In these v. The State of Madras

As in the West Bengal case, the jurisdiction of Special Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, which tried and convicted the appellant, was challenged on the ground that the impugned Ordinance, under which the Court was constituted, was discriminatory and void. The objection was overruled by the Special Judge as well as by the High Court of Saurashtra on appeal and the appellant now seeks a decision nf this Court on thl" point. to amend in certain areas The impugned Ordinance purporti; Saurashtra State Public Saftey Measures Ordinance (No. IX of 1948) which had been passed "to provide f:or public safety, maintenance of public urder and pr·~­ servation of peace and tranqui.~lity in the State of Suarashtra", hv the insertion of sections 7 to 18 whfrh deal with the .establishment of Special Courts of criminal try certain classes of jurisdiction offences in accordance with :i >implified and 5hortenecl Section 9 empowers the St:ite by notifica- procedure. tion to constitute Special Courts for such :ireas as may the notification and section 10 provides be specified in f:or appointment of Special Judges to preside over such courts.

Section 11 enacts tliat the Special Judge shall "such offences or classes of offences or the Government may, cases or classes of cases in writing, direct''. general or special order (I) Since repor~<l as fl 9521 S.C.R. 284. - )" . " • 440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1952] Kathi Raning Raum v. 1952 Then follow provisions prescribing the procedure·. applicable· to · the trial . of such offences. The only variations in such procedure from the normal procedure in criminal trials in the State consist of the xi.. s1o1. •! abolition of trial by jury or with the aid of assessors Saumhtra. and the elimination of the inquiry before commitment P:;;;;: u : in sessicins cases. Even under the normal procedure Saatri b~ J. trial by jury is not compulsory unless the Government so directs (sections 268 and 269 (I)). while_ assessors are not really members of the court and their opinion is not binding on the judge with whom the respon- sibility for the decision rests.

Nor can the commit- ment proceeding in a sessions case be said to be an essen- · tial requirement of a fair and impartial, trial. though its dispensation may involve the deprivation of cer- tain advantages which an accused person may other- wise enjoy. Thus the variations from the normal pro- cedure are by no means calculated to imperil the . chances of a fair and impartial trial. . • In exercise of th.e power conferred by sections 9, 10 and · 11, the Government issued the notification No. H/35-5-C dated 9/11February,1950, directing that a Special Court shall be constituted for certain special areas and -that it shall try certain specified offences which included offences under sections 302, 307 and - 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra) for which the appellant was convicted and sentenced.· · .. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that sec- tion 11 and the notification referred to above are discriminatory in that the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant within the specified areas are required to be .tried by the Special Judge. under the special procedure, while any person com- . mitting the same offences outside those areas would be tried by the ordinary courts under the ordinary procedure.

It is also urged that sections 9 and 11 by - empowering the State Government to establish• a Special Court and to direct it to try under_a special procedure such offences as may be notified by the Government, in effect, authorise the Gove!llII!ent tQ r S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 441 (as adapted and applied amend section 5 of the Criminal Procedure Code read with the Second Schedule that "all the State of Saurashtra), which provides offences under investi- and otherwise dealt with gated, enquired into, tried contained", according the executive and that delegation of such power Government was beyond legis- lature and was, therefore, void. the competence of a the Indian Penal Code shall be the provisions hereinafter 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Patanjali Sastri C. /. On first point many of the considerations the constitu- which weighed with me in upholding tionality of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, which is in identical terms with Section 11 impugned Act, apply a fortiori to the present of the case.

The West Bengal case(') arose out of a reference the State Government of certain individual cases the Special Court for trial and I there expressed the view that it was wrong to think that classification was someth'ing that must somehow be discoverable in every piece of legislation or it would not be legislation. That way of I pointed out, regarding classification, tended only to obscure the real nature of the problems for which we have to find solution. In the present referred nor case, however, the State Government certain certain individual committed in the ob- and so is more easily jection as to discriminatory in my answered on the jud¥~ent in the normal procedure authorised by vanat1ons the impugned Ordinance are less disadvantageous the persons tried before the Special Court than under that any the West Bengal Act. variation in procedure: which operates materially the disadvantange of such persons was discriminatory and violative of article 14.

On the other hand, it was contended on behalf of the that, the only constitu- tional provided in art ides 20 to· 22, and this Court having held in the West Bengal case(1). Again, treatment line of reasoning certain areas field of personal liberty, It was, however, said respondent State safeguards were specifically indicated offences (I) fl952l S.C.R. 28+. ·'" ;, ,,... ·; 442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952J 1952 Kathi Ran in g Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Paianiali Sastri C. ]. Gopalan' s case(') that any procedure prescribed by law satisfies the requirements of article 21 (the only the impugned Ordinance which article relevant here) prescribes a special procedure trial of offences falling within its ambit could not be held to be un- constitutional. Reliance was placed on a decision of (Abdur a Full Bench of the Hyderabad High Court Rahim and others v. Joseph A. Pinto and others) ( 2 ) which seems to lend some support to this view.

I am, however, of opinion these extreme contentions is sound. neither of t.hat to; In fact, If such bias is disclosed All legislative differentiation is not necessarily dis- "discrimination" does the word criminatory. not occur in article 14. The expression "di·scriminate is used in article 15 ( 1) and article 16 (2), against" the Oxford Dictionary, and it means, according "to make an adverse distinction with regard distinguish unfavourably others". Dis.crimina- tion thus involves an element of unfavourable bias and it is in that sense tl1at the expression has to be under- and is stood in this context. based on any of the grounds mentioned in article 15 and 16, it may well be the statute will, without tl1at more, incur condemnation as violating a specific con- saved by one or stitutional prohibition unless other of tl1e articles. But 14 is different. Equal pro- position under examined tection action justified.

