[1952] May 2 v. THE STATE OF U. P. AND ANOTHER ( CASES) [PATANJALI SASTR! C.J & Ors.

A committee was appointed to give effect to the re- It solution and to prepare made its report in July, 1948. A Bill was intro- the United Provinces Legislative Assembly on the 7th July, 1949, was referred to a Select Com- January, 1950, mittee which made and was read before the Assembly for the first time on 17th January, 1950. On the 21st January, 1950, the Assembly was prorogued. 2nd February, the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th February, 1950, and was read the second time on 28th July, 1950, and for the third time on 4th August 1950. On 6th September, 1950, it came before Legislative Council and the Council passed it with cer- tain amendments on the 30th November, 1950. The Legislative Assembly was prorogued on the 13th Octo- ber, 1950, and in view of the amendments made in the Legislative Council, the Bill was reintroduced in Legislative Assembly on 26th December, 1950, and was passed January, 1951. the Legislative received the assent of the Council and after having President came into force on or about the 25th Janu- ary, 1951. It was subsequently passed by its amended form on 10 The Preamble of the Act declares that- the Uttar Pradesh and for "Whereas it is expedient to provide for the aboli- tion of the zamindari system which inter- the State mediaries between the tiller of the soil and the acquisition of their rights, title and interest and to reform the law relating to land tenure consequent on such abolition and acqui- sition and for other matters connected therewith." to make provision involve.<i 13-10 S. C. India 71 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and A nothcr. Mahajan J, 1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] that as Sub-section (1) of section 4 provides the State Government may by notifica- in the Uttar Pradesh the Sta~e free from all encumbrances. such date as tion declare, all estates situated shall vest "Estate" is defined in section 3 (8) as meaning "the . area included under one entry in any of registers prepared and maintained under clause (a), (b), ( c) or the United Provinces Land Reve- (d) of section 32 of nue Act, 1901, or the registers maintained under clause ( e) of the said section in so far as it relates to a in or of permanent tenure holder and an estate." Section 6 enacts to certaii: very minor exceptions, upon the publication of a notifi- cation under section 4, the rights, title and interest of intermediaries in everv estate in the area referred to in the notification, and· in all sub-soil in such estates including rights, if any, in mines and minerals, shall cease and shall be vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh free from all encumbrances. The expression "inter- mediary" is defined in section 3(2) as meaning with . reference to any estate, "a proprietor, under-proprietor, sub-proprietor, in Avadh, and permanent tenure-holder of such estate or part thereof." includes share that subject thekadar permanent lessee .• receive thus acquired become entitled The intermediaries whose ;ights, title and interest com- pensation at eight times the net assets mentioned prepared the Compensation Assessment Roll ;ccordance with the provisions of tl1e Act. The Act that the State Government shall pay further provides to every intermediary other than a thekadar, whose estate or estates have been acquired under the Act, a rehabilitation gram on a graduated scale provided such an revenue payable by that the land inter- mediary does not exceed Rs. 10,000. The scale of the grant is given in Schedule case of wakfs, trusts and endowments which are wholly for :inultiple religious or charitable purposes, is for class paying land revenue up to multiple being twenty, while the lowest is for the class I. Save in the highes• !.<s. 25, 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahaian /. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1061 . J paying land revenue exceeding Rs. 5,000, but not ex- ceeding Rs. 10,000 when the multiple is one. - ' > - to all II deals with consequential for payment of compensation Part I of the Act includes provisions for the vesting of all estates in the State, for assessment of compen- sation, inter- mediaries and of rehabilitation grant to those of them who pay Rs. 10,000 or less as land revenue and similar changes matters. Part that become necessary by reason of the vesting of all estates in the State and provides for the incorporation in each village of a gaon samaj and the vesting of certain lands in the gaon samaj ; it divides the culti- sirdars, vators classes, adhivasis, determines asamis and the payment of land revenue; it further provides for contains provisions designed to prevent the fragment- ation of holdings or their division into holdings of uneconomic size, and to facilitate the establishment of co-operative farms, and other similar matters. viz., bhumidars, rights The following provisions of the Act which came the arguments for severe criticism during the course of addressed to us may be set out in extenso. Section 6 (a) provides for the vesting in the State of all rights, title and interest of all the intermediaries every estate in such area including (cultivable or barren), grove land, forests whether within or outside village boundaries, in village abadi, holding or grove), fisheries, wells private wells in village abadi, holding or grove), tanks, ponds, water channels, sites, hats, bazars and melas. Clauses ( e) and (g) of this section are in these terms : - ferries, pathways, abadi trees (other (other "(e) All amounts ordered to be paid by an inter- mediary to the State Government under sections 27 and 28 of the U. P. Encumbered Estates Act, 1934, and all amounts due the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, or the Agricultural Loans Act, 1884, shall notwithstanding anything con- forthwith tained in the said enactment, become due to any other mode of and may, without prejudice from him under 1952 ~aia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. ,.,.d Another. Mahaian f. 1062 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] recovery provided tharefore, be realised by deducting the amount from payable to such intermediary under Chapter III. the compensation money (g) (i) Every mortgage with possessiop ex1stmg on any estate or part of an estate on the date immedia- tely preceding the date of vesting shall, to the extent of the amount secured on such estate or part, be deem- ed without prejudice, rights of the State Government under section 4, to have been substituted by a simple mortgage ; (ii) notwithstanding anything mortgage deed or any other argreement, the amount declared due on a simple mortgage substituted under sub-clause (i) shall carry such rate of interest and from such date as may be prescribed." contained in tenant same privilege :to to Rs. 250, a hereditary the zamindars. Section 9 provides Section 7 saves certain rights at present held by the proprietors from the purview of the Act. The rights included are in respect of mines which are being worked that private wells, trees in abadi and buildings situate within the limits of an estate shall continue to belong to or be held by such intermediary. Section 10 makes every tenant of land belonging to an intermediary and paying land revenue up thereof at the rate of rel).t payable on the date of vesting. Section 12 gives thekadars. Similarly section 15 confers the status of hereditary tenants on occupants of lands in which such rights did not exist. Section 18 provides that all possession of intermediaries as sir, khudkasht or 'intermediary's grove shall be deemed to qe settled by the State Government with etc., subject to the provisions of the Act and he will be en- titled to possession of it as bhumidar thereof. Land held by any person as a tenant is deemed to be settled by the State Government on such person sirdar. Section 27 and 28 are in these terms ·- "27. Every intermediary, whose title or interest in any estate are acquired under the provi- sions of this Act shall be entitled to receive and be paid compensation as hereinafter provided. intermediary rights, 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan/. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1063

