The Union of India v. Madan Gopal

impleaded as a defendant. As the Constitu~ion and that all in section 8 which, so far as by a Division Bench save as tb; it that the "A declaration under section 6 shall be conclusive land in respect of which the declara is needed for a public purpose and, after the Provincial Government the ·provisions of thereupon in thi.s far as evidence tion is made making such declaration. may acquire the land and the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, section may be, apply : (hereinafter the said Act), shall, so referred to as Provided that- (b) in determining to be awarded for " the amount of compensation land acquired in pursuance of this " S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 561 to be the market value of the Act the market value referred to in clause first of sub section ( 1) of section 23 of the said Act shall be deem land on the date of publication of the notification under sub-section ( 1) of the land is section 4 for included subject . say- to the following condition, that is the notified area in which if such market value exceeds by any amount the market value of the land on the 31st day of December, 1946, on the assumption that the land had been at it in fact was on the date of ·date in the state the amount of such publication of the said notification, excess shall not be taken into consideration." in which 1953 The State of J11est Bengal v. Bela Banerjee and Others. Patanjali Sastri C.J . The provision making the declaration of the Govern land on December 31, 1946, ment conclusive as purpose of the acquisition and amount of compensation value of market were declared ultra vires the Constitution and void. limitation of exceed the public nature of so as not The Attorney-Genera\, appearing for the appellant, inasmuch as article 31 (2) made rightly conceded that the existence of a public purpose a necessary condition ·of acquisition the existence of such a purpose as a fact must be established objectively and section 8 relating .to the conclusiveness of the declara tion of Government as to the nature of the purpose ·of the acquisition must be held unconstitutional but he saved by article the provision was ·.contended 31(5) of the Constitution which provides: "Nothing .in dause (2) shall affect-( a) the provisions of any exist to which the provisions of ing law other than a law dause (6) apply, or .............. " Clause thus: the provision (6) "Any law of the State enacted not more the commencement of eighteen months hefore Constitution may within io the President for his commencement be submitted the President by certification ; and, thereupon, it shall not be called in public notification so certifies, question in any court on the ground that it contravenes this article or has the provisions of clause (2) of three months The State of West Brngal v. Bela Banerjee and Ot1iers. Patanjali Sajtri C.J. se2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] contravened prov1s10ns section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935." sub-section (2) of • It was argued impugned Act having been passed within 18 months before the commencement of t<> the Constitution and not having been submitted the President it was a law to for his certification, which the provisions of clause ( 6) did not apply and, therefore, as ·an existing impugned Act was law, not affected by clause (2) of that article. The argu ment is manifestly unsound. Article 31(6) is intended to save a State law enacted within 18 months before the commencement of tht President while, article same was certified by 31 (5) saves all existing than 18 laws passed more the commencement of the Cof)stitntion. months before the intention is clear Reading law passed within 18 months before that an existing January 26, 1950, it was submitted to the President within three months from such date for his certification and was certified by him. if accepted, would reduce article 31(6) The argument, to ameaningless redundancy. the Constitution provided to be saved unless the two clanses together, is not (b) section 8 limiting the "condition" the appeal centred The only serious controversy constitutionality of the compensation proviso payable so as not to exceed the market value of the lorn! on December 31, 1946. The Attorney-General, while conceding by itself must mean a full and fair money equivalent, read with entry No. 42 of List importing equiva term was not used lence in value but had reference to what legisla ture might think was a proper indemnity for the loss sustained by the owner. Article 31(2) provides : the context of article 31 (2) III of the Seventh Schedule, the word "compensation'' in any rigid sense that, interest immovable, No property, movable or in, or commercial or possession of or acquired any law authorising including any company owmg, any industrial undertaking, shall be taken for public purposes under taking of such possession law provides such acquisition, unless S.C.R. · SUPREME COURT REPORTS 563 compensation acquired and either fixes sation, or specifies manner in which, mined and given. for the property taken possession of or the amount of the compen the principles on which, and the to be deter the compensation and entry 42 of List III reads thus : Principles on which compensation for property ac quired or requisitioned for the Union or of a State or for any other public purpose is to be determined, and the form and the manner in which such compensation is to be given. the purposes of 1953 The State O H'est Bengal v. Bela Banerjee· and Others- Patanjali Sastrf C.J. It legislature is argued term "compensation" m mtry 42 could not mean full cash equivalent, for then, to lay down the the power conferred on the to be determined principles on which compensation and the form and the manner in which such compen sation is to be given would be rendered nugatory. On the entry showed that the compensa the other hand, was determined on the principles laid down by the law enacted in exercise of the power, and, as the conclud ing words used it was claimed, same as in the entry, left scope for legislative discretion m determining measure of the indemnity. to be "given" was only "such co111pensation" in article 31(2) are substantially the Constitution, is given legislature the principles which laying down We are unable to agree with this view. While it is the discretionary · should power of govern the determination of the amount to be given to such princi the owner for the property appropriated, is determined as payable ples must ensure tl\at what is, a just equivalent of must be compensation, indemnification limits of this basic requirement of full allows free play to the legislative to what princi the determination of the amount ples should guide into account payable. Whether such principles the elements which make up the true value of the · property appropriated and exclude matters which are the owner has been deprived of. Within the expropriated owner, the Constitution judgment as • ,. 1953 The State of ·Wesl Bengal v. Bela BanerJe1 and OtherJ. Palanjali Sastri C.J. 564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] to be neglected, the court. This, is a justiciable issue to be adjudicated indeed, was not disputed. Reference was made the opinion was expressed to certain Australian cases terms of compulsory acquisition of property were matters of legislative policy and judgment. The decisions largely turned on the absence of any· constitutional prohibi tion in regard to deprivation of private property with out compensation as American Constitution and on the use of the words instead of "compensation" in section 51 "just terms" (xxxi) of the Commonwealth Constitution which con to make laws with ferred power on the Parliament respect to "the acquisition of property on just (cf. Grace Brothers from any State or person ...... " Pty. Ltd. v. The Commonwealth(')). Those decisions, therefore, are of no assistance to the appellant here. the Fifth Amendment of so as not limits to exceed it will be seen section 8 impugned Act, the proviso Turning now to the provisions relating to compensa tion under that the latter part of amount of compensation land on December 31, 1946, no market value of the matter when the land is acquired. Considering that the is a permanent enactment and lands impugned Act may be acquired under it many years after it came to force, fixing of the market value on December 31, 1946, as the ceiling on compensation, without refer time of the ac the value of the qumt10n is arbitrary and cannot be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of article 31 (2). The fixing of an anterior date for the ascertainment of value may not, in certain circums tances, be a ·violation of the constitutional requirement as, far instance, when the proposed scheme of acquisi tion becomes known before launched and prices the benefits to be fixing of an anterior date, derived under it, but which might have no relation when it is acquired, may be, many years later, cannot but be Judges it is in anticipation of regarded as arbitrary. The to the value of the learned sharply land at (1) 72 C.L.R. 269. .. 1953 TM State of· West Bengal and Othtrs. Patanjali Sastrf C.J. 1954 Jan. 19·. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 565 that it is common knowledge below· observe that since the end of the war land, particularly around Calcutta, in value and might still increased enormously further increase very considerably increases. Any principle for pace of industrialisation to the owner determining compensation which denies the .ascertain this increment in value cannot result in ment of land appropriated. the true equivalent of the in value ·when We accordingly hold that latter part of proviso (b) to section 8 of the impugned Act which fixes the market value on December 31, 1946, as the maximum compensation for lands acquired under it offends against the provisions of article 31 (2) and is unconstitutional and void. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Agent for the appellant : P. K. Bose. Agent respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 : S. C. Banerjee. Agent for the intervener: C. H. Rajadhyaks?a. WARYAM SINGH AND ANOTHER v. AMARNATH AND ANOTHER. [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C.J., B. K. MuKHERJF.A, S. R. DAs, VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ. J Constitution of India, art,·. 227 and 241-High Court-Whe ther conferred power of judicial superintendence-Rent Controller the meaning of fudge-Whether Tribunals within and District art. 227-East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (III of 1949) 13(2)(i), Proviso as extended Non-payment of arrears of rent on first hearing of application for ejectment-Legal effect thereof. to Himachal Pradesh, s. The Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Himachal Pradesh exercises jurisdiction in relation to the \Vhole of the territories of Himachal Pradesh. The Rent Control and diction under certainly the Constitution and tribunals the District Judge exercising juris· the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949, are if not courts within the meaning of art. 227 of the territories of they' function within