This presumption of con- reasonable and stitutionality the wide power of classifi- cation which the legislature must, of necessity, possess in making laws operating differently as regards dif- ferent groups of persons in order to give effect to its policies. The power of the State to regulate criminal trials by constiruti, ng different cour~s , with different procedures according to the needs of different parts of its police power- its territory is an essential part of { cf. Missouri v. Lewis)(3 the differing ilie provisos article claims w1der the presumption article the State ). Though stems from (1) [1950] S.C.R. 88. (2) A.LR. 1951 Hyderabad 11. (3) 161 U.S. 22. » \' 1952 Kathi Raninz Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Patanja/i Sastri C. /, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 443 in my opinion, to outweigh procedures might involve disparity in the treatment of the persons tried under them, such disparity is not by itself sufficient, the pre- sumption and establish discrimination unless the degree of disparity goes beyond what the reason instance, when it amounts existence demands as, for to a denial of a fair and impartial trial.

It is, therefore, not correct to say that article 14 provides no further constitutional protection to personal liberty than what Notwithstanding that its is afforded by article 21. qualified wide general practical application by a due recognition of the State's necessarily wide powers of legislative classification, article 14 remains an important bulwark( against dis- criminatory procedural laws. language greatly figures to an relating facts and In the present case, the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent State by one of its responsible officers increasing states number of incidents of looting, robbery, dacoity, nose- cutting and murder by marauding gangs of dacoits in certain areas of the State, and these details support the State and public the claim that "the security of that it became impossible peace were jeopardised and to deal with the offences 'in that were committed different places in separate courts of law expeditiously.

" The statement concludes by pointing out areas specified in the notification were the "main zones the dacoits as mentioned above. " of the activities of The impugned Ordinance having thus been passed to types of combat regional crime, the two-fold classification on the lines :impugned type and Ordinance, read with the notification issued thereunder~ the degree is, in my view, reasonable and valid, and of disparity of excess of what the situation demanded. tempo of certain treatment involved territory adopted in no way increas'ing On the second point, the appellant's learned counsel claimed that the majority view in In re The Delhi Law1 Act, 1912, etc. (1) supported his contention. He attempt- together certain dicta ed to make this out by piecing .... 1 (1) fl95ll S.C.R. 747. - - 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Patanjali Sastri C. /. 444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] definite in regard laid down by found m the several judgments delivered in that case. conclusions were While undoubtedly certain reached by the majority of the Judges who took part in the decision the constitutionality of certain specified enactments, the reasoning in each case was different and it is difficult to say that any parti- cular principle h~s been the majority which can be of assistance the determination of other cases. country have plenary authority to legislatures· in this delegate to subordinate agencies of their choice and such delegation, however is constitutio·n- inexpedient or undesirable politically, this contention.

I accordingly reject ally competent. It follows try the appellant and the persons accused along with him. that the Special Judge had jurisdiction there expressed my view their power to make I have law.< As the majority concur in overruling the preliminary objection the appeal will be heard on the merits. imprisonment. The appellant was FAzL Au J.-This is an appeal by one Kathi Raning Rawat, who has been convicted under sections 302, 307 and 392 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to death and to seven years' rigor- tried by a the Saurashtra State Special Court constituted under Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949 (Ordinarrce No. LXVI of 1949), which was issued by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on the· 2nd Novem- ber, 1949, and his conviction and sentence were •pheld on appeal by the State High Court. He has preterred an appeal to this Court against the decesion of the High Court.

The principal question which arises in this appeal is the Ordinance to which reference has been whether is void under article 13(1) of the Constitution on the ground that it violates the. provisions of arti- the 5th April, 1948, the cle 14. It appears Rajpramukh of Saurashtra State promulgated an the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 · Ordinance called (Adaptation) Ordi~ance, 1948 (Ordii1ahce No. xq of that on .. • ' ~ .. 1952 Kathi Ranint: Rawat v. The State of Saurashtr11. Fazl Ali f. 1 > S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 445 1948), by which "the Criminal Procedure Code of the Dominion of India as in force in that Dominion on the 1st day of April, 1948" was made applicable to the State of Saurashtra with certain ·modifications. In the Sau- the same month, another Ordinance called rashtra State Public Safety Measures Ordinance (Ordi- nance No. IX of 1948) was promulgated, which provid- the detention of persons ed among other to public safety, acting maintenance of public order and peace and tranquillity in the State.

Subsequently, on the 5th November, 1949, the Ordinance with which we are concerned, the Saurashtra State Public Safety Measures namely, (Third Amendment) Ordinance, 1949, was promulgated, which purported to amend the previous Ordinance by inserting in it certain provisions which may be sum- marised as follws:- in a manner prejudicial things for Section 9 of the Ordinance empowers the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette to constitute Special Courts of diminal jurisdiction for s,uch area as may be specified in. the notification. Sec- tion 11 provides that a Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the State Government may, by general or special order in writing, direct. Sections 12 to 18 lay the procedure for trial of cases by Special Judge, the special features of which are as follows:- (1) The Special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to his court for trial; (2) There is to be no trial by jury or with the aid of assessors; (3) The Special Judge should ordinarily' record a memorandum only of the substance of the evidence of each witness; and (4) The person convicted has ~~ High Court within sentence.

6-S S. C: Indial71 15 days from to appeal ro the date of the - .. • • ' ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952} 1952 Kathi Ran in g Rilwlll v. The State of Saurashtra. Fazl Ali J. The Ord'inance further provides that the provisions of sections 491 and 526 of the Code of Criminal Pro- cedure shall not apply to any person or case triable by the Special Judge, and the High Court may call for the record of the proceedings of any case tried by a Special Judge and may exercise any of the powers conferred on an· appellate court by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 of the Code. summary of From the foregoing the provisions of the Ordinance, it will appear that the difference bet- the Criminal Pro- ween the procedure laid down cedure Code and the procedure to be followed by the Special Judge consists mainly in the following matters :- triable by a court of session, ( 1) Where a case is no commitment proceeding necessary, Special Judge may take cognizance without any com- mitment; (2) The trial shall not . be by jury or with the aid of assessors; (3) Only a memorandum of the substance of the· evidence of each witness is ordinarily to be recorded; ( 4) The period of limitation appeal to High Court is curtailed; and (5) No court has jurisdiction to transfer any case from any Special Judge, or to make an order under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code . . It appears that pursuant to the provisions contained in sections 9, IO and 11 of the Ordinance, the State Government issued a Notification No.