#28. ( 1). Compensation for this Act shall be due as acqms1t10n to determination of estates the date of amount subject vesting thereof. (2) There shall be paid by the State Government on the amount so determined rate of two and half per centum per annum from the date of vesting to the date of- interest at I (i) in the case of the amount to be paid in cash, determination, (ii) in the case of the amount to be given in bonds, the redemption of the bonds." Section 39 lays down the method of determination of the gross income of the land comprised in a mahal, while section 42 provides for the determination of the gross assets of an intermediary. Section 44 lays down the manner of assessing inter- mediary. the net It provides as follows :- income of an "The net assets of an intermediary in respect of from his a mahal shall be computed by deducting gross assets the following, namely : (a) any sum which was payable by hini in the the State Government previous agricultural year to on account of land revenue ............. . (b) an amount on account of agricultural income- tax, if any, paid for the previous agricultural year ....... . ( c) cost of management equal to 15 per centum of the gross assets." Provision has been made for the appointment of assessment officers and for the preparation of draft compensation assessment roll by after hearing objections. Right of appeal has also been provided against their decision. Chapter IV concerns itself with the payment of Section 65 of this chapter provides compensation. that there shall be paid to every intermediary as com- pensation in respect of the acqui~ition of his rights, title and interest in every estate the amount declared in that behalf under section 60. Section 68 is in these terms:- 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan f. 1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952} "The compensation payable under this Act be given in cash or in bonds or partly in cash and partly in bonds as may be prescribed." ·hats, bazars etc., Section 72 empowers the State Government to make rules on all matters which are to be and may be pres- cribed. Sections 113 and 117 provide for the establish- ment and incorporation of a gaon samaj and for the vesting of all lands not comprised in any holding or grove and forests within the village boundaries, trees, public wells, fisheries, tanks and ponds in the gaon Mmaj, which is to supervise and manage and control the lands subject supervision by the Government. Other provisions of the Act relate to acquisition of bhumidari rights sirdari rights by a certain amount mentioned in the Act. A bhumidar in direct reforms relation to Government and contemplated zaminclari tenure system into a ryotwari system. tenants, thekiadars etc., a peasant proprietor on payment of the Act aim these agrarian at converting the status of The main questions appeals are the following :- consideration 111

#1. Whether the impugned Act was validly enacted.

#2. Whether thee acquisition of properties con- templated by the Act is for a public purpose.

#3. 'Vhether the delegation of power in the various sections of the Act is within the permissible limits.

#4. Whether the taluqclari properties held under the British Government can be "sanads" from 'subject-matter of acquisition.

#5. Whether the properties of the Maharajah of Kapurthala in Oudh could in view of the article 12 of the Pepsu Union Covenant be acquired under the Act.

#6. Whether the said Act constitutes a fraud on the Constitution. The validity of the Act was attacked on a variety ne> of grounds by the learned counsel 111 different cases and the grounds urged were by appearing • 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan f. , S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1065 means uniform or consistent and ~me of these were destructive of one another. the word Mr. P. R. Das, who opened the attack, reiterated the arguments he had addressed to us in the Bihar appeals and urged that the obligation to provide compensation is implicit in the power conferred on the State Legislature by entry 36 of List II with respect to acquisitions, that the words "subject to the provisions of entry 42 of List III" in entry 36 compel the court to construe entry 36 of List II along with entry 42 of List III and, when so construed, it is clear that compensation has to be provided for whenever power is exercised under entry 36, that there is no provision for payment of compensation in the impugn- ed Act, the property compulsorily equivalent acquired, that the U. P. Legislature had no power to enact this Act without making provision for payment of: compensation and in legal contemplation the Act is that article 31 (2) confers a fundamental lh>t right but has nothing to do with legislative, powers conferred by articles 245 and 246 which have been read with the three that: article 31(4) does not in any way affect the rights conferred by article 31(2), which exist notwithstanding article 31 ( 4), and it only bars the remedy to challenge the Act on the ground that it contravenes the provisions of clause (2), that the Constitution, and the Act constitutes a fraud on lastly that the Act is void by reason of delegation of essential legislative power. "compensation" meaning in money of lists, law, On the question of the invalidity of tl1e Act for want of a provision for payment of compensation, Mr. P. R. Das reinforced his arguments by reference to legislative practice in India and England and con- tended that even without any express provision for compensation in the different enactments to which our attention was drawn, the mere use of the word "purchase" con- the exercise of the power to comitant obligation of reasons For property. compulsorily acquire that compensation was implied a 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan/. ' 1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] given by me in the Bihar appeals I cannot accept this If contention. the Constitution was silent on the point and for compulsory acquisition, the provided position might have been different. regards contended is provided, regarding half of the arguments of Mr. Das on properties were at eight though compensation Mr. Dhar, who appeared ·in some of the appeals, supplemented point. He the Act was a piece of confis- properties acquired, non- legislation catory the other income bearing, times the net half, income it is a mere sham inasmuch as the Act makes payment of compensation discretionary at the will and pleasure of the Government; the pro- vision being that Government will pay when it chooses to do so and it may never make the choice. He further contended the Act regarding they completely compensation are the zamindars, take ignore the potential in the khatuni notice only of sir income, and entries which do not acquire and undeveloped mines without any compensation, that the deduction of agri- cultural the gross-income was unjust and the object of deduction was to artiiicially reduce the net same procedure had been adopted in the case of forests. colourable because incomes of rent-free holdings the provisions of income, and the income-tax . from include the the income recorded Dr. Ambedkar, who appeared m some of appeals, suggested a new approach for declaring Act to be bad. He contended that qua "estates" defined article 31-A, Part I of the Constitution should be deemed as repealed and struck off from the In deciding these appeals, therefore, we Constitution. are to look at the Constitution without the chapter on Fundamental Rights ; but as the Constitution aims at securing liberty for the people and to the State, the obliga- gives only a restricted power tion to pay compensation when private property is taken is implicit in the very spirit of the Constitution. Mr. Das found the obligation to pay compensation implicit in entry 36, but Dr. Ambedkar could not see equality 1952 -Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Annther. Mahajan J. • ( S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . 