Dealing first with the last of these Acts v. S111u ot

Dealing first with the last of these Acts, namely the one of the 19th of May, 1938, we can put that on one side at once because, unless the Opium Act was valid the mere addition of a clause fourteen when made, years later stating that it shall come into force at a date fourteen years earlier would be useless. In year 1938 law which required all enact- ments after the 1st of November, 1924, to be published in the Gazette. Therefore, if the Opium Act was not a valid Act at that date, it could not be validated by the publication of only one section of it in the Gazette fourteen years later. The Jaipur Laws Act of 1923 required the whole of the enactment to be published ; therefore publication of only one section would not validate it if it was not already valid. We need not consider whether a law could be made retroactive as to take effect from 1924 by publication in 1938, though that point was argued. That throws us baek to the position in 1923 and raises the question whether a law could be brought into operation by a mere reso- lution of the Jaipur Council. laws were operative We do not know what regarding the coming into force of an enactment Jaipur in that State. We were not shown any, nor was our attention drawn to any custom which could be said to In the absence of any special law govern the matter. or custom, we are of opinion that it would be against the principles of natural justice to permit the subjects of a State to be punished or penalised by laws of which they had no knowledge and of which they could not even with the exercise of reasonable diligence have acquired any knowledge. Natural jwtice requires 1951 H111U. v. S111u ot Rtljas1b1m Bose J. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 113 the very before a law can become operative it must be promul- gated or published. It must be broadcast recognisable way so that all men may know what it is; or, at least, there must be some special rule or regulation or customary channel by or through which such knowledge can be acquired with the exer- cise of due and reasonable diligence. The ·nhought that a decision reached in the secret recesses of a chamber to which the public have no access and to which even their accredited representatives have no access and of which they can normally know nothing, can neverthe- less affect their lives, liberty and property by the mere passing of a Resolution without anything more abhorrent to civilised man. It shocks his conscience. In the absence therefore of any law, rule, regulation or custom, we hold that a law cannot come into being in this way. Promulgation or publication of some reason- able sort is essential. to enact a special Act of Parliament In England the rule is that Acts of Parliament be- come law from the first moment of the day on which they receive the Royal ass.ent, but Royal Proclamations only when actually published in the official Gazette. See footnote (a) to paragraph 776, page 601, of Hals- bury's Laws of England (Hailsham edition), Volume VI and 32 Halbury's Laws of England (Hailsham edition), page 150 note (r). But even there it was neces- to enable such proclamations to become .law by publication in the Gazette though a Royal Proclamation is highe.~t kind of law, other than an Act of Parliament, known to the British Constitution; and even the publication in the London Gazette will not make the proclamation valid in Scotland nor wiU publication the Edinburgh Gazette make it valid for England. It is clear therefore that the mere enacting or signing of a Royal Procla- is not enough. There must be publication mation before it can become law, and in England the nature of the publication has to be prescribed by an Act of Parliament. The Act of Parliament regulating this matter is the Crown Office Act of 1877 (40 and 41 Victoria Ch. 41). That Act, in addition to making provision for publica- tion in certain official Gazettes, also provides for the 1951 Htirla' v. Stilte of Raja>ehan' Bose·/. · 114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952J insisted therefore making of rules by Order in Council for the best means of making Proclamations known to the public. The British Parliament has Crown Office Act that not only must there be publi- cation in the Gazette but in addition there must be other m<;>des of publication, if an Order in Council so directs, so· that the people at large may know what these special laws are. The Crown Office Act directs His· Majesty in Council carefully to consider the be.<t mode of making these laws known to the public and the same empowers that body and embody them in an Order in Council. We take it that if these Proclamations are not published strictly in accordance with the rules so drawn up, they will not be valid law, to draw up rules for lower plane, it was held The principle underlying this question has been in England.· For example, on a judicially considered fohnson. v. somewhat Sargant(') that an Order of the Food Controller under the Beans, Peas and Pulse (Requisition) Order, 1917 does not become operative until it is made known to the difference between · an Order of the public, and that kind and an Acr of the British Parliament is stressed. The difference is obvious. Acts of the British Parliament are pµblicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the Acts are passed by the accredit- 'ed representatives of the people who in theory can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been do11e. They also receive wide publicity in papers and, now, over the wireless. Not so Royal Proclama- tions and Orders of a Food Controller and so forth. therefore be promulgation and publica- There must tion in their cases. The mode of publication can vary; is a good method in one country may not neces- the best in another. But reasonable publi- sarily be cation of some sort there must be. Nor is to France by the principle peculiar to England. It was applied the first Article of which states that the laws are executory "by virtue of the promulgation thereof" and that they shall into effect "from the moment at which the Code Napoleon, (!) (1918] I K.B. 101; 67 L.J.K.B. 122. I -< \ 1~1 .IIarl(I \ I v. l State of Rajasthan Ba&e f. .J s.c.R.. SUPREME COUllT REPORTS 115 promulgation can have been known." . So also it has been applied in India in, for instance, matters ansmg under Rule 119 of the Defence of India Rules. See, for example, (Crown v. Manghumal Tekumal(1), Shakoor v. King Emper01'(2 ). It is true . none of these cases is analogous to the one before us but they are only particular applications of a deeper rule which is founded on natural justice. The Council of Ministers which passed ) and Babulal v. King Emperor(3 the Jaipur Opium Act was not a sovereign body nor did it func- It was brought into being by tion of its own right. · the Crown Representative, and the Jaipur Gazette Notification dated the 11th August, 1923, defined and limited its powers. We are entitled therefore to import the principles· and ,into . notions of · natural the British inconceivable that a representa- .. Constitution, for it is tive of His Britannic Majesty could have contemplat- ed the creation of a body which could wield powers so fundamental principles of natural . abhorrent justice which all freedom loving peoples share. We hold that, in the absence of some specific law or custom · to the contrary, a mere resolution of a Council of Ministers in the Jaipur State without further publica- tion or promulgation would not be sufficient to make a law operative. this matter consideration of justice which underlie t;he It is necessary to consider another point. It was urged that section 3(b) of the Jaipur Laws Act of 1923 saved all regulations then in force from the necessity of publication in the Gazette. That may be so, but the Act only saved laws which were valid at the time and not resolutions which had never acquired the force of law. · The appeal succeeds. The conviction and sentence are set aside. The fine, if paid, will be refunded. Appeal allowed. Agent for the appellant : R. A. Govind. Agent for the respondent: P. A. Mehta. l (1) I.L.R. 1944 Karachi 107. (2) I.L.R. 1944 Nag. 150. (3) I.L.R. 1945 Nag. 762.