March-4 v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

"obviously evidence of a very weak type ..... .It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which infirmities." is not subject to any of They stated in addition that such a confesision can- not be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in "support of other evidence." In view of these remarks it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The ques- tion is, in what way can it be used in support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a witness who, though not an accomplice, the same category regarding credibility is placed judge refuses to believe him except in so because the far as he is corroborated? In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Sir Lawrence Jenkins Chuckerbutty(2) where he said that such a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused" or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan(3)·- is evidence against "the provision goes no further than this-where believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence." the co-accused sufficient, (I) [1949] 76 I. A. 147 at 155. (2) [ 19 l l] I. L. R. 38 Cal.559 at 588. (3J [1931] J. L. R. 54 Mad. 75 at 77. 1952 Kashmira Singh v. . State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose/. 530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] Translating into concrete these observations they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, the evidence against to marshal the accused excluding the confession altiogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a con- viction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act 011 the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, In it would be such an event the judge may call in ail the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify hi=elf in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept. to sustain a conviction. sufficient tested by and cannot Then, as regards its use the corroboration of accomplices and approvers. A co-accused who con- fesses is naturally an accomplice and the danger of using the testimony of one accomplice to corroborate another has repeatedly been pointed out. The danger is in no way lessened when the "evidence" is not on cross-examination. Prudence will dictate the same rule of caution case of a witness who though not an accomplice is re- garded by judge as having no greater probative value. But all these are only rules of prudence. So far as the law is concerned, a conviction can be based on· the uncorroborated testimony of ·an accomplice pro- vided the judge has the rule of caution, which experi- ence dictates, in mind and gives reasons why he thinks it would be safe in a given case to disregard it. Two of us had occasion to examine this recently in Ramesh war v. The State of Rajasthan('). It follows that the testimony of an accomplice can corroborate another though it ought not to be so used reasons in Bhuboni disclosed. As Sahu v. The King(2):- exceptional circumstances and the Privy Council observe in law be used "The tendency to include the innocent with the guJ'.lty is peculiarly preval'ent .in India, as judges have ti) [1952] S.C.Jl.. 377. (2) [1949] 76 I.A. 147 at 157. - - .,, - } - 'S.C.R .. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 531 noted on innumerable occasions, and it is very difficult for the court to guard against the danger ......•. The the risk of condemning -0nly real safeguard against . the innocent with the guilty lies in inde- insisting on implicates pendent evidence which such accused." in some measure Tur~ing now to the facts of the present case. The evidence on which the prosecution relies, apart from the confession, is this:- (1) Previous association between Gurubachan and the appellant. 1952 Kashmira Singh v • State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose]. The only evidence about t~ is P.W. 23 Upasrao, three meetings and is a water carrier. He speaks of curiously definite about days of the week and times though he did not know on what day of the week diwali fell nor could he give the names of anybody else he met on those occasions. However, for what it is worth, he says he saw them talkiing (1) three weeks before the murder, (2) on the 24th and (3) on the 25th. They SIPoke in Punjabi which he does not understand, . but on the second occasion he heard them mention the name of Ramesh. Two of these meetings, namely the first and the third tally with two of the only three is proved meetings described these facts that the witness did not disclose police but despite the Sessions Judge believed him because of the confession. The High Court appear to have disbelieved him, for in paragraph 37 of the judgment the learned judges point out that he is con- tradicted by his own statement the police. There three brothers met and not his story was Gurubachan and the appellant. This evidence can therefore be disregarded and consequently the confes- sion cannot be med to prove previous association. the confessiqn. It if it is proved in disposing of It was argued however that that the appellant helped then their previous asssociation can be inferred murder, because one would hardly seek the assistance of a stranger for a task like that. That has some force but the weakness of that in this case lies on the fact that, the body after 1952 Kashmira Singh v. State ·of Madhya Pradesh. Bos~/. 