Judgment · High Court

Mr. G's first objection is that the proceedings before th.e Tribunal were ultra vires because there was no pro per order of appointment. At a very early stage he applied to the Prothonotary for a copy of the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Registrar and also Mr. 'G', a Senior .Ad1,1ocate of th1 Supreme Court ,V Thi Hon'ble Chief Justice and judges .of the High Court of J·udicature at Bombay. Bose]. 502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS r195sJ the Tribunal. He was the order was oral. told by the Prothonotary Mr. 'G' put in two written statements before the Tribunal and did not challenge this statement of fact in either. He contented himself with saying that order was not "judicial" and so was not valid. He took up the same attitude in the High Court. The learned Judges said- > ..... j "The record dearly shows it came to the notice of this Court .... it was decided to refer this case to the Bar Council under section 10(2) and accord ingly a Tribunal was appointed under section 11(1) by the learned Chief Justice of this Court." that when In his petition to this Court he did not challenge this is evident the fact that an ora \ order was made to go statement of fact but again confined his attack question of the validity of from all this that was not challenged. We cannot allow Mr. 'G' behind that. the order. It , The next question is whether an oral order is enough : lay dowf'. any procedure. Bar Councils Act does not All it says is- Section 10(2) : " ........ the High Court .......... may of its own in which it ·has otherwise that any such advocate has been motion so refer any case reason to believe so guilty." and section 11 (2) says- "The Tribunal shall consist of not less than three for the ........ members of the Bar Council appointed purpose of the inquiry by the Chief Justice." - - in our opinion, to a proper officer of the Court. We agree it is necessary that there should De some record of the order on the files but, order itself need not be a written one ; it can be an oral order given letter No. G-1003 dated 29th April, present case, 1953, of the Registrar and letter No. E. 41-09/53 dated the 1st May, 1953, of Registrar (office copies of which were retained on the files) are a sufficient record of the making of the order. Mr. 'G' was supplied with copies the Bar Council the Prothonotary In S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 503 of these letters an<l so was aware of the fact that orders issued. As a matter of fact, we have ' seen had been the originals of the High Court's office files and find three members of the Tribunal that the names of the are in the Chief Justice's handwriting with his initials underneath. That is an additional record of the making of the order. We hold that an order recorded manner set out above is sufficient for the purposes of sections 10(2) and 11(2) of the Bar Councils Act and hold that the Tribunal was validly appointed. ·~.54 Mr. 'G', a Senior Advocate of tic< Supreme Court. v. The Hon'ble Chief Justice and Judges of the Higle Court of Judicature al Bombay. Bose J. Mr. G's next point is that there was no "complaint" to the High Court and so it had no jurisdiction the matter to the Tribunal. This the fact that the High Court can refer a matter of this kind "of its the Bar Councils ~.. own motion" under section 10(2) of ignores Act. We have dealt with the merits in the connected case. This petition is dismissed but, here again, we make no order about costs. Petition dismissed. SETH JAGJIVAN MA VJI VITHLANI ti. MESSRS RANCHHODDAS MEGHJI. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., S. R. Di1.s, V1v1AN BosE, BHAGWATI and VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.] 1 954 May 2&. - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXV/ of 1881) ss. 7, 32, 61, 64, 78-Drawu, liability of-Acceptance-Bill payable at sight -Prese1ltment-Acceptance-Oral-W hether valid. '> Under section 32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the liability of the drawee arises only when he accepts the bill. There is no provision in the Act that the drawee is as such liable on the instrument, the only exception being under section 31 in the case of a drawee of a cheque having sufficient funds of the customer in his lands ; an<l even then, the liability is only towards the drawer im<l not the payee. There is no substance that section 61 of 0e :'-ct provides for acceptance only when the bill is payable after sight, and not when it is payable on demand. two distinct stages, In a bill payable for presentmen~ the contention there are sight,