H/35-5-C, dated the 9/llth February, 1951, directing the constitution of a Special Court for certain areas mentioned in a schedule attached to the Notification and empower- ing such court to try the following offences, namely, offences under sections 183, 189, 190, 212, 216, 224, 302, 304, 307, 323-335, 341-344, 379-382, 384-389 and 392-402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as adapted and applied to the State of Saurashtra, and most of the offences under the Ordinance of 1948. · • 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Fazl Ali/. S.C.R.: SUPREME COURT REPORTS 447 In•• the course of the hearing, an affidavit was filed by, then •Assistant Secretary in the Home Department of the Saurashtra Government, stat'ing that since integration of different States in Kathiawar in the beginning of 1948 there had been a · series of crimes against public peace and that had led to the promul- gation of Ordinance No.

IX of 1948, which provided among other things for detention of persons acting in a manner prejudiciial to public safety and maintenance in the State. Notwithstanding this of public order the cnmes went on increasing and there Ordinance, occurred numer9us cases of dacoity, murder, nose- some of which certain cutting, ear-cutting, notorious gangs were responsible, and hence O!'dinance No. LXVI of 1949 was promulgated to amend the earlier Ordinance and to constitute Special Courts for the speedy trial of cases arisilng1 out of the activities of the dacoits and other criminals guilty of violent crimes. etc. for - • 1949 voilates the provisions As has been already indicated, the main contention advanced before us on behalf of the appellant is that the Ordinance of article 14 of the Constitution, by laying down a pro- cedure which is defferent from and less advantageous to the accused than the ordinary procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code, and thereby discri- minating between persons who are to be tried under the special pr<><;edure and those tried under the normal this argument, reliance is procedure. placed on the decision of this court in The State of West Bengal v.

Anwar Ali Sarkar and Gajen Mali (Cases (1), in which certain provi- Nos. 297 and 298 of 1951) sions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1949, have been held to be unconstitutional on grounds similar to those urged on behalf of the appellant in the present case. A comparison of the provisions of the Ordinance in question with those of the West Bengal Act will show that several of the objectionable features in the latter enactment do not appear in the Ordinance, In support of ..._t (1) f1952l S.C.R. 284. 58 '148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952} 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of S11Urashtra. inclined to think that that but on the whole, I am circumstance by itself will not afford upholding the Ordinance. There is however one very important difference between the West Bengal Act and in my opinion, does the present Ordinance which, afford such justification, and I shall try to refer to it as briefly as possible. justification the West Bengal Act was "without I th'ink that a distinction should be drawn between "discrimination "discrimination without reason" with reason".

The whole doctrine of classification is based on this distinction and on the well-known fact that the circumstances which govern one set of persons or objects may not necessarily be the same as governing another set of persons or objects so that the question of unequal treatment does not really arise as by different conditions between persons governed and different 5ets circumstances. The main objection permitted discrimination reason" or with- out any rational basis. Having laid down a procedure which was materially different from and less advanta- geous to the accused than the ordinary procedure, that Act gave uncontrolled and unguided authority to the State Government to put that procedure into operation in the trial of any case or class of cases or any offence or class of offences. There was no principle to be found in that Act to control the application of the dis- criminatory provisions or to correlate those provisions to some fungible and rational objective, in such a way to enable anyone reading the Act to say:--,-If that is the objective the provisions as to special treatment of the offences seem to be quite suitable and there can be no objection to ·dealing with a particular type of offences on a special footing.

The mere mention of speedier trial as the object of the Act did not cure trial" the defect, standing by itself provided no rational basis of classi- result It was merely a description of fication. sought to be achieved by the application of the special procedure laid down in the Act and afforded no help in determining what cases required speedier trial. expression "speedier because - - ' ..... ,,._ ' 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Fazl Ali /. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 449 govern also, and treatment of the same as to a particular the object with wMch As regards the present Ordinance, we can discover a guiding principle within its four corners, which can- not but have the effect of limiting the appl'ication of the special procedure category of offences only and establish such a nexus (which was missing in the West Bengal Act) between offences of a particular category and Ordinance was promulgated, as should suffice to repel the charge of discrimination and furnish some justi- fication for the special those offences.

The Ordinance as I have already stated, purported to amend another Ordinance, the object of which was to provide for public safety, maintenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State. It was not disputed before us that the preamble of the original Ordinance would amending Ordinance the object of promulgating the subsequent Ordinance was object of promulgating the original OrdinanGe. Once this is appreciated, it is easy to see that there is some- thing in the Ordinance itself to guide the State Govern- to any to apply die special procedure not and every those cases or offences which have a rational or connection to, relation with, the main object and purpose of the Ordinance and which a class by themselves requiring to be dealt with on a special footing. The clear recital of a definite objective fur- nishes a tangible and rational basitl of classification the Stare Government for the purpose of applying provisions of the Ordinance and for choosing only such offences or cases as affect public safety, main- tenance of public order and preservation of peace and tranquillity.

Thus, State Government is expected to select only such offences ot class of offences or class of cases for being tried by the special court in accordance with the special procedure, as are calculated to affect public safety, maintenance of public order, etc., and under section 9, the use of the special procedure must necessarily be confined only disturbed areas or those areas where adoption of case but only to become section reason 11, ·~ • 1952 Kathi Ran in g Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Fazl Ali /. 450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] that if that all see at once court is the · State over which to exercise public safety measures is necessary. That this is how . the Ordinance was intended to be understood and was confirmed by the Notification in fact understood, issued on the 9/llth February by the State Govern- the Ordinance. That Noti- ment in pursuahce of fication sets out 49 offences under the Indian Penal Code as adapted and applied to the State and certain the Ordinance, and other offences punishable under one can offences directly affect the maintenance of public order and peace and tranquillity.