532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] particularly travel without a according to the prosecution case, as disclosed in the confession, Gurubachan was a stranger to Gondia. He had come there only six weeks before the murder and did not meet the appellant till three weeks later and then only casually. Their second meeting, equally casual, was on the 21st, that is, five days before the murder, and on that date the appellant is said to have disclosed his intention to this stranger whom he had It is true this stranger knew the only met once before. appellant's brother, but how? The brother was a tra- velling ticket inspector on the railway and used to allow Gurubachan ticket, presumably because he wa~ also a Sikh. If probabtlities are to be calkd in aid, the story disclosed in the confession has distinct weaknesses, as Gurubachan's · assi:stance was wholl~ unnecesisaty). If tlie 1colnfession is true there was a well thought out plot timed with the precision almost o£ a minor military operation. At a given moment the newphew Pritipal was to decoy the deceased away from his companions and isolate him. Then, after leading him several hundred yards down the road, hand him over to Gurubachan. Guru- bachan. was to take him down to point No. 6 on the map well over half a mile from the spot where he took the appellant over from Pritipal. In w~ to walk another half miEe at right angles Gurubachah's course to hire a cycle. From there he was to cycle dose on a mile to point No. 6 and meet Gurubachan and the boy. As the learned High Court Judges, who made a spot ins- pection, point out, through a crowded bazaar locality. From point No. 6 Guruba- chan was to hand over the child to the appellant who _was to cycle with him close on a mile to his brother Gurudayal' s quarters, point No. 16, through this same crowded bazaar. In the meanwhile, Gurubachan was to walk back to his house (No. 17) and pick up a chisel and a piece of wire for the purpose of the murder the appellant at Gurudayal's house. As will be seen, the timing would have to be within fairly itself, what the route would lie tolerances. Then, at the point No. 15 the meanwhile, the murder rejoin \. - \., } - - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 533 assistance did Gurubachan give ? Nothing which a grown man could not easily have accomplished him- self on a small helpless victim of five. The appeUan~ could have accomplished all 1tihis as easily without the assistance of Gurubachan, and equally Gurubachan, a mere hired assassin could have done it all himself without the risk of drawing pointed attention to himself as having been last seen in the company of the boy. We hold that previous association of a type which would induce two persons to associate together for the purposes of a murder is not established. the appellant running (2) That the deceased Ramesh was in the Gurud wara about 9-30 or 10 in the morning of the 26th. This is not disputed. 1952 Kashmira Singh Y. State of Madhye1 Pradesh. Bose J. (3) That Kashmira Singh who had gone Gurudwara in the morning was absent between 11 A.M. and 12-45 P.M. That the appellant was at the Gurudwara in the morning is not disputed, in fact his case is that he was there the entire day. The evidence to prove that it between these hours consists of three per- he left sons: P.W. 30 Atmaram, P.W. 35 TiLakchand and P.\V. 5 Bisan. The prosecution story is that the appellant left the Gurudwara about 11 A.M. to go to the shop of P.W. 5 Bisan to hire a cycle. He was first seen by P.W. 35 Tilakchand, a wood stall keeper, at point No. 13, just near the Gurudwara. The witness places the time at about 10-30 or 11 A.M. He says he saw him coming the direction of the railway station and going past his later, he went past his stall again in the opposite direction, that is to say, towards the railway station which lies on his way to the cycle shop. stall. Fifteen minutes Next comes P.W. 30 Atmaram. He keeps a book- stall on the broad gauge platform of the Gondia Rail- way Station. He says he saw the appellant coming from the bridge and going towards the Railway Police 534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] y, 1952 Bose /. Pradesh. Station of all places m the world. He came near Kashmira Singh enough the witness to wish him good day. He places time at about 10-30 or 11. The only comment State of Madhya we make on this witness is that he says he used to see the appellant at ,the station almost every day and to greet each other. The possibility they used is mixing up this day with one of the the witness other days cannot be excluded. It is certainly a matter for comment that a would be murderer