1067 eye to eye with him though he supported his conten- tion by urging that the prohibition to acquire property by legislation without payment of compensation was implicit in the spirit of the Constitution . further argument Mr. Varma, who appeared in some other appeals, supported Mr. Das's 36 should be read subject to the provisions of entry 42 impugned Act the culminating point of a series of enactments passed as a device to confiscate the properties of the zamindars after the passing of the resolution in 1946 by the U. P. Legislature. contended implicit .in Having negatived the contentions of Mr. Das, I cannot for the same reasons accept the contentions of Mr. Dhar as sound. It is convenient now to examine the point made by Dr. Ambedkar that the obligation to pay compensation is the spirit of the It is well-settled that recourse cannot be Constitution. had to the spirit of the Constitution when its provi- sions are explicit in respect of a certain right or matter. the fundamental law has not limited either in When terms or by necessary implication the general powers conferred on the legislature, it is not possible to deduce supposed to be inherent a limitation from oomething in the spiirit of the Constitution. This elusive spirit is no guide in this matter. The spirit of the Constitution -cannot prevail as letter. Dr. Ambedkar Telied on the observations of Nelson J. in People v. Morris ('), quoted in the footnote, at p. 357 of Cooley's Constitutional Limitation. The footnote states :- against its "It is now considered an uni versa! funda- regulated and pro- mental proposition in every well perly administered government, whether embodied that private property a constitutional for strictly private purposes at all cannot be nor for public uses without a just compensation; and that the obligation of contracts cannot be abrogated or other vested rights essentially impaired. These and inviolable, even of the citizen form or not, sacred and are held (1) l3 Wend. 325. 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan f. 1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] against department." the plenitude of power of legislative the learned lend support Those observations of Judge, however, do not the contention urged; on the other hand, it seems to me that the proposition stated by Dr. Cooley at page -351 (Vol. I) that the courts are not at liberty to declare an Act void, because in their opinion it is opposed to the spirit supposed to pervade expressed in words, has an the Constitution but not It is difficult upon any opposite application here. omnipotence of the general principle interposition judicial sovereign except so far as the express words of a written con- stitution give that authority. limit the legislative power by the Constitution ; on The argument of Dr. Ambedkar cannot be accepted for the further reason that it is based on an unwarran- ted assumption that qua the estates of the zamindars, Part III of the Constitution stands repealed and is non est. The is that Part III of the Constitution is importa11t and integral part of it and has not been repealed or abrogated by anything contained in arti- cle 31-A of the other hand article 31-A, while providing that no law providing for the acquisition by the State of any estate, shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any of the rights con- ferred by any of the provisions of Part III, clearly provides that where such law is made by the legisla- ture of a State, the provisions of this article shall not apply thereto unless such law having been reserved for the consideration of the President has received his assent. This proviso in express term5 keeps alive the III of the Constitution alternative provisions of Part 'm article 31 (3) for judging whether the State law has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The provisions of article 31(2), therefore, <lo not stand repealed by article 31-A. On the other hand, they are kept alive. The difference is that persons whose properties article 31-A are deprived of expression their remedy under article 32 of the Constitution and the definition of fail within "estate" in • • .. .. • . ..,, _.J • S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1069 the President has been constituted the sole judge of deciding whether a State Law acquiring estates under compulsory power has or has not complied with the provisions of article 31 (2). The validity of the law in those cases depends on the subjective opinion of the President and IS not justiciable. Once the assent IS given, the law is taken to have complied with the pro- visions of article 31(2). 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahaian /. "equitable compensation". It is true that the principles of payment of compen- sation stated in the Act do not give anything like an equivalent or quid pro quo for the property acquired and provide only for payment of what is euphemisti- resolution of the U. P. Legis- cally described in the lature Properties fetching no income pass to the State without payment of any separate compensation and as comprising part to the of an estate which yields some net income proprietor. According to the affidavit Balrampur Raj income of Rs. 1,42,000 actual that the owner receives at present, works out to a sum of Rs. 10,000 under the provisions of the Act and pro- perty worth several crores is being acquired for a mere fraction of Culturable waste which for~ twenty per cent. of the entire area of the estate, trees, sen:ral lakhs m number, water channels and irrigation works etc., are being acquired along with income-fetching properties the cultivated without for payment of com- the conclusion can- pensation. But from those not be drawn that the provisions as to compensation in the Act are illusory . lands and :my separate provision true value. case, it~ impugned Act would In none of the cases could it be said that the pro- result m non- visions of the payment of compensation. Great emphasis was laid on the circumstance that nothing was being paid for- It has, however, to non-income fetching properties. be observed that these non-income fetching properties defined m article 31-A and it cannot be said when payment of compensation is provided for on the basis of the net income of the whole of the estate, that the legislation integral parts of an esate 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan /. 1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] character. Different coruidera- is of a confiscatory tions might have prevailed if the estates as a whole were not being acquired but different pieces of pro- perty were made subject-matter of acquisiticn. Properties comprised income- fetching and non-income fetching, the value of these to the owner in the market may well be on the basis of income and if the Act has laid down the principle of payment of compensation on the foot of net income, it cannot be said ambit of entry 42 of List III. in an estate may be the kgislattion is outside tha.t conceded the U. P. Dr. Ambedkar frankly Encumbered Estates Act that he was not prepared to go to the length of contending that the compensation ~provided for in the Act was illusory. inadequate, whether He, however, said it was During the period tested subjectively or objectively. that the Balrampur Raj was under the supervision of the Court of Wards, part of the property acquired was purchased on payment of Rs. 24,09,705 fetching a net income of Rs. 25,915. This property, however, under the Act would be acquired on payment of Rs. 2,08,000. Under Government in various itself had valued properties places in Uttar Pradesh for the purpose of the Act on standard multiples, viz., from 37 to 20 times the net income. Price of part of the property acquired on to Rs. 47,14,696, while compensation this basis comes according the Act payable would be about one- fourth of this amount. Be that as it may, article 31 (4) to all these contentions, as held by me in the Bihar appeals. This Bill was pend- ing in the legislature of the State on the 26th January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force and this circumstance makes article 31 ( 4) It was contended by Mr. Varma that the these cases. U. P. Assembly was prorogued on the 21st January, 1950, and the Bill was reintroduced on the 7th Febru- ary, 1950, and on January, 1950, when the Constitution came into force it could not be said to be pending as it had lapsed. This contention seems to be based on a misapprehension as to the provisions of the is a complete answer applicable the 26th • • ~- - S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1071 1935 and the provisions of the Constitution Act of present Constitution. Section 73 of the Government of India Act, 1931, and article 196 of the present Constitution provide in unambiguous terms that a Bill pending in the legislature of a State shall not lapse by reason of the prorogation of the House or Houses there- In view of these clear provisions the content~on of of. the learned counsel that the Bill was not pending on 26th January, 1950, has Further the provisions of articles 31-A and 31-B completely shelter this law from any attack based on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. This proposition was not disputed. As the validity of the Act could not be impugned on any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution, that was the reason why the attack on its constitutionality was made on other grounds- ingenious but unsubstantial-lying outside the ambit of Part III. to be rejected. 