The Notification also specifies certain areas jurisdiction. There can special be no dispute the State Legislature finds that fawlessnes5 and crime are rampant and there is a direct threat to peace and tranquillity in certain areas within the State, it is competent to . deal with offences which affect .the maintenance of public order . and preser- vation of peace, and tranquillity in those areas as a class by themselves and to provide that such offences shall be tried as expeditiously ance with a special procedure devised for the purpose. This, in my opinion, is in plain language the rationale of the Ordinance, and it will be going too far to say that in no circumstances can a case and under no the trial legislature lay down a special procedure for of a particular class of offences, and that recourse to a simplified and less cumbrous procedure for the trial of those offences, abnormal conditions prevail, will amount to a violation of article 14 of the case is dis- Constitution. to the West Bengal tinguishable from the case relating Act, but I also feel that the legislatures should have recourse to legislation such as the present only in very special circumstances.

The question of referring indi~ vidiual cases to the special court does not arise in this l do not wish t() express any opinion appeal, and on it. I am satisfied even when as possible in accord- 1 • ... Certain other points· were urged on behalf of the Ordinance suffers from legislative authority, and that appellant, namely, excessive delegation of 1952 ' Kathi Raning Rawat_ v. The State of Saurashtra. Mahajan/. ~ ... - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 451 the Rajpramukh had exceeded his powers in amending the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. These contentions were found to be devoid of all force and have to be rejected. In the result, I would hold that the Suarashtra State :Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance accordingly overrule the is not unconstitutional, and objection as to clie jurisdiction of the spedal court try the appellant . MAHAJAN J.-The principal point for decision in the is whether section 11 of the Saurashtra State appeal Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance (No.

LXVI), 1949, wllich came into force on 2nd Novem- ber, 1949, is hit by article 14 of the Constitution inas. much as it mentions no ·basis for the differential ·treat~ ment prescribed in the Ordinance for trial of criminals in certain cases and for certain offences. Section 11 of the Ordinance ·is in these terms:- "A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of 9ffences or · such cases or classes of cases as the Gov- ernment of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, direct. " This section is in identical terms with section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act (Act X of 1950), section 5(1) of that Act provided as follows:- "A Special Coun shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government may; by general or special order in writ- ing, direct. " The question whether section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act (X of 1950) was hit by art'icle 14 of the Constitution was ·answered in the affirmative by this court in The State of West Bengal v.

Anwar Al~ Sarkar etc. (1) In that case I was of the opinion that even if the statute on the face of it was not discriminatory, it was so in its effect and operation inasmuch as it vested in the executive government unregulated official discre- to be tion and therefore had adjudged unconstitu- tional. Section 11 of the Ordinance, like section 5(1) (1) f19521 S.C.R. 284. 1952 Kathi Ran in g &wat v. The State of Saurashtra. Mahajan/. 452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] of the West Bengal Act, suggests no reasonable basis or classification either in respect of offences or in res- pect of cases. It has laid down no measure for the grouping either of persons or of cases or of offences by distinguished thse groups could be which measure from those outside the purview of the special Act. The State Government can choose a case of a person it over to the special tri- similarly situate and hand bunal and leave the case of another person in the same circumstances to be tried by the procedure laid down in the Criminal Procedure Code.

It can direct that the offence of simple hurt be tried by the special tri- in the bunal while a more serious offence be ordinary way. The notification m case fully the point. Offence of simple hurt punish- illustrates able with two years' rigorous imprisonment is included in the list of offences to be tried by the Special Judge, while a more serious offence of the same kind puni~h­ able with heavier punishment under section 308 is ex- cluded from the list. It is the mischief of section 11 of the Ordinance that makes such discrimination pos- the group sible. To my mind, offences falling Indian Penal Code pos- the appellant can sess common characteristic and reasonably complain of hostile discrimination. therefore of the opinion that section 11 of the Ordinance is unconstitutional and the conviction of the appellant under the Ordinance by the special judge is bad and must be quashed. There will be a retrial of the appel- lant under Criminal Procedure. the procedure prescribed by the Code of· section 302 to 308, I ' The contention of the learned counsel for the State that the provisions oi. the Ordinance are in some res- pects distinguishable from the provisions of the West Bengal Special Courts Act cannot be sustained.

Refer- ence was made to section 9 of the Ordinance which in these terms :- "The Government State of Saurashtra may by notification in the official gazette constitute Special Courts of criminal jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification. " the United - • • - + "l"-" S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 453 This section is in the same terms as section 3 of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. It only empowers the State Government to constitute Special Courts for any area or for the whole of the State of Saurashtra in the like manner in which section 3 empowered the West Bengal Government It does the whole of the State or any particular area. not in any way limit or curtail the power conferred on the State Government by the provisions of sec- tion 11. Reference was also made to the preamble of the original Orditiance which uses the familiar con- ventional phraseology. to constitute special courts 1!>52 Kathi Raning Rawat v.

The State of Saurashtr11. Mahajan f. ' - "An Ordinance to provide for public safety, main- tenance of public order and preservation of peace and trartquillity in the State of Saurashtra. " These words cannot limit the plain and unambigu- ous language of section 11 of the Ordinance which auth- orises the State Government to send any case or com- mit persons guilty of any offence to the special judge for trial by the procedure prescribed in the Ordinance. MuKHERJEA J.-The appellant before us was tried, along with two other persons, by the Special Judge, Court of Criminal Jurisdiction, Saurashtra State, on attempted murder and robbery charges of murder, under sections 302, 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code read with section 34. By his judgment dated 20th December, 1950, the Special Judge convicted the appellant on all charges and sentenced him to death under section 302 and to seven years' rigorous imprisonment both under ~ctions 307 and 392 of the Indian Penal Code.

The c6nviction and sentences were upheld by the High Court of Saurashtra on appeal. The appellant has now come to this court ·on the strength of a certificate granted by the High Court under article 132(1) and 134(1) (c) of the Constitution. The appeal has not been heard on 'its merits as yet. It was set down for hearing on certain preliminary points of law raised by learned counsel for the appellant attacking the legality of the entire trial on the ground that section 11 of the Saurashtra Public 1952 Kathi Ranin g · Rawal v. The State of Saurashtra. Mukhe?jea /. 454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952) Safety Measures Ordinance No. XL VI of 1949 passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra as well as the Noti- fication issued by the State Government on 9/llth February, 1951, under which the Special Court was constituted and the trial held, were void and inopera- tive. The first and the- main ground upon which the constitutional validity of the section and the notifica- tion has been assailed is that they are in conflict with the provision of article 14 of the Constitution.