on his way to hire a cycle for the purpose and keep an assignment with his accomplice and victim should go out of his way and either go on to or very near the railway plat- form to gret;t a person he knows there and then walk away towards the police station of all places where the danger of recognition would be strong. Next there is P.W. 5 Bisan, the man ii) charge of the cycle shop. He speaks from his register and says the appellant hired a cycle from him on that day at 11-20 A.M. and returned it at 12-45 P.M. The Ses- s10ns Judge and the High Court lay great stress on this witness. But as against this 1s the evidence of , Anupsingh Bedi, D.W. 1, a m;pectable disinterested witness, who is a resident of Nagpur. He says he saw the appellant at the Gurudwara at 11 and agam "about 11-45 A.M." The Sessions Judge thought he was interested because he admits he reported a complaint he had received from Gurudayalsingh, to the effect that the appellant was being harassed by the police and that they threat- ened to arrest 1adie5 also, to the Inspector General of Police and .the Home Minister. He explained that as in that State he felt head of the highest authorities. We are unable to regard this as disclos- ing interest. There is no suggestion that what he did wa~ improper and we are of opinion he did nothing than any man of responsibility in his position would have done. The High Court has not criticised him. The learned Judges merely say that he may be mistaken as to the time; nor of course does he suggest that he is giving more than a mere estimate. All he the Sikh community these complaints to pass on - ~. 1952 Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose /. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 535 says is that, "It may have been about 11-45 A.M. by this time." We do not think there is much in all thisi. Nobody, except P.W. 5 Bisan, pretends to be exact and when one is guessing at time several days after is not much discrepancy between really there would 11-20 and 11-45. Even if it was 11-45 still have been sufficient time to commit the murder. As two Courts have believed the evidence on this point without calling in aid the confession, we are not pre- pared to depart from our usual rule regarding concur- rent findings of fact. We will position that the appellant was absent from the Guru- murder. We will also take into consideration the fact that he made a false statement on this point when he said he was not away at all. (4) Disposal of the body. therefore accept to enable him long enough to commit the rickshaw the confession, The rest of the · evidence relates to the disposal of the body and the only direct evidence connecting the appellant with this, apart from is that of Sannatrao P.W. 14, .coolie. He does not bring the appellant into the picture till about mid- is a very shaky witness. We night. Now this coolie cannot but note the remarkable series of coincidences which emerge from his testimony. First, he is not a rickshaw coolie at all. He merely happened to hire a rickshaw that night, and he told the police that this was the first time he had ever done that at night after a day's work. Next, he knew the appellant because he happened to be a chowkidar in the Food Office at Gondia at the same time that the appellant was there incident ·as a Food Inspector. But at the date of the neither was sitill in service, so by a . somewhat strange :coincidence the appellant happens to hire, for the first time, this old co-worker in the middle of the night who, in his turn, happened to hire, also for the first time at night, a rickshaw for which he had no licence. N;ext comes a still stranger coincidence. He is taken to within a few paces of his own house and the body ) )'!, ...4 1952 Kashmira Singh v. Pradesh. Bose /. State of Madhya carried, unaided, 536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] in his presence, into a well, a stone's is dumped, . throw from where he lives. Gurubachan tells us that earlier in the day, about 7 P.M. he, (Gurubachan) had the "bedding" on his head for a distance which we know was half to three quarters of a mile, namely from Gurudayal's house to the chowki- two are sa.id this, dar's hut. Despite to have to carry it j\l.5/1: half a engaged rickshaw coolie mile (,i shorter distance) to the well and there they threw it in in the man's presence; and none of this the police till a month la, ter, namely was disclosed the 17th of January, though the witness was present though he was questioned on three previous occasions. the body was recovered and We do not doubt that a rickshaw was used because rickshaw tracks were discovered by the well long be- fore anybody had suggested that a rickshaw had been it difficult to resist the inference used. But we find that this witness was an accomplice so far as the dis- posal df •th~ b~dy was concdrned. Consequent'J,y, he is in much the same category so far as credibility is concerned. That brings us at once to the rule that save in exceptional circumstances one accomplice can- · not be