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan /. As debts of contention of the Act contentions are unsound. to be deducted out of it, my view regards the provisions payment with regard to compensation would it as it is payable at the result in non-payment of pleasure of Government zamindars are that both Under the provisions above cited, compensation becomes, due on the date of the vesting of the estate. two and a half per cent. runs from that Interest at date and becomes payable forthwith. Section 27 of the Government to the Act makes it obligatory on pay compensation. Section 65 in clear terms provides that there shall be paid to every intermediary as com- pensation the amount declared in that behalf und_e.r the Govern- section 60. Section 68 gives option to ment to pay compensation either in cash or in bonds, or partly in cash and partly in bonds as: may be If the Government does not prescribe prescribed. anything, it that CClffipensation will be is obvious payable forthwith. the other hand, Govern- ment makes any rules and prescribes that compensa- tion will be payable at time and not some remote reasonable period it will be open to the within a If, on 1952 .Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan /. 1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] the rules parties affected to challenge the validity of on the ground of abuse of power. These provisions, however, do not vitiate the Act and affect its validity. So far as the debts are concerned, they were payable in certain instalments out of the income of the lands, they have been made payable at once and provision has been made that the amount be deducted from the amount of compensation. Instalments had been fixed fact that they were recoverable from because of the the income of the land. When the lands are converted into money, it follows as a matter of course that the right to recover the debts from the the compensation money and the provision instalments becomes in- fructuous by the fact of acquisition. Dr. Ambedkar further contended that in fixing the amount of com- pensation the State was a judge in its own cause and this was against the spirit of the Constitution. There contention as the actual is no substance amount of compensation is to be determined by the compensation officer and his adjudication on the point is subject to an appeal. Government is not the judge of the actual amount of compensation. So far as the law is concerned, it is the act o~ the legislature and its competence, no challenge can be being within made against the validity of the Act on this ground. regarding income of transferred The question it was contended that the Act does no postulate any public purpose and thus unconstitutional was argued by Mr. Dhar and Dr. Ambedkar with some vehemence and that there was no public purpose behind legislation. Mr. Dhar urged that sole purpose of the acquisition of revenues zamindars' estates was of the State and for selling the intermediaries' interests to private intention being to make money by trading activities and at the same time root out the zamindars- who constitute one-fourth of the It was contended that population of Uttar Pradesh. no community in Uttar Pradesh derived any benefit from the provisions of the Act because the tenants whose status was intended to be raised, had been given individuals, increasing • • ·- 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v • The State of U. P. and Another. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1073 statutes already passed and sufficient relief what was humanly possible to do for them had been done, that they were at present more prosperous than the middle class: people and that the creation of a classless society by destroying a class was not a public purpose. Dr. Ambedkar on the other hand argued that he would have been content had the State nationalised the zammdaries because then the acquisition would be for a public purpose, but as under the impugned Act itself a trustee for the State had merely interests amongst distribution of "h " "h ave nots , t.e., t e h amongst the bhumidars, sirdars, asamis and adhivasis and not amongst the landless, the Act was not for a public purpose at all but was an unfortunate piece of legislation as property was being acquired for the private benefit of persons and not for public use and that giving of property to gaon samaj also could not be held to be for public benefit or public use. constituted intermediaries' I not amongst tie d " . as already In my opm10n, stated by me in the these arguments are unsound. The Bihar appeals, expression "public purpose" is not capable of a precise definition and has not a rigid meaning. It can only be defined by a process of judicial inclusion and ex, In other words, the definition of the expres- clusion. the statute in sion is elastic and takes its colour from the time and state of society and its needs. The point to be determined in each case is whether the acquisition is interest of the community as disting- in the general uished from individual. interest of an summarized the present position in Prof. Willis has the United States on this subject, at pages 817 and 818 of his book, in these words :- the concept varying with the private it occurs, "What is public use ? On this question there have been two view-points. One may be called the older view-point and the other newer view-point. Accord- to have view-point, a public use, public . . . . . . . . . . According to the newer view-point there there must be the use by the older in order • , • 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan /. 1074 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] the thing taken is useful to the is a public use if public. This makes public use for eminent domain practically synonymous with public purpose for taxa- tion and for police power. Under this rule ·it is not necessary for the benefit to be for the whole community, but it must be for a considerable number." somewhat interest social • The High Court took the view that acquisition of securing an to be a matter of is an acquisition for a public purpose. judgment of property under compulsory powers for aim declared in the Constitution State policy The following observations Bhargava J. may be quoted with advantage:- is an farms. to vest resources of "The effect of impugned Act the community ownership and control of a considerable part of the the State material Government ; .............. the vesting in the State of the estate of the intermediaries indispensable preli- minary to the pursuit of measures for the eradication or mitigation of the principal causes of agricultural poverty. Two of such measures are embodied in the for three new classes of Act, which makes provision and .asami, "and for tenure-holders, bhumindar, sirdar The provisions t'll.e formation of co-operative the Act, which depend in some of Chapter VII of measure for their efficacy on the transfer of property to the State effected by Part I of the Act, are clearly directed self-govern- ment. It can, we think, be inferred from the Act that the scope is given for more effective development of the State's is at present possible. . . . . . . . . . . . . Reading the Act as a whole there can, we think, be no doubt that the primary object of the legislature radical change in the in this system of State." • In my opinion, legislation, which aims at elevating the status of conferring upon them the bhumidari rights to which status the big zamindats have also been levelled down cannot be said as wanting to the development of village tenure now prevailing is to effect a agricultural tenants by resources ' .,. ' "'- + - .,_ . • • ' S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1075 It aims at in public purposes in a democratic State. inferiority complex in a large number destroying the them a status of of