The other point raised is that the provision of section 11 of the Ordinance is illegal as it amounts to delegation of essential legislative powers by the State Legislature to the Executive. So far as the first point is concerned, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed great reliance upon the majority decision of this court in two analogous appeals from the Calcutta High Court (being cases Nos. 2'17 and 298 of 1951(1 ), where a similar questron arose in regard to the validity of section 5(1) of West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950. In fact, it was because of our pronouncement in the Calcutta appeals that is was considered desirable the ptesent to have case heard on the preliminary points of law. . language of section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance, with which we are now con- cerned, is identically the same as that of section 5 ( 1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act. The wording of the section is as follows:. It is not disputed that the ''11.

Jurisdiction of Special Judges- . A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Govern- ment of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in wt'iting, direct.;.' In the West Bengal Act there is a further provision embodied in clause (2) of section 5 which lays down that no such direction as is contemplated by clause (1) could be given in respect of cases pending before ordi- nary criminal courts at the date when the· Act came into force. No such exception has been made in the In · the Calcutta cases· referred Saurashtra Ord'inance. (!) Since reported as [19521 S.C.R. 284. ..... - 1952 Kathi Raning Rawae · v. The State <>f Saurashtra; Muftheriea f. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 455 involved to to above, the notification under section 5(1) of the West individual cases in which Bengal Act directed certain specified persons were tried by the Special Court and it was held by the High Court of Calcutta that section 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act to the extent that it empowers the State Government to direct any case to be tried ·by Special Courts was void as offending against the provision of the equal protection clause in article 14 of the Con- stitutt"on; and this view was affirmed in appeal by a majority of this court.

With regard to the remaining part of section 5(1), which authorises the State Govern- ment to direct, "offences, classes of offences .. or classes of cases" for trial by Special Courts, the majority of the Judges of the Calcutta High Court were of opinion that it was not obnoxious to article 14 of the Constitu- In the present case the notification, that was tion. issued by the Saurashtra State Government on 9/llth February, 1951, did not individual cases. The notification constituted in the first place a Special Court It specified appointed in the next place a judge to preside ovs:r the Special Court and finally gave a list of offences with reference to appropriate sections of the Indian Penal Code which were to l:ie tried by the Special Judge. If the Cal- the view cutta High Court and the majority of his colleagues is right, such notification and that part of section 11 of the ordinance, under which it was issued, could not be challenged as being in conflict with article 14 of the Constitution.

This point did come . up for considera~ tion before us the Calcutta in· the appeals against decision with reference to the corresponding part of section 5(1) of the West Bengal Act, but although a majority of in dismissmg the appeals, there was no such majority in the pronounce- ment of any final opinion on this particular point. the Chief Justice of the schedule. this court the areas taken by concurred relate In my judgment ·in the. Calcutta appeals I was sceptical about the correctness of the view taken upon this point by the learned Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court and ·the majority of liis colleagues. The S\I . 1952 Kathi Raning Rilwat v. The State of Saurashtra. Muk.herjea /. 456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] ' consideration that weighed with me was that as the learned Judges were definitely of opinion that the necessity of speedier trial, as set out in the preamble, was too elusive and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a proper classification, the authority given by section 5(1) of the Special Courts Act to the State Government to direct any class of cases or offences to be tried by the Special Court would be an unguided authority and the propriety of the classification made by the State Government that is said to be implied in the direction could not be tested with reference to any standard.

Mr. Sen, definite appearing for the State of Saurashtra, has argued be- fore us that in this respect the Saurashtra Ordinance referred in stands on a different footing and he has this connection to the preamble to the orig'inal ordi- nance· as well as the circumstances which necessitated the present one. As the question is an important one and is not concluded by our previous decision, it merits in my opinion, a careful consideration. legislative policy or .... .. ... the provisions of into the Saurashtra State. It may be stated at the outset that the Ctiminal Procedure Code of India as such has no application to the State of Saurashtra. After the State acceded the Indian Union, there was an Ordinance promulgated by the Rajpramukh on 5th of April, 1948, which in- troduced the Criminal Procedure Code of India (Act V of 1898) with certain modifica- ·Another ordinance, known as the · Public Safety Measures Ordinance, was passed on the 2nd of April, 1948, and this ordinance, like similar other public safety measures obtaining in other States, provided -for preventive detention, imposi- tion of collective fines, control of essential supplies and similar other matters.

On 11th of November, 1949, the present ordinance was passed by way of amend- ment of the Public Safety Measures Ordinance and inter alia it made provisions for the establishment of special courts. Section 9 of this Ordinance empowers special courts of the State Goverment criminal jurisdiction for such areas as may be specified in the notification. Section IO relates to appointment to constitute 1952 Kathi Ran in g Rawat v. The State of Saura1htr11. Mukherjea /. . ' ...... S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 457 of Special Judges who are to preside over such courts and section 11 lays down that the Special Judge shall try "such offences or classes of offences ........ or classes of cases as the Government of United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, -~Iirect. " The procedure to be followed by the Special Judges 'is set out in sections 12 to 18 of the Ordinance. In sub- stance the Special Court is given the status of a sessions is eliminated court, although committal proceedings and so also is trial by jury or with the aid of assessors.

The Special Judge has only to make a memorandum of the evidence and he can refuse to summon any wftness if he is satisfied after examination of the accused that the evidence of such witness would not be material. 'section 16(1) curtails the period of litn.itatiqn within whicli an accused convicted by the Special Judge has to file his appeal before the High Court and clause (3) of that no court shall have jurisdic- the section provides tion to transfer any case .from any Special Judge or make any order under section 491 of the Criminal Pro- cedure Code. The ordinance certainly lacks some of the most objectionable features of the West Bengal Act. Thus it has not taken away the High Court's power of revision, nor does it expose the accused to the chance of being convicted of a major offence though he stood charged with a minor one. There is also no provision in the ordinance similar to that in the West Bengal Act which enables the court to pro- ceed with the trial in the absence of the accused.