used to corroborate another, nor can he be used to corroborate a person who though not an accomplice is no more reliable than one. We have therefore either to seek corroboration of a kind which will implicate the appellant apart from the confession or find strong reasons for using Gurubachan's confession there is no purpose. Of course, against Gurubachan difficulty, but against the appellant the pos, ition is not as easy. We will the appellant. Now though it was safe for therefore examine the reliability of Guru- bachan's confession against t'ltls confes- are some glaring irregularities regarding sion and the Se&',ions Judge and the High Court to act on it as against Guruba- to it throughout the sessions chan because he adhered trial despite his pleader's efforts to show the contrary, a very djffereqt position emerges when we come to the appella11t. .., • - ~ 1952 Kashmira Sing1' v. State of Madbyf! Pradesh. Bose J. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 537 The first point which emerges the confession was not made the 25th of February 1950, that is to say, not until two mo, nths after the murder. regarding We do not know when Gurubachan was first inter- rogated but P.W. 42 Narayandas tells us that when he was taken to the police station house at Gondia for interrogation about the 1st or 3rd January he saw Gurubachan sitting in the police lock up. We do not know how long he was kept there like this but it is evident that he was not there voluntarily, at any rate till the 1st or 3rd, because the Station Officer P.W. 44 that "until Gurubachan Singh was arrested he used to be allowed to go home." Also he says that Gurubachan was times and was confronted with Pritipal. interrogated several tells us that from However, eventually Gurubachan was allowed to go away and he went to Balaghat. Then, on the 16th of February the Station Officer P.W. 44 went to Balaghat, brought Gurubachan back with him to Gondia and handed him over to the C.l.D. Inspector Guha. Guha P.W. 50 the 20th of February, when he was arrested, he was kept · under observation but was allowed to . go home at night. He the Station Officer did not confess till the 25th and P. W. 44 tells us that from the 20th to the 25th he was kept in Guha's quarters. Then, after the confession on the 25th he was taken back to Guha's custody for a couple of days and then only was he sent (See Guha's evidence). He was kept in this lock up till the conclusion of the committal proceedings, that the 30th of June, instead of being sent to jail custody in Bhandara where there is a jail. The other accused including Pritipal who had by then confessed were sent to Bhandara. in one of the rooms the magisterial lock up. is, Now though Gurubachan was kept in the magis- terial lock up the distinction between the magisterial is only lock up and police custody< 'in Goncfi/a - J - 1952 Kashmira Singh ... State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose/. 538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952J theoretical. In practice, custody. Police constable Lalbahadur P.W. 55 us that- it is no better than police "The Station House Officer ·Gondia deputes con- stables for duty m lock up. The constables m charge take the prisoners out to the latrine and also arrange for their food .... The Head Constable in fact is in charge." Also, Guha admits that he interrogated Guruba- chan in the lock up twice within the ten days which in disregard of the succeeded the confession. This 1S Rules and Orders the Nagpur High (Criminal) of Court which enjoin at page 25, paragraph 84, of the 1948 edition that- "After a prisoner has made a confession before a the magistrate should note on the warrant the iinformation of the Superintendent of the jail a magistrate he should ordinarily be · committed jail and that the prisoner has made a confession." No explanation has been given why these directions, which were made for good reason, were disregarded in the other pri Gurubachan' s case. As we have said, soners were all committed to jail custody in the usual way, so there was no difficulty about observing th.e this makes ·it unsafe to disregard the rule rule. All as corroboration about usmg accomplice against a non-confessing accused. None of· the judges who have handled this case has given any reason why this rule could safely be departed from in this parti- cular case. In the circumstance$, we do not feel that the confession by itself can be used to corroborate the rickshaw coolie Sannatrao, P.W. 14. But IS It consists of . san border, other corroboration. and this IS the next point on which the prosecution relies. testimony There IS one arugment about this confession advanc- ed on behalf of the appellant with which we shall have· to deal. The prosecution were criticised for not calling the magistrate who recorded the confession as a witness. We wish to endorse the remarks of their - - ; . - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 539 the Privy Council Lordshilps of v. King Emperor (1) regarding such a practice. rightly not