GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under v. Tht Mewar Tex·

GHULAM HASAN J.-This appeal is brought under a certificate granted by the High Court of Rajasthan under article 133 ( c) of the Comtitution of India against a judgment and order of that High Court in writ petition under article 226 holding the appointment of one Shri Sukhdeo Narain as invalid and directing that all proceedings Industrial Court Industrial Disputes Act (No. XIV under section 7 of the of 1947) are null and void. taken by him as 1954 Thi State of Rajasthan v. Tht Mewar Tex· tile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and Ot™rs. Ghulam HaJan ]. 1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1954] We are informed that Shri Sukhdeo Narain has ceased to work as Industrial Tribunal and the". present appeal, therefore, becomes infructuous, but we are invited by the Advocate-General on behalf of the is the appellant before us to State of Rajasthan who decide the question as the appoint likely to affect other awards made by ment, as it is Industrial Disputes Act. We tribunals under according! y proceed to give our decision. to the validity of The question involved in the case is whether appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain is invalid because he does not fulfil the qualifications laid down for a tribunal under section 7(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 7(3) hereinafter referred to as the Industrial Act says:- "Where a tribunal consists of one member only, two or more tribunal, shall be a that member, and where it consists of members, person who- chairman of the (a) is or has been a Judge of a High Court; or (b) is or has been a District Judge ; " The Industrial Act was applied to Rajasthan by the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950 (Ordinance IV of 1950), by the Rajpramukh on January 24, 1950. By this adaptation section 7 of the Industrial Act came to be applied to Rajasthan. Shri Sukhdeo Narain was appointed on October 9, 1950, by a notificati<;m which ran as follows :- "In exercise of the powers conferred by section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (XIV of 1947) the Government of Rajasthan is pleased to constitute an Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri Sukhdeo Narain, a retired Judge of the High Court of the erstwhile Jodhpur State for the adjudication of an Industrial dispute in the Mewar Textile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara, in Rajasthan." The appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was objected to by the respondent on the ground that the S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1131 words "a Judge of a High Court" in section 7(3) mean "a Judge of the High Court of Judicature for Rajas than established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949" and as Shri Sukhdeo Narain had been a Judge of the High Court of the former State of Jodhpur, he could not be held to be Judge of the High Court under section 7(3) of the Industrial Act. · This objection was upheld by the High Court. 1954 The State of Rajasthan v,. T ht Mewar Tex tile Mills Ltd., Bhilwara and Others. GhUlam Has an J. Though the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain in the notification was based upon the fact that he was a retired Judge of the High Court of · Jodhpur, in argu ments· it was also contended before the High Court that even if he was not qualified for appointment as a former Judge of a High Court, he was certainly quali fied for appointment as a former District Judge. The High Court repelled this contention. the United State of Rajasthan came into existence on April 7, 1949, and the United State of Matsya was integrated with it on May · 15, Section 5 of Ordinance No. IV of 1950 lays down that : It appears

#1949. "For the purpose of the application of any Central there be anything repugnant law to Rajasthan, unless in the subject or context,- courts, (ix) references therein to other civil, criminal Judges, to public offices, revenue Magistrates, officers or authorities shall be deemed to Judges, Magistrates, officers or authorities of or in Rajasthan." courts, offices references Judges The High Court held that the word "Rajasthan" as defined in Ordinance I of 1949 means the United State and other officers" of Rajasthan and "the mentioned in section 5 (ix) must be held to be those in the service of the United State of Rajasthan. Accord ingly they held that Shri Sukhdeo Narain could not be held to be a District Judge within the meaning of section 7(3) (b) and his appointment as an Industrial Tribunal under therefore, invalid. We are of opinion that this_ appeal can be decided on a short ground. (Appellate Tribunal) Act (XL VIII of 1950) came into force on May 20, 1950. By section 34 Industrial Disputes it was provided section was, The 1954 The Stat1 ef Rqjast!,.an v. Tht Mewar T1x tile Mills Lld., 8hilwara and Others. Oh~/am Hasan ]' 1132 SUl'REME COURT REPORTS [1954] Industrial Disputes Act, XIV of 1947, shall be amended in the manner Schedule substituted to section (1) of the Industrial Act as follows :- specified in the Schedule and sub-section (2) "It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir." therefore It is not necessary As we have already stated the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was made on October 9, 1950, i.t:., after the Industrial Disputes Act had become applic able to Rajasthan. invoke the provisions of Ordinance IV of 1950 in appoint deciding the question of the validity of the ment. The argument based on section 34 of Act XL VIII of 1950 was put forward before the High Court at the time of the hearing of the application for in view of it was contended to appeal and section 34 the provisions of Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordinance, 1950, namely section 5, sub sections (vii) and (ix), stood amended or repealed but the High Court observed that even if this argument had been .raised before them in appeal, it would have made no difference. It has been contended before us by Mr. Hajela, the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the State, that after the Industrial Disputes Act of to Rajasthan by section 34 of the 1947 was extended Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, XLVIII of 1950, the provisions of the former stood amended by section 34 and could not be read subject to section 5 of the Rajasthan Adaptation of Central Laws Ordin in this contention. ·, The effect of section 34, as we have already indicated, was to extend territorial appli cation of the whole of India· including Rajasthan the exception being the State of Jammu and Kashmir only. This being so the words "A Judge of a High Court and a District Judge" used in section 7(3) (a) and (b) respectively of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, must be held now to include "A Judge of the High Court and a District Judge in the former State of Jodhpur". There is now no room for the application of section 5 of Ordinance IV of 1950 according to which a Judge of the High Court Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, IV of 1950. We think there S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1133 Rajasthan established under and a District Judge could only mean a Judge of the High Court for Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 and a District Judge of or the meaning of section 5 (ix) of Ordinance No. IV of 1950. Accordingly we hold that the appointment of Shri Sukhdeo Narain was perfectly valid. in Rajasthan within 1954 Tiu Stat• qf Raja.sthan v. TM Mewar T ,,,_ Iii< Mthq J,td., ·Bhilwara , and Ot/urs. Ghulam Ha.son ]. ' We accordingly set aside the order of the High is not respondent as the Court but without costs, represented. Agent for the appellant : R. H. Dhebar. HEM RAJ (). THE STATE OF AJMER (And Connected Appeal) [MEHR CHAND MAHAJAN C. J., VIVIAN BosE and GHULAM HASAN JJ.] 1954 Marth 17. Constitution of India, art. 136(1)-Principles gorcrning exercise of powers by the Supreme Court under art. 136(1)-Confes sions-Whether can be corroborated by evidence already in possession of police. Unless it is shown that execeptional and special circumstan~ ces exist that substantial and grave injustice has been done and the case in question presents features _of sufficient gravity to war~ rant a review of the decision appealed against, the Supreme Court does not exercise its overriding powers under art. 136 ( 1) of has been Constitution and the circumstance admitted by special leave does not entitle the appellant to open out the whole case and contest all the findings of fact and raise every point which could be raised in the High Court. Even at the final hearing only those points can be urged which are fit to be urged at the preliminary stage when the leave to appeal is asked for. appeal ·The contention that confession cannot be corroborated by the use of materials already in the possession of the police is devoid of force. A confession made and recorded even during a trial can be corroborated by the evidence already recorded. It may .be made and recorded in the court of committing magistrate and materia, ls already in the possession of the police may be used for purpose ef corroboration.