But in certain respects compares although favourably with the West Bengal Act, the procedure which it lays down for the Special Judge to follow does differ on material points from the normal procedure the Criminal Procedure Code and as prescribed in these differences abridge rights of the accused who are to be tried by the Special Court, and deprive them of certain benefits to which they would otherwise have been entitled under the general law, the ordinance prim a f acie makes discrimination and the question has got to be answered whether such discrimination brings it in conflict with article 14 of the Constitution. the ardinance

195.2 Kathi Raning Rawat . v. Tk State of Saurtuhtra. Muk._herjea J, 458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1952] in more The nature and scope of the guarantee that is im- plied in the equal protection clause of our Constitution have been explained and discussed than one decision of this court and do not require repetition. It the purpose of is well settled that a legislature for dealing with the complex problems that arise out of an infinite variety of human relations, cannot but pro- ceed upon some sort of selection or classification of persons upon whom . the legislation is 1:9 operate. The consequence of such classification would undoubtedly be to differentiate the persons belonging to that class itself would not make the from others, but that by protection clause. to the equal legislation obnoxious Equality prescribed by the Constitution would not be violated if the statute operates equally on all persons who are included in the group, and the classification is not arbitrary or capricious, but bears a reasonable legislation has in relation to the objective which the view.

The legislature is given the utmost latitude in making the classification and it is only when there is a palpable abuse of power and the differences made have no rational relation to the objectives of the legislation, that necessity of judicial interference arises. Section 11 of the Saurashtra Ordinance so far as it is material for our present purpose lays down that a Special Court shall try such offences or classes of offen- ces... or classes of cases as the State Government may .. direct". This part of the section undoubtedly con- templates a classification to be made of offences and cases but no classification appears on the terms of statute itself which merely gives an authority to the State Government to deterrnine what classes of cases or offences are to be tried by the special tribunal. The question arises at the outset as to whether such statute is not on the face of it discriminatory as it commits to the discretion of an administrative body or officials the: duty of_ making selection or classification for purposes of the legislation; and there is a still further question, namely, by what . tests, if any, is the propriety of the administrative adjudged and what to be the aggrieved person if the would be the remedy of action • ' .. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 459 classification made by arbitrary or capricious? administrative 1952 Kathi Raning RaU.at v.

The State of • Saurashtra. M u'l(,l1erjea T. - • regulate terms of It is a doctrine of the American courts which seems to me to be well-founded on principle that the equal can be invoked not merely where protection clause discrimination appears on express statute itself, but also when it is the result of improper or prejudiced execution of the law(). But a statute will not necessarily be condemned as discriminatory, because it does not make the classification itself but, as an effective way of carrying out its policy, vests the authority to do it in certain officers or administrative Illustrations of one class of such cases are to bodies. be found in various regulations in the U. S. A. which are passed by States in exercise of police powers the purposes of protecting public health or welfare or trades, bu~iness and occupations which may become unsafe or dangerous when unrest.rained. Thus there are regulations where discretion is lodged irr public officers or boards to grant or with- hold licence to keep taverns or sell spirituous liquors(2), · ) or cigarettes{'). or other commodities Similarly, relating to appoint- ment of trained men necessary such cases, ordinarily, conditions are laid down by the statute, on compliance with which a candidate is con- sidered qualified.

But even appointI!lcnt board has got a discretion to exercise and the fact of the candidate for a particular post is submitted to the judgment of the officer or the board as the case may be. It is true that these cases are of a somewhat different nature than the one we arc dealing with; but it seems to me that the principle underlying all these cases is the same. The whole problem is one of choosing the method by which the legislative policy is to be eff ec- tuated. As has been observed by Frankfurter J. there are river pilots(5) and other difficult like milk( 3 particularly regulations (I) Vitle Weaver on Constitutional Law, p. 404. (2-) Crowley v. Christensen, 137 US. 86. (3) People of the State of New York v. Toh. E. V.rn De C•rr, ( 4) G11ndlint v. Cliic1110, 177 U.S. 183. (5) Kotd v. BOlll'tl of Ri"" Pon Pilot Commissioners, 330 U.S. 199 U.S. 552.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] 1952 Kathi &ming Rawfll v. The State of Saurashtra. Muk,,herjea /. in such circumstances Tinger v. Texas('), "laws are not abstract propos1t1ons ·: • b~t are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties addressed to the attainment of specific ends by the use of specific remedies. " In my opinion, if the legislative policy is clear and definite and as an ., e_ffec~'ve method of carrying out that policy a discre- tion 1s vested by the statute upon a body of adminis- trators or officers to make selective application of the law to certain classes or groups of persons, the statute itself ·cannot be condemned as a piece of discrimina- tory legislation. After all "the law does all that Is indicates a policy needed when it does all that it can, lines all similarly .•• and seeks to bring within situated so far as its means allow(2)''. In such cases, the power given to the executive body would inlport a duty on it to classify the subject-matter of legislation in the stat- in accordance with the objective indicated conferred on official ute.

1....:.5 S, C, India /71 - II .. 1952 Kathi Rani111 Rawat v. The ·state of Mukherjea /. Mukherjea /. 462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] the objective· that the classification and between if the legislation has in view. On the other hand legislature indicates a definite objective and 'the dis- cretion has been vested in the State Government as a itself, as I that object, means of ach'ieving have said above, cannot be held to be discriminatory, though the action of the State Government may be condemned if it offends against the equal protection clause, by making an arbitrary selection. Now, the earlier ordinance, to which the present one is a subse- quent addition by way of amendment, was passed by the Rajpramukh of Saurashtra on 2nd April, 1948. It is described as an ordinance to provide security of the State, maintenance of public order and maintenance of supplies and services essential to the the State of Saurashtra.