called and and undesirable for otherwise. in Nazir Ahmad the undesirability of In our opinion, the magistrate was it would have been improper to have acted the prosecution (5) Sari borders, Articles F, G, and T. 1952 Kashmira SitJgh v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose J. It is therefore regarding take a different view. That the body was discovered. There Articles F & G are two pieces of a sari border which were used for tying up the mouth of the gunny bag in which the body was placed. The evidence about that is beyond doubt. Article T is another piece of a sari border which was found in the appellant's hou~e on the 30th of December, 1949. the appel- lant was not present at the time but his mother was there and it will be seen di.at it was scized on the same day strong proof that Articles F and G are a part of the same border as Article T, and as there is a concurrent facts we are not prepared to finding affords corroboration of Sannatrao's evidence and the confes- sion can be called in aid to lend assurance to the in- ference which arises from these facts, namely that the appellant did help to dispose of the body. The High Court and the Sessions Judge were accordingly entitled to act on thils evid~nc:e for establishing that panicular fact and we are not prepared to disturb their concur- rent conclusions. But the matter cannot be carried further because, not only are the sari borders not pro- to have had any connection with the crime of murder but the confession shows that they did not. The only dondlusJon permi~ble on these facts is tl1at the appellant, at some time which is unknown, sub- sequent to the murder assisted either actively or passi- vely in tying up the gunny bag in which the corpse was placed and that he then accompanied Gurubachan in the rickshaw from the chowkidar's hut to the well in the middle of the night. (6) Coat, Article X, and Safa, Article Y. (1) A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 253 at 258. 5--6 S. c. India/71 1952 Ka;hmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose /. 540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] is not These were seized on the 20th of January 1950 from a trunk in the house of the appellant's brother in this Gurudayalsingh. The appellant's house neighbourhood. It is some distance away in another part of the town. The coat is a uniform coat of the kind worn by a Travelling Ticket Railways. Gurudayal travelling Ticket Inspector. The appellant is not. Here again the appellant was not present when the seizures were made. This coat and safa were recovered in the fourth search. The first search was on the 30th of December 1949. The next on the 10th of January 1950. The third on the morning of the 20th and the fourth in the afternoon of the 20th. These Articles were not found in the first three searches. Inspector on is a The· Chemical Examiner reports that there is one minute blood stain on the safa and some (the number is not given), also minute, on the coat. The seizure memo, Ex. P-55, picked out only five. Those stains are not proved to be of human blood. Now the clothes of the appellant's coat there is next no evidence to connect either the coat or the safa with the appellant. The High Court has relied on the evidence of Sannatrao (P.W. (P.W. 44) and the Station Officer 14), Gokulprasad Tiwari (P.W. 48). Sannatrao does no more than say that he noticed the appellant wearing a popat colour- ed safa and a black coat. But he was not able the passenger he had carried describe immediately before the appellant, nor was he able to describe i!ri detail. That there- fore is no identification of this coat with the one the appellant wore or owns. The Station Officer Gokul- prasad said that he had seen the appellant wear this very coat and safa and therefore he identified them as his clothes. he had only seen the appellant on three occasions but not to speak to. Consequently, that is not strong evi- dence of almost conclusive against Tiwari, P.W. 48, who is clearest on the point and who the best opportunities. for observation, of course had In cross-examination he identification. But what in our opinion identification admitted . l - - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 541 gives a distinctive the appellant's coat, feature of namely that it had only one button. That is one of his reasons for knowing what the appellant used wear. But the seizure memo, Ex. P. 55, shows that In the circum- the coat, Article X, had two buttons. stances we find it difficult to see how i~ can be the ap- pellant's coat. 195Z Kashmira Singh. v. State of Madhya Pradesh Bose J. • ..,, - There is another strong point in the appellant's fa the High Court has not noticed. P.W. vour which 35 the wood stall keeper Tilakchand, who saw him on his way to pick up his victim, is definite that the ap- pellant was not wearing a coat at It is diffi- cult to see why he should have donned a coat and got it stained with blood just for murdering a child of to conch1de five. is established between the appellant. The