C.R. 478, 488. (5) [1918) 46 T. A. 72, 86, R7. 7-8 SCI/ND/Si /955· Sahu Madho Das and others V. Pandit Mukcuul Ra111 and another Ho.~e J. 46 SUPREf\IF COURT REPORTS [ l 955] that time which amounted tn an actual election to hold the deed gpod --.. Ramgouda case I') is an illustration of what that some thing can be, for there the assent was given by the ultimate reversioner heforc he became in tiru/o to alie nations by a widow. one of which was a gift. The present case is another illustration. For the reasons we have given and which we shall now further exa mine, we hold that the plaintiff. who is in rirulo now that the succession has opened out. unequivocally as sented to the arrangement with full knowledge of the facts and accepted benefit under it. therefore. he is now precluded from avoiding it and any attempts he made to go behind that assent when it suited his pur pose cannot render the assent once given nugatory even though it was given when he was not i11 1it11lo and even though the assent was to a series of gifts.

The reai question is whether the plaintiff assented to the family arrangement. and as the plaintiff was not a party to the arrangement his assent to the arrange ment itself, and not to something else. :nust be clearly established. and also his knowled!.!e of the facts. But we think they have been. Jn the first place. there was the express assent in 1 ~NO to the gifts made to the other grandsons on the basis that each grandson got an absolute estate. Next. there was the course of·dealings by Kanhaiva Lal and Mukhand Ram in which they asserted absolute titles. Mukand Ram tells us in the witness box a<; P. W. 11 IC.A. 91) that Kanhaiya Lal was the karta of the joint family to which Mukand Ram belonged. therefore Kanhaiya Lal's dealings with the properties which he and his brother held under a joint and undivided title are also relevant as thev will bind Mukand Ram. And lastly, there is Muka~d Ram's representation to Shyam Lal 10.W. 1 iii C.A. 94) which leaves us in no doubt about his knowledge.

The cumulative effect of this course of conduct Kanhaiya Lal and Mukhand Ram were holding. not on the basis of a separate Rnd individual gift made by a life owner with the assent of the next set of life rnasonable inference to a (I) [ 1927] 54 I A 396. 402. 2 s.c.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 47 family formed parts of the same owners, but on the basis of the which was one composite whole in ·which the several Salm Madho Das dispositions under 'which Mukand Ram himself acquired a part of Pandit M11ka11d the estate: see Ramgouda v. Bhausaheb('). We are Ram and another therefore satisfied that the plaintiff's assent was to this very arrangement; and that concludes both cases. ·arran, sement transaction and others BoseJ. 1955 Jn C.A. 94/ 50 there is, in addition, a direct personal estoppel aginst the plaintiff. The transfers that are challenged there are sales of 23-9-18 and 25-11-19 made hy fll'o of the grandsons, one personally and the other by the guardian, but the relevant dates for the purposes of the estoppel are later because the sentation in this case was not made to the immediate transferees hut to the llrst defendant who obtained title to the rroperties at a later date, in one case by a sale from the immediate transferee, in the other by pre-emption.

But the exact dates do not matter be cause the rerresentation to the first defendant was made in 1910 before the first defendant's purchases. It was made by Kanhaiya Lal and Mukand Ram as well as by other members of the famtly. We have already referred to the first defendant's evidence. This case would therefore be governed by Dhiyan Singh v . .fugal Kishor<'i') in any event. But we need not elabo rate this further because of the other principle which, in our opinion. is sufficient to dispose of both the pre sent cases. ,The result is that both appeals are allowed. The decrees of the High Court are set aside and those of the first Court dismissing the plaintiff's claims in those suits out of which Civil Appeals 92 and 94 of 1950 arise_ are restored. Costs here and in the High Court will be paid by the rlaintiff-respondent but there will be only one set of costs and they will he divided half and half between the two sets of appellants. Appeals allowed. (I 1 [ 19271 54 IA W6, 402. (2J 195~ S.C.R. 478.