The pream- community ble to the ordinance sets out the objective of the ordi- nance in identical terms. It is to be noted that the integration of several States in Kathiawar which now form the State of Saurashtra, was completed It appears from the affidavit time in February, 1948. of an officer of the Horne Government of the Saurash- tra State that soon after the integration took place, an alarming state of lawlessness prevailed in some of the districts within the State. There were gangs of dacoits their number began operating at different places and increase gradually. As ordinary law was deemed the nefarious activities of insufficient those criminal gangs, the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures Ordinance was promulgated by the Rajpra- mukh on 2nd April, 1948. The Ordinance, as stated already, provided principally for preventive detention fines; and it was hoped and imposition of collective the State that armed with these extraordinary powers Government would be able to bring the situation under control.

These hopes, however, were belied, and the affidavit gives a long list of offences in which murder and nose-cutting figure conspicuously in addition looting and dacoity, which were committed by <lacoits during the years 1948 and 1949. In view of this ugly situation in . the State, the new ordinance ·was to cope with . " (.• - - 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Mukherjea J. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 463 passed on 11th of November, 1949, and this ordinance provides inter alia for establishment of Special Courts which are to try offenders under a special proce- dure. Acting under section 11 of the Ordinance, the Government issued a notification on 9/llth February, 1950, which constituted a Special Court for areas specifi- ed in the schedule, and here again the affidavit shows that all these areas are included in the districts of Go- hilwad, Madhya Saurashtra and Sorath, where the tribe of marauders principally flourished.

The object of pas- sing· this new ordinance is identically the same for which the earlier ordinance was passed, and the preamble to the latter, taken ·along with the surroundmg circum- legislative policy which stances, discloses a definite has been sought to be effectuated by the different pro- If Special Courts visions contained in the enactment. to cope with an abnormal were considered necessary situation, it cannot be said that the vesting of authority in the State Government to select offences for trial by such courts is in any way unreasonable .. - .. > it authorises In the light of the principles stated already, I am unable to hold that section 11 of the Ordinance in so far as the State Government to direct classes of offences or cases to be tried by the Special Court offends against the provision of the equal pro- If the notification tection clause m our Constitution. that has been issued by the State Government proceeds on any arbitrary or unreasonable basis, obviously that It is neces- challenged as unconstitutional. could be sary, the notifica- the terms of tion and the list of offences it has prescribed. therefore, to examine the areas mentioned The notification, as said above constitutes a Special Court for in the Schedule and appoints Mr.

P. P. Anand as a Special Judge to preside the Special Court. The offences triable by the Special Court are then set out with reference to the specific sections of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Chibber Ii.st attacks the classification of offences made primarily on the ground that while it mentions offences of a particular character, it excludes at other . offences of a cognate character m reference to the same 1952 Kathi Ran in g Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Muk_herjea /. 464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] though justifiable. to persons treatment is constitutionality which no difference It is pointed out that while section 183 of the Indian Penal is mentioned in the list, sections 184, 186 and Code 188 which deal with similar offences are excluded. Similarly the list does not mention section 308, Indian it mentions section 307. The Penal Code, learned counsel relies in this connection upon the deci- s\on of the Supreme Court of America in Skinner v.

Oklahoma('). for consider- In that case the question certain of a ation related statute of Oklahoma which provided for sterilization of certain habitual criminals who were convicted two or more times in any State of felony involving moral turpitude. The statute applied guilty of larceny, which was a felony, but not to embezzlement, and it was held that the legislation violated the equal protection clause. is undoubtedly a sound and It that when reasonable proposition offences is intrinsically the same and they are punish- able in the same manner, a person accused of one should not be treated differently from a person accused of the other, because it is an essential principle unde'r- lying the equal protection clause that all persons simi- larly circumstanced alike both in privileges conferred and liabilities imposed. At tl1e to be noted as Douglas J. observed in same time it is the very case that in determining the reach and scope of particular legilsJature "It may symmetry. the classes and types of problems mark and set apart according and as dictated or suggested by experience.

" A too rigid iinsistance therefore on a .thing like scientific classification is neither practicable nor desirable. It is the notification men- tions section 183 of the Indian Penal Code, though it omits section 184; but I am unable to hold that the two are identically of the same nature. Section 183 deals wlth resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of public servant; while section 184 relates to obstructing sale of property offered for sale legislation it is not necessary to provide abstract the nature of the needs true that shall be treated {1) 316 U.S. 535. - • • , 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Muk_herjea /. - > >- _;. --lo- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 465 State by authority of public servant. Section 186 on the other hand does not relate to the taking of property at all, but is concerned with obstructing a public servant in the discharge of his public duties.

Then that it was incumbent upon again I am not sure 308, Government include Indiian Penal Code, because that culpable It they included section 307. to murder are specified homicide as well as attempt to commit culpable homi- cide i,s certainly a less heinous offence and the State it proper, having regard to Government might the facts known to them, that an offence of attempt to commit culpable homicide does not require a special treatment. list; but an attempt section simply this case. The for purposes of the various offences specified Be that as it may, I do not think that a meticu- lous examination of the list with regard to their nature and punishment is necessary appellant before us was accused of murder punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. There is no other offence, I believe, described in the Indian Penal Code, which can be placed on an identical footing as murder. Even culpable homicide not amounting murder is something less heinous than murder, although it finds a place in the list.

In my opinion, the appel- lant can have no right to complain if he has not been in any way by any unjust or arbitrary agrieved classification. As he is accused of murder and dacoity and no offences of a similar nature are excluded from the list, I do not think that it is open to h'im to com- plain of any violation of equal protection clause in the notification. There are quite a number of offences specified in the notification and they are capable of being grouped under various heads. Simply because could have been mentioned certain offences whiieh similiar others in a particular group along with have been omitted therefrom, it cannot be said the whole list is bad. The question of inequality on the ground of such omission can be raised only by the person who to be tried under the special is directed 466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] 1952 Kathi Raning Rat.vat . v. The State of Saurashtra. for commis~ procedure for a certain offence, whereas sion of a similar offence not mentioned the list another person has still the advantages of the ordinary procedure open to him.