citizens of the State and giving equality with accumulation of big tracts of land in the hands of a the expressed individuals which intentions of the Constitution. lords and prevents their former is contrary 1952 Ra;a Suriya Pal Singh Y. T lie State of U. P. Rnd A·notlier. Dr. Ambedkar combated this view and urged that Mahaian /. , makers to that to give intended in Part laid down the expression "public purpose" "public purpose" was not a new the expression concept when the Constitution of India was framed ; on the other hand, it had a settled meaning in the past legislative history of this country and it must be presumed that the Constitution used the expression in the same sense in which it had been used in the earlier India Act, 1935, and Acts and in the Government of that it should not be construed in the light of the directive principles IV of . the that had the constitution- Constitution. He contended this concept a different meaning than it had acquired in .the past, they would intention by have clearly given expression includes saying purposes which aim at implementing the directive ' principles of State policy and that Part IV of the Constitution merely contained glittering generalities them and should which had no not be phrase "public purpose". In my opinion, justification behind into consideration raised by Dr. Ambedkar, though interesting, are not sound because they are based on the assumption that the concept of rigid concept and has a settled • public purpose is a ~ meaning. Dr. Ambedkar is right in saying that in the is a negative purpose interest can be created in other to be concept for public benefit. are present in the acquisition concept of public element in that no private the property acquired compulsorily ; words, property of A cannot be acquired given to B for his own private purposes theI'C the property Both these concepts l+-10 s. a. India 71 is a positive element the contentions in construing taken must 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. ~nd Another. Mahajan /. 1076 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] the general interests of Zamindaries are not being of the zamindari estates. taken for the private benefit of any particular indi- vidual or individuals, but are being acquired . by the State communit}'. Property acquired will be vested either in the State or in the body corporate, the gaon samaj, which has to function under the supervision of the State. Tenants, sirdars, asamis etc., · are already in possession of the lands in which their status is to be raised to that of bhumidars, Zamindars who are being reduced to the status of bhumidrs are also in possession of the lands.. There is no question in these circumstances of taking property. of A and giving it to B. All that the Act achieves is the equality of the status of. the different persons holding lands in It is not correct to say· that Government is acquiring the properties for the purpose of carrying on a business or a trade. The moneys bhumidari status or from the income of zarnindari estates will . be used for State purposes and. for the benefit of the com- munity at large. For the reasons given above I hold that the impugned Act is not void by reason of the circumstance it does not postulate a public purpose. from persons the State. received seeking As regards the question of delegation, our attention to the proviqions of sections 6 was drawn particularly ( e) and (g) and 68. These sections provide for the prescription of the rate of interest by the executive government on mortgages and they also authorize the local government to determiille the period of redemp- tion of the bonds and the fixation of the ratio between payment of compensation in bonds and payment in cash. In my opinion, the delegation is within the permissible limits and does not amount to delegation of essential legislative power. The main principles on in the Act and these matters have been laid down matters of detail have been left to the rule-making power. As regards the appeal of the Maharaja of Kapur- thala (Appeal No. 285 of 1951), the facts are these: By article 12 of the Covenant of Merger dated the ·5th '\_ .. - 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh .v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan f. • - S.C.R. ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1077 petitions, impugned Act into between the Rulers of the May, 1948, entered States now comprised in the Pepsu Union, the pro- perties which are the subject-matter of the appeal were declared and guaranteed as the private properties of the . Mararaja. The Maharaja was also guaranteed a It was. suggested that privy purse of Rs. 2,40,000. the Maharaj:a accepted this sum which was smaller in amount than what was allowed to other Rulers as privy purse because he was assured of the income of th.e Oudh estate. On these facts it was contended that the provisions of contravened article 362 of the Constitution inasmuch as it has not paid due regard to the guarantees contained in arti- cle 12 of the Covenant. As already held by me in the Madhya Pradesh this contention devoid of force. The impugned Act has fully respected the Covenant of the 5th May, 1948, inasmuch as it has treated the Oudh estate as the private property of the Maharaja as disitingui:shed from th~ State Properties and it is on that basis that it has proceeded to acquire it on payment of compensation. The allegation that the income of this estate was tlo supplement the privy purse and that the appellant accepted a lower sum by way of privy purse than given to the other ·Maharaj as has been denied by the Government and we see no reason to hold in the asbence of any material to the contrary, that this denial is not true. This Act, there- fore,· constitutes no breach of the guarantees given in article 362 of the Constitution. It was urged by the learned Attorney-General that article 363 of the Consti- tution bars the jurisdiction of this Court from going into this question. Dr. Ambedkar, on the other hand, contended that this article has no application because of the fact that the Government of India was not a party to this Covenant. As at present advised, I see goOd deal of force in the point raised by the learned Attorney-General. Not only did the Government of India sign the Covenant as a guarantor but it also signed it as a concurring party and that being so, the provisions of article 363 seem to be altracted to the case. The appeal of the Maharaja. therefore fails on this point. 1952 Raja Suriy« Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan ]. 1078 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] Mr. Bishan they were reinstated Singh, who appeared taluqdars were absolute owners of in Appeals argued the special Nos. 284, 285, 288, 289 and 290, It was contended cases of the taluqdars of Oudli. holdings at the time of the annexation of Oudh in February, 1856, that subsequently the British Govern• ment under the directions of Lord Dalhousie tried to take away the taluqdars' rights, but that after the their earlier status mutiny and that status was reaffirmed by the enactment of the Oudh Estates Act, I of 1856, that the permanent and hereditary rights of Act in the lands granted to them under the sanads could not be affected by any legislation made by the the British Government and succes.sors in that Government could not derogate from its grant. It taluqdars stand on no higher footing .than the properties of other owners in Oudh. Be that as it may, the matter seems to have been set at rest by the decision of their Lord- fagannath. ships of Baksh Singh v. United Provinces ('). At page 119 of the report it was observed as follows :- the appellants under the Privy Council lands held by nhe in Thakur interest of to me tl1at "It it is sought is, however, desirable to examine the parti- to induce the cular grounds on which court to arrive at tliis paradoxical conclusion. Some tl1e general principle of of these are said to be based on law tliat tlie Crown cannot derogate from its own grant, others are said to depend on particular pro- visions of the Government of India Act. It has not been possible for tlie appellant to adduce any autlio- rity for tlie principle involved. which tlieir Lordships apprehend tl1at Parliament,. whether Imperial, Federal or Provincial, in tlie absence of express pro- hibition, to vary the effect of a Crown grant." is debarred from legislating so as to be • - The Crown carmot deprive a legislature of its leg'is- lative authority by the mere fact that in tlie exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of land within tlie legislative authority exists territory over which such ~ '9 (1) [1946] F.C. R.111, S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1079 I • legitimate acting within and no court can annul the enactment of a legislative sovereign competence. If therefore subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the legislature, nothing can competence of a provincial from legislating about it, un- prevent that legislature itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either absolutely or con- ditionally. scope of it be found the Constitution Act . 