furthest point to which this evidence can be push- indicadte that the appellant possessed a coat similar to Article X but which was not Article X. that any connection the safa and It our opinion, it would be unsafe the coat and this evidence the time. We do not ordinarily interfere with a concurrent finding of fact but when the finding omits to notice these two very vour which, in our opinion, swing the balance the other In our way, we are unable to let the finding stand. opinion, the nexus between the appellant and the coat and the safa is not established. important points in the accused's (7) Motive. rely. Both courts hold This is the last piece of evidence on which the pro- secution to prove it established and We accordingly accept that the appellant had a motive for enmity against Tiwari and that he had expressed ~ determination revenged. The only comment we will make is that other persons who were also dismissed from service had similar motives. is strong evidence the finding the motive to be What then is the summary of the evidence ? In there is no appellant's favour proof of his having been last seen in the company of there are the facts that 70 1952 Kaslimira Singh v;,· State of Madhya Pradesh. Bou·f. •• .. - ( - 542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] tea and then Pritipal the deceased. The only evidence of the boy's move- ments is that of Krishna (alias Billa) P.W. 9, a boy of seven years, and all he says is that Pritipal asked him to bring Ramesh with him to the Gurudwara that morning about 9 A.M. The boys played about and had some took Ramesh away in the direction of the prostitute's house. Priti- returned without Ramesh. The Sessions Judge ·thought ·this witness had been tutored on at so called confession has least one point. Pritipal's been rejected because, in the first place, it is not a con- fession at all, for it is exculpatory, and, in the next, the High Court was not able to trust it. Therefore, the only evidence of the boy's I~ movements 1s as above. The next point in the appellant's favour is that he was seen without a coat shortly before the murder and at a time when he was not in the vicinity of his own house. According the murderer wore the coat, Article X, and the safa, Article Y. the prosecution, The third point is that the appellant was not see11 by anyone in the vicinity of the place of occurrence. The fourth point is that if the prosecution case is true, then it i& remarkable that no one saw the appel- lant and the boy on a cycle through nearly a mile of what the High Court, which made i spot inspection, describes as a crowded locality. The points against the appellant are ( 1) that he had a motive and that he said he would be revenged, (2) that he was absent from the Gurudwara about the time of the murder long enough to enable him to commit it, and denied the fact, (3) that some twelve hours after three quarters of a mile distant from the scene of the crime, and ( 4) that at some unknown point of time he assisted in tying up the month of the gunny bag in which body was eventually placed. In our opinion, would be unsafe to convict of murder on these facts. the crime he assisted m removing from a place between half to 1952 Kasnmi'ra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Bose/. .. ' ,. ,., S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 543 A number of rulings were cited, including one of the Privy Council, and it was argued that in those cases persons were convicted of murder on similar facts. We do not intend to examine them because no deci- sion can be a guide on facts. Each case has its own special circumstances and must be decided on its own facts. For example, m most of accused was associated with the disposal of ·the body very ~on after the occurrence and at the scene of the cnme. Here, twelve hours had elapsed and the first connection proved with the disposal is at a place over half a mile distant from where the boy is said to have the points we have shown m been murdered. Next, favour of the appellant in this case were not present there. the cases cited We allow the appeal on the charges of murder, con- the findings and spiracy and kidnapping and reverse sentences on those charges· and acquit ·the appellant of them. Vv e however convict the appellant of an of- Indian Penal Code, and fence under section 201. sentence him to seven years' rigorous imprisonment. The Judge omitted learned Sessions to record a .section 201 because he was convict- conviction under ing the appellant of murder. He followed a Nagpur decision which holds that in such a case it would be improper to convict alternative. We express no opinion about that; the question does not arise as we have acquitted the appellant of the murder and the cognate charges. The case now falls in line with that of the Privy Council in Begu v. The King-Em per<>r (1) and the conviction and sentence are confined to section 201. in the Agent for the appellant: Ganpat Rai. Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta. (l) (1925) 52 I.A.191. - -