In my opinion, therefore, first point raised on . behalf of the appellant cannot succeed. In fact, legislative authority by that of section the Rajpramukh The other point urged by the learned counsel for the to the question of delegation appellant which relates State Government admits, I · think, of a short answer. It is conceded by the learned counsel that the facts of this case are identical with those of King Emperor v. Benoarilal Sarma(') which was decided by the Privy the language of section 5 of the Council. (No. II of 1942) Special Criminal Courts Ordinance whkh came up for consideration in that case is almost the same as the Saurashtra 11 of It was held by the Privy Council that it Ordinance. was not a legislation at all, but case of delegated legislative merely an example of the not uncommon arrangement by which the the judgment provision of a statute is determined by of a local administrative body as to its necessity.

In it was a case of conditional legislation other words, coming within the rule of Queen v. Burah (2). The Judicial Committee in Beno pronouncement of the arilal's case(') has been accepted and acted upon by this court in more than one case and it is too late now to question its correctness. My conclusion, ltherefore, is that both the preliminary points must be disallow- ed and the appeal should be heard on its merits. application of ,, - '· DAS J.-The appellant before us was tried by a Special Court constituted under the Saurashtra Public Safety Measures (Third Amendment) Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 for offences alleged to have been committed by Indian him under · sections 302, 307 and 392 of Penal Code. On December 20, 1950 he was guilty of the offences charged against . him and was convicted and sentenced to death under section 302, (I) 72 I.A. 57. (2) 3 App. Cas. 889. .. ., S.C.R.: SUPREME COURT REPORTS 467 Indian, Penal Code, and to seven years' rigorous im- prisonment under each of the charges under sec- tions 307 and 392, Indian Penal Code, the sentences of imprisonment running concurrently.

He appealed to the High Court of Saurashtra but the High Court, by its judgment pronounced on February 28, 1951, re- jected h'is appeal and confirmed his conviction and the its order sentences passed by the Special Court. By the High Court made on March 21, 1951, however, granted him a appeal to this Court both under article 132 and article 134 (1) (c) of the Constitution. This appeal has accordingly been filed in this Court. certificate 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat . v. ' The State of Saurashtra. · Das/. namely, raised by jurisdiction to A preliminary point has been the appellant, learned that the Special counsel for Court had no case and the whole trial and conviction .have been illegal and void necessary, for the disposal of the preliminary objection, to refer to the provisions of the Ordinance and the cfr- cumstances in which the Special Court came to be constituted. initio and should be quashed try this limine.

It In the beginning of 1948 that time different dacoits the different States in Kathiawar were integrated into what is now the State in- of Saurashtra. About dulged in lawless activ'ities in Kathiawar and in parti- cular in the area now known as the districts of Gohil- wad and Madhya Saurashtra and on the outskirts of Sorath that was formerly a district in Junagadh State. Their activities gathered such strength and virulence that the security of the State and the maintenance of In order public peace became seriously endangered. the Rajpramukh to check of the State of Saurashtra on April 2, 1948, promulga- ted Ordinance No. IX of 1948. The preamble of the Ordinance recited that it was "expedient to provide safety, maintenance of public order and for public preservation of peace and tranquillity in the State of Saurashtra. " That Ordinance gave power State Government to make orders, amongst other things, for detaining or restricting the movements or their nefarious activities - } +· - ) 1952 K•thi Raning Rawat v.

The State of Saur•shtra. Das/. 468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] thereto. from the It appears looting, dacoity, the provisio1111 of continued as before and and modifications mentioned actions of persons and impose collective fines. The Rajpramukh on April 5, 1948, promulgated another Ordinance No. XII of 1948 which extended State of Saurashtra the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act V of 1898) subject to certain adaptations Schedule affidavit of Ramnikrai Bhagwandas Vesavada, Assistant Secre- in the Home Depaitment, Government of Sau- rashtra, that the Ordinance was not sufliCient to cope with the activities of the gangs of dacoits and robbery, nose-cutting and cases of indeed increased murder number, frequency and vehemence and it became im- possible to deal with the offences at different places in separate Courts of law expeditiously. In view of the serious ,it necessary ' to con- Stiate of Saurashtra stitute Special Courts and to provide for a special trials so as to expedite the disposal of procedure of cases in which offences. of certain specified kinds had The Rajpramukh of Saurashtra promulgated 1949, accordingly, Ordinance No.

LXVI of 1949 called "The Saurashtra (Third Amendment) State Public Safety Measures the Saurashtra Ordinance, 1949", whereby State Public Safety Measures Ordinance IX of 1948). By section 4 of the Ordinance No. LXVI of 1949 several section were added to Ordinance No. IX -0f 1948. Three of the sections thus added, which are material for our present purposes, were sections 9, 10 and 11 which run as follows:- considered situatibn prevailing on November it amended committed. districts (No. 2, "9. Special Courts.-The Government United State of the Saurashtra may by notification In the Official Gazette constitute Special Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction for such area as may be specified in the notification.

Special Judges.-The Government appoimt a Special United State of Saurashtra may Judge to preside over a Special Court constituted under section 9 for any area any person who has been - - '".! :S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 469

a Sessions Judge for a period of not less than 2 years under the Code of Criminal Procedure, applied to the United State of Saurashtra. Jurisdiction of Special Judges.- A Special Judge shall try such offences or classes of offences or such cases or classes of cases as the Government of the United State of Saurashtra may, by general or special order in writing, direct. " 1898, 1952 Kathi Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra. Das]. Pursuant the Ordinance as the provisions of amended the State of Saurashtra issued a notification, the material part of which is as follows:~ • -· .. "No. H/35-5-C-In exercise of the powers con- ferred bv sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Saurashtra State (Ordinance Public Safety Measures Ordinance, 1948, -No. IX of 1948), (hereinafter referred to as the said Ordinance), Government is pleased to direct- (i) That a Special Court of a Criminal Jurisdiction, (hereinafter referred to as the said Court) shall be con- stituted for the areas, mentioned in the schedule hereto annexed, and that the headquarters of the said Court ·shall be at Rajkot, (ii) that Mr.