1952 Raja Suriy• Pal Singh .... The State of U. P. and Another. feeding dedicated for holding melas, Dr. Asthana, who appeared in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951, argued the case of the religious institu- tions. He contended that the properties held by these institutions had already been public purposes, that the income of these properties was being sadhus and other charitable purposes and tihat any reduction in that in- those institutions imd the come would adversely affect properties. that were already dedicated for public pur- poses could not be acquired under compulsory powers of acquisition. The argument is fallacious. A charity individual is not immune from created by a private the sovereign's power It is incorrect to say property for public purposes. that the vesting of these properties in the State under the provisions of the Act in any way affects the charity adversely because the net income that the institutions are deriving from the properties has been made the basis of compensation awarded to them. to compulsorily acquire Mr. Varma, who appeared in Appeal No. 295 of 1951, raised several new and ingenious points, none of which, however, he was able to substantiate. He contended impugned Act may not be void but the that the authorised the Government was noti1ication which the powers conferred on it by the to issue under executive statute would government could not rights infringe remained unaffected by arti- by a notification which cles 31 (4), 31-A and 31-R The argument does not seem to be valid because it suffers from the defect that if the statute is good, the notification which is of a consequential nature cannot be held to be bad. It was fundamental because • 1080 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952J 1952 R•i• Suriya P•l Singh .v. The State of U. P. and Another. Mahajan . /. next contended by the learned counsel that the zamin-' daw had vested rights in existing law, namely, the Land Acquisition Act and the impugned statute could not deprive them of the benefits of the provisions of that Act. Similar argument was raised in the Bihar appeals and for the reasons given therein it is repelled; It was then contended that in view of the provisions of the Religious Endowments Act, lands of religiowi endowments could not be acquired under the provisions· of the This contention seems to have been raised on some misapprehension as. to the Endowments scope and extent of It is not. proved that that Act has Act, XX of 1863. any application to the properties sought to be acquired under the impugned Act. Moreover, that Act only deals with management of certain properties and does not stand in the way of their acquisition. the Religious impugned statute. Great effort was made by Mr. Varma to establish that the impugned Act was a piece of fraud on the It was contended that the U. P. Govern~ Constitution. ment had been &ince a long time enacting laws with the fraudulent intention of depriving the zamindars of compensation by reducing their incomes,-he made mention of half a dozen Acts that were enacted iri U. P. prior to the impugned Act. The argument, to my' mind, is based on a confusion of thought. The enactments referred to were enacted by · the legislature of U. P. ·between 1939 and 1949, before the Constitu'. tion came into force, and have no Connection what- ever with acquisition of properties. Mr. Vanna attacked the validitv of section 340 of the Act which enacts that- , ;-. .J .... ,~ - "where any orders had been made ................ or th/! jurisdiction exercised under U. P. Agriculture Tenants (Acquisition of Privileges) Act, 1949, the provisions· of· the said Act shall be so amendments mentioned read and construed as if the in Schedule IV had · been made thercin and were in force from the commencement of the said Act'" the provisions of • It wa~ contended that tpe U. P. Agriculture T~nants (Acquisition of 'Privileges) Act, 1949, was an existing S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1081 law in U. P. and had not been repealed by the impugn- ed Act and that being so, this Act could not validate notifications made under I have not been able to see the force of this suggestion. Be this section it may, that as does not affect legislation as a whole. The point was never raised before the High Court and has no substance. the constitutionality of that existing law. 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Si11gA v. The State of U. P. find Another. Mahajan J. ' • • • rights that mere It was also contended rights in land apart from the lands themselves could not be acquired uD:der compulsory power and that the U. P. Legislature lands and could not acquire proprietary leave the bhumidari rights with the landlords. This proposition is open to Govern- ment to acquire the whole of the rights of an owner or a ,part of that Leasehold and other similar rights can always be acquired and if a person owns is not necessary to acquire the totality of if it is not needed the whole interest of that person for public purposes . rights, it strange. sounds right. It fell under Lastly, it was urged that in truth the legislation in question legislative power conferred by ·entry 18 of List II and this power could only be exer. cised subject to the freedom guaranteed by article 19(f) the total abolition of the of the Constitution, zamindaris could not be protected by the · provisions of clause 6 of article 19 in that it could not be regard- ed a reasonable restriction. on the exercise of the right to hold property. . This argument lose.'l sight of the fact that no help can be oought in these cases from any of the provisions of Part III; moreover, the legis- lation in question has been enacted under legislative powers given by entry 36 of List II and not under entry 18 of that List. Mr. Varma raised some other contentions eventually abandoned them. but during · discussion ,. · ' The result there is no substance in any one of the appeals and I ·would accordingly dismiss a:ll of them. I would however, make no order therefore is·· that 1082 .SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. tMld Another. these cases. as to costs in any of them in view of the peculiar cir- cumstances of The Constitution was amended during the pendency of the litigation and any costs allowed to the Government would further the inadequate compensation that the Govern- '1"educe ment is paying for the acqwsition .of these estates. MUKHERJEA J.-1 agree these appeals should Das /. be dismissed. DAs J.-This group of appeals arises out of various proceedings instituted in the High Court of Allahabad under article 226 of the Constitution questioning the the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition validity of and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (U. P. Act No. I of 1951) hereinafter referred to as The Act. resolution accepting the abolition of involving On 8th August 1946, the United Provinces Legis- the. lative Assembly passed a the zarnindari system princip1e of in the 'Province intermediaries between the cultivators and the State and reoolving that the rights of· such intermediaries should be acquired on payment of equitable compensation. To prepare the necessary the Zamindari Abolition .scheme a committee, called Committee, was appointed. That committee sub- in August, 1948, making various mitted recommendations which have been summarised ·by Mr. S. K. Dhar appearing for some of the appellants· as follows :- its r.eport (1) Abolition of zamindari on payment of Rs. 137 crores at 2i per cent. mterest ; ' ' . (2) Establishment of gaon samai; .(3) Supply of rura:l credit by Government ; ('I) iintroduction of a modified form of peasant proprietorship combined with voluntary co-oper:nivc fanning; (5) lordism; Introiluccion of a restricted 'land {6) Pr.ohibiting sub-letting and permitting aliena tion only to 'llhe extem .that the alienee will not get more than 35 acres including n'is previous possessions. • • ... S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1083 the Bill To give effect to the recommendations of the com- mittee a Bill which eventually became the Act was introduced in the U. P. Legislative Assembly on 17th July, 1949. After having been passed by the U. P. received Legislature President on 24th January, 1951. There is no dispute in this case that the provisions of article 31 (3) have been complied with. It is also clear, notwithstanding that at one stage it was disputed by one of the learned counsel evidently out of some misapprehension, that the Bill was pending before the Legislature at the commencement of the Constitution and comes within article 31 ( 4) of the Constitution. the assent of 1952 Raia Suriy• Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Anothtl'. Das /. soil and tenure consequent two parts, each part containing The title and preamble of the Act follow the word- ing of the resolution of the Legislature. The preamble recites that it is expedient to provide for the abolition involves intermediaries -of the zamindari system which between the tillers of the the State in the Uttar Pradesh and for the acquisition of their rights, the law relating to to reform title and interest and such abolition and :acquisition and to make a provision for other matters connected therewith. The body of the Act is divided six chapters. Chapter TI of Part I deals with acquisition ; Chapter III with assessment of compensation and Chapter IV with payment of compensation. Chapter V is concern- ed with rehabilitation grant, while Chapter VI deals with mines and minerals. Chapter VII, which is in Part II, deals with the constitution of gaon samaj and gaon sabha, Chapter VIII relates to tenure, Chapter IX to · Adhivasis, Chapter X revenue farms. Chapter XII deals with miscellaneous matters. · Broadly speaking, interest of intermediaries for a compensation calculat- ed at eight times the net income arrived at by deduct- ing from the:. gross assets (which are the same as the income) cesses and costs of rates, management. and Chapter XI with co-operative the Government revenues, is concerned with for acquisition of the Act provides agricultural income"tax 1952 Rlli• Sun'ya Pal Singh ... The State of U •. P. 1md Another. Das J. 1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952) Before notification was issued by the State Govern- ment under section 4 of the Act, the intermediaries filed petitions under article 226 of the Constitution praying, inter aJia, for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus or other appropriate directions, orders or writs calling upon the State to forbear from giving effect to or acting in any manner by virtue of or. under the Act. By a Allahabad High Court delivered on 10th May, 1951, the petitions were dismissed. The High Court, however, certified; under article 132 (1), that the cases involved substantial questions of the interpretation of the Constitution. The intermediaries accordingly have come up on appeal before us. judgment of a Full Bench of as to Mr. P. R. Das who appears in support of several of these appeals raises the same questions as were raised by him in the Bihar appeals. Other learned counsel appearing for the other appellants mainly supported Mr. P. R. Das and also sought to reinforce. the appel- lants' cases on some additional grounds. remaining zamindars the soil also; Mr. S. K. Dhar has taken us through the provisions to the facts and of the Act and drawn our attention the affidavit of Sri J. Nigam figures appearing filed in Appeal No. 285 of 1951 and the Report of the Zamindari Abolition Committee. He has contended that of the 20, 16, 783 in U. P. about 20,00,000 are tillers of that one-fourth of the cultivable lands is· with peasant proprietors and three-fourths is with tillers who pay rent to the zamindars. •Most of the tillers have OCCU' pancy rights and cannot be ejected. Since 1947, Congress Government extensive the zamindars' profits have gone agrarian down from 1108 crores in 1939-40 to 1,069 crores in 1945-46, that is to say, there has been a drop of about 39· crores ; cess has been raised by 27 lacs and income- tax has been imposed to the exte,;t ·of about one crore of rupees. The price of agricultural produce has gone up by 400 per cent. so that the price ~f produce aggre- gates· to about rupees 851 crores while the rent pay- able by the tenants is only 17 crores. Therefore; it is reforms ; carried t •• Raia Suriya 1952 Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. D•s f. :i ... • t ... S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1085 contended that there does not appear any essential or urgent public purpose for which impugned Act was necessary at all. in various the appellants Dr. Ambedkar appearing Appeals Nos. 285 . and 288 of 1951 has addressed us at length as to the meaning of the expression "public purpose" as explained judicial decisions and. text books. He has contended that it is wrong to that the Act proposes to acquire the zamindaries for the State. What, he asks, is the destination of the property acquired ? Under the Act the State assumes the. function of a trustee for distributing the property. The main purpose of the Act is to convert the tenants The net result into bhoomidars, sirdars and of the Act, according to him, is that the property of the zarnindars tenants. He points out that the Act makes no pro- Dr. Ambedkar v1s1on "acquisition for maintains that a public purpose". He that public purpose must be distinguished from a mere public interest or public ·benefit or public utility. He further contends that the establishment of gaon samaj cannot be said to be a public purpose. taken away and vested this cannot be called labourers. landless submits so on. compensation under Table A income. Non-income yielding pro- As regards compensation Mr. Dhar points out that regard is to in fixing be had only to perty goes without any compensation, e.g., culturable In point of fact Government acquired a large waste. area of culturable waste at Rs. 300 per acre and yet no compensation will be paid under the Act for cultu- rable waste. Abadi sites also will bring no compen- sation. Even income yielding property, e.g., irrigation works like 600 miles of canal in Balrampur and 14.J.! in Bird estate, will yield no compensation although the Government will get additional revenue qut of them. Scattered trees in Balrampur alone will coine up to 85,000 . in number. The income of Seyer taken :i.t the figure recorded iri, property will only be that actual Khataunis, although Seyer and khud· incomes are not recorded is well-known therein.· ii: 1952 Raia Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. .,,,j Another. Das/. J 1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] industry khast were never assessed to revenue, but under the Act they will be so assessed. No compensation is, however, provided for the loss of status from Zamin- dari to Bhoomidari. Rent-free holdings granted by the zamindar which at present yield no income are not taken into account althougb there is always a possibi- lity of tbeir income-tax is resumption. Agricultural rlcducted and forest is valued on an average of 20 t10 40 is of a very forest years' income although recent growth. Finally, the income of mines is to be computed on an average of 12 years' income. The undeveloped mines or mines which have not started yielding any income will not fetch any compensation. These are, in short, the main objections of the landlords as summarised by Mr. S. K. Dhar as to the method of assessment of regards the manner compensation Mr. S. K. Dhar points of payment of out that the Act does not really provide for payment of compensation at all in the eye of the law. Under It is left to section 68 no time is fixed for payment. be prescribed by rules, but no rules have been made. Compensation payable, say in 40 years or SO years or 200 years, may be a charity or a dole but is certainly not compensation, prompt and certain the United States ·contemplated by Supreme Court in Sweet v. Rachel (') and several other •cases cited by him. He maintains that the compensa- tion is illusory because- compensation. As the decision of (i) it is based not on arbitrarily determined income ; the actual income but on (ii) the determination of time and manner of pay- ment is left entirely at the discretion of the appropria- tor, and (iii) the source of payment is not the community the expropriated proprietors' own as a whole but property. In my judgment in the Bihar appeals I have dealt at length with the meaning of "public .purpose" and I the question or compensation. ha¥e also dealt with (I) 40 L. Ed. 188 at pp. 196-97. 1952 Raja Suriya Pa/Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Das f. .. s.e.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1087 for me therefore, unnecessary It is, to reiterate the ,principles as I apprehend them. For reasons stated by me in that judgment the impugned Act cannot be questioned on the ground of ablience of a public pur- pose or absence of just compensation. If anything, the public purpose in the impugned Act is much . more evident and pronounced than it is in the Bihar Land Reforms Act. say that the im- impossible pugned Act is not . a law with respect to principles on which compensation to be determined and the If the Government dpes not manner of its payment. prescribe how much of the compensation will be paid in cash and how much will be paid by bonds as men- tioned in section 18, the intermediaries will not suffer because under section 65 their right will remain en- forceable. It is I have also dealt with the questions of fraud on the improper delegation of essential the Bihar repeat the answers given by to say that for reasons stated in my the main grounds on Constitution and the legislative power appeals and I need not me. judgment in the Bihar appeals which the Act is impugned must be rejected. judgment Suffice it in my for establishing Dr. Ambedkar has urged that the spirit of the Constitution is a valid test for judging the constitu- tionality of the impugned Act. He maintains that our Constitution being one liberty and equality and a government of a free people it must be held to contain an implied prohibition against the taking of private property except for a public purpose and on payment of just compensation. The necessity for the existence of a public purpose and for providing for compensation are, as I have said in my judgment in the Bihar appeals, provisions of article 31 (2) and, therefore, it is not necessary to have recourse to any spirit of the Constitution, for the letter of the Constitution itself re- two requisites. Dr. Ambedkar, however, quires argues that, so far as the appellants are concerned, Part III of the Constitution does not exist and, therefore, the maxim expressum f acit cessare tacitum does not I am not prepared to accept this argument u apply. 1952 Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. 1."he State of U. P. 1111d Another. Das J. t ... 1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1952] if it It is true that. the appellants cannot question sound. the impugned Act on the ground that it is inconsistent , with or takes away or abridges any of the rights con- ferred by any provisions of Part III, but this circum- stance does not imply tha,~ Part IiI is wholly erased out ~f the Consti~tion. It exists for all other purposes. For instance, article 31-A protects a law providing foi:. acqui.-;ition by the State of any estate, but it does not protect a law providing for acquisition by the State oc any property which does not come within the expre~ sion "estate" as defined in that article. For all laws for acquisition of all other properties Part III certainly exists and is conceded that the provisions of Part III exist in so far as such other laws are concerned the provision of article 31 (2) requiring the existence of a public purpose and the provision for compensation theory of the implied existence of must exclude any In the next place, the spirit those two requirements. of the Constitution has to he inferred from some provi- &ion, express or implied, of the Constitution. Mr. P. R. implications to be Das based his argument on deduced from the language of entry 36 in List II and entry 42 in List III. · Dr. Ambedkar, however, says that it is not necessary for him to go to any entry at all. He points out that the American Courts have held that where in a Constitutlion there is a representa- tive form of government in which there is liberty and equality and when the government is a limited one such a Constitution carries with it the implication that the State cannot take private property except for a public purpose and on payment of compensation. I find it very difficult to accept this argument. The existence of a public purpose and the necessity for payment of insisted upon from very old compensation have been times when different countries were entirely different Constitution of there- fore, that these two elements cannot be said to be an inherent part of the spirit of any particular form of government. Our Cons.titution has in article 31 (2) two elements as a recognised the · existence of constitutions of governments the United States. It follows, 1952 'il Raja Suriya Pal Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Das /. .. IJ- S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 1089 prerequisite to the exercise of the power of eminent do- main. The impugned Act having been expressly taken out of the operation of those provisions, the ques- tion of invoking any imaginary spirit of· the Constitu- invocation of tion cannot be entertained. such an counter to the imaginary express letters of articles 31 ( 4), 31-A and 31-B. spmt will run Indeed, the Maharaja figure fixed at a low · income of the Oudh estate. Dr. Ambedkar appearing for Kapurthala, who is the appellant in Case No. 289 of 1951, has also raised the point that the private pro- perty of the appellant is protected by article 362 of the Constitution and as the impugned Act does not those rights , it is void. On 5th pay any regard May, 1948, certain covenants of merger were entered into between the Rulers of seven Punjab States. {Jnder article 12 of the covenant each Ruler is to be entitled to the . ownership, use and enjoyment of all private properties. A list was furnished to . the Rajpramukh in which certain Oudh properties belonging to the appellant were shown as his private property. ·The that the amount of his privy purse appellant states in consideration of the These allegations are not admitted by · the I have already dealt with the correctness of a similar argument raised by Dr. Asthana on behalf of the Ruler of Khairagarh in petition No. 268 of 1951 which was concerned with the Madhya Pradesh Act. Shortly put, my view is that this claim to the private property is not within article 362, that by offering him compensation the Act has recognised his ownership, that, in any event, that article imposes no legal obligation on the Parliament finally, that article 363 or the State Legislature and, bars the jurisdiction of this Court with respect to any dispute arising out of the covenant of merger. Those covenants were entered into by the seven Rulers and the Government of the Dominion of India was a party thereto in the covenants and guaranteed for reasons stated in my judgment in the Madhya Pradesh peti- tions, there is no s.ubstance in this point. that it concurred the same. In my opinion, respondents. 1952 Raja Suriya Pa/. Singh v. The State of U. P. and Another. Das/. 1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1952] Dr. Asthana appearing for certain religious institu- tions which are appellants in Appeals Nos. 291 to 294 of 1951 contended that their property already dedicat- ed to a public purpose cannot be acq_uired for another I see no substance in this contention. public purpose. The property belonging institutions the religious will only change its form, namely, from immovable property into money. Certain subsidiary points raised by Mr. Bishun Singh and Mr. Prem Manohar Varma have been dealt learned brother Mahajan J. and it is un- with by my necessary for me to add anything thereto. In. my judgment, for reasons stated in my judg- ments in the Bihar appeals and the Madhya Pradesh petitions and those mentioned these appeals should be dismissed. above, CHANDRASEKHARA AYYAB. appeals should be dismissed costs. J .-I agree without any order ·as to Appeals dismiSS1:tl •. Agent for the appellant : S. S. Sukla. Agent for the respondents: